The Prelude To Bolshevism The Kornilov Rising

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THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

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THE
PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

THE KORNILOV RISING

BY

A. F. KERENSKY

Former Prime Minister of Russia, Minister of

War and Marine and Commander-m

Chief of the Russian Army

WITH FRONTISPIECE

NEW YORK

DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY
1919

PUBLISHED, 1919* iw U. S. A,,
BY DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY, INC.

A. F. KERENSKY'S PREFACE TO THE KORNILOV

AFFAIR

DEAR FRIENDS,

I send you the stenographic copies of my fundamental
statement on the Kornilov affair which have been saved
from destruction, with supplementary remarks and explana-
tions which I have now made. I place this manuscript at
your disposal and ask you if possible to publish it, but ex-
actly in its present form. This is necessary, though I my*
self see all its imperfections from a literary point of view.
But this is not a literary production, not " memoirs " for
history, not the fruit of my unfettered creative faculty.
This is only a document, a bit of real life, a document which
can give to those who are really anxious to discover the
truth about the Kornilov affair, more information than a
whole volume of " memoirs," because, without forcing any
one to form an opinion, it gives every one the opportunity
of acting on the lines of a commission of inquiry, of doing
the work of such a commission himself, sorting out the
most important facts of the Kornilov affair, and drawing
his own conclusions about it.

To enable the reader to judge fairly is my only desire.
My latest notes supplement the statement received by the
Commission of Inquiry with additional matter which may in
part have been forgotten by or unknown to those who will
read the official report of my examination.

Certainly in these notes I have been unable to confine
myself all the time strictly to the mere facts of the case,
and to the narrow limits of the story of Kornilov's at-
tempt, though I tried my best to refrain from all digression,

vi PREFACE

and especially from argument and deductions. I tried to
restrain myself because I found that for me at this mo-
ment any other language than that of facts and documents
was out of place.

Why? You know that better than I. You know bet-
ter than I how the enemies of the February revolution, my
enemies from the Right and from the Left, took advantage
of the Kornilov affair, and Jjow large was the number of
those whose faith weakened before the persistent attacks of
my slanderers. It was not for those who deliberately
slandered, not for those who deliberately lied, that I wrote.
It is impossible to convince them of anything. They them-
selves knew perfectly well that they were distorting and
making a mockery of the truth.

I wrote for those who knew little or nothing, who in the
end gave credence to what was so insolently described as
"truth" in the Kornilov affair. I do not want to con-
vince them. Let them, dispassionately and calmly, after
acquainting themselves with the facts, not from the words
of others, but by their own reasoning, discover the truth
for themselves if not of the whole Kornilov affair, at least
of my connection with it.

It is not personal interest that urges me at this terrible
time to think and to write of the Kornilov affair. No ; I
have seen and studied too many people, not to know the real
value of popular love and hatred. At the time when I was
at my height, and the crowd bowed before me, 1 quietly said
to my friends : ** Wait, ancl they will come and vSmite me/'
So it always has been, and so it always will be. No per-
sonal motive, I say, but a public one impelled me to write.
For now, when the enemies of Russia and of the freedom
of all peoples have attained their shameful aims, when our
Motherland lies prostrate in the mud, dishonoured and lacer-

PREFACE vii

ated, when utter despair has seized those who have any
honours and conscience left now those who have attained
their aims must not be allowed to justify their Judas-like
crime by hypocritically imputing it to " the treason of
others/' and the memory of the great Russian Revolution,
which created a new life of truth and sincerity, must not be
shadowed by even the smallest doubt as to the honesty of
those who strove for it in life and death.

I want to say a few more words about General Kornilov.
I have written many things against him. But I do not
desire that more should be found in my words than I in-
tended to say, and that is why I feel obliged to say em-
phatically that I have never doubted his love for his country.

I saw not in bad intention but in a lack of understanding,
and in great political inexperience, the cause of his actions,
which menaced Russia with such a vast upheaval. I saw,
and many times I tried to check him, instigated as he was by
th cunning enemies of freedom, or by mere political
sharpers.

I did not succeed; the man who in his own way loved
Russia passionately was doomed by some power to bring
about the victory of those who hated and despised her.

A. KERENSKY.

PS, A few words about the stenographed copy. I
gave evidence on October 8, 1917. It took several days to
decipher the notes of the evidence, and only five or six days
before October 25th I received it to revise and sign. I had
not time to do so. The final official text of my evidence be-
fore the Commission of Inquiry was not ready when the
Bolshevik havoc began.

Having at length an opportunity to look through this text,
I felt I had the right to correct it editorially and stylisti-

T1U

PREFACE

cally, to shorten it here and there, and in some places to add
a few additional words, of course without changing the
meaning and tone of the evidence; in two places I found it
expedient to change slightly the order of the account, so as
to bring together separated pieces of evidence about the same
point.

I think that the publication of the whole original official
report of the Inquiry will be useful also as a picture of the
judicial examination of one whom General Alexeiev called
the " Master of Destiny." It will enable every one to recall
that period, still near but already so distant, when judicial
inquiry and courts of justice were absolutely free and inde-
pendent of those in power, that brief chapter in the history
of Russia when " this bourgeois prejudice " in favour of im-
partial justice was not trampled on to speed a return to the
traditional Moscow period of " Shemiaka trial." *

name of Prince Demetrius Shemiaka of Halitsh (1420-53)
stands in Russia for a dishonest, venal, partial judge.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION v

INTRODUCTION xiii

CHAPTER I

FROM KORNILOV'S APPOINTMENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNTIL
THE Moscow CONFERENCE. REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

i. Reasons for appointing Kornilov. Points in favour
and against him. Situation at the front. Conference
at Headquarters on July i6th, 1917 I

2. " Irresponsible influences " on Kerensky. Conversa-
tion in the railway carriage 21

3. Kornilov's requests. Their essence and their illegal
form. The incident of Tcheremissov's appointment.
Why Kornilov was not dismissed 26

4. Kornilov's memorandum of the loth of August. Sup-
port of Savinkov, Filonenko and Kokoshkin. Hopes
of the Right at the Moscow Conference 33

5. Conspiracy at Headquarters. Suspicions against Lu-
komsky and Tikhmenev. The personages around
Kornilov 40

6. Kornilov's journey to Petrograd and his memoranda
of the 3rd and the loth of August. Incident at the
Cabinet meeting 45

7. Open and secret activities of the Main Committee of
Officers' League. Attacks upon the Provisional Gov-
ernment. Campaign in the newspapers. Preparation
of the coup d'ttat. Measures against the Committee . 5 1

8. Details about the 3rd and the loth of August. Con-
versation of Kornilov with Kerensky. Incident with
Savinkov 64

9. Reorganization of army and Provisional Government
False steps in Gutchkov's administration. Efforts to
liquidate them. Necessity of utmost prudence ... 70
10. Kornilov's speech at the Moscow Conference. More
about Kornilov's memoranda. The attitude of Korni-
lov towards the Government * 60

ix

x CONTENTS

CHAPTER II

PREPARATION OF THE REBELLION AND ITS BEGINNING PAGE

ii. Conspiracy at the Moscow Conference. Movements of
troops. Resolutions about Kornilov's irremovability.
Kornilov's conduct in Moscow 86

12. Pretended danger of a Bolshevik rebellion. Weakness
of Bolshevism on the eve of the Kornilov rebellion.
Its rapid increase after the rebellion and as a conse-
quence of it 95

13. Reasons for summoning: the third corps to Petrograd.
Proclamation of martial law in Petrograd. Disarma-
ment of Kronstadt Work on fortifications in Finland 103

14. The summoning and the movements of the third corps
against Petrograd. Its role in the plans of the con-
spirators. Suicide of General Kruno v in

15. More about the circumstances of the summoning of
the third corps. Journeys to Headquarters of Savin-
kov, Mironov and Terestchenko 121

16. First visit of V. Lvov to Kerensky 127

17. Second visit of V. Lvov to Kerensky. Kornilov's de-
mands for transference of power to him. Kerensky's
conversation with Kornilov by direct telegraphic wire.
Second conversation with V. Lvov in presence of a
witness 131

18. Was V. Lvov acting under Kornilov's instructions?
Kornilov's conversation with Savinkov by wire. Kor-
nilov's conversation with Trubctzkoy. Confirmation
by Alexeiev 141

19. Kerensky's alleged complicity. History of Lvov's

mission 146

20, Details about the 26th of August Lvov's visit , 154

CHAPTER ITI

LIQUIDATION OP THE REBELLION. ROLES OP VARIOUS PERSONAGES
21. The theory of a "misunderstanding due to Lvov."
Various opinions of Savinkov, The criminal action of
Kornilov. His appeal. Impossibility of delay with

counter-measures 161

22. Extraordinary powers delegated to Kerensky. Resig-
nation of ministers. Subsequent reproaches of non-
democratic conduct. Formal defects of the telegram
ordering Kornilov's dismissal; disputes about its
validity 166

CONTENTS si

PAGE

23. Kerensky's appeal to the population. Kormlov's at-
tempt to justify his actions by the appearance of this
appeal. Rebellious actions of Kornilov before the
appeal. Text of Kerensky's and Kornilov's appeals.
Impossibility of delay in view of the presence of Kor-
nilovists in Petrograd 177

24. The days of the rebellion. Conduct of Miliukov.

Terestchenko, Nekrassov and others 183

25. Filonenko' s role. Divulgence on the 2Qth of August
of his activities at Headquarters. His participation in
the schemes for a dictatorship. His ambiguous posi-
tion at Headquarters 199

26. Savinskov's role. His friendship with Filonenko. His
non-participation in the conspiracy. His deception by
Kornilov. Transgression by Savinkov of his powers.
His resignation 210

27. Definition of the crime. The accomplices . , . . 219

28. Liquidation of the rebellion. Movements of the mili-
tary against Headquarters. Excitement of the democ-
racy. Slowness of General Alexeiev. Successful ef-
forts of the Provisional Government to suppress the
rebellion without bloodshed 224

29. Kornilov's accomplices. General Alexeiev's letter.
Accusations against Kerensky, Savinkov and Filonenko.
Participation of financial circles and the reality of an
organized conspiracy 229

30. Summoning of the troops and the Soviets. Savinkov's
statement Represenattives of the Soviets in the Pro-
visional Government 233

31. Some details about the conspiracy. Participation of
Cossacks and officers. Arrest of Lvov. Zavoiko's
character 236

32. Political situation of Russia at the time of the rebellion.

Impossibility of a dictatorship; necessity of a coalition 240

33. Various details : The text of Lvov's statement.
Kerensky's actions on the 26th of August. Criminal
nature of Krimov's intentions. More about Savinkov's
actions. More about Filonenko. Attacks upon the
provisional Government 244

CHAPTER IV
KEKENSKY AND KORNILOV

A reply 249

A "WHO'S WHO" AND "WHERE'S WHERE " OF PEOPLE AND PLACES
OCCURRING IN THE Too: 279

INTRODUCTION l

AFTER the breaking of the Russian front near Tarnopol
on the i pth of July, 1917, it was decided to replace the
Commander of the South-western front, General Gutor,
and later also the Commander-in-Chief, General Brus-
silov, and the choice fell- on General Kornilov, Kornilov's
good qualities and defects were both well known to the
Provisional Government, but at this moment his good
qualities made him the only suitable candidate. His de-
fects, especially his impetuosity in success, did not then
seem to offer any danger; moreover, the views that he
professed seemed to exclude the possibility of a conflict.
He advocated the cessation of a further offensive; he,
alone among the generals, attributed the responsibility for
the failure not only to the soldiers, but also to the offi-
cers. He spoke with sympathy of the army elective or-
ganizations, of the commissaries, and so forth. Therefore
the appointment of Kornilov was due to serious con-
siderations in his favour, and not at all to " irresponsible
influences " on the Premier, Kerensky.

But after his appointment Kornilov immediately revealed
his dangerous side. In his telegram accepting the duties
of Commander-in-Chief he made a series of demands re-
garding reforms in the army. These reforms were accept-
able in their essence; they were even approved in prin-
ciple, and were already being worked out by the Pro-
visional Government before Kornilov's nomination, but

1 This introduction gives a resume of the events discussed in the book.

xiii

xiv INTRODUCTION

Kornilov presented his demands in an inadmissible form.
He interpreted his rights as Commander-in-Chief in an even
broader way than did the Grand Duke Nicholas, and he
assumed towards the Provisional Government such a tone
as compelled Kerensky to propose his immediate dismissal
to the Provisional Government. Kornilov was, however,
permitted to retain his command, partly to avoid changes
in the High Command at that critical moment, and partly
because his conduct was ascribed to the influence of adven-
turers surrounding him at Headquarters. After the events
of the beginning of July, 1917 (the breaking of the front
and the Bolshevik rebellion in Petrograd), the Provisional
Government, supported by the whole of the country and in
particular by the democracy, quickly took a series of ener-
getic steps, including the restoration of capital punishment
at the front, and occupied itself in further planning for the
reorganizing of the army. In spite of this, Kornilov, sup-
ported by Savinkov, started an energetic campaign against
the Provisional Government. On his arrival in Petrograd
on the 3rd of August for the purpose of giving the Provis-
ional Government an account of the military situation,
Kornilov brought with him a memorandum in which he de-
manded a series of army reforms, but the discussion of the
proposed changes in the army was delayed, and Kornilov's
memorandum was handed to the War Ministry to be
brought into agreement with the proposals of the War Min-
ister. In this way was prevented the publication of Korni-
lov's memorandum in a form so exceedingly sharp and tact-
less that it would inevitably have led to his retirement.

In the meantime the attack on the Provisional Govern-
ment by those in favour of "decisive measures " was
being continued. Kornilov's memorandum of the 3rd of
August was handed over to Savinkov, the Deputy Min-

INTRODUCTION xv

ister of War, for the purpose of co-ordinating it with
the plans of the War Minister. Savinkov, who all the
time was attempting to carry on a personal line of politics
without taking into consideration the directions of his chief,
the War Minister, wanted to benefit by this occasion and,
with Kornilov's help, to force the Government to accept
quickly, en bloc, a program of most serious military
measures at the front and at the rear without these meas-
ures having first received the sanction of Kerensky, the
Prime Minister and the Minister of War, and even without
previously reporting to him about them.

This attempt, made immediately before the Moscow Con-
ference, did not succeed, but still it created great excite-
ment in political circles. This excitement might have mani-
fested itself at the Moscow Conference in an acute form,
and the Government took measures to save the unity of
the country and to safeguard the army from all possible
disputes. Finally, the Moscow Conference went off with-
out a hitch. General Kornilov made a speech which did
not realize the expectation of the extremists, as it differed
from the War Minister's speech enunciating his program
only by its tactless form and a brief allusion to the necessity
of "measures in the rear, at the front, on the railways
and in the factories."

The regeneration of the fighting capacity of the army was
the task of the Prime Minister, Kerensky, from the very
first moment when he took over office from Gutchkov.
It was necessary to liquidate the tendency of army reforms
which had been carried out during the first two months
of the Revolution, but in striving with this object the War
Minister, Kerensky, could not permit the too harsh and
premature steps which were demanded by the irresponsible
partisans of " strong power." Such steps could give only

xvi INTRODUCTION

a negative result in the unbalanced conditions in which
the country then was. After the Moscow Conference,
Savinkov admitted that the plan of reforms traced by the
War Minister coincided in the main lines with his and
Kornilov's wishes. He admitted also that his conduct dur-
ing the period just before the Moscow Conference was
a breach of discipline, and after this the Prime Minister
recalled the order for Savinkov's resignation.

But all the danger from the activities of too hasty " re-
formers " was nothing in comparison with the terrible con-
sequences of the secret intrigue which was carried on at the
same time at Headquarters and in other places with the
object of making a forcible coup d'etat, and which already
by the time of the Moscow Conference had attempted
to accustom Russia and Kornilov himself to the idea of
the military dictatorship of the latter. Information about
conspiracies began to reach the Provisional Government as
early as July, 1917; the break through near Tarnopol deeply
touched the feeling of national pride; moreover, after the
abortive Bolshevik rising many thought that a courageous
and well organized assault on the Government was sure
to succeed. Parallel with the open propaganda of the
idea of a military dictatorship, secret work was going on.
At the first stage separate conspirative circles were organized
in which some military elements took an active part, among
them a part of the members of the Main Committee of the
old Russian Officers' League, Later, these circles united,
and the technique of the conspiracy improved. Some du-
bious persons, such as Aladin and Zavoiko, were accepted in
their midst ; they formed the link between the military con-
spirators, the civil politicians, and the financial circles that
were supporting them. In this way a real organization
was created, which later took such a definite shape that

INTRODUCTION xvii

General Alexeiev could menace it with revelations at the
trial of General Kornilov, should the civil participants,
who remained unknown, withhold financial help from the
families of the arrested conspirators. At one time the
partisans of " strong power " sent out feelers to Kerensky ;
not meeting with any sympathy there, they directed their
attention to Kornilov. " Kerensky does not want to be
a dictator; then we will give him one," said V. Lvov.
At the moment of the All-Russian Conference in Mos-
cow on the I2th-25th of August, the idea of Kornilov J s
dictatorship was already quite ripe, and the prepara-
tion of the coup d'etat, anticipating the sympathy of the
Conference, was in full swing. A " reliable " Cossack
detachment was summoned to Moscow, and the officer-
cadets who were guarding the building where the Con-
ference took place were given notice that a proclamation
of dictatorship was possible during the Conference. A
whole series of organizations, before the Conference, carried
threatening resolutions to the effect that Kornilov must
not be dismissed. A ceremonious entry of Kornilov into
Moscow was being organized; various public men " in-
troduced " themselves and presented "memoranda." A
pamphlet was distributed in Moscow entitled "Kornilov
The People's Leader."

Contrary to the expectations of the conspirators, the desire
of all parts of the population for union and the force of
the Provisional Government became so evident at the Mos-
cow Conference that all plans to profit by the Moscow
Conference had to be postponed; on the other hand the
conspirative preparation of the coup d'etat became more
intense. A few days later Aladin attempted through the
intermediary of Prince George Lvov to obtain an audience
with Kerensky; having failed, he and his friends deter-

xviii INTRODUCTION

mined to use V. Lvov for this purpose, knowing that his
position as a former member of the Provisional Govern-
ment made it possible for him without difficulty to obtain
an audience with the Prime Minister.

Oil the 3ist of August Lvov, \\ho was prepared suit-
ably by Aladin and Dobrinsky, went to P'etrograd, where
he was received by the Prime Minister, but he lim-
ited himself to a conversation of a general character
about the necessity for strengthening the Government's
authority by the inclusion in it of new elements with
" power " behind them. Kerensky did not attach any im-
portance to this visit, as at that time many people came
to him whose conversation was of this character. Lvov
returned to Moscow and went immediately to Headquarters
with a letter from Aladin to Zavoiko. The meaning of
this sending of Lvov to Kerensky, as well as of Aladin' s
attempt to interview the Prime Minister, was that the con-
spirators wished to secure for themselves means of contact
with the Prime Minister independent of the ordinary chan-
nels of communication between Headquarters and the Gov-
ernment.

At the same time at Headquarters Kornilov and his
friends were working out the final plan of " military "
pressure on the Provisional Government. It is difficult
to determine exactly when Kornilov became a conscious
participant in the conspiracy and the head of the movement
directed against the Government. In the first informa-
tion about the conspiracies his name was not mentioned,
but already on the 3rd of August, in the conversation
with Kerensky, Kornilov spoke about a military dictator-
ship as about a possibility which might become a neces-
sity. At the Moscow Conference the behaviour of Kor-
nilov towards the Provisional Government was very

INTRODUCTION xix

provocative. On the 23rd of August, at Headquarters,
Kornilov spoke harshly to Savinkov about the Provisional
Government; he found the continuation of Kerensky's
power to be obnoxious and unnecessary and so on. But
on the following day, on the 24th of August (6th of
September, N.S.), before Savinkov's departure to Petro-
grad, Kornilov told him that he was going loyally to
support the Pro\ r isional Government; he asked him to
inform Kerensky of this, and Savinkov went away reassured.
Now on this day the work of the conspirators was already
in full swing.

The presence at Headquarters of the Deputy-Minister
of War, Savinkov, from the 22nd to the 24th of August
was called for, amongst other reasons, by the necessity
for clearing up the conditions for the transference of the
army of the Petrograd Military District to the Commander-
in-Chief, also the conditions for sending a military detach-
ment from the front at the disposal of the Provisional
Government in connection with the proclamation of martial
law in Petrograd. The proclamation of martial law in
Petrograd was necessitated by the military situation created
after the fall of Riga, which had brought the battle front
nearer to the capital, by the necessity for transferring the
Government institutions to Moscow, by the increase in
numbers of refugees from the Baltic provinces and in
the licence of the Petrograd garrison, by the proposed
transfer of the other troops of the Petrograd Military Dis-
trict to the command of General Kornilov, and by the
possibility of riots and various attempts from the Left and
from the Right.

All these considerations compelled the Government to
demand for its own use a well disciplined army force.
Savinkov, in transmitting this order of the Provisional

xx INTRODUCTION

Government to the Commander-in-Chief, pointed out that
the strict conditions for sending troops for the use of
the Provisional Government were that the detachment to
be dispatched should not include the Caucasian " Savage
Division/' which was not reliable from the Government's
standpoint, and that General Krimov should not be appointed
to command it. General Kornilov definitely promised
Savinkov on the 2ist of August to fulfil exactly the pro-
posal of the Provisional Government and not to send to
Petrograd either Krimov or the " Savage Division " ; but
on the following day the 3rd Cavalry Corps was already
moving towards Petrograd, with the <c Savage Division "
at its head, and the whole under the command of General
Krimov, who had received definite instructions from
Kornilov. It was proved later that General Krimov, who
had been nominated as commander of one of the armies
of the South-western front in order to divert attention
from him, had been already, as a matter of fact, for some
time at Headquarters working out a plan of military pres-
sure upon the Government. Owing to the events of the
26th of August (September 8th, N.S.), which will be
mentioned later, the Provisional Government had time
to take measures ; Krimov's army did not reach Petrograd
(where he was expected by the local conspirative organ-
izations), and he committed suicide. But the role of this
unit was so important in carrying out the conspiracy that
it was only after Kornilov had learned the fate of this
detachment that he took actual measures to put an end
to the adventure.

While General Krimov's detachment was approaching
the capital, the conspirators attempted to get hold of the
power " legally " by terrorizing the Government. On the
26th of August (8th of September, N.S.) Lvov, who had

INTRODUCTION xxi

arrived in Petrograd from Headquarters, presented an
ultimatum to the Prime Minister in the name of Kornilov.
The Provisional Government must give up its power the
same evening, transferring it to General Kornilov, who
would form a new Government. Kerensky and Savinkov
must immediately, during the night of the 26th-27th of
August, depart for Headquarters, as Kornilov proposed
to offer them posts as ministers in his Cabinet and would
not take the responsibility for their lives if they remained
in Petrograd. At the request of Kerensky, Lvov on the
spot put in writing Kornilov's demands; then Kerensky
asked Kornilov to come to the direct telegraphic wire,
and Kornilov himself repeated to him the proposal to come
immediately, confirmed Lvov's authority, and indirectly
confirmed all that had been said by the latter. To gain
time Kerensky promised Kornilov to come to Headquarters,
and at the same time took immediately all steps to cope
with the rebellion at its very commencement. In the mean-
while, after the above " favourable conversation " by the
direct wire, the most prominent political men in opposition
to the Government were invited to Headquarters ; the ulti-
mate form of the dictatorship was being finally settled and
the composition of the Government agreed upon. But on
the following day, the 2/th of August, a wire was re-
ceived from the Prime Minister ordering Kornilov to^
surrender his office immediately and to come to Petro-
grad. Kornilov did not obey this order, but confirmed to
Savinkov by the direct wire his refusal to submit to the
Government. On the same day appeared Kerensky's appeal
to the population about the Kornilov rebellion and Korni-
lov's appeal saying that he was <e provoked " to make the
rebellion and that he was acting against the Government,
which was submitting to the "Bolshevik majority of the

xxii INTRODUCTION

Soviets " and " working in agreement with the plans of
the German General Staff."

Thus the armed revolt against the Government began.
For two days, while this attempt was being crushed, differ-
ent " conciliators " besieged the Prime Minister, attempt-
ing to persuade him to compromise " as the real force is
on the side of Kornilov." But already on the 29th of
August it became evident that the whole of the real force of
the country was against Kornilov, and, as had been predicted
to him by Kerensky himself some time before, Kornilov
found himself in splendid isolation. On the I3th of August
the rebellion was definitely and bloodlessly suppressed. It
was easy to deal with it. Kornilov was not backed by a sin-
gle important political organization, nor could he rely upon
the force of any class. Owing to their political inexperience,
Kornilov and those of the officers who were with him mis-
took for a real force the grumbling of the "man in the
street/' irritated by the Revolution, but passive by nature,
together with the instigation of various adventurers and the
promises of support from isolated politicians. The finan-
cial help of a certain group of banking-houses artificially ex-
aggerated the dimensions o f the movement.

But Kornilov's adventure, though predestined to fail,
played a fatal part in Russia's destiny, as it shook pro-
foundly and painfully the consciousness of the popular
masses. This shock was the more serious as it was unex-
pected. An adventure of a small group was transformed
in the inflamed imagination of the masses to a conspiracy
of the whole of the bourgeoisie and of all the upper classes
against democracy and the working masses. The Bol-
sheviks, who up to the 13111 of August were impotent,
became masters in the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's
and Soldiers* Delegates on the 7th of September, gain-

INTRODUCTION xxffi

ing a majority there for the first time during the whole
period of the Revolution. The same happened everywhere
with lightning rapidity. Massacres of officers again began ;
again the commanding officers lost all their authority.
"Throughout the whole country, as in the first days of the
March Revolution, there appeared spontaneous organizations
which seized the functions of governmental power under
the pretext of fighting the counter-revolution. In the sol-
diers' and workmen's masses the authority of the leaders,
who were fighting against the cry of " All authority to the
Soviets " and who were defending the idea of a national
power basing its authority on the will of the whole people,
was annihilated. The wave of anarchy broke the Russian
front and overflowed the State. Nobody will ever succeed
in breaking the fatal link between the 27th of August (Sep-
tember 9th, N.S.) and the 25th of October (November
7th, N.S.) 1917.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

MINUTES OF THE EXAMINATION OF A. F. KE-
RENSKY BY THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
INTO THE KORNILOV AFFAIR

(.All the dates in this section of the book when not otherwise stated

are Old Style, which is thirteen days behind the chronology of

Great JSritain, etc.),

CHAPTER I

I

1 [THE Investigation Commission specially appointed by the
Provisional Government for the Kornilov affair planned its
work upon a very broad basis, embracing the whole period
preceding the revolt and beginning from the 8th of July,
when General Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief
of the South-western front.

Although strictly speaking, none of the events preceding
the August days had direct connection with General Korni-
lov's movement of the 26th-3Oth of August, as subject to
prosecution, yet this widening of the scope of judicial inves-
tigation to include the terrible days of the 3rd-5th of July
had a profound inner meaning.

The scope of action of the Investigation Commission could
not be narrowed, because the events of those July days
(3rd~6th), days of the first Bolshevik riot, days of the

1 The square brackets denote the explanations and supplements
added by A. F. Kerensky to the stenographic report of the examination,
All English words in italics are underlined by A. F. K.

1

2 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Tarnopol disgrace, promoted General Kornilov to the high-
est post in the army, and created throughout Russia that
novel atmosphere of wounded patriotism which originated
the subsequent events of the 26th-30th of August.

I will not dwell in detail upon the events which preceded
the appointment of General Kornilov as Commander-in-
Chief of the South-western front. I think no Russian can
have forgotten those two dates (the i8th of June and the
6th of July, 1917), the great impulse of self-sacrifice of the
troops of the i8th of June, and the sombre orgy of the dev-
astators of Tarnopol and Kalusch.

Who does not recollect the time when the hopes of salva-
tion and honourable peace reborn in Russia were smashed
by the double blow dealt to the Russian army by the German
Government, alarmed for its future? Having tolerated the
fall of the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and a liberal
tendency in Vienna after the i8th of June, the rulers of the
Central Powers decided to employ extreme measures in
their attempt to prevent the regeneration of the Russian
army and to blow up the Russian front.

One example is sufficient to give an idea of how this work
was organized by the German General Staff,

I was at the western front near Molodetchno at the time
of the Bolshevik " revolt " of the srd-Sth of July. Our
troops were preparing to launch an offensive. Here, while
visiting the front trenches, where as yet nothing was known
of the Petrograd events, one of my aides-de-camp took from
a group of soldiers a fresh copy of the Bolshevik paper
The Comrade, published in Vilna by the German Gen-
eral Staff for the benefit of the Russian soldiers. This copy
contained an article upon "Russia and the Offensive,"
dated " Petrograd, July 3rd " (June aoth, old style), which
with strange foresight made the following statement:

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 3

"According to news received from Russia, the Russian
offensive in Galicia has excited great indignation among the
Russian people. Tremendous crowds assemble in all the
large towns to protest against this mass slaughter of Rus-
sia's sons. Indignation against England, whom all consider
to be the originator and cause of the prolongation of this
terrible war, increases daily. Kerensky is openly de-
nounced as a traitor to the people. A huge manifestation
has taken place in Moscow, whither Cossacks have been sent
to quell the disturbance. The present situation cannot last.
Russkoe Slovo states that martial law has been lately en-
forced again in Petrograd. A great many Left Socialists
have been arrested during the past week. The paper adds
that many of the extreme Left leaders were obliged to leave
Petrograd for the interior of Russia/'

Naturally, the ground was well prepared for the recep-
tion of the Russian accounts of the real disorders of July
3rd-5th, which reached the front trenches a few days later ;
and were described by the well-known and widely circulated
" Russian " newspapers of the front as a revolt of the pro-
letariat against the government of " the traitor Kerensky,"
who had sold himself to the capitalists of England and
France.

The same kind of attack from the front and the rear
was launched against the Russian soldier mass all along
the front from the Carpathians to Riga.

The break-through of the Germans at Tarnopol com-
pletely unbalanced our higher command, and yet it war
necessary to do the utmost to re-establish the front as
speedily as possible. General Kornilov, Commander of the
8th Army, was at that time appointed Commander-in-Chief
of the South-western front.

The narrative of my deposition begins from that mo-

4 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ment; the beginning of it, as being of no importance, is
omitted.

General Gutor, whose name is mentioned at the beginning
of the deposition, had in May been appointed Commander-
in-Chief of the South-western front. The commanders of
the other fronts were : Northern front, General Klembov-
sky ; Western, General Denikin ; Rumanian, General Stcher-
batchov; General A. Brussilov was Generalissimo, with
General Lukomsky as Chief of General Staff.]

Kerensky. General Kornilov was appointed Command-
er-in-Chief of the South-western front under the following
circumstances. General Gutor lost his head, and Kornilov
seemed to me the only man at the front capable of imme-
diately replacing him. It seemed, then, that the danger-
ous tendency of his character a too great impetuosity
in case of success would present no danger during a*
retreat. For the time when that tendency could become
dangerous was still far distant. The retreat would bring
into play all his positive qualities: decision, organizing
talent, his initiative and independence. That is the reason
for his appointment to the South-western front. There
was no one else. Personally, I considered these reasons
as all-sufficient.

[The decision to exercise actively the extensive rights
of a military commander, the daring to act without fear
of responsibility, without hiding behind another's back
these were the qualities most needed at the time. Un-
fortunately, these qualities were seldom to be found among
otir higher army command. It must be remembered that
the active straggle against the disruption of the army,
against the " soft-skins " and the " bag-men/' * the defeat-

1 Cowardly soldiers and soldiers travelling about buying and specu-
lating.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 5

ists and pro-Germans, a struggle which often necessitated
the use of armed force, was almost entirely carried on
by the War Minister's commissaries and army commit-
tees.

Nearly the whole staff of the higher command were, so
to speak, u not there" for all practical purposes during
the period (May-June) of the most strenuous efforts for
the re-establishment of military efficiency on all the fronts.
And yet a true regeneration of the army could not be
achieved without authoritative leaders, recognized as such
by the whole mass of the army. Therefore, I think it
obvious why every conspicuous personality, every man of
initiative and action, met with the entire support of the
Minister of War and received promotion. Therefore it is
also obvious why I promptly and decidedly promoted Gen-
eral Kornilov, in spite of the original " ultimative " methods
of his activity.

If we recall the whole military-political situation at the
beginning of July, 1917, it becomes obvious that the sub-
stance of General Kornilov's " demands," was by no means
an America discovered by him, but a somewhat peculiar
formula applied by him to the measures partly passed, partly
planned by the Provisional Government and fully corre-
sponding to the frame of mind of all responsible democratic
and liberal circles.

Russia was shaken and stunned by this combined blow
by the bolshevik attempt to " break up the inner front "
at Petrograd and the actual piercing of the front of the
nth Army at Tarnopol. The bolshevik attempt was al-
most immediately suppressed. The task of stemming the
German invasion was a hundredfold more difficult. Prompt
and heroic measures were necessary, and their adoption be-
came all the more easy, as all Russia was extraordinarily

6 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

unanimous in her estimate of the current events and of
the measures to be taken against the double enemy.

" The meeting of the committees of the N corps " (ac-
cording to a telegram received by me) <( considers promoters
of discontent, traitors and men who incite others to breaches
of discipline and disobedience to battle-orders to be inad-
missible in our ranks. We demand of all regimental com-
mittees the immediate arrest of all such individuals and
the bringing of them up for trial to the army committees.
We demand that all comrades of our corps should detain
every individual appearing in the trenches or quarters of a
unit to which he does not belong; all such individuals should
be brought to the regimental committees for identification/ 1

The executive committee of the South-western front and
the army committee of the nth Army, reporting to me on
the situation created after the 6th of July, in a joint tele-
gram dated July 8th, declared that the members of the
frontal army committee and the commissaries *' unanimously
admit that the situation demands the adoption of the most
extreme measures, as it is urgent to stop at nothing to save
the Revolution from peril. Today, with the consent of the
commissaries and the committees, the Commander-in-Chief
of the South-western front and the Commander of the
nth Army have issued the order to shoot deserters.
Let the whole country learn the whole truth. Let her
shudder and form the resolve to punish the faint-hearted,
who betray and destroy Russia and the Revolution,"

On July nth the Central Executive Committee of the
Social Revolutionists and Social Democrats and the Execu-
tive Committee of the Soviet issued a proclamation "to
all the people/' peasants, workmen and workwomen, to
all councils and committees, to the army. In this procla-
mation the C.E.C made the following statement : " We

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 7

acknowledge the Provisional Government as the govern-
ment for the saving of the Revolution. We acknowledge
it to be a government invested with full and unlimited
powers. Let its orders be law to everybody. Any one
disobeying any battle-order of the Provisional Government
is a traitor. For cowards and traitors there is no mercy.
Remember that only a hard struggle will bring peace to
Russia and to all peoples. By retreating you will lose both
land and freedom, you will lose peace. Victorious German
Imperialists will force you to fight again and again for
their interests. Let there be no traitors nor cowards among
you. Only one way is open to you forward/ 7

On July I3th the " Isvestia of the Council of S. & W.
D." 1 published the following, in an article entitled:
** Faced by an Imminent Peril/' " The work of irrespon-
sible demagogues has already borne its bloody fruit upon
the battle-field. Dissension and confusion have penetrated
the ranks of the army. . . . And the army's force and
efficiency have vanished like a phantom. . . . The army is
dissolved and broken-up, dismembered units are in flight
before the enemy. . . . Our armies are retreating; worse
still they are running away, maddened by war. We
tremble for the fate of Russia and the Revolution, and
we are filled with shame. The troops, which fought bravely
beneath the rod of Tsarism, have become a mob of miser-
able cowards now that the banner of liberty is hoisted above
them: it is a disgrace."

As if answering the feeling of inspired alarm which had
taken possession of all the democratic centres, the army
commissaries of the South-western front, with B. V, Savin-
kov at their head, sent the following telegram : " We feel
bound by our conscience to declare what measures are to
1 Soldiers and Workmen's Deputies,

8 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

be taken. There is no choice : death-penalty for those who
refuse to risk their lives for their country, for land and
liberty." By this time my answer to the above-quoted
telegram of the Executive Committee of the South-western
front had been already received at the front. " I fully
approve the truly revolutionary and highly proper decision
adopted by the Executive Committee of the South-western
front at this crucial moment."

Upon the background of this great tide of patriotism,
which swept over the whole country, the contents of the
telegram sent by the Commander of the nth Army (General
Baluev) were but the natural expression of the general
feeling. " Having become acquainted with the spirit of the
army, I am horror-struck at the peril and disgrace that
threaten Russia. Time presses. All the high command
and officers' staff are powerless to do anything except sac-
rifice their lives. Paragraph 14 of the Declaration (i.e.
the right of shooting on the spot) cannot be executed,
because the chief is single-handed against hundreds and
thousands of armed men, bent upon flight. . , . As a faith-
ful son of Russia, having devoted my life to the
service of my country, I consider it my duty to declare
to the Government that Russian democracy and the Revo-
lution are perishing." (The general further proposes a
series of measures concluding with the death-paialty, and
adds:) " I hold that the suppression of the death-penalty
in the army was a mistake : if the Government sends men
to die from enemy bullets, why does it grant cowards
and traitors the possibility of escape? "

The solidarity of opinion is clearly emphasized by the
following extract from General B/s telegram : " All litera-
ture circulated at the front must be approved by the Council
of S, & W. D, and the army committees,"

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 9

No wonder General Kornilov, suffering the same great
anxiety as other patriots, expressed the general opinion;
but with characteristic eccentricity he concluded his famous
telegram of the nth of July concerning the death-penalty
with the following announcement : " Enough ! I declare
that if the Government does not confirm the measures
proposed by me, and thereby deprives me of the only means
of saving the army and using it for the fulfilment of its
true object, the defence of the country and of liberty, I.
General Kornilov, will arbitrarily resign my post of Com-
mander-in-Chief."

Such was the will of the country for its salvation. It
could not be otherwise. The Provisional Government had
not underrated the certainty of obtaining universal support
when it demanded decisive action at the most critical mo-
ment.

The front of the nth Army was pierced upon the 6th
of July; the law committing for high treason all persons
guilty of inciting officers and soldiers to disobedience of
military orders in wartime was published on the same day.
General Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of
the South-western front in the night of the 7tli-8th of
July. On the morning of the 8th of July I issued the
following order, No. 28 : " After reading the reports pre-
sented to me dealing with events at the South-western
front, and particularly the grievous events whid: took place
in the nth Army, I consider it my duty on^e again to
call attention to the unflinchingly gallant conduct of the
commanding and officers' personnel, proving their devo-
tion to liberty and the Revolution, and their unalterable
love of their country. I command discipline to be re-
established in the army with the full use of revolutionary
authority, including armed force, to save the army. The

10 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

disruption of the army cannot be tolerated. All criminal
elements, engaged in written or oral propaganda inciting
to disobedience and refusal to carry out battle-orders,
must be immediately eliminated from the army.* 1

On the 1 2th of July the Provisional Government (from
V. N. Lvov * to V. M. Tchernov) passed a unanimous
vote, temporarily re-establishing the death-penalty at the
front and setting up revolutionary martial tribunals. On
the I3th of July the Ministers of War and of Home Affairs
obtained the right to suppress papers and periodicals " in-
citing to disobedience to military chiefs, to revolt and
civil war." I also received the right to close meetings,
dissolve congresses, etc. A whole series of laws and meas-
ures was adopted by the Government in less than a fort-
night.

Of course (I must again repeat it) all this was rendered
possible by the extraordinary unanimity of all classes of
Russian society and by the proof given by all governmental
and social, especially democratic, circles of a thorough un-
derstanding of the existing situation. It was the beginning
of a remarkable sobering of the populace, a rapid growth
of a consciousness of responsibility towards the State, a
period of an unheard-of decline of anarchic-bolshevik in-
fluence upon the masses. It became the Government's task
to accentuate these tendencies, to strengthen the unity of
the all-national front. At the same time the Government
was obliged to keep a close watch, lest the reaction against
Left Maximalism should lead to a Maximalism from the
Right]

I recollect that A. A, Brussilov (who, by the way, like
all the commanding officers and military authorities, greatly

*High Procurator of the Holy Synod; not to be confounded with
Prince Procurator Lvov, the former Premier.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 11

distrusted Kornilov's somewhat naive impetuosity) at first
disapproved of Kornilov's appointment to Gutor's post, and
I was obliged to use a certain amount of pressure to over-
come his (Brussilov's) hesitation. I adduced the same rea-
sons in favour of Kornilov to Brussilov which I have
given you.

Chairman. 1 Concerning the conference of July i6th
at the Stavka (Headquarters). What were the views ex-
pressed at that conference, and did it not become the cause
which subsequently brought about Kornilov's succession to
Brussilov ?

Kerensky. The conference of July i6th certainly played
a part in Kornilov's appointment. I must say, this con-
ference produced upon me and upon all my colleagues
(Terestchenko, Baranovsky and others) a disheartening im-
pression, absolutely disheartening. I called this conference
upon my own initiative and asked Brussilov to invite all
the military authorities he could bring together. . . , You
know the names. There is no need to repeat them.

Chairman. No.

[The members present at the conference of July i6th
at the Stavka were: Kerensky, Premier and Minister
of War and Marine; Terestchenko, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs ; General Alexeiev, attached to the Provisional Gov-
ernment; Generalissimo Brussilov; his Chief-of-Staff, Gen-
eral Lukomsky ; General Klembovsky, Commander-in-Chief
of the Northern front; General Denikin, Commander-in-
Chief of the Western front; his Chief -of -Staff, General

1 The Commission which examined me consisted of the following
members: Chairman; chief military and naval prosecutor, Shablov-
sky; appointed members: Kolokolnikov, Ukraintsev, Raupakh; elected
members : members of the Central Executive Committee of the Council
of Soldiers and Workmen's Deputies, Krokhmal and Liber. The ex- .
amination took place in my study at the Winter Palace.

12 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Markov; General Ruzsky, former Commander-in-Chief of
the Northern front; Chief Engineer General Velitchko;
Savinkov, Commissary of the South-western front; officials
of the War Minister's cabinet and of the Generalissimo's
staff.

The conference was called for purely strategical military
purposes. It was of the greatest importance for the Pro-
visional Government, and particularly for the War Min-
ister, to form a circumstantial and impartial view of the
real situation at the front and of the strategical conse-
quences of the break through ; to sketch out a plan of future
military policy, etc. This last item was particularly im-
portant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who therefore
accompanied me to the conference. We desired to hear
the opinion of men with a three years' war experience,
men who had passed through the hard school of the debacle
of 1915 and the adversities of 1916. The observations
I had made concerning the preparation* and the carrying-
out of the offensive of 1917 filled me with the gravest
fears and misgivings. And I desired that the immediate
problems of defence should be defined, however generally,
by a conference of the most experienced former, present
and, maybe, future chiefs. Naturally, these fears engen-
dered certain doubts as to the expediency of General Brus-
silov's remaining at the post of Generalissimo.

Alas! No leaders were to be found at this conference,
not even ordinary military specialists attaining the modern
war-standard. There were none, not from lack of capacity
in those present, but, I am firmly convinced, from lack of
wish to reveal it The possibility of settling old scores
obscured everything else. All the misfortunes, the catas-
trophes, the disgrace, the horror of the first three years
of war no longer existed for them. Everything had gone

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 13

well in the past. The reason of all reasons, the source
of the July debacle, lay solely and exclusively in the Revo-
lution and its influence upon the Russian soldier. Soldau,
Warsaw, Kovno, Peremyshl, San, Kovel, Mitava, etc., etc.
all these had not been, had never been. , . . The wine
of hate for all things new had gone to those old wise
heads. Russia and the Provisional Government obtained
no counsel, no aid from the military chiefs. On the other
hand, here for the first time General Denikin outlined the
program of the "revanche" that " music of the future"
of military reaction, which inspired many and many a
partisan of Kornilov's movement Some points of Deni-
kin's program had already been presented to the Provisional
Government in the form of demands. Thus at the very
beginning of the Tarnopol break through the Main Com-
mittee of the Army and Navy Officers 5 League, in a highly
significant telegram addressed to the Provisional Govern-
ment, spoke as follows : " We insist upon the re-establish-
ment of full power, authority and disciplinarian rights to
commanders of all ranks."]

Kerensky. Kornilov was not present at this conference.
He received a telegram from the Stavka which seemed to
imply that his presence was not desired. I cannot recall
the exact text, but the tenor of it was to that effect : " In
view of the critical situation at the South-western front
you will be unable to come."

[General Kornilov, speaking of this telegram in his state-
ment, says : " I received the telegram No. 5067 from the
Generalissimo to the effect that, owing to the situation at
the South-western front, my arrival at the Stavka is con-
sidered to be impossible, and that I am invited to present
my considerations."]
. In the midst of all the disheartening opinions and pro-

U THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

posals expressed by all the generals present, the telegram
from Kornilov seemed to shed a faint ray of light. It
was deeply oppressive, but still it contained a more im-
partial attitude towards the soldier mass and the com-
manding staff. I must say, that all the generals, particu-
larly Alexeiev, Ruzsky and Denikin, evinced a complete
lack of strategical and political insight. According to them
the state of mind of the private soldiers lay at the root
of all the evil. For instance, one of them considered that
the only reform necessary to prevent soldiers from deserting
was the immediate re-establishment of the salute.

[The general alluded to in the last sentence was not
Denikin.]

Such were the judgments expressed. And upon such a
background General Kornilov's opinion, that the present
calamities were not solely due to the soldiers' demoraliza-
tion, but also to the original and long-standing deficiency
of the commanding staff; that therefore, simultaneously,
with punitive measures immediate steps should be taken
for the purifying of the commanding body such a view
tended to produce the impression that here was a man
with a deeper and wider outlook upon the situation than
that of his compeers. Lately it became obvious to me,
by the style of the telegram, that it had not been drafted
by him. Strange to say, all General Kornilov's appoint-
ments after he became Generalissimo were based upon an
inverted principle. He immediately began to promote and
reinstate men belonging to the oldest traditions. Take,
for instance, the wholesale dismissal of the commanding
staff of the South- western front, which occurred as soon
as General Kornilov transferred thither Generals Denikin
and Markov* They started a general' removal of all com-
manders sympathizing with the new army organizations*

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 15

I was obliged to come into serious conflict with Kornilov,
who was bent upon promoting to a high post General Lechit-
sky, an officer utterly inacceptable under the existing novel
conditions. In fine, Kornilov's policy was in such absolute
contradiction to the contents of his own telegram produced
at the conference of July i6th, that I believe this telegram
to have been written either by Savinkov or by Filonenko;
I cannot be certain which of the two, but that one of
them wrote it.

[General Kornilov's constant tendency to appoint to posts
of high command partisans of the pre-revolutionary methods
of army administration and his passive attitude towards
the absolutely inadmissible conduct of some commanders in
their treatment of the soldiers, his indifference, to say the
least of it, towards the campaign set up by some of the
commanders and staffs against the army organizations,
drove me to despair. I was completely bewildered, until
I realized that General Kornilov had two programs
one for presenting to the Provisional Government and an-
other for daily practice. For instance, one of his reports
upon army organizations presented to the Provisional Gov-
ernment ran thus : " It is surely matter for wonder that
the young elected bodies have scarcety ever swerved from
the right path, and have so often proved themselves quite
equal to the situation, even to making the supreme sacri-
fice in blood in their valorous military activity. The com-
mittees symbolizing in the eyes of the masses the existence
of the Revolution guarantee the calm acceptance of all
measures at the front and in the rear indispensable for
the salvation of the army and the country." In practice,
however, the battle-front which was the most highly or-
ganized (namely the South-western front) became speedily
disintegrated owing to the course adopted by Generals Deni-

16 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

\

kin and Markov, ardently supported by the " driller/' Gen-
eral Selivachov, and the recent "democrat," General
Erdely. And yet the services rendered by the Executive
Committees and the commissaries of the South-western
front in the raising of the army efficiency and the struggle
against anarchy at the time of the break through were
absolutely invaluable. I regret being obliged to en-
dorse the following estimate of General Denikin's policy
stated in a resolution of the South-western front Executive
Committee : " From the moment of General Denikin's ap-
pointment to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the South-
western front, the staff began directly to oppose all elected
army organizations. . . . Great partiality was practised in
relation to the commanding body. Officers violating the
rights acquired by the Revolution are encouraged, while
those working in touch with the elected organizations are
persecuted/' The staff not only longed to violate these
rights, but actually attempted to restore corporal punish-
ment and resort to blows. By the way, General Alexeiev,
in his well-known letter to P. N. Miliukov, gives the fol-
lowing explanation of the hostile attitude of the Executive
Committee of the South-western front towards Denikin and
Markov. " The committee had accounts to settle with Deni-
kin and Markov, who put a stop to the committee's grabbing
of public money/* I consider it my duty to refute this
entirely false accusation. The Executive Committee of the
South-western front was one of the most serious, self-
denying, patriotic army organizations which, after the 6th
of July, raised a protest against the " soft-skins " x and
authoritatively supported the Government in its struggle
against the Bolshevik soldier rabble]

1 Cowardly soldiers.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 17

Chairman. By the way, d propos of this conference,
Denikin took part in it.

Kerensky. Yes.

Chairman. He stated that his views upon the imme-
diate reforms needed in the army received your approval.

Kerensky. No. Denikin is a good and brave man.
You see, when I arrived at the conference (remember, that
it assembled at the moment of defeat, not success), I saw
at once that all the generals 7 pent-up resentment against
me and the new regime was ready to burst out. But
Alexeiev, Brussilov and Ruzsky, men better versed in diplo-
macy, restrained themselves, although boiling with indigna-
tion, while Denikin behaved like a simple, straightforward
soldier. His speech was such as not one of them, under
any other Government, would have ever dared address to
the Head of the Government. Such a speech would not
even have been listened to under the old regime. It con-
tained personal attacks on me. ... So, after Denikin's
speech, in order to emphasize that I took a different view
of such plain-speaking from that of the old regime, and
valued liberty of opinion, as well as to avert a scandal (the
other generals were nonplussed), I rose, held out my hand
to him, and said : " Thank you, General, for the courage
of frankly stating your opinion." I meant to show my
appreciation of his behaviour, not of his speech. Later, I
opposed Denikin's point of view and defended my own.
However, Denikin only sharply expressed the opinion silently
shared by all the others. The immediate dissolution of
all elected bodies, the abolition of all rights proclaimed in
the Declaration, the resumption of full authority and disci-
plinarian rights by the commanding officers, including the
re-establishment of the salute such was General Denikin's

18 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

program. [In a word, it meant the immediate return to
the old order in the army.] However, even his adherents
there present admitted that such wholesale reaction was
impossible at such short notice.

General Denikin himself, in his telegram of August 27th,
No. 145, addressed to the Provisional Government upon
Kornilov's dismissal, refers to his speech at the Stavka
Conference on July 6th in the following terms : " On July
6th, at the Conference with members of the Provisional
Government, I declared that by a series of acts it had
destroyed and corrupted the army and trampled our battle-
standards in the mud." He was so firmly persuaded that
no Government would have tolerated such open criticism
and attacks from its subordinate, that he " considered his
being allowed to remain Commander-in-Chief as a sign of
the Government's confession of its heavy sin."' . . . He
never understood that a Government, acting upon the prin-
ciple of right and truth, can and must listen calmly to
every honest and independent opinion.

[What irony of Fate! General Denikin, arrested as
Kornilov's accomplice at the South-western front, was saved
from the fury of the maddened soldiers by the members
of the Executive Committee of the South-western front and
by the Commissaries of the Provisional Government. I
remember with what emotion the never-to-be-forgotten N.
N. Dukhonin and I read the account of how a handful of
brave men escorted the arrested Generals Markov, Denikin
and others across the town, through a crowd of thousands
of soldiers thirsting for their blood; how they boarded a
train and, having cleared the rails by force, drove them
safely out of Berditchev. How very unfair is General
Alexeiev's statement in his letter to Miliukov, that "the
passions and hatred of the rude mob and soldiery of Ber-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 19

ditchev were artificially fostered by the unclean wretched
personality of Mr. N. and the corrupt personnel of the
committee revealing demagogic tendencies/' and that "if
the base agents at Berditchev, gambling with the rude pas-
sions of the rabble, fail to play their game court-martial
and execution at Berditchev they have other means at
their command, namely lynching by an insulted democracy."
N. N. Dukhonin's own fate has given a striking example
that, with leaders actually playing with the passions of the
mob, the victims are doomed to perish.]

Chairman. Did not this conference provide a basis for
the subsequent replacing of General Brussilov by Kornilov?

Kerensky. Yes in a way. We had generally a very
limited choice. To my mind, General Brussilov could not
remain. Besides, he seemed quite at a loss what to do next,
and was obviously utterly unable to continue the policy of
leaning more upon the common soldiery than upon the
commanding body. Meanwhile the situation was such that
events might have developed with catastrophic suddenness,
if there had been no firm hand to control the entire front.
We expected a further development of the German offen-
sive. On the other hand, I was obliged to consider the
fact that the appointment of an adherent of Denikin's
policy would provoke a simultaneous revolt among all the
troops. These reasons settled the question.

Chairman. And were there no hints or, perhaps, polit-
ical considerations of a certain kind pointing to General
Brussilov's reactionary tendencies, or even counter-revolu-
tionary aspirations ? Or were there no such data, nothing
but hesitation and indecision ?

Kerensky. I had observed even before the debacle that
strictly speaking, the Stavka had no plan; there was no
stability; they never seemed to anticipate events, but to.

20 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

follow in their train. For instance, I remember Brussilov's
consternation when the offensive did not develop as rapidly
as was expected. I saw he was quite incapable of dis-
entangling the situation on all the fronts taken as a whole.
But there were no data whatever as to Brussilov' s being
a counter-revolutionary. Simply I deemed it impossible
for him to remain at the head of the army, owing to his
lack of a definite orientation. At this conference he op-
posed no opinion of his own to all the arguments expressed
by the commanders [passively submitting to the general
tendency] .

All this created such a situation that, if Brussilov had
remained, we should have faced coming events in total
ignorance of our next move. We could not tell what course
we should adopt on the morrow, what would happen to the
army, whether we should advance simultaneously in all
directions, etc.

[The scheme of the offensive of July, 1917, consisted of
a series of attacks to be delivered against the enemy on
all the fronts in succession, thereby preventing the con-
centration of his forces on the point of attack. The suc-
cess of this general offensive depended upon its rapid devel-
opment, but in reality all calculations were upset from the
start, the connection between the operations at various fronts
severed, with the consequence that the entire aim of the
operation was frustrated. As soon as this state of things
became evident I advised General Brussilov before the 6th
of July to stop the general offensive. But I met with no
approval Separate offensives were continued at different
fronts, but all spirit and sense had forsaken them. Noth-
ing remained but the inertia of movement, which only tended
to augment the ruin and dissolution of the army. I remem-
ber that Kornilov's telegram of the nth of July, pointing

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 21

to the necessity of " immediately stopping the offensive on
all fronts," played an important part in his appointment to
the post of Generalissimo.]

Chairman. Has not a certain conversation taken place
with Savinkov and Filonenko in a railway car, concerning
the conference, which explains our previous question?

Kcrcnsky. I do not know which conversation you refer
to. There were several conversations.

Chairman. About replacing Brussilov by Kornilov.

Kerensky. I should like to say that Savinkov ought
to be distinguished from Filonenko. As far as I can
remember, Savinkov accompanied me to the conference.
. . . Oh, no he arrived from the South-western front
[though at my summons]. He was commissary at that
time. At first I did not even know that Filonenko was
at the Stavka. I was acquainted with Savinkov's work
at the South-western front; I had spoken to him, whereas
Filonenko was personally very little known to me. I met
him almost for the first time at the Stavka, After the
conference of July i6th conversations did take place in the
railway-car. I do not remember whether Filonenko was
present or not, but I do not think he could speak in the
same way as Savinkov would.

Chairman. Perhaps in connection with this conference
conversations had taken place concerning changes in the
Government. Who were the Cabinet Ministers proposed,
or what were the changes anticipated?

Kerensky. I do not at all remember what happened on
the train. I was then already Prime Minister. ... I do
not remember whether the crisis was over then or not. It

22 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

seems as if all this happened before the Cabinet had been
reformed I cannot say. I do not remember. If the
Cabinet was incomplete, then the conversation did take place.
That crisis lasted a long time, a whole month, I believe,
and ended in my resigning. It was the only way to force
public opinion to come to any decision. Generally, I must
say, concerning your references to different conversations
in which I took part, that conversations are freely going
on around me. I never forbid any one, not even a sub-
lieutenant (let alone a commissary), to express his opinion,
give advice, etc. But such talk seldom influences subse-
quent events.

[During the examination proper /these questions concern-
ing conversations in the railway-carriage seemed to me
rather unnecessary and irrelevant. But now, having become
acquainted " at leisure " with the different statements upon
the Kornilov affair, I see the use that was attempted to be
made of such conversations and find it necessary to discuss
the matter more fully.

Now I understand that the Commission of Inquiry was
trying to clear up the question of the " irresponsible influ-
ences " upon the Prime Minister. Here are those of the
statements touching upon this question and made in con-
nection with the Kornilov affair with which I became ac-
quainted General Kornilov says that he "openly" de-
clared to Savinkov that he considered " Kerensky a man of
weak character, easily influenced by others." Savinkov
relates : "On the way, I learnt in the train from A. F. Ker-
ensky that he had summoned me from the Southwestern
front in view of formation of a new Cabinet based upon the
principle of a strong revolutionary power. . . . However,
after our arrival at Petrograd, Kerensky's combination did

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 23

not come into existence* The problem of a strong revolu-
tionary power remained unsolved, but General Kornilov
was appointed Generalissimo, Filonenko Commissary-in-
Chief, and I Deputy Minister of War." " On the way,"
says Filonenko, "we drew the Prime Minister's attention
to the urgent necessity of creating a strong authority, and
were energetically supported by M. I. Terestchenko, The
question of forming an inner ' War Cabinet * of Govern-
ment members was particularly discussed. . . . This idea,
which received A. F. Kerensky's full approval, was warmly
supported by Terestchenko. ..." Lastly, in Savinkov's
supplementary statement there was a special clause 4 : "On
irresponsible advisers/' which ran as follows : " I became
convinced that both N. V. Nekrassov and M. I. Terestchenko
with Kerensky's knowledge interfere in the affairs of the
Military Department." But both Nekrassov and Terest-
chenko were fully constituted members of the Provisional
Government and as such had full right to " interfere/' even
without my " knowledge/' in the affairs of any department.
They not only possessed that right, but it was their duty to
do so, as members of the Provisional Government jointly
responsible for each other. Besides, V. N. Nekrassov was
then my Deputy, and M. I. Terestchenko Minister for For-
eign Affairs. Military problems touched them both very
closely. I consulted them upon questions of military policy
more frequently than any other ministers. Only a man very
unversed in statesmanship could in this case speak of u irre-
sponsible influences." " Besides which," continues Savinko,
" I became convinced that A. F. Kerensky is advised upon
affairs of state by persons not belonging to the Provisional
Government. Thus Colonel Baranovsky and Flag-Captain
Muraviev, and also, to the best of my belief, Gotz and Sen-

24 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

sinov offered advice about the formation of a new Cabinet,
while Messrs. Balavinsky and Virubov discussed V. N.
Lvov's ' ultimatum.' "

Balavinsky and Virubov, as will be seen later, rendered
me very important services upon the evening of the 26th of
August and that is all I will also dilate further on the
circumstances in which Colonel Baranovsky and Flag-Cap-
tain Muraviev have expressed their views. Concerning the
hints as to the influence of Gotz and Sensinov, I could
greatly enlarge the list of " irresponsible advisers " by add-
ing to it the representatives of other political parties (C.-D.,
S.-R., S.-D., etc.), 1 whom I invariably consulted every time
the Government was reformed. I do not think it possible
to form a serious Cabinet without learning the wishes and
tendencies of the political parties called upon to support the
Government

When, however, the question was not of a political agree-
ment for the formation of a coalitionary Government, but
one of a measure of administration then the most in-
fluential " irresponsible advisers " remained powerless, even
" Gotz and Sensinov/' For instance, both of them decidedly
protested in the name of the S.-I. party against B. V. Savin-
kov's appointment as Deputy Minister of War, and yet he
was appointed in spite of them.

** Moreover/' continues Savinkov in his disclosures, " Col-
onel Baranovsky often expressed his views concerning the
appointments and dismissals of persons belonging to the
high command/' But Colonel Baranovsky was chief of my
Military Cabinet, whose duty it was to give me correct in-
formation and conclusions upon all military questions which
came before me. Moreover, the only effect of his opinion

i C.-D. =s Constitutional Democrats; S.-R. SB Socialist Revolutionists;
S.-D. = Social Democrats,

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 25

about the staff of the military department was in helping me
to examine each case more fully. Savinkov even added my
eighteen-year-old aides-de-camp to the list of my "irre-
sponsible advisers." Well, here he beats me, and I am
powerless to refute this accusation.

I have purposely dwelt upon these details to give an ex-
ample of how history is written and legends created. The
events of the 3rd-5th of July in Petrograd, the break-up of
the front, the Government crisis, complications with dif-
ferent nationalities, economic difficulties, the food crisis
offered problems which the Government, diminished numeri-
cally (the cadets having only just left it) had to cope with
all at once.

On me devolved primarily the task of dealing with these t
matters : for almost twenty-four hours at a stretch I had to
divide my time between supreme State Government, Home
policy, reports of the Ministries of War and Marine, and
continuous trips to the front or the Stavka. At such a
time, the railway-car meant rest a respite, when one could
cease to be Prime Minister and just sit quietly and listen, and
when one could also allow one's companions to indulge in un-
conventional talk upon all subjects; for my closest collabo-
rators also worked like convicts when not on the train. And
now such a railway-respite assumes historical significance,
the chance companions of a casual talk upon the burning
topics of the day transform it into a political event of which
they were the centre. And when later the Provisional Gov-
ernment does not act upon " our report," naturally all the
blame is laid upon other advisers, who had played upon the
" weakness " of the Premier. Men who wish to govern must
possess the art of listening silently and letting others speak
out their thoughts, for this brings one into closer touch with
the yet unconscious hopes and aspirations of different social

26 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

circles. We were, of course, not exempt from work even
on the train. So on this occasion I listened attentively to
all Savinkov's conclusions upon military questions and to
his character-sketch of General Kornilov, as both of them
were destined to occupy more responsible posts in the
future.]

3

Chairman. What was your attitude, sir, and that of the
Provisional Government, towards General Kornilov's pro-
posals regarding the enforcement of army discipline and the
restoration of order at the front and in the rear? also
as regards his program and demands after he was appointed
Generalissimo ?

Kercnsky. Well, you see, here you must take both sides
of the question : the substance of his desires and the outward
forms he wished them to assume. In substance his scheme
was already partly being worked out by the Provisional
Government and was expected to be put into practice accord-
ing to the plan : co-ordination of relations between the com-
mittees, the commissaries and the commanding staff; defi-
nition of rights and duties; army discipline, such as the re-
establishing and enforcing of the officers' authority, etc*
All this was already being worked out. The only novelty
that presented itself was this: proposals became demands,
presented to the Provisional Government by General Kor-
nilov. This was strongly emphasized. Moreover, he spe-
cially insisted on reprisals, such as death-penalty, revolu-
tionary tribunals in the rear, etc. Part of the Provisional
Government advocated the full acceptance of General Kor-
nilov's ** demands." Myself and the majority of the Gov-
ernment were of opinion that Kornilov's demands, like all
the proposals of other commanders, however highly placed,

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 27

could only serve as material for free discussion by the Pro-
visional Government, as we could not on principle deviate
from our adopted course of action, which consisted in gradu-
ally introducing necessary measures without creating undue
shocks in the army and the country. As to the form of
Kornilov's demands, here the Provisional Government as a
body was obliged to protest emphatically against Kornilov's
ultimative manner of addressing the Government, in order
to safeguard the rights and the prestige of the Provisional
Government as the Supreme Authority of the State.

General Kornilov's first ultimatum was presented imme-
diately after his appointment as Generalissimo and before he
had even left Bendery. I sent him the customary telegram
of congratulation, expressing the hope that under his com-
mand, etc. ... in short, all that is usually said upon such
occasions. It seemed to me that the man honestly desired
to and would work. In reply to my telegram I at once re-
ceived the first ultimatum. You know, the Tcheremissov
affair. I told the Provisional Government that we must dis-
miss Kornilov at once ; that if we wanted to restore discipline
in the army, we must begin by giving an example in high
quarters. My proposal was not accepted, and Kornilov in-
terpreted our indulgence as a sign of impotence.

[As a matter of fact, General Kornilov during the first
twenty-four hours of his Generalissimoship managed to send
me two ultimative telegrams, but I did not deal with them in
the same way. I simply made a note of the first telegram.
I did not report it to the Provisional Government, although
it contained neither more nor less than the " terms " upon
which General Kornilov consented to remain Generalissimo.
Here is the text of this ultimatum: "As a soldier bound
to give an example of military discipline I obey the order of
the Provisional Government appointing me to the post of

g8 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Generalissimo; but now as Generalissimo and a citizen of
free Russia I declare that I shall remain at this post only so
long as I am conscious of being useful to my country and to
the established regime. According to the above statement I
declare that I accept this appointment upon the following
terms: (i) responsibility only before my conscience and
before the whole people; (2) absolute non-interference with
my imperative orders, including appointments to the high
command; (3) extension of all measures lately adopted at
the front to all districts in the rear where there are army
reserves; (4) acceptance of my proposals stated in my tele-
gram to the Generalissimo at the Conference of July i6th,
attheStavka. . . ."

Today, upon the background of the events which suc-
ceeded them, these " terms," drawn up by Zavoiko, produce
a far less naive impression than they did on the 20th of
July, 1917. Then, if treated seriously, an official discussion
of the 'ultimatum of General Kornilov, acting "now as
Generalissimo/' would have resulted in one inevitable conse-
quence (see Clauses i and 2 of the terms) General Kor-
nilov's immediate dismissal from his post, with committal
for trial according to military statute. And yet the entire
document gave proof of such absence of even an elementary
knowledge of statesmanship that it seemed impossible to re-
prove this gallant soldier, who clearly had signed a docu-
ment foisted upon him by " chance persons." At that time
I could have entirely shared Prince G. N. Trubetzkoy's later
expressed opinion of General Kornilov.

" My general opinion of Kornilov," wrote Prince Trubetz-
koy, " is, that he is above all a soldier unable to grasp com-
plicated political matters, and as such he offers a particularly
remarkable sample of our commanding staff." I recollect
that, after reading the Generalissimo's terms, I handed over

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 29

the telegram to Savinkov and Baranovsky. They both said
it was unworthy of notice, and Savinkov added that this
action showed that the General had been again influenced by
the unscrupulous adventurers who surrounded him, and that,
after receiving corresponding explanations, Kornilov would
acknowledge his mistake.

If you bear in mind that those were times when " all and
sundry " addressed nothing but " demands " to the Pro-
visional Government, that the relation of a person demand-
ing something to somebody of whom he demands it was the
only accepted form of relation to the authorities; if you
understand an attitude entirely comprehensible in the case
of a people intoxicated with liberty after long years of
slavery, whose imperious mode of address was adopted by a
street meeting and the State Duma Conference, by the
spokesman of the " revolutionary democracy " and the Cen-
tral Committee of the Officers' League if you bear all
this in mind, you will understand why I considered General
Kornilov's terms as mere literature. Added to that was the
extraordinary critical position at the front, which had to be
dealt with with the utmost circumspection, and clamoured
not for " politics " but for military art ; and I think that
every impartial critic will understand why I could not deal
with Kornilov's telegram otherwise than by locking it up in
my desk.

General Tcheremissov's affair was quite another matter.
This time I had to deal not with mere literature but with a
very decisive act, which called for instant repudiation by the
Supreme Authority. In his statement to the Commission
of Inquiry General Kornilov himself gives the following
narrative of his Tcheremissov ** conflict" with the Pro-
visional Government :

ff On the igth of July I was appointed Generalissimo by

30 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

order of the Provisional Government. I telegraphed a re-
ply, stating upon what terms I considered it possible to
accept that post One of the terms was the absolute non-
interference of the Provisional Government in all appoint-
ments to the high command. ... In reply I received a
telegram from the Minister of War, recognizing my right
to appoint my own collaborators, and the next day I learnt
from the Press news that General Tcheremissov had, with-
out my knowledge, been appointed Commander-in-Chief of
the Southwestern front. I was obliged to telegraph to the
Minister of War, asking him to cancel this appointment and
warning him that otherwise I should find it impossible to
accept the Supreme Command. On the 2Oth of July I wired
to Savinkov telling him that before receiving a decisive an-
swer to my telegrams I would not start for the Stavka/'

In the first place, the simultaneous appointments of Gen-
erals Kornilov and Tcheremissov by order of the 1 Senate
were made on the i8th of July, i.e. before Kornilov pre-
sented his terms, and therefore my answer to General Kor-
nilov's telegrams of July ipth could have no connection with
the events of July i8th. Then my answer contained no
assent to the terms of " non-interference " ; I only recognized
General Kornilov's right as Generalissimo to make such ap-
pointments to the commanding staff as are within the juris-
diction of a Generalissimo, but this right had never been
disputed. The fact is that the Statute concerning the rights
of the Generalissimo, which had been drawn up for the
Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaevitch, gave the Generalissimo
the right of appointment to commanding posts, subject to
the presentation of the candidates for confirmation by the
Supreme Authority. This Statute remained in force after
the Revolution, the power of the Sovereign being trans-
ferred to the Provisional Government. In practice, both

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 81

before and after the Revolution the mutual relations be-
tween the Supreme Authority and the Stavka concerning
appointments to the High Command consisted in each case
in a preliminary agreement. I cannot recall a single in-
stance of the Provisional Government appointing any one
to the army without previously consulting the Stavka, or of
refusing the confirmation of an appointment made by the
latter. On the other hand, I must bear witness that neither
General Alexeiev nor General Brussilov ever exercised their
rights in cases of importance without first privately consult-
ing the Premier or the Minister of War. Naturally, Gen-
eral Kornilov's attempt to give such a wide interpretation of
the Generalissimo's rights as to make him completely inde-
pendent of the Government was doomed to failure. In
Kornilov's time the Provisional Government made as much
use as ever of its right of control and final confirmation of
all appointments, decidedly interfering, when necessary,
with the Stavka's activity. Thirdly, and that is the most
important point, General Kornilov, in spite of my telegram,
continued to insist upon General Tcheremissov's dismissal,
and threatened to abandon his post in the middle of the
enemy offensive. Having accepted the post of Generalis-
simo on the I9th of July, Kornilov arbitrarily delayed en-
tering upon his duties for five days until the 24th of July*
This was no longer literature, but a serious breach of mili-
tary duty, which threatened the country with grave conse-
quences.

I plead guilty for not having finally insisted upon Kor-
nilov's immediate dismissal, but . . . but those were such
awful times, there was such sore need of a strong person-
ality at the front Besides, General Tcheremissov's re-
maining under the existing circumstances at the post of
Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front could only

32 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

bring harm. When judging this " conflict " one must bear
in mind that General Tcheremissov, commanding one of the
8th Army corps, had delivered a successful attack at Galitch
and had added fresh laurels to General Kornilov's fame.
At the time of my visit to the 8th Army, just before the
Galitch offensive, General Kornilov spoke very highly of
Tcheremissov, and my personal impression of Tcheremissov
was that of a man capable of commanding troops in the
novel post-revolutionary conditions. In the opinion of
every unprejudiced person General Tcheremissov appeared
as General Kornilov's most natural successor at the South-
western front. And when, under pressure of the moment, I
appointed them both on the i8th of July, I had no idea of
creating a " conflict/'

Since then I received weekly ultimatums from General
Kornilov. I here again repeat that I struggled most de-
cidedly against these ultimatums and against this matter of
treating the Provisional Government. I struggled from
first to last.

This struggle was all the more difficult because I could
and would not use the favourite method of both the Right and
Left parties demagogy. You have but to open the papers
of that period to see the organized demagogic campaign led
by the Stavka by means of special correspondents, inter-
views and declaration telegrams, which appeared in the
Press before reaching the Premier's study all of which
produced an echo from the demagogues of the Left. Ob-
serving the play of these passions, the Government tried by
all means to calm the social atmosphere, to support the
authority of the Stavka as the supreme military centre in
the eyes of democracy, to keep General Kornilov within
bounds in such a way as not to increase the differences in
the army. During those long weeks of struggle there was

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM S3

not a single instance of a hostile act done by any member
of the Government against the Stavka. On the contrary,
when General Kornilov arrived at Petrograd on the 3rd
of August, I took the opportunity of feting him at a meet-
ing of the Provisional Government and of having the fact
printed in all the papers. Just before and during the Mos-
cow Conference, as will be seen later, the Government took
steps to prevent Kornilov from compromising himself. The
Government's conflict with Kornilov assumed the shape of a
passive resistance, the main point of it being the prevention
of him and his adherents from taking one step beyond the
limits drawn by the Provisional Government, so that all
his attempts to use the Provisional Government as a means
for the attainment of his own ends proved a failure. The
Provisional Government executed the will of the whole
people as expressed in the agreement between all the politi-
cal parties which had delegated their representatives to the
Provisional Government, and the only way of forcing
it to deviate from such an all-national program in the in-
terests of one separate party was to overthrow it an
attempt which failed on the 27th of August and succeeded
on the 25th of October.]

4

Chairman. Did Kornilov always address his demands
for reform in the army and the rear to you personally, or
through Savinkov, and were you always acquainted with
them?

Kerensky. No; and I must say that the most critical
period was at the time of the possible prevention of the
Moscow Conference (loth-nth of August), on the very
eve of its meeting, when without my knowledge Kornilov

34 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

was summoned to Petrograd. Although he refused to come
[owing to the grave situation at Riga], the Ministry of
War, that is Savinkov and Filonenko, insisted upon his ar-
rival. When I heard of this insistence (about midnight
on the eve of the Generalissimo's arrival at Petrograd) I
sent the following telegram to Kornilov: " The Provisional
Government has not summoned you, does not insist upon
arrival, and will not be responsible for it in view of the
strategic situation." In spite of that Kornilov arrived and
presented me with a memorandum [to be brought that eve-
ning before a meeting of the Provisional Government], sup-
posed to have been jointly drawn up by the Minister of War
and the Generalissimo. But / had never seen it before it
was shown to me by the Generalissimo. Neither had Kor-
nilov seen it before his arrival at Petrograd, but he supposed
I was acquainted with it. Here he had sat on that little
chair and I in this arm-chair, and it seemed to me that I had
succeeded in persuading him that, whatever opinion one
might have of the memorandum itself, it was impossible to
issue a document in the name of the Minister of War of
whose contents I, then Minister of War, knew nothing [and
that therefore, before I became thoroughly acquainted with
it, it could not be discussed by the Provisional Government].

Kornilov agreed to this, took this document, and de-
parted. He returned, however, in the evening in a totally
changed frame of mind and declared that he was fully in
accord with Savinko and Filonenko and had already signed
the memorandum.

Chairman. Therefore this memorandum did not pro-
ceed from him, but was apparently written by Savinkov?

Kerensky. It seems to have been drawn up by Filon-
enko.

[As will ultimately be seen, my deposition at this point

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 35

refers to the so-called second report of General Kornilov.
This document ought to have been brought before the Pro-
visional Government instead of the first report of the Su-
preme Command which he proposed to lay before the
Government on August 3rd, but the reading of which was
postponed until its contents were approved by the Minister
of War. Thus the very origin of this second report proves
that, even if I did not entirely agree with all it contained,
my knowledge of its essential contents was an indispensable
preliminary condition of its being laid before the Provisional
Government. From General Kornilov's deposition it is evi-
dent that his decision to sign the report of Savinkov and
Filonenko, at 6 p. M. on August loth, was brought about
by Savinkov's declaring that although "the memorandum
had not actually been laid before A. F. Kerensky for his
final revision," he had reported to him (Kerensky) " bit by
bit in the course of its preparation, and that in any case the
contents of the report were known to the Prime Minister."
In reality I was only informed of the first clause relating to
" the introduction of military courts-martial at the rear/'
However, Savinkov in his deposition changes the definite
word " contents " into the vague term " substance of ."
"This memorandum," says Savinkov, "apart from the
projects of bills of Committees and Commissaries, contains
within itself other projected measures: (i) The establish-
ment of revolutionary courts-martial at the rear; (2) the
restoration of disciplinary powers to commanding officers ;
(3) the militarization of the railways; (4) the militarization
of such enterprises as were working for the defence. A. F.
Kerensky was kept informed by me to some extent of the
preparation of such a report by the War Office, since on
several occasions I laid before him the substance of it, em-
phasizing more especially the bill of the military-revolu-

36 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

tionary courts-martial by which it acquired a decisive impor-
tance. Kerensky did not express his views as to the meas-
ures proposed by me until August 8th, when at the Ministry
of War he declared to me categorically that in no case, and
under no conceivable circumstances, would he sign such a
document. After this declaration of his, I said that in that
case the report to the Provisional Government would be
presented by General Kornilov and I sent in my resigna-
tion."

This deposition depicts in sufficiently high colours the rela-
tions between the Deputy-Minister of War and the War
Minister; but an indispensable commentary on Savinkov's
cautious words will be found in the conversation by tele-
gram between Filonenko and the Commissary of the South-
western front, Gobetchia, on August s/th. "You know
our rule/ 7 said Filonenko, " to act always with the cogni-
zance not only of our allies, but of our real, or presumed,
enemies as well. Therefore we have informed the Prime
Minister betimes of the fact that I am writing a report,
that Boris Victorovitch * is in constant touch with me, and
that General Kornilov fully shares our views on the state
of things. , . . The Premier did not find it possible to
lay such a report before the Provisional Government for
consideration. We then warned him that it would be pre-
sented to the Provisional Government all the same by one
who had the right to do so, that is to say, by the Com-
mander-in-Chief. Unfortunately the Premier did not
value our sincerity, nor the frank line of action we adopted.
... I, bidding good-bye (Filonenko had to proceed to
Headquarters on the evening of August loth), assured

1 Familiar appellation of Savinkov, according to the Russian custom
of calling a person by his prenomen plus his father's prenomen*

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 37

Savinkov that in this extraordinary political conflict he had,
of course, a right to the support of his adherents/'

Thus, on account of a political quarrel, it was con-
sidered possible to command the presence of General Kor-
nilov in spite of the fact that " the changes in the strategic
situation demanded his presence at Headquarters," as, ac-
cording to Savinkov, Kornilov had declared to him in per-
son, on August Qth, by telegram. (These were the critical
days of Riga,)

Savinkov, fully realizing how serious was his action,
assured General Kornilov, according to the statement of
the latter, that " the summons to Petrograd was made with
the knowledge of the Provisional Government." In his own
deposition Savinkov speaks as follows : " I summoned
General Kornilov to Petrograd in the full conviction that I
was acting entirely in agreement with Kerensky, for: (i)
on August 3rd, General Kornilov notified me that he was
coming to Petrograd for the discussion of the memorandum,
and his declaration had met with no objection on Kerensky 5 s
part; (2) on August 7th, General Kornilov telegraphed to
Kerensky and received no objection; (3) on August 8th, I
referred the matter to Kerensky and encountered no opposi-
tion. The fact of Kerensky's having sent a telegram to
Kornilov on the 9th, intimating that his journey to Petrograd
was unnecessary, which did not find the General at Head-
quarters, was not known to me." While so precisely demon-
strating that on August 3rd, 7th and 8th he had good
grounds for his conviction that he was acting in complete
agreement with me, Savinkov has forgotten that he himself
was only informed on August 9th of General Kornilov's re-
fusal to come to Petrograd; while as to Savinkov' s being
ignorant of my telegram sent to catch General Kornilov, the

38 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

matter is easily explained: it was sent late in the evening,
after I had accidentally learnt of the unauthorized and re-
peated invitation to Kornilov, which, it is to be regretted,
I did not learn from Savinkov personally.]

Raupakh. This was on August loth?

Kcrciisky. All this took place on August loth, and early
on August nth Kokoshkin came to me with the intimation
that he would resign at once if General Kornilov's pro-
gram was not accepted that -day. The tension was great,
but I succeeded in smoothing things over,

[It is only necessary to remember the exceptional tension
of political passion under pressure of which the Moscow
Conference met and was inaugurated, in order to realize
what a sense of bewilderment came over me on Kokoshkin's
appearance with his resignation for I was in the very
centre of this area of tension. This matutinal interview
with Kokoshkin was one of the stormiest of my political
encounters. But today I rejoice to remember the passion-
ate flame of love for his country which he felt in the depths
of his soul ; a love which so soon consumed him on the mar-
tyr's pyre; a love which then made it possible for us, in
fine, to speak independently of party, and above all party
feeling, the fraternal language of the sons of one toother
Russia,

The departure of one group of ministers from the Pro-
visional Government on account of Kokoshkin would prob-
ably have been followed by the resignation of the remaining
ministers on the eve of the opening of the Conference for
the same reason as in the case of Kokoshkin the " de-
mands " of Kornilov. This would have made any further
preservation of national equilibrium an impossibility. The
Government, however, was only too well aware of the state
of the country to risk a disastrous attempt at government

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 39

by a f ' homogeneous " Cabinet, and was compelled to put
aside any subject of which the ** Bolsheviks from the
Right" l might take advantage for an attempt (which was
being prepared for the Moscow Conference) to create a so-
called " strong authority " and in any case to deviate the
course of the Government towards the Right. Of course,
such an attempt could only have brought to cruel shame
those who took part in it Its danger might only have lain
in the fact that it would have thrown towards the Left the
leaders of democratic circles which at this juncture were
following sincerely and honourably in the steps of the Gov-
ernment. I think the Moscow Conference proved that the
hypothesis that the masses of the nation might at that time
have been detached from the Provisional Government in
order to follow a course more to the Right was a harmful
Utopianism, because such dreams, impotent to bring forth
results, were only effective in producing irritation in the
masses and increasing their distrust of the classes. At that
time, at the Moscow Conference, the Utopians of the Right
were shown their proper place without serious trouble, but
no lessons of facts and realities could disillusion them, and
they continued to clamour just enough to become a con-
venient weapon in the hands of the demagogues of the Left
to rouse the wild beast in the masses, who in the end has
broken his cage and run amuck.

Later, after the Moscow Conference, I laid matters before
Savinkov and persuaded him not to resign. When it
seemed that at Moscow everybody realized clearer that it is
impossible to attack the Provisional Government on this
ground, I decided that it was not worth while to follow up
any further all the consequences of this episode of the
memorandum and summons to Kornilov.

i The Absolutists.

40 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Of course this decision may appear to have been wrong,
but I did not perceive in Savinkov's doings any evil design,
and only saw in them an extreme manifestation of his
militant temperament But in any case his resignation
would not have averted Kornilov's proceedings, because I
am convinced that the events of August 27th-29th had been
prepared behind Savinkov's back, I think it will be evident
to the reader later that this deduction was correct.]

5

Chairman. Were reports made to you by Filonenko con-
cerning the conspiracy at Headquarters, and on what were
they based? Especially as regards Lukomsky and Tikh-
meniev?

Kerensky. I read in the newspapers that certain wit-
nesses attach some great importance to the alleged " fact "
that I was informed of a plot almost under the direction of
Lukomsky, and nevertheless paid no attention to it . . .
As a matter of fact, the affair was quite otherwise. There
was some talk of Lukomsky, but under the following cir-
cumstances. A day or two after Filonenko was elected
Commissary to the Supreme Command, Savinkov told me
that Filonenko had "discovered" something, and that he
insisted on the immediate dismissal of Lukomsky. I re-
plied by asking how he had learnt it, seeing he had only
just arrived from Headquarters. Then Filonenko came
here and said to me : " I do not trust General Lukomsky and
I insist on his immediate dismissal." I answered that I
could not do this because it was quite impossible to dismiss
the Chief of the Staff of the Generalissimo without any
grounds or information; that my posi^ou 'would be ridicu-
lous, and it would be said that this was autocracy in its

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 41

most inadmissible form to dismiss one man for who-
knows-what one day, and another one the next. So far,
General Lukomsky had carried out his duties conscien-
tiously, and there was nothing against him. " If you bring
me positive information, that will be another matter/' I
said.

Shdblovsky. And he produced no facts?

Kerensky. He produced none; he only said: " I declare
that I utterly distrust Lukomsky and insist on his immediate
dismissal." M. I. Terestchenko, who was at Headquarters
at that time, came and told me that the feeling there was
extremely serious because Filonenko led a most persistent
campaign against Lukomsky. After this I received no fur-
ther communications regarding Lukomsky except that in-
formation reached me that the people there managed to get
on together better than before.

Shabloz'sky. In connection with this indication by
Filonenko of the lack of any data which would confirm his
desire to see Lukomsky dismissed, did you not explain to
Filonenko that as Commissary to the Supreme Command
he ought to maintain good relations with the Chief of the
Staff?

Kerensky. I spoke thus : I consider, generally speaking,
that such behaviour was undesirable, and that without suf-
ficient grounds such assertions should never be made to me.
Also I insisted that the relations between himself, as the
Commissary attached to the Commander-in-Chief, and the
Chief of the Staff should be correct.

Chairman. And did you say that in the meantime you
did not suspect Lukomsky of being a counter-revolutionary?

Kerensky. Yes. Because there was no sort of evidence
to that effect. [General Lukomsky's appointment to the
post of Chief of the Staff was made at the same time as

42 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

that of General Brussilov (who became Commander-in-
Chief). Comparatively young, energetic, very intelligent,
an accomplished specialist, with great experience in ad*
ministrative and military matters, General Lukomsky car-
ried out his duties as Chief of the Staff during an extremely
difficult phase of the war in an exemplary way, under-
standing how to limit tactfully the circle of his duties and
never mixing himself up in politics. Therefore what after-
wards happened the union between Lukomsky and Gen-
eral Kornilov was incomprehensible to me. Now that I
am acquainted in detail with all that took place at Head-
quarters previous to August 27th, and that the role played
there by Filonenko himself became clear to me, I understand
why Lukomsky at the last moment proved to be at one with
Kornilov. But then, at the close of July, the cam-
paign against Lukomsky could be explained as being (as it
seems in fact to have been) merely an effort to rid Head-
quarters of a man who was distrusted. Here is a char-
acteristic passage from a statement of Prince Trubetzkoy
which confirms my conjectures : * I must say that as early
as August 24th, having called on Lukomsky after a dis-
cussion with General Kornilov, I pointed out to the former
the people who surrounded Kornilov, enlarging upon the pos-
sible harm to him from their influence. Lukomsky, agree-
ing with me entirely on this point, remarked that he had
been kept altogether out of the recent political discussions
. . . and that he had raised the question as to whether he
possessed Korniloifs confidence or no, after which he was
informed in a general way of the political movements/'
Elsewhere, Trubetzkoy relates how, on August 27th, Lukom-
sky, in his presence, asked Kornilotf " to make it possible
for them to converse in prh*ate, if only for a few minutes."
I do not think that the effort to get rid of Lukomsky in

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 43

July was made without Kornilov being aware of it, because
his wish to change the Chief of the Staff was known to
me, and it was only at the Moscow Conference that Kor-
nilov told me that he had come to an agreement with Lu-
komsky.]

Chairman. More particularly, sir, as regards Tikhme-
niev, was not his dismissal demanded on similar grounds,
namely that he was something like the head of the plot, and
had not the prejudice against him some foundation?

Kerensky. I must confess that the incident relating to
Tikhmeniev passed before me as in a dream, I heard that
a telegram had been sent to summon Tikhmeniev to the
Ministry of War, that when on his way thither he was sent
back again, and that all this was done on account of that
telegram from Filonenko to Savinkov, a phrase of which
was found later in a note-book in the possession of Kor-
nilov when he was arrested about " the pale horse/' *
This story did not reach me officially. All this fuss was
grounded on the fact that almost immediately after his ar-
rival at Headquarters Filonenko sent Savinkov a code tele-
gram to the effect that Tikhmeniev was leading troops
("the pale horse") against Kornilov ("the Myrta").
Afterwards Filonenko explained this telegram by the fact
that just at this time the Third Army Corps was moved
from the South to Headquarters.

Shablovsky. Did not Colonel Baranovsky then specially
vouch for Tikhmeniev, saying that so far no kind of sus-
picion had been aroused by him, and did not that serve to
rehabilitate Tikhmeniev?

Kerensky. There was some conversation on Lukomksy's
account, but the story about Tikhmeniev did not reach me.
Some one just mentioned that a curious telegram was re-
1 *' The Pale Horse " is a well-known novel by B, V. Savinkov.

4* THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ceived which had very mysterious contents. Perhaps I am
confusing matters, but it seems to me this was how it stood.
[General Tikhmeniev was the Chief of the Military Trans-
port at Headquarters, consequently orders for the trans-
port of troops were sent out from there signed by this gen-
eral. But Tikhmeniev could only give such directions after
having received corresponding orders from the Staff. Con-
sequently, the duties of Chief of the Military Transport
were purely technical and administrative. The case of Gen-
eral Tikhmeniev is quite unimportant, almost farcical; it
was touched upon by the Commission of Inquiry evidently
in connection with that version of it which was so persist-
ently expounded by Filonenko and a few others : there was a
plot, but all the threads of it centred in the Staff, and Ker-
ensky, being reassurred by Baranovsky, closed his eyes to
this. ... In reality the misunderstanding with Tikh-
meniev happened because, at the time of General Kornilov's
arrival at Headquarters, the Third Army corps also went
there, having been summoned after the events of July 3rd-
5th to station itself in the region of Headquarters. The
fact was that, having received false intelligence of the vic-
tory of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, their comrades of the
Soviet of Mohilev (where the Headquarters were) tried to
achieve a similar result at Headquarters, and appeared be-
fore General Brussilov with a proposal to recognize them as
Authority. In a discussion on this subject it came out that
Headquarters were, in reality, completely without protection
against such insolence. Now, to create, even temporarily,
entanglements in the working at Headquarters would be a
very attractive plan, and not only for Russian Bolsheviks,
. . . Therefore we t with Brussilov, decided to strengthen
the defences at Headquarters. This is all.]

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 45

6

Chairman, Then, what about Kornilov's arrival on
August 3rd, its reason, aims, and all that took place there?
Both Kornilov and Savinkov express themselves explicitly
on this subject.

Kerensky. On the 3rd of August, Kornilov arrived in
order to ...

Raupakh. To report on the strategical situation . . .

Kerensky. Yes, yes. . . .

Chairman. They refer to a memorandum which Savin-
kov wrote to Kornilov and transmitted through the Minister
Terestchenko. In this connection Kornilov makes an ex-
tended deposition ; he says in it that then a complete change
came about in his ideas . . .

Kerensky. In his deposition he states what I said.
Please do not repeat it all here.

Shdblovsky. Yes, and Savinkov gave him a note. . . .
Was Kornilov summoned by the Government, or did he
come, as on August loth, on the invitation of Savinkov?

Kerensky. I cannot say on whose initiative it was
whether the Government summoned him, or whether he ex-
pressed a desire to present a report. We usually observed
the following procedure : the Commander-in-Chlef used to
come in order personally to review generally the military
situation and to confer with the Provisional Government
upon the essential questions relating to the front. In any
case Kornilov's coming on August 3rd was quite straight-
forward. On whose initiative he came is of no importance.
He arrived, and on the same day a special sitting of the
Provisional Government was called, at which Kornilov pro-
duced a report. That report had the following antecedents.

46 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Kornilov brought with him a memorandum (which was cer-
tainly not written by him personally, but by somebody at
Headquarters) of such a nature that I considered it impos-
sible to read it out before the Provisional Government.
It set forth a whole series of measures, the greater part
of which were quite acceptable, but formulated in such
a way and supported by such arguments that the an-
nouncement of them would have led to quite opposite re-
sults. At any rate, there would have been an outburst,
and after making the memorandum public it would have
been impossible to retain Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief.
I then requested the Deputy Ministef for War so to arrange
matters that this report should not be read before the Pro-
visional Government. It was resolved that the memoran-
dum should be revised in conjunction with the Minister for
War (i.e. myself), to make it acceptable to Headquarters,
to public opinion, and to me; and that on that particular
day General Kornilov should only report upon the strategic
situation of the army and upon possible military events. By
the way, I do not know whether you are aware that in the
second memorandum presented on August loth there ap-
peared two entirely new clauses relating to factories and
ways of communication.

Shdblovsky. Which did not figure in the report of
August 3rd?

Kerensky. No. Both these clauses were very like a
production by a Stchedrin official. 1 They were not, as it
appears, known to Kornilov before he came to Pettograd
on August loth. On that day, we that is to say, Nckras-
sov, Terestchenko and myself insistently asked Kornilov
at any rate not to touch upon these clauses at the Moscow
Conference. At the same time we said that if he made
1 Stchedrin, a famous Russian satirist.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 47

these clauses ptrblic, there would simply be a great scandal.
As a matter of fact, if any one had desired the downfall of
Kornilov at the Moscow Conference, it would only have
been necessary to let him read his report in public, and espe-
cially the two clauses dealing with factories and ways of
communication- Thin all would have been at an end.

I well remember how Nekrassov and Terestchenko, with
the greatest tenderness for the General's feelings, tried their
utmost to bring things home to him ; and, pointing to their
own experiences in the Duma, in the War Industries Com-
mittee, and other public organizations, endeavoured to make
it clear to him that all his proposed measures for the regen-
eration of the rear the militarization of the railways and
factories had already been brought f orward by the Minis-
ters of the old regime, and were even then rejected, not only
by public opinion, but even by official experts ; that it was
impossible, for instance, to condemn an engineer to death
for some technical error, or to attach the workers to their
factories under the threat of repressive measures, and so on ;
how for General Kornilov to come forward with such proj-
ects borrowed from the archives of bureaucracy would
hardly increase his authority, and so on. But all in vain.
The general, much too simple in matters of state-administra-
tion and economics, who, without bothering about thinking
it out, had signed this school-boyish composition in the style
of Ugrium-Burcheev, 1 would not believe a word of what
the two ministers said, and was convinced that the Provi-
sional Government, on some pretext or other, did not wish
all Russia to know of his new program for the country's
salvation. Moreover, General Kornilov was so persuaded
of the unique importance of this report, that in his speech
at the Moscow Conference he even attributed the authorship
* A character in u History of a Town/' by Stchedrin.

48 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

of it to himself (" My report was presented to the Pro-
visional Government, and this document was signed without
any hesitation by the Deputy Minister for War, Savinkov,
and the Commissary attached to the Supreme Command,

Filonenko")-

On August 3rd all was carried out as decided. At the

sitting of the Provisional Government General Kornilov
made a report on the strategical situation, stating that he
will report on the proposed measures for the regeneration
of the army during his next visit. As regards the deposi-
tion of Kornilov concerning a note received by him from
Savinkov during the sitting of August 3rd, I do not know
what Savinkov wrote to General Kornilov. I do not wish
at present to decide whether Kornilov interpreted sincerely
or not rny words in regard to this document, but the con-
versation we had with him was on a quite different subject.
He reported, at great length, on the question of the pro-
posed offensive operations on the South- Western front,
and on a whole series of other measures, and afterwards
he began to talk of various technical matters in detail.
Then I turned to him and said, " General, these details are
not at all necessary here." That is all.

Shablovsky. . . . Thus, the general strategical situa-
tion was sketched out?

Kerensky* More than that; he even spoke, as I have
said already, about the preparations made for an offensive
on the South- Western front. Only after I perceived that
all that was essential had been reported, I said to the Gen-
eral that these details were unnecessary here. It should be
stated and members of the Provisional Government can
confirm this that I always endeavoured to keep the sit-
tings of the Provisional Government as brief as possible,
and used to cut short even Ministers ruthlessly when once I

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 49

saw that the essence of the matter had been laid before
us. ...

KrokhmaL There was not in it a thought of the neces-
sity of secrecy?

Kerensky. I had no such thought. Simply, if it had
happened to be a member of the Provisional Government
or an intimate friend, I should have said : " Ivan Ivanovitch,
enough. The matter is now clear/' I did not wish
to ...

KrokhmaL Offend him ?

Kerensky. To place him in an awkward position, and I
said : " General, these details are quite unnecessary here."

Shabloi*sky* But what was in Savinkov's note?

Kerensky. I do not know. It was addressed to Kor-
nilov.

Shablovsky. Yes, the note came to Kornilov from
Savinkov, and in his deposition he now insists upon this
note.

Kerensky. I think it likely that this happened after-
wards, and that it was not a note, but a conversation. I sat
beside Kornilov and should have noticed if a document had
been handed over to him. Even if this had been done be-
hind my back I should have seen Kornilov stretch out his
hand.

Shablovsky. This episode is not within your recollec-
tion?

Kerensky. I do not remember it.

[In order to form a clear judgment as to which note it
was that the Commission of Inquiry was so anxious to be
enlightened upon, and why, I will quote the depositions on
that subject of Kornilov and Savinkov which are known to
me. Speaking of the sitting of the Provisional Govern-
ment on August 3rd, General Kornilov added : " I con-

50 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

sider it my duty to observe that when I touched upon the
question, which is the front where it might be possible to
carry out an attack under certain conditions, the Prime
Minister, who was sitting beside me, turned round and
warned me in a whisper that this question must be handled
circumspectly* Shortly afterwards Savinkov's note was
handed in to me with a similar warning. I was filled with
consternation and indignation; that in the Council of the
Ministers of Russia the Commander-in-Chief could not,
without risk, touch upon questions about which he deemed
it necessary, in the interests of the defence of the. country,
to keep the Government informed ! But at the close of the
sitting it became evident to me, from a few words spoken

by Savinkov, that the warning concerned the Minister "

About this same episode Savinkov says : " During the sitting
of the Provisional Government I sent Kerensky a note con-
taining approximately the following: 'Does the Prime
Minister feel sure that the communication by General Kor-
nilov of the secrets of our Government and its Allies will
not become known through " comrades " to our enemies? '
Moreover, at the close of the sitting I said to General Kor-
nilov that unfortunately I was not certain that all which
was said in the sittings of the Provisional Government was
kept secret. Of course, I had no intention of casting sus-
picion on any of the Ministers as having relations with the
enemy, but I knew that some members of the Government
were in frequent and friendly communication with members
of the Soviet, among whom, according to information from
the Intelligence Department, were persons suspected of in-
tercourse with the enemy. Besides which I knew that an
officer of the Austrian army (Otto Bauer) had been invited
to attend a meeting of the Soviet/' From these two depos:-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 51

tions it would appear that Kornilov did not receive a note
from Savinkov, and that I did receive such a note from the
latter, which note I immediately tore up (I remember so
much), Savinkov was very cautious, being as he was in
close touch with the Military Intelligence Department and
studying all the reports of the Secret Service. Thus, in an-
other part of his deposition he says: "Zavoiko was sus-
pected of taking part in the plot, and, at the same time, my
attention was drawn to him by the Intelligence Department,
on account of his excellent relations with a Mr. Kurtz, who
had been exiled to Ribinsk on suspicion of being a German

Such is the history of the note at the sitting of August
3rd. The reason why the Commission of Inquiry became
interested in this story and why I am now telling it in detail,
is that it furnished General Kornilov with grounds which he
deemed sufficient for an infamous statement that "the
Provisional Government is acting in complete agreement
with the plans of the German General Staff." This accusa-
tion appears in his famous first manifesto " to the Russian
people/' which, by the way, was the work of the friend of
Mr. Kurtz Mr. Zavoiko.]

7

Chairman. Did not the General, then Colonel, Baranov-
sky visit Headquarters on August 3rd-4th? For what
reason was this journey undertaken? We wish to receive
evidence as to when more definite reports began to come in
regarding the possible plot at Headquarters.

Kerensky. This is an old story. Long before Baranov-
sky's journey.

52 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Shablovsky. Earlier than August 3rd~4th ?
Kerensky. You know that at the Moscow Conference
an attempt was made , . .

Shablovsky. This was later . . . but on August 3rd-
4th?

Kerensky. Why did Baranovsky visit Headquarters?
Perhaps at that time arose the question of proclaiming the
establishment of martial law in connection with the Riga
events.

KrokhmaL No ; Riga was taken after the Moscow Con-
ference.

Raupakh. Baranovsky went on August 23rd?
Kerensky. Yes ; he went there when it was necessary to
decide the question of separating . . .

Liber. This is a different visit ; it was no doubt in con-
nection with the separation of the territory of Petro-
grad. . . .

Shablovsky. This was when he went with Savinkov, on
August 23rd-24th; but on the 3rd-4th he went there on
account of the peculiar relations which had already existed
between Headquarters and the Provisional Government.
The question ol superseding the Commander-in-Chief had
not yet arisen ?

KrokhmaL Why, Kornilov was here on August 3rd.
I must remind you that Baranovsky s journey was after
this,

Ukrainzcv. Colonel Baranovsky was to have gone to
Kiev to see his sick mother (or was it his father?), and
stopped at Headquarters on the way.

Kerensky. Yes. He went to Kiev to his father, who
was ill. I wish to be accurate, and I am afraid of stating
positively whether I asked him to go to Headquarters, or
whether he went of his own accord, Let us assume that it

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 53

was I who asked Baranovsky to go there. The question of
the moment might have been to make clear what was the
position of the League of Officers. I must say that from
July 3rd~5th the League of Officers had taken up a some-
what aggressive attitude towards the Provisional Govern-
ment and was addressing to the latter telegrams in the spirit
of the " Bolshevism from the Right " : " We ask this," " we
demand that/' ** we protest, 15 etc* When I came to Head-
quarters, Novosiltsev always met me with a good deal of
opposition. There may often be something in the attitude
of people especially in political and social matters
which one feels clearly, although one may not be able to pro-
duce any documentary justification for the conclusions one
draws from it. The tension in the atmosphere at Head-
quarters, especially among the Central Committee of the
League of Officers, had long been felt ; and a month, or per-
haps more, before all these events about the end of July
I received precise information of a plot which was being
prepared among the officers and had its centres in Petrograd
and at Headquarters.

Shablovsky. At the end of July?

Kerensky. Yes, perhaps even earlier ; it can be verified
in this way: when was the law passed giving the right to
arrest officers when not on duty and to send them into
exile ?

Liber. I believe, on July Qth.

Kerensky. No, later. A week or two before this law
was promulgated, I was thinking out the way to organize
the struggle against the plotters. Ultimately, the legal
measure which, as early as the month of April, I, as Minister
of Justice, had brought in for formal purposes, now be-
came necessary in practice. Of course I kept the Pro-
visional Government informed of this new phenomenon, the

54 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

"plots wave.*' At this time occurred the arrests of the
Grand Dukes, but it appeared that we were purposely put on
the wrong track. Baranovsky went to Headquarters in
order to investigate the state of mind of the people there,
and to throw some light upon what they were doing there
at the League of Officers. Another time, after going there
with Savinkov, he said to me among other things on his re-
turn: "The atmosphere at Headquarters is desperate just
now ; they absolutely can not stand you."

[I consider it necessary to emphasize sharply the fact
that Colonel Baranovsky's journey to Headquarters was not
and could not have been in any way connected with ques-
tions of political investigation. The plotting at the League
of Officers was a sort of smugglers 7 business, and the in-
vestigation of that matter was being done separately. From
the midst of the Central Committee of the League of Of-
ficers were recruited the active conspirators; its members
in various places were also the agents of the conspiracy on
the spot : on the other hand, they also determined the char-
acter of the legal declarations or actions of the League*
Now, Colonel Baranovsky was interested in the League of
Officers precisely as in a legitimate social organization an
organization of which the object was exceedingly useful
and necessary although in the activities of this Central
Committee features were appearing which became more
and more disquieting to me both as Prime Minister and
Minister of War. In its conception and rules, the League
of Officers was a professional, non-party organization.
"The League of Officers of the Army and Navy" (it is
stated on the first page of its statutes) "is a professional
League. ... It has no political platform, and pursues
no political aims. Every member of the League has a full
right freely to form his political views. Members bind

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 55

themselves not to carry political intolerance into their pro-
fessional relations and the everyday life of the Army and
Navy." This is an entirely correct definition of the char-
acter of every professional Union. Of course, it would be
absurd to expect a completely non-political attitude from
any professional association in Russia during the summer of
1917, but a professional Union, and still more its admin-
istrators, never should or could behave like a militant and
" intolerant " political body. Now, the Central Committee
of the League of Officers violated this ABC of a profes-
sional organization, and also its own rules, in a radical
manner. It is true that on July 25th of the previous year
the " Messenger of the Central Committee of the League of
Officers of the Army and Navy" concluded its leading
article as follows : " In this article we reply to past and
future accusations against the League attributing to it politi-
cal activities, in order that we may point out to those who
wish to implicate us in politics that the League refuses to go
that way. Its mission is far wider, its activities more use-
ful, for it aims at making it possible for every officer of the
Russian revolutionary army and navy to fulfil his duties
tinder the most favourable conditions, in the firm belief that
the League will afford him full and organized support in
his efforts to promote the interests and greatness of his
native land/' But, in its conception of " the most favour-
able conditions " under which officers can " fulfil their duty "
the Central Committee introduced an entire political pro-
gram, and, in the name of the whole body of officers, made
very definite and sharp demands, and put forward trenchant
political declarations. In order to be convinced how pecu-
liarly the Central Committee understood its own " profes-
sionalism," it is sufficient to glance at a few numbers of
its Messenger, and to bear in mind that the Central Com-

56 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

mittee, far from assuming a neutral attitude, would often
adopt a rather "intolerant" one towards even the Pro-
visional Government itself.

Better than any one else, I, as Minister of War, together
with my close collaborators, knew and understood all the
horror, moral, professional and political, of the officers 1 situ-
ation; better than any others we realized that the officers
of the Russian army, who, after the Revolution, were be-
coming the " scape-goats " for the sins of others, could not
keep outside politics. Less than anybody else could we be
surprised by, let alone indignant at, the opposition, however
sharp, on the part of the officers, who, not knowing all the
complexity of the new political conditions in the life of the
country, might justifiably, and quite naturally, not only com-
plain of, but be indignant at, the Government. They did
not know that strange, powerful pressure of elements let
loose by revolution in the mass of the people, and par-
ticularly in the masses of soldiers a pressure which
strained to the utmost the whole organism of the State.
They did not grasp the reasons for the apparent slowness
with which Government exercised a cooling influence on
these elements, nor realize that any imprudent measure might
only enable these elements to break out afresh and sweep
everybody before them, and first of all the officers and, with
them, the entire Russian army.

In the fiery atmosphere of revolution, as in the torrid
desert, many saw mirages before them, and in their efforts
to reach them, they unhappily brought disaster not only
on themselves. That the Central Committee of the League
of Officers should run after a mirage was dangerous, be-
cause the Committee spoke in the name of the whole per-
sonnel of the officers, calling itself " the representative " of
"the corps of officers, 1 ' pretending that its own political

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 57

creed was the cult of all the officers, and setting its seal
upon the entire corporation. This was too risky a game.
It was like playing with fire on the edge of the powder
magazine. And if we take into consideration that the Cen-
tral Committee of the League was located at Headquarters;
relied in its work on the co-operation of officials upon the
staff at the fronts and in the various armies ; nominated its
own confidential representatives; kept a black list of offi-
cers who differed from its political views; set up its own
commissions of inquiry; expressed its approbation or dis-
approval, etc. ; if, as I say, we take all these facts into con*
sideration, it will, on the one hand, be evident why the
proceedings of the Central Committee of the League as-
sumed a " highly officious '* character, and, on the other
hand, why the responsibility for the actions not even of
the whole League, but only of its Central Committee, was
attached to all the Russian officers jointly and individually.
I will cite a clear example of the embarrassing relations
between the military powers and the Central Committee
which prevailed last summer and required the intervention
of the Ministry of War. Savinkov then telegraphed to
Kornilov as follows : " Your instructions obliging the staffs
to provide the Central Committee of the League with lists
of Bolshevik officers may lead to most undesirable misun-
derstandings, because these orders will result in setting up
a certain control by the Central Committee over the party
organizations and activities of the officers, which control
certainly is not a function of the Central Committee; and
the right of such a control can only belong to the Commis-
saries and to competent tribunals. In view of the above
considerations, I would suggest the desirability of cancel-
ling your instructions." Again, the staffs used to circulate
certain militant resolutions of the Committee, which cir-

68 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

cumstance was understood as an official approval of the
course steered by the Committee and served to increase the
tension already existing in the relations between the officers
of the army and the rank and file, etc.

I considered this position quite abnormal, impermissible,
pregnant with serious consequences. By way of example
I will point to the alarm aroused by the activity of the
League among the naval officers, on whom the least fluctua-
tion in the political temperature of the men reacted pain-
fully. "In view of the strong agitation in both fleets
against the officers, due to the activities of the League, I
beg you to bring to the knowledge of the fleets that there
is information to the effect that the officers of the Baltic
Fleet never had representatives in the Central Committee
of the League at Headquarters, and that the Black Sea
Fleet recalled theirs." Thus the Chief of the Naval Staff
of the Commander-in-Chief telegraphed to me at the be-
ginning of August.

Considering, however, that the root-idea of the League
was healthy and useful, I and my collaborators, especially
General Baranovsky, desired to clear up the general posi-
tion, by an exchange of views, by pointing out the pos-
sible results of such a course, and thereby to restrain the
Central Committee from tendencies which were psycho-
logically intelligible, but dangerous for the personnel of
the officers as a whole , and, what was even more important,
fatal to the whale army. I remember having issued in-
structions that Colonel Pronin, a representative of the Cen-
tral Committee, should be requested to come to me per-
sonally for a discussion of the matter, but, unhappily, for
some reason the discussion never took place.

At the end of July, information began to come in point-
ing to the participation of an influential section of the Cen-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 59

tral committee (especially of the staff officers) in an or-
ganized conspiracy, and the question of the ultimate fate of
the Committee became still more acute. It was urgently
necessary to find some issue before it was too late. Un-
fortunately, the leaders of the Committee, and among them
a former member of the Fourth Imperial Duma Colonel
Novosiltsev (Constitutional Democrat) persisted in their
dangerous game, and after the Moscow Conference I re-
solved to have the Central Committee removed from Head-
quarters. . . . The nightmare through which we are living
today has fully confirmed our fears, having shown how
cruelly the whole body of officers suffered for the proceed-
ings of a separate and unimportant group of fantastic and
insane gamblers. And yet, as I said in my manifesto of
August 22nd, " the flower of the army the personnel of its
officers had gone through a great bloodless revolution in
brotherly unity with their men, strengthening the work of
those who had struck off the shameful fetters of slavery.
The officers had shown that they were of one flesh with
the people. The first days of joy passed ; a hard task was
keeping every man at his post, and preventing him from
throwing down his arms, so that the foe should not snatch
away his newly found freedom. The officers remained at
their posts, the better part of them, in spite of all calumnies,
having faith in the common sense of the people, displaying
the loftiest heroism; in some units the casualties included
almost all the officers. The officers, as a body, gave their
blood on the battlefield, and proved their faith in their
country and the Revolution. . . . History will do honour
to these heroes."]

Shablovsky. What was the particular information re-
garding the extent of this plot, the individuals or per-
haps the organizations which might be implicated in it?

60 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Perhaps there was merely general information that some-
thing was being hatched?

Kerensky. There was not merely information that
something was being hatched, but concrete data. You are
aware of our position at present. Without actual means
of investigation, we are like blind puppies. We may be
tricked on all sides and yet notice nothing. Generally
speaking, a whole pile of information was amassed, and
even before the Moscow Conference I expected that some
developments were inevitable. This information came in
at the end of July and the very beginning of August.

Shablovsky. Was it a military conspiracy?

Kerensky. The position was, that the people about
whom we received information were all in the army, but
they had relations with some civil elements ; they had abun-
dant resources. Quite a series of newspapers appeared
some of them are flourishing to this day which started
to attack the Provisional Government, and myself person-
ally. They were all organs of the partisans of " a strong
rule " : the Jivoe Slovo, Narodnaya Gasctta, Novaya Russ,
Vechernce Vremya, etc. I cannot, naturally, furnish at this
moment proofs satisfactory for inquiry purposes, but to me
the whole plan is clear.

Shavlovsky. The creating of a suitable public opinion
in certain circles, by means of a propaganda in the Press?

Kerensky, Yes.

Shablovsky. But were there any indications as to the
immediate object in view?

Kerensky, To seize the power and arrest the Provisional
Government A typical counter-revolution was being pre-
pared; not a mass movement, but a coup d'etat.

Shablovsky. On what could "they" rely?

Kerensky. " They " had links with Headquarters. At

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 61

that time no special indications pointed to Kornilov, but
there was some talk of the part played by the staff officers.
The first source of information was perfectly trustworthy.
It was not received through agents, not being denunciatory
information, so to speak; but it carne from people of the
highest reliability, who were honestly and seriously anxious
that I should look betimes into possible occurrences. Later
on, information was received through less trustworthy
sources, but it completely coincided with the first intima-
tions. Then we began to take our own observations as far
as lay within our means. Naturally this was very diffi-
cult to do, for the general feeling at Headquarters was
so strained that every person who came there from the
Centre awakened irritation and suspicion.

[As regards the plot, it is necessary to make a few gen-
eral remarks. Where did the wave of conspiracy origi-
nate? There can be but one reply: it originated at Tar-
nopol, and on July 3rd~4th in Petrograd. The debacle at
the front had created a feeling of wounded national pride
which lent itself easily to methods of conspiracy, and the
Bolshevik insurrection had revealed to the unenlightened
how far-reaching was the inner dissolution of the democracy,
the impotence of the Revolution against anarchy, and the
power of the minority if competently organized and acting
unexpectedly. The fact that only a handful of Cossacks
and a few soldiers who had not yet lost discipline had saved,
the Taurida Palace (that is to say, the Soviet itself) from
being wrecked was duly noted by those who were interested
in such things. A further series of mistakes, and more
particularly, an absurd terror, amounting almost to panic,
of a coming counter-revolution, which after the 3rd~5th
of July positively became the fashionable disease of the
democracy, gave the circles from which the future adven*

62 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

turers originated the impression that the democracy was
afraid because it felt its weakness.

Now began a tragic misunderstanding: one side lost faitt
in its strength, which was real, while the other, hearing
its power talked about, believed in this myth. The former
panic-stricken on account of a coming counter-revolution
grew demoralized and thereby contributed towards re-estab-
lishing in the masses the anarchical-Bolshevik influences
the other side became bolder and bolder in its attacks or
the " revolutionary democracy/' and so irritated the people
to the great joy of the unruly elements. Besides, among
circles adhering to the " Right " it was supposed that popu-
lar discontent was to their advantage, consequently the}
considered it a good thing to inflame the passions of the
masses. See, for example, how Souvorin's Narodnayc
Gazetta sang to the tune of Messrs* Bronstein-Trotsk)
and Co. : " In the very first days when in the streets oi
Petrograd appeared the solemn placard, * Long live the
Democratic Republic! 5 we said -that this kind of politica
emasculation will not succeed in Russia; for here only 2
great People's Republic can be established on a new soda
order a great Social Republic." And here is an echc
of the Bolshevik war-cry, this time from an authentic orgar
of the Black Hundred the Grosa ("The Storm")
"On June i8th [when a number of demonstrations toot
place] the workers of the capital and the soldiers had a
review of forces, which marched against the capitalists witt
a view to shortening the war and exchanging ministers
taken from among the merchants and landowners for min-
isters from their own ranks. Against them marched the
Jews, supported by the capitalists who are for the continua-
tion of the war. The workers and soldiers threw them-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 63

selves upon the Jews, soundly beat them, and tore up their
banners."

On this " July " soil, " non-party organizations " sprang
up like mushrooms, and soon began to form themselves
into various circles and groups, which proceeded to take
practical steps towards preparing a counter-revolution.
From among various similar beginnings finally emerged
a serious nucleus, the work of which was planned on a
large scale. A special Press made its appearance, a propa-
ganda was started and members enrolled, while in some
places agents were appointed and gathering-points estab-
lished. Valuable information received by me at this time
made it possible for us to see something of what was going
on, and at least to note certain individuals and partially
to reveal their object and task. One thing stood out clearly :
the aim of the counter-revolution was not the re-establish-
ment of the fallen dynasty; consequently some successor
of the Provisional Government was being prepared some-
where, and in any case this question must have been very
seriously discussed. Later it became the special aim of
certain groups to '* remove " me by some means, however
drastic. I was warned of an occasion when the lot had
been already drawn to decide who should carry out the sen-
tence, and only an accident prevented the performance of
the act itself. . . . Upon considering every aspect of this
seditious movement, I decided that the extra-judicial arrest
and exile of the prominent conspirators would be an entirely
suitable measure of precaution in this case (although in the
case of a mass movement such procedure is useless and
even harmful) , However, our means of investigation were
technically so imperfect that we did not succeed In suppress-
ing the leading centres in time.

64 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

The whole time between July 3rd and August 27th ma;
be divided into three periods : first comes that of work b;
primitive methods in small separate Leagues, and the proc
ess of merging the more important of them into one body
in the second, the forces were organized and means devisee
for an attempt to take advantage of the Moscow Confer
ence; and in the third and last period occurred the decisive
effort to seize the governing power by violence under th<
pretence of a conflict with the Bolsheviks. The aim 0}
the movement was a military dictatorship.]

3

Shablovsky. When Kornilov was here on August 3rd,
did you not have a conversation with him did you nol
simply deliberate on the subject of how he would regard
your personal departure from power? Was there no such
conversation, discussion or talk?

Kerensky. I read about this, and marvelled. Some-
where in his printed depositions he says that " Kerensky
discussed with me or inquired whether it was not time
for him to retire " or something to that effect.

Shablovsky. He put it rather differently.

Kerensky. In realty (it was in this study of mine) I
assured him as positively as I could that the existing coali-
tional Government was the only possible combination of
forces, and that any other course would be fatal I said to
him: "Well, suppose I retire, what would be the out-
come?" That was what I said . . .

Shablovsky. So there was a discussion ?

Kerensky. There was no deliberation of any kind. All
that Kornilov and others said to the effect that the Provi-
sional Government attached a political value to him is quite

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 65

absurd. I and other members of the Government did all
we could to restrain Kornilov from politics, which were
not within the range of his intellect; he did not in the least
understand politics nor political developments.

Chairman. Therefore this conversation, if it took place,
had the character of a discussion, but not, in fact, of a
consultation ?

Kerensky. I said : " What are you aiming at ? You
will simply find yourself choked in an airless space: the
railways will stop, the telegraph will not work." The
conversation was in that kind of spirit.

[I remember how, following my question about the Dic-
tatorship, Kornilov answered thoughtfully : " Well, maybe
we shall have to make up our minds even to that." . . .
" Well," I remarked, " and that will lead inevitably to a
fresh massacre of the officers." " I foresee that possibility,
but at least those who are left alive will have the soldiers
in hand," Kornilov replied with decision.]

Really, all my relations with Kornilov and my attitude
to his enterprises are very well known to the Provisional
Government, and ought to be known everywhere. I was
obliged to carry on a stiff fight all the time for the main-
tenance of a single fount of authority and to prevent po-
litical adventures. I believe this was the sole method I
made use of to watch and be ready. I am sure that
this was my only way, because I could not act (that is to
say, bring forward accusations officially in court) on the
strength of secret evidence and on the mere friendly in-
formation which I possessed. I would then have appeared
in the opinion of the public like a man suffering from
persecution-mania. Nothing would have come of this.
But all the while I was on my guard and followed the
smallest fluctuations which took place in these circles.

66 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Chairman. Then, as to this incident of the summoning
of Kornilov. You stated in your deposition that the Pro-
visional Government did not summon Kornilov, that you
found yourself faced with the fact of his intention to come,
and that, having learnt it, you tried to prevent him by
sending him a telegram which crossed him on the way,
and that afterwards he arrived here and on his arrival
presented himself. . . .

Kerensky. He arrived, and his attitude towards me
was so " friendly " that he came to me with machine guns.

Ukrainzev. With machine guns? What do you mean?

Kerensky. A motor-car with machine guns went in
front, and another motor with machine guns came in the
rear. The Asiatic soldiers of Kornilov brought in two
bags with the machine guns and laid them in the vestibule.

Chairman. Really, they brought in machine guns?

Kerensky. Yes !

Chairman. And left them there?

Kerensky. No. Afterwards they took them away,
when they themselves were departing. Again one motor-
car with machine guns led the way and another followed
behind. This was their manner of leaving.

[On his previous visit to Petrograd on August 3rd,
Kornilov came in without machine guns. The following
quotation from the Russkoe Slovo gives some idea of
the sultry atmosphere which prevailed at Headquarters
before the Moscow Conference and the visit to Petrograd
on August loth: "The feeling at Headquarters in con-
nection with General Kornilov's departure was very strained,
and this nervousness increased, particularly on account of
vague rumours which came from Petrograd of a plot against
the Commander-in-Chief which was said to be in prepara-
tion. . . . This explains why, during General Kornilov's

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 67

journey, measures of precaution were taken. . . . Nearer
to Petrograd the feeling of apprehension of the guard in-
creased, although there was no ostensible reason for it."]

Oh yes, I forgot that I was informed of the existence
of a certain political " salon," where an organized campaign
was going on in favour of Kornilov, and where all kinds
of agitation took place and attempts were made to form
public opinion. But as this was a lady's salon I will not
mention the names; this is of no importance.

Chairman. Well, then, in your first deposition you state
that on August 3rd Kornilov withdrew his memorandum,
and that later he presented it again, personally or through
Savinkov, in a revised form, in which new clauses appeared
respecting the output of work in the factories.

Kerensky No; he brought it to me quite ready on
August loth. As far as I remember the matter stood thus :
Savinkov and Filonenko met Kornilov at the station and
handed him the report there. Personally, I believe it was
so, although I do not insist upon it. I believe it happened
as I said. Anyhow, Kornilov came straight to me with
this memorandum. A space was left at the end of the
document for his signature, and Savinkov signed just under
this space, while quite at the bottom of the document Filo-
nenko had put his signature.

Chairman. Now, about these paragraphs regarding the
railways and factories. When Kornilov came with his
fresh report, was he alone or accompanied by Savinkov?

Kerensky. He -came quite alone. Previously, however,
Savinkov insisted that Kornilov should, without fail, make
a report to the Provisional Government.

Chairman. On August icth, when he was summoned
by you?

Kerensky. Previously. I said at a sitting of the Cab-

68 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

inet that, at a moment when we were wholly occupied in
preparing for the Moscow Conference, the sittings of the
Provisional Government did not provide either the right
time or the right place for a report that required to be
considered in detail. Then Savinkov and Filonenko sum-
moned him notwithstanding; still, it all happened as I pre-
dicted: the report was not read before the Provisional
Government on August loth. It was read here, in this
study, in the evening. I summoned Terestchenko and
Nekrassov, and Kornilov laid the document before us
here.

Chairman. You have expressed your views during the
day. Kornilov did not show you the report earlier?

Kerensky. No; I had run through the report during
the day and noticed the factories, workshops and railway
clauses, which opened up entirely new questions; more-
over, as I have already told you, it contained some prepos-
terous things.

Chairman. And then you expressed your objections
to it?

Kerensky. I said that from the formal point of view
it was quite incorrect. After all, said I, who is the Deputy
Minister of War? He is an official attached to myself,
the Minister; he is my close collaborator and my repre-
sentative.

The Deputy Minister of War had no right to go against
his chief, the Minister, and still less to sign documents.
Kornilov agreed that this could not be done* He agreed
that, as I had not yet seen the memorandum, whereas he
had brought it to me supposing that its contents were known
to me, it was impossible to insist on its being read before
the Provisional Government immediately. He also un-
derstood that Savinkov. had behaved with a lack of

THE PRELUDE JO BOLSHEVISM 69

discipline. During the evening, while Kornilov was mak-
ing his report, Savinkov called. I was informed that " the
Deputy Minister of War is there/* I did not receive him.
Savinkov was not present while Kornilov read his report,
because I considered that he had already retired from the
Government This was obvious to me.

[Savinkov's effort to be present during the reading of
Kornilov's report on August loth was evidently made
counting on my " soft-heartedness," which would prevent
me from refusing before strangers to receive him. The
fact is that, according to Savinkov himself, after my cate-
gorical refusal on August 8th to sign the measures pro-
jected in the second report, he gave in his resignation, de-
claring that "in that case the report would be presented
to the Provisional Government by General Kornilov. . . .
My resignation (he continues) was not accepted. I carried
on the current work as usual, but I did not report any
more to Kerensky." (Which was, of course, quite unwar-
rantable, I may add.) In a conversation with Kornilov
on August loth, Savinkov acknowledged that his conduct
had been an offence against discipline, but considered that
it could not be regarded as positively harmful to the State,
for during that time there were no urgent reports. " On
the other hand, my offence against discipline was the only
method at my disposal of rousing the Prime Minister to
give his serious attention to the report, to which I attached
exceptional importance."

Is not the whole character of Savinkov revealed in this
incident?

It is true I did not cause official action to be taken in
regard to Savinkov's letter of resignation dated August
8th, hoping that he would come back to his senses and
would not carry his " threats" about General Kornilov

70 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

into execution. When General Kornilov actually arrived
and began to carry out Savinkov's ideas, I recognized that
it was not permissible that the latter should remain any
longer in the service of the Government, and I signed my
acceptance of his resignation. Thereupon, in order that
I might not put Savinkov into an awkward situation on that
day, 1 sent him word through Terestchenko, so that he
should not call on me that day. . . . (" Terestchenko in-
formed me," says Savinkov, touching on this subject, " that
I was not invited to attend at the Palace that day,") How
then, under such circumstances, could Savinkov have re-
solved to call on me that evening, and how could he count
on being received?]

Chairman. That is to say, it has been assumed then
that Kornilov's lack of tact was due to Savinkov?

9

Raupakh. And Savinkov did not make any verbal re-
port to you as to the contents of the document ?

Kerensky. It was in this way: He would begin to
speak of the introduction of the death-penalty at the rear ;
to this I invariably objected, and there our conversation
would usually come to an end. " If you disagree on this
fundamental point," Savinkov was saying, "all the rest
is unessential." Now, all the other measures, with the
exception of the clauses relating to the railways and fac-
tories, had been projected even earlier by the Ministry of
War. The complete error into which every newly ap-
pointed administrator fell, and which he would innocently
propagate, was that nothing had been done before he came,
as though he were the first to start upon any reforms:
Savinkov was the first, Kornilov was the first, now Verk-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 71

hovsky is the first and so on. In reality, all the material
for my collaborators had long been collected in 'full, and
systematically elaborated into a series of measures which
all tended to definite aims [to re-establish the organization
and the fighting capacity of the army],

[From the very beginning, when I became Minister of
War, it was evident, without expending much time in one's
survey, in what an inextricable confusion Gutchkov, with
his preposterous reforms, had thrown the Ministry. At
a glance it was obvious what a vast work was required in
order to amend this muddle and carry out well-planned
and thorough reforms. Now, Kornilov wished to pro-
ceed by sweeping reforms, a method which could only have
shaken the whole State.

In connection with this point, the history of reforms
made by the Ministry of War, I recollect the words I
spoke at the Moscow Conference : " Gentlemen, that which
many now set down to the account of the Revolution was
wrought by the force of elements, not by a conscious action
and ill-will on the part of malign forces of revolution;
this is evident from the fact that all which arouses the
indignation of the present regenerators of the army, all
that was done before me, without me, and by their own
hands."

In fact, the statute which defined the nature of the com-
mittees and organizations elected by the soldiers was sanc-
tioned by Gutchkov and appears in his famous order, No.
213. The much-discussed Commission of General Poli-
vanov (formerly Minister of War) which worked out the
declaration of the rights of the soldier, and generally has
cost the army so dear, existed during Gutchkov's term of
office, but was, as soon as my authority enabled me to do so,
set aside by me. The Admiralty paid also dear for the

72 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

doings of the Commission of Savitch (member of the
Octobrist " Right " in the Fourth Imperial Duma) ; while
V. I. Lebedev l brought it back to some extent to sanity
and activity. The Military Council even found means to
reduce by May the maintenance of the officers. Then, that
formation of detachments of homogenous nationality, in-
troduced without the knowledge of the Provisional Gov-
ernment how many difficulties I experienced later in
struggling with the inevitable consequences of this inno-
vation! Then, the shuffling of the commanders at the
front incomprehensible to any one ! Etc., etc. !

I signed the " declaration of the rights of the soldiers/'
which I received fully prepared as a legacy from my pred-
ecessors. To refuse to sign it when its existence was
already known in the remotest corners of the front and
it was actually in practice, would have been to act upon
an "ostrich-policy," to believe that the reality disappears
because one shuts one's eyes to it. I took upon myself
the formal responsibility for it; and at the same time I
demanded categorically that it should include not an im-
plicit assumption but a clear and open statement of the
rights of commanding officers, under battle conditions, to
act by force of arms against those who were disobedient.
Such was the origin of the final text of the famous 14,
which furnished the grounds upon which the Bolsheviks
raised a hue-and-cry about me in the army. Now is the
right time to speak of it; let the powers that be reproach
me with that crime against the people they who so
piously bow before the inviolability of human life!

Yes, when I was Minister of War it was my lot to be
continually cutting down and curtailing various " liberties "
introduced under Gutchkov, and my collaborators will cer-

1 Socialist Revolutionary, and for a short time the Marine Minister*

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 73

tainly remember that I sometimes said to them : " How
strange that a ' violent * revolutionist should have to oppose
the initiatives of the Octobrist * upholders of the State ' I "
They will remember, too, how, when signing some restric-
tion or prohibition, I laughingly said : " Give me some-
thing to sign which would be pleasanter for ' comrades/
otherwise they will be down on me " ! Ah, least of all do
I wish in any way to do Gutchkov an injustice, and still
less to justify myself! History will have its word to say
and determine the place of each one of us. I only wish
that more should be known and understood at this present
moment. I want once again, as at the Moscow Confer-
ence, to make this statement: from the time of my coming
to the Ministry of War, not one measure was passed which
could have undermined the power of the army or the au-
thority of the commanders. From the outset I carried on
a systematic plan of work for the revision, codification,
and definition of the limits of all the new institutions in
the army. Above all, I considered it necessary to pro-
claim throughout the army, from top to bottom, that " the
entire army, without regard to rank or position, ought to
set an example of discipline, of obedience of every one
to his chief and of all to the supreme command."

In less than a month the very Head of the Army had
given an example of insubordination towards his superior
the supreme authority of the Government. Thus was
confirmed the right of every one who carried arms to get
his own way. Kornilov's action played the same part for
the army that the counter-revolution of October 25th ef-
fected for all Russia it started the army on the road to
ultimate ruin.]

Chairman. Who, besides yourself, took part in this
Council, of August loth?

74 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Kerensky. Terestchenko, Nekrassov and Kornilov him-
self.

Chairman. At this Council did you express your opinion
of the report, or have you had no opportunity to do so?

Kerensky. No; I believe only two people spoke, one
of them being Nekrassov; I kept silent.

Chairman. You had said what you thought of it during
the day?

Kerensky. All of us said the same thing: in the mili-
tar)*- section most of the projected clauses were just and
acceptable, but the form was impossible.

Chairman. Another question. In this report was there
any mention of the suppression of the Soldiers' Soviets and
Committees in the army?

Kerensky. Not in the second report. The situation
had, apparently, altered so much that when on another day,
on the eve of the Moscow Conference, the military section u
of the Government's declaration there was being considered
by the Provisional Government, it was found possible to
put the question as to the measures in the army thus : That
the Provisional Government accepted the substance of Kor-
nilov's first report, in my exposition of it. At the Moscow
Conference it fell to me to bring forward Kornilov's report
as formulated by me.

[I remember this sitting of the Provisional Government
on the eve of the Moscow Conference. It was marked
by great nervous tension. Only that morning Kokoshkin
had sent in his resignation, and the sitting was tak-
ing place literally just a few hours before the time
of departure for Moscow. When it came to the ques-
tion of what should be said about the army in the name
of the whole Government, it was proposed that we should
first of all hear the report of the Commander-in-Chief.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 75

Following the reading of this report (the first one, which
was more militant, but more acceptable in substance, being
without the two nonsensical clauses), there was a very sharp
discussion. Then I brought forward my version of the
clauses of the program, which, in my opinion, might have
met the requirements of the case, the real intentions of
the Government, and would have been at the same time
acceptable to Headquarters and the views of the general
public. My formula secured the assent of the Ministers
(with the exception of the clause referring to the death-
penalty at the rear).

Here is the substance of the decisions accepted by the
Provisional Government on August nth respecting army
reforms, as they were laid before the Moscow Conference:
"The experience of these last months has shown that all
that was done in a fortuitous, sometimes spasmodic way,
sometimes without sufficient consideration, has now to be
reconsidered. It is necessary to regulate both the rights
and the duties of every man belonging to the army. . . -
What was accomplished first was a hasty and fortuitous
structure. This haste was unavoidable, otherwise all this
vast mass of material would have gone to pieces after the
fall of the despotic military power. This tendency to
* disaggregate ' has been checked. Now the work of prep-
aration for building gives place to real construction. All
will be allotted their right places and each one will know
his rights and obligations. . . . The Commissaries, Com-
mittees, and disciplinary tribunals will be maintained; but
all will assume the forms which are now necessary to the
army. And we who are, or have been, in the army know
where it is possible to draw the line, and where the im-
possible and the hazardous begin. When it comes to the
limit, the Provisional Government will say: 'Thus far

76 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

and no further/ " Then followed the passage already
quoted about discipline.

In order that it may be understood how the declarations
of the Provisional Government differed from the " de-
mands " of General Kornilov, I will quote an extract from
his speech, also made at the Moscow Conference, on the
Committees and Commissaries : " I am not hostile to the
Committees. I have worked with them as Commander
of the Eighth Army and as Commander of the South-
western front. But I ask that their activities should be con-
fined to the economic interests and internal life of the army,
within limits which should be strictly defined by the law,
without in any way interfering in the sphere of military
operations and the selection of commanding officers. I
recognize the Commissaries as being a necessity at the actual
moment, but this institution will only be effective if the
personnel of the Commissaries combines democratic views
with energy and fearlessness of responsibility." If we
take into consideration that, at the time of the Moscow
Conference, the Committees had no legal right to interfere
in the question of operations at the front, etc., and com-
pare this passage of Kornilov's with my short formulas
about the Committees and Commissaries, it will be evident
that the difference between us was only in tone, and in
Kornilov's putting the matter in a very personal way.

Here is what was published on the subject of the Moscow
Conference in Savinkov's name, on August iSth, in the
Isvestia, the organ of the Central Soviet : " I may state
that I remain at the head of the administration of the War
Office . . . and according to the statement of A. R Keren-
sky I may again work in complete unity with him to bring
into being that program to which he refers in certain pas-
sages of his address before the Moscow Conference, and

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 77

in which I, as well as the Commander-in~Chief, Kornilov,
fully concur. ... It would be a mistake to think (and all
information which appeared in the Press to this effect is
absolutely false) that I proposed to do away with the sol-
diers' organizations. Neither I nor General Kornilov pro-
posed to do anything of the kind. Both Kerensky and we
stood for the preservation and strengthening of the sol-
diers' organizations, with the proviso, however, that they
had no right to alter the battle-orders or interfere in the
question of the appointments and transferences of the com-
manding officers/'

How vital was the new organization of the army, sys-
tematically prepared by the Ministry of War and energet-
ically brought into existence, will be evident by comparing
the following facts. On July 28th Savinkov, in the name
of the Ministry of War, formulated the new situation thus :
" With the establishment of the institution of Commissaries,
the Supreme Command is in charge of military operations,
the army organizations (Committees, etc.) are entrusted
with the army administration (economic affairs and con-
ditions of life), while the Commissaries control the political
life of the army." At the Moscow Conference a declara-
tion of the Army Committees was read, in which it was
stated among other things that : " The commanding body
ought to be left quite free to direct military operations
and activities, and to have the decisive voice in regard to
military preparations and training. . . . The Commissaries
should act as the vehicles of the revolutionary policy of
the Provisional Government, the representatives of the will
of the revolutionary majority in the country. . . . The sol-
diers' organizations, being the organs of the soldiers' self-
administration, ought to have their rights and obligations
fully fixed in and confirmed by the law." Finally, the

78 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

following regulation was published on March 30, 1918, and
accepted by the supreme Military Council of the " People's
Commissaries " : " The soldiers' committees will only con-
serve their economic functions; they are deprived of the
right to interfere in questions of service or of military
operations. All political questions will be decided by spe-
cially nominated Commissaries, who will keep in touch
with the Committees." It is evident that matters con-
cerning operations at the front will again be within the
jurisdiction of commanding officers, no longer appointed
by elections!

Thus, through the nightmare-like experiment of Krilen-
ko's folly the miserable remnants of the army returned to
the "counter-revolutionary order of the Kornilovite Ker-
ensky"!]

Chairman. At the Moscow Conference you set forth
in your version the whole of Kornilov's report except the
question of the death-penalty at the rear ?

Kerensky. Yes, with that exception, because at the sit-
ting of the Provisional Government on August nth it was
decided to recognize in principle the possibility of applying
these or any other measures, including even the death-
penalty at the rear, but to bring them into existence dnly
after discussing in a legislative way each concrete measure
separately [according to conditions of time and place].

[" Let every one be aware/ 1 I said at the Moscow Con-
ference, in reference to the death-penalty at the rear, " that
this measure is a very trying one, and let no one venture
to inconvenience us in that matter with any unconditional
demands. We will not permit this. We only say: 'If
the wholesale devastation and disaggregation, pusillanimity
and cowardice, treacherous murder, attacks on peaceful in-
habitants, arson, pillage if all these continue in spite of

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 79

our warnings, the Government will combat them in the
way now proposed/ " I spoke thus conditionally of the
death-penalty at the Moscow Conference because on this
question the Provisional Government was not only not
unanimously " for " it, but had actually had a majority
" against " this method of fighting destructiveness and de-
composition. On the other hand, the whole Government
unanimously acknowledged that the question of the death-
penalty should not be the subject of a sharp political con-
flict, especially within the Government itself; the more so
as, after the partial reintroduction of the death-penalty at
the front, the quarrel was no longer one of principle but
of opportuneness. Personally, I was decidedly opposed to
the restoration of the death-penalty at the rear, because I
considered it absolutely impossible to carry out the sentence
of death, say in Moscow or Saratov, under the conditions
of a free political life.

Homicide by sentence of a court of law, in accordance
with all the rules and regulations of the official execution
ritual, is a great " luxury " that only States with a smoothly
working administrative and police apparatus can afford.
Setting aside all humanitarian considerations, the practical
impossibility of carrying out a judicial death sentence in
Russia should have been a conclusive reason for every
practical statesman. The short but sad experience of the
revolutionary courts-martial even at the front has added
very weighty evidence in support of this view of mine.

I feel that readers of these lines in the Russia of the
present will be irritated by this goody-goody sentimentalism
or " Manilovism," * and will ask me indignantly : " What
about the executions by order of the Commissaries, the

1 After " Manilov," a ridiculously sentimental hero in Gogol's " Dead
Souls."

80 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Bolshevik terrorism?" . . . Yes, exactly; there is terror-
ism: executions, mass executions; but without any previous
sentence by competent judicial authority; assassinations by
the police, but not death sentences imposed by courts of
law; and that is the whole point. It is the Bolshevik re-
action which has proved that in Russia it is not yet possible
to take human life by judicial sentence. As far as I am
able to judge by the information that has reached me, Mr.
Bronstein (Trotsky) did not dare, after all, to introduce
his guillotine, in other words to reintroduce the death-
penalty, to be executed with the solemnity of a sentence
passed by a court of law. In Russia they now practise
" shooting on the spot." That, however, is an institution
beyond the pale of any State Constitution, or of any cul-
ture, however barbaric. To transform every coward who
left the front into a privileged assassin the State has had
first to be thoroughly destroyed. . . . But even irrespective
of these considerations, Kornilov and Filonenko's idea of
employing capital punishment as a specific against strikes,
locks-out, disorganization of transport and similar occur-
rences is much too original to be applicable in any State
which is at all civilized.]

10

Chairman. Did not this sitting (of the Provisional
Government on August nth) deal with the question of
Kornilov's taking part at and addressing the Moscow Con-
ference?

Kerensky. It did.

Chairman. What attitude did the Provisional Govern-
ment take up?

Kerensky. We had a perfectly definite point of view*

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 81

Our task at the Moscow Conference was clear and definite.
Our policy, which we applied everywhere and at all times,
and which, however, is often by misunderstanding consid-
ered a sign of weakness in the Government, consisted in
abstaining from forcing events or provoking any explosions.
In this particular case one of our objects was to create
such an atmosphere at the Moscow Conference that, in
the event of Kornilov's addressing the Conference, he
should not arouse a hostile attitude against himself among
large masses of people, simply because it appeared to us
that at that time Kornilov could not be replaced by any-
body. Being guided, then, by that consideration, the Pro-
visional Government adopted the following plan : the Com-
mander-in-Chief will deliver an address or report of con-
tents similar to that which he made to us on August 3rd,
that is to say, he will deal with the position at the front,
with the state of the armies, the strategic situation and
so on. The Provisional Government adopted a decision
specifically limiting General Kornilov's address in that sense,
and in spite of that . . .

Chairman. And in spite of that, in spite of the warning,
he acted in his own way. Had he been warned already
here at Petrograd?

Kerensky. If I am not mistaken, he was warned here.

[I now recollect that the warning could not have been
given at Petrograd, as General Kornilov left Petrograd
on the eve of the meeting of the Provisional Government]

After Kornilov's arrival at Moscow, the Minister of
Ways of Communication called on him the day before he
spoke. Then I spoke to him on the telephone and at the
Theatre. 1 I again sent for him, and told him for the
second time of the decision of the Provisional Government

1 The Grand Theatre, where the Moscow Conference took place.

82 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

and insistently asked him again to act accordingly. When
in reply he said to me that he would speak in his own way,
I warned him that he must understand that he would thus
be infringing discipline. "You should anyhow show an
example to tie rest, and you speak of breaking discipline/'
said L At that time General Kornilov was in such a mood
that he was firmly convinced that the Government was
absolutely powerless; he looked upon the Government as,
so to speak, a thing in the past, to which no heed need be
paid: if we, i.e. the Provisional Government, said that a
certain thing must be done or must not be done, our reason
for it was solely our fear of him. This, I believe, was
at the time Kornilov's state of mind and that of his friends.
Liber . Allow me to ask you a question. Did you know
that the address which Kornilov delivered at the Moscow
Conference was written by Filonenko, or at least that Filo-
nenko was part-author of it?
Kerensky. I know nothing as to that
[Later I read the following evidence of Filonenko, the
truth of which is of course a matter for his own conscience :
" On the evening of August I3th I asked General Kornilov
whether he had prepared the speech which he intended
making at the sitting of the I4th, and upon being told that
it was not ready, I offered him my help in sketching out
its contents. Apart from my desire to be of assistance to
General Kornilov, I thought it to be my duty, in view of
the responsibility which was incumbent upon me for all
acts of a political nature by the Commander-in-Chief.
Similar help was also offered to the General by Zavoiko,
who met General Kornilov. Zavoiko's assistance consisted
in his writing down at my dictation the text of the speech
that I had previously discussed in a general way with Gen-
eral Kornilov. With a few additions, dealing purely with

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 83

some facts, the text as dictated by me was read by General
Kornilov at the Conference." In drawing up the speech
Kilonenko was apparently cognizant of the instructions
issued by the Provisional Government to the Commander-
in-Chief, for these instructions were substantially complied
with in the speech, and all the sharper angles, such as the
question of capital punishment elsewhere than at the front,
were avoided.]

I forgot to mention that on the day, I think, before his
arrival at Moscow, Kornilov, knowing already of Savin-
kov's resignation, sent me a telegram while on his journey
insisting on Savinkov's retention in the service. Then I
received a second telegram, in which Kornilov stated that
Savinkov's and Filonenko's presence at the Moscow Con-
ference was of the utmost importance for him (Kornilov),
as they, S. and F., would support him either in his demands
or in his speech I forget the exact words. That was
the kind of telegram I received. Let us assume the less
offensive wording (since I am not sure of the exact words) :
" in his speech," The telegram further contained the fol-
lowing opinion of Savinkov: a well-known man wielding
enormous influence with democracy. Something to that
effect.

[In giving my evidence I was mistaken on that point:
there was only one telegram mentioning Savinkov, as fol-
lows : " Information has reached me that . . . Savinkov
has tendered his resignation. I deem it my duty to express
the opinion that the withdrawal of so important a man
as Boris Victorovitch (Savinkov) from the Government is
bound to affect adversely the Government's prestige with the
country, more particularly at this serious juncture. I con-
sider Savinkov's presence and support of my views neces-
sary on the occasion of my speech at the Moscow Con-

84 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ference on August I4th, because those views will have
more chance of unanimous adoption if they have the ad-
vantage of the prestige attaching to Boris Victorovitch's
great revolutionary past and the authority he enjoys among
the large democratic masses. . . ."

Raupakh. Allow me to return to the question of the
Memorandum. Was that draft of Kornilov' s submitted to
the Provisional Government on your behalf in your capacity
as Minister of War, or was it submitted by the Commander-
in-Chief on his own behalf?

Kerensky. The Memorandum was submitted by Kor-
nilov on his own behalf.

Raupakh. The new draft which was discussed on
August loth?

Kercnsky. We (Nekrassov, Terestchenko and myself)
asked Kornilov about it on the loth of August in the eve-
ning, and he left the Memorandum for the Government
in its first draft of August 3rd.

Raupakh. He thought it necessary to bring . . .

Chairman. The Prime Minister has explained to us
that this draft was a new one, and was signed.

Kerensky. The signature of the Deputy Minister of
War was affixed to the second draft, but the latter had not
been read before the Provisional Government.

Chairman. That second draft had not been read?

Kerensky. That second draft had not been brought out
at the time. Later, it disappeared.

[I remember my surprise when, at the Moscow Confer-
ence, I heard Kornilov talking of his report presented to the
Provisional Government, which had been signed without
reservation by both Savinkov and Filonenko. I was sur-
prised to hear the announcement that the draft, backed
by three signatures, had been "presented" to the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 85

Provisional Government, whereas what I had read, with
General Kornilov's consent, at the meeting of the Provi-
sional Government on the nth of August, was his first
memorandum. Now, only, having read the conversation on
the Hughes tape-machine between Filonenko and Go-
betchia, the Assistant Commissary of the South- West-
ern front, I learnt that " General Kornilov, after the
discussion upon the general situation (on the loth of
August), drove away to the railway station carrying the
report with him; but there B. V. Savinkov and myself,
thinking that such important questions could not be de-
cided by private conversations between persons however
highly responsible, persuaded General Kornilov to send the
report in an envelope to the Provisional Government, which
he did." However, that " envelope " never reached me.
This case provides an example of General Kornilov's lack
of independence in political actions.]

To come back to the Moscow Conference, I must say
that the only trespass beyond the limits assigned to him
made by Kornilov in his speech was a somewhat general
discussion of measures to be adopted in the rear, containing
the remark that he did not, at present, enter into an examina-
tion of the measures necessary for the reorganization of
railway traffic and industry.

Raupakh. He evaded that question?

Kercnsky. We had stipulated that he should not men-
tion the railways, whereas he did mention them.

CHAPTER II
11

Chairman. Did information concerning the conspiracy
begin to reach you just before the Moscow Conference, or
even at an earlier date? Did not the evidence grow and
strengthen ?

Kerensky. Yes, all the time.

Chairman. Was not Kornilov's name mentioned in con-
nection with the conspiracy?

Kerensky. Kornilov's name cropped up later, not long
before the events actually took place. An officer used to
put in an appearance at the time, whom later I transferred
to the Intelligence Department. He was a bit of a black-
mailer, but he often attended the Cossack Council and was
apparently well-informed. This officer would come to warn
me just as Lvov did, that I was threatened with inevitable
ruin in connection with coming events due in a few days, that
is, the seizure of power by the conspirators.

Raupakh. From the parties of the " Right J1 or . . .

Kerensky. Yes, from the " Right/' There is no doubt
this officer was well-informed, but I never clearly could make
out whether he came to me as a scout or simply to betray
others and earn something for himself. Only one thing
is perfectly obvious to me he was quite au courant.

Chairman. He did not name Kornilov or any one else
at the time?

Kerensky. He did not name Kornilov, but he named
others closely associated with the latter Zavoiko, and
others whose names I forget, who were intimate with Kor-

86

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 87

nilov. Then, as you know, a Cossack regiment had been
summoned to Moscow at the time of the Moscow Con-
ference . . .

Chairman. The 7th Orenburg Cossack regiment ?

Kerensky. . . . without knowledge of the Commander
of the Moscow District. At this same time the corps of
Prince Dolgoruky was advancing to Petrograd from Fin-
land, but was stopped by the Commander of the troops
there, General Vassilkovsky. Various rumours were spread
in the officers 5 training school. For instance, we received
a communication from the Moscow cadets to the effect that
an officer had warned them that during the Moscow Confer-
ence a dictatorship would be proclaimed. I do not know
what were the results of the investigation of that case. I
do not know the reason of the Cossack regiment's move.

Chairman. Kornilov did not know. It was probably
done to support some kind of demand.

Kerensky. Probably,

Chairman. Is it not now definitely known who sum-
moned the regiment?

Kerensky. It has been certified that the regiment was
hastily summoned without the knowledge either of the Com-
mander of the Moscow military district, the Provisional
Government or the Minister of War. We knew nothing;
and only were in time to stop it at Mojaisk.

Chairman. At the time of the Conference, did not Kor-
nilov's refusal to yield to the Provisional Government's
directions excite the Government's suspicions as to his
loyalty; did not the Government suspect him in connection
with the rumours of the conspiracy?

Kerensky. You see, I must admit that part of the Pro-
visional Government were completely hypnotized by Kor-
nilov's personality. Of course, I do not mean that these

members of the Government were particularly in touch with
him or approved of his bearing, but simply that some of
the ministers believed that here was a man outside politics,
an honest, daring soldier, who can and should organize
the army [but who finds it difficult to strike the right note in
complicated "civilian 5 " affairs]. Therefore, they consid-
ered this move as a hopeless action of a helpless man : cer-
tainly (they said) the man is completely unversed in politics,
unable to cope with them, but, then, like everybody, he has
a citizen's feelings! But I and some of the other ministers
did take into account Kornilov's behaviour. I remember
telling my intimate friends and also the Provisional Govern-
ment, on my return, that I was extremely satisfied with the
Moscow Conference, as I had been able to learn and under-
stand all I wanted, and know the ff how, why and where "
of everything. Later, when the Kornilov rebellion took
place, one of the Constitutional Democrats said to me:
" Only now we understand your attitude at the Moscow
Conference, your tone; then your threats addressed to the
Right wing seemed unintelligible to us."

[Here are the corresponding parts of my speech at the
Moscow Conference: "... Let those who deem the time
has come to overthrow the revolutionary power by bayonets
beware still more. (Loud applause from the Left.) .
Others at their meetings dare to utter against the Supreme
Authority of the Russian State words for which, in the days
of the old regime, they would soon have found themselves
removed very far, as insulters of Majesty. ... I will
now, with the aid of the entire Provisional Government,
employ the same energy (as was exerted upon the 3rd, 4th
and 5th of July) to set a limit to all aspirations tending to
use Russia's great misfortune . , . for injuring the com-
mon national interests; . . . and whoever dares present

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 89

me with an ultimatum, in whatever form, will be subjected
by me to the will of the Supreme Authority. Once more, I
repeat : every attempt of the ' inside-out Bolsheviks ' I will
find a barrier in me."

In general, the Moscow Conference presents a very im-
portant stage in the development of the movement for the
establishment of a military dictatorship in Russia. It is
but a prologue to the 27th of August. Here the Russian
republican reaction becomes definitely conscious of itself.
Here this peculiar Russian " Boulangisme '' definitely selects
its leader, here forces are reckoned up, here is the rallying-
point of the social circles which support the movement both
ideally and materially* The circle of active conspirators is
here greatly widened; here, for the first time, Russia makes
acquaintance with her future dictator Kornilov. The
circles sympathizing with the idea of a military dictatorship
were so thoroughly prepared and organized, that even on
the 3Oth of August Kornilov could still seriously think of
getting a " support," when he declared to the Government
that ortly on condition that the latter agreed to certain terms
would he immediately take steps to tranquillize those who
" followed him " ; the organization was so real that, after
his arrest, General Kornilov complained bitterly of being
forsaken by every one at the crucial moment while General
Alexeiev, in his letter of the I2th of September to Miliukov,
warned him "that General Kornilov would be obliged to
describe in detail before the court all the preparations, all
the negotiations with various persons and groups, their par-
ticipation in the affair, to show the Russian people who were
his adherents, and why he, abandoned by all in time of need,
alone with a few officers/' etc.

1 Expression used (as well as "Bolshevik of the Right") to denote
people employing Bolshevik methods for conservative purposes.

90 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Without even peeping " behind the scenes " of all these
" preparations " and negotiations, the mobilization and con-
centration of forces could be observed upon the open stage
itself just before the Moscow Conference. A considerable
number of meetings took place of various organizations
looked upon as influential by some sections, and one after
another, as if obeying a word of command, they adopted
resolutions against the removal of Kornilov. On the 6th of
August, the Council of the Cossack Troops' League decided
to " inform the Provisional Government and the Minister of
War, and to publish in all the daily papers, that : ( I ) . , .
(2) General Kornilov cannot be removed, being a true leader
of the people and in the eyes of the majority of the popula-
tion the only general capable of regenerating the army's
fighting force and of extricating the country from an ex-
tremely serious situation; (3) the Council of the Cossack
Troops' League, as representative of all Russian Cossack-
dom, declare that the removal of General Kornilov will
inevitably suggest to the Cossacks the fatal idea of the
futility of all further Cossack sacrifices, in view of the Gov-
ernment's not desiring to adopt effective means for the sal-
vation of the Motherland; (4) the Council of the Cossacks'
Union think it their moral duty to state to the Provisional
Government and to the people that they do not hold them-
selves responsible, as they were until now, FOR THE BE-
HAVIOUR OF THE COSSACKS' ARMY AT THE FRONT AND IN

THE REAR in case of General Kornilov's discharge; (5) the
Council of the Cossacks' Union LOUDLY AND FIRMLY de-
clare their complete and absolute devotion to their heroic
chief, General Lavr Georgievitch Kornilov."

On the 7th of August, the Central Committee of the
League of Army and Navy Officers telegraphed to the Min-
ister of War, to the Commanders of groups of armies of

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 91

different fronts and to the Commanders of armies, their de-
cision about General Kornilov, which was very diplomati-
cally drawn up and concluded thus : " We summon all honest
people and all Russian officers to declare their full confidence
in him without delay. We do not admit the possibility of
interference by any institutions or persons whatever in his
acts sanctioned by the Government, and are ready to assist
in the fulfilment of all his lawful demands TO THE LAST

DROP OF OUR BLOOD."

Late at night, on the same day and at the same place, the
Union of Knights of St. George carried the following reso-
lution :

"(i) The Conference of the Union of Knights of St.
George, having deliberated on the Cossacks' Council's reso-
lution at their special meeting on the 7th of August, has
unanimously decided to support this resolution and FIRMLY
announce to the Provisional Government that, if they should
allow calumny to triumph and General Kornilov to be dis-
charged, the Union of the Knights of St. George would im-
mediately call to arms all the Knights of St. George for
joint action with the Cossacks." Similar resolutions were
carried by the Military League and other organizations.

This movement to maintain General Kornilov in his
position has culminated in the significant decision of the
" Conference of public workers," held on the 6th to the
loth of August before the All-Russian Conference, and at
which were gathered all the best men of the Progressive
Coalition of the Fourth Duma. The following was tele-
graphed to Kornilov by Rodzianko : " The Conference of
Public Workers, welcoming you, the Chief Leader of the
Russian Army, declare that they consider all attempts to
prejudice your authority in the army and in Russia to be
criminal and join their voice to the voice of officers, Knights

92 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

of St George and Cossacks. In the terrible hour of heavy
trial, all thoughtful Russia looks to you with hope and
faith." All this campaign was said to be provoked by the
rumours of General Kornilov's " possible discharge " under
the pressure of the Central Soviet. In fact, this campaign
was the call to arms which united all the different political
parties gravitating towards a "firm government" The
Conference of Public Workers, under the leadership of
Rodzianko, was the centre which has reviewed the troops,
defined the ideal aims of the growing movement and made
the final preparations for the assault on the Provisional
Government at the All-Russian Conference at Moscow.
The leaders of the movement had such confidence in their
success that some most practical politicians determined to
take part in the drafting of resolutions on behalf of Kor-
nilov, though only three days later they winced at being re-
minded of the fact.

At the same time, many journeys of representatives of
different organizations and of private individuals to Gen-
eral Headquarters were taking place, as well as conferences
at some houses in Moscow, etc. In short, something sub-
stantial was being prepared for the justification at the A1I-
Russian Conference of the confidence in the success of the
movement for a " firm government/' Should the circum-
stances prove favourable, preparation was made to bring
matters to an end at the Conference itself. Hence the at-
tempt to have at hand some real help, to create the neces-
sary atmosphere amongst the cadets of the Officers' Training
Schools. Just before General Kornilov's arrival in Mos-
cow, a special pamphlet was largely circulated, under the
title " Kornilov, the hero of the people " (or " Kornilov, the
leader of the people"), written, in a suitable style, by a
prominent member of one of the military " associations.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 93

Finally, General Kornilov's solemnly ceremonious entry
into Moscow took place in conformity with a previously set-
tled plan (including the call at the Iverskaya Chapel),
During the whole time of his stay different persons, having
nothing to do with the army, were being received in his
saloon carriage* The great financial experts W. and P.
"reported" (as stated in Moscow papers) on Russia's
financial situation. Aladin "presented a report" on the
general international situation* Purishkevitch was "pre-
sented," Miliukov *' received " ; of course Kaledin called, eta

However, the Moscow Conference did not in the least
justify their hopes. Not only was it necessary to abandon
the hope of the support of the Conference in proclaiming a
Dictatorship, but the very clenched fists of the Preliminary
Conference of Public Workers became hands extended for
a friendly shake. From the start, the schemes of both the
extreme parties of Right and Left were washed away by the
general feeling of provincial representatives attending at the
All-Russian Conference, and the general strike proclaimed
by the Bolsheviks had no more success than the call at
Iverskaya.

The overrating of his forces by one party and the under-
rating by the other party of his a circumstance already
mentioned by me became strikingly apparent at the Mos-
cow Conference. Before the Moscow days, a great number
of people, even among the democratic masses, were infected
by a sickly fear of a counter-revolution and looked forwjard
to the Moscow Conference with apprehension, fearing that
the voice of the country would join that of the " Progressive
Coalition " (regenerated in those days at Moscow) and sus-
pecting me of flirtation with the reactionists. (I was not
at that time acknowledged to be counter-revolutionary.)
On the other hand, the leaders of the coalition of "all

94 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

thoughtful elements in Russia " (to quote Rodzianko),
which prepared themselves for an assault on the Govern-
ment, were, under the pressure of their provincial con-
stituencies, also obliged to alter their intended resolutions.
Summing up the results of the Moscow Conference, the
Izvestia of the Soviet stated with some astonishment in
their issue of the i6th of August that " all men of the 3rd
of June, 1 who were ready to kick the dying lion, expe-
rienced, in the days of the Moscow Conference, a profound
sense of disappointment/' Noting the unanimity displayed
at the Conference by the representatives of workmen and
peasants, the masses of the army and navy, by the Zemstvos,
the towns, the co-operative organizations, by railwaymen,
teachers, etc., the I&vestia rightly remarked that "the
democracy has been strengthened by the Moscow Confer-
ence/' Notwithstanding this, though the results of the
Moscow Conference seem to have destroyed all hopes of a
coup d'etat from the Right, the active adherents of a Dic-
tatorship were not persuaded to keep quiet, but were incited
to pursue their aims by other more peremptory means. An
open political struggle with the Provisional Government
being found to be not within their power, they decided to
storm it unawares by a " sharp stroke/']

Chairman. Did a plan arise after the Moscow Confer-
ence for some changes in the composition of the Govern-
ment, and have certain names been mentioned in this con-
nection ?

Keremky* No, there was only talk about the necessity
of making use of the change of mood arising from the
Bublikov-Tseretelli incident 2 and of starting pourparlers

1 Supporters of the coup d'etat of the 3rd of June, 1907, when Stoli-
pin disfranchised the great majority of the people.

2 After Bublikov*s speech at the .Moscow Conference urging the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 95

with the industrial circles with regard to their being repre-
sented in the Provisional Government. The question was
then simply that of recalling to the administration of the
State representatives of the propertied classes not Cadets
(Constitutional Democrats), but Konovalov and other
genuine representatives of these classes.

12

Chairman. What intelligence have you had about the
Bolsheviks' actions, whence did you get it, and was it not
of a designedly provocative character?

Kerensky. We used to receive information of Bolshevik
actions nearly every week or fortnight For instance, not
long before the 2/th of August, at a Government meeting,
one of the Ministers asked me whether I, or the Minister of
the Interior, was aware of the rumours about an impending
Bolshevik rising, and whether these rumours had serious
grounds. Then I answered (and so, I believe, did Skobelev)
that these rumours were of no importance.

Chairman. What measures did the Government under-
take in case the expected Bolshevik rising in Petrograd and
Kronstadt took place?

Kerensky. In Kronstadt, nothing was proposed to be
done. I must state that a Bolshevik action then had no im-
portance at all. In my deposition at the preliminary exami-
nation, I mentioned my talk with Mr. V. Lvov. It is stated
there that Lvov was assuring me that a Bolshevik rising was
inevitable, and I replied that, as far as we know, no Bolshe-
vik action was expected to take ptace. I even told him:

necessity of the loyal co-operation of the bourgeoisie with the demo-
cratic elements, Tseretelli demonstratively shook hands with him.

96 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

" You speak with as much certainty as if you were going
yourself to take part in this rising."

[Now, after the Bolshevik counter-revolution, or (to use
a better term) after the All-Russian new " Pugatchevst-
china/' which has destroyed the Russian State, and taking
into account our remarkable ability to forget altogether yes-
terday's events, very many of my readers will think at this
part of my statement that, whilst firing at sparrows (the
Kornilovites), the Provisional Government ignored the real
game, and many others will say that Kornilov had foreseen
the possibility of a Bolshevik rising, whereas the Provisional
Government was fatally blind, or at least had their left eye
blindfolded. These criticisms are thoroughly wrong, be-
cause (i) before and at the time of Kornilov's rebellion,
there was no real danger or even any symptom of a Bolshe-
vik rising, and (2) before Kornilov's rebellion, the Bolshe-
vik menace was confronted by the whole enormous force of
democracy organized in the new local self-government
the Soviets and army organizations, the force which was
defending the country and Government from the chaos of
the extreme Left,

Kornilov's movement was being prepared, just at the time
of the most intensive struggle of the statesmanlike and patri-
otically minded democracy with her anarchist and Bolshevik
elements. On the 8th of July a resolution of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet insisted on " the sharp
change in the minds of the masses, which was created by
the adventurous political attempt (of July 3rd~5th) at an
armed rising against the Provisional Government/' prepared
by anarchist-Bolshevik elements and by some dark forces
acting under their colours.

On the 1 8th of July, the same Central Soviet unanimously
stated that " the restoration of the fighting capacity of the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 97

army is the most serious problem of the moment" I have
already quoted many other proclamations and resolutions of
the Central Executive Committee full of the same healthy
feelings. It is enough to run over the leaves of the
Izvcstia of the Central Executive Committee for July-
August, to be convinced of the intensity of this struggle be-
tween the statesmanlike and the anarchist parties, to see how
the class feelings were more and more subdued in the minds
of the democracy to the needs of the State, how the longing
for work and order was reviving, and how the conscious-
ness of the necessity of sacrifices for the country's sake was
penetrating deeper and deeper into the minds of the people.
One should remember how unselfishly the army organiza-
tions and commissaries struggled on the front with the Bol-
shevik propaganda of " my precious life first/' how many of
them redeemed their unwitting errors of the first days of
Revolution, and sanctified their struggle with cowards and
traitors by their blood. One has only to look through the
many hundreds of resolutions drafted by battalions, regi-
ments and divisions at that time, to be convinced that a
process of purification was rapidly going on in the minds of
the soldiers themselves, and that the position of the com-
manding officers was steadily getting better. At the same
time, the activity of newly formed local government bodies
was developing in the country at the expense of the Soviets
and various self-appointed Committees. The leading
Soviets* papers acknowledged this fact and thought it to be
a symptom of the healthy development of revolutionary
statesmanship. But, first and foremost, we must not forget
that everywhere the Bolsheviks were then a small minority
and were playing the part of an irresponsible opposition.
Their piteous attempt at organizing a general strike at the
time of the Moscow Conference, their forfeiture of their

98 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

right of independent action at its meetings, decreed by the
Bureau of the Central Soviet, and, on the other hand, the
boldness of the democracy in extending a friendly hand to
the bourgeoisie all this is no dream, but the actual reality
in which we lived before the 27th of August and which en-
abled me to answer, to the proposal to postpone the procla-
mation of martial law until the arrival of the 3rd Corps of
Cavalry, that I did not need it for that purpose at all.

On the whole, a comparison of forces showed that all
attempts to repeat the 3rd~5th of July were sure to be a
COMPLETE FAILURE. Still less was there any real danger to
the regime then existing to be anticipated from the attempts
of the extreme Right THE " BOLSHEVISM OF THE RIGHT "

BY ITSELF WAS NEVER TO BE FEARED. It Was not a pOW-

der store which on explosion destroys the foundation of
everything, but a match that could fall in a store of ex-
plosives and then . . . The results of the 27th of August
have shown WHAT would follow.

One of the most prominent leaders of the S.R. party,
notorious for his irremediable propensity towards the Left
extremists, speaking of Kornilov's rebellion at the last Con-
gress of his party in November, 1917, said: " The sudden
increase of energy in the struggle against the threatening
military plot and counter-revolution for one moment suc-
ceeded in reuniting the forces of the revolutionary democ-
racy against the only great party of Russian propertied
classes which still held an ambiguous position, the * party of
the People's Freedom' (Constitutional-Democrats): the
position of socialist democracy and the rather shaken influ-
ence of the Soviets was much strengthened by this rising of
enthusiasm and energy. This had enabled the Soviets, who
had, after the events of the 3rd-Sth of July and the disloca-
tion of the democratic front, become more moderate, again

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 99

to join the line and provoked a new MOVE TO THE LEFT.
That is why it is no wonder, comrades, that many, and I
amongst them, were welcoming Kornilov's action as a step
which would bring this MODERATION of the country to its
logical end, to absurdity, to a military plot, and would enable
us to profit by the mistakes and folly of the Right in order
to smooth over and rectify all the harm that was done by
the mistakes and folly of the Left"

I was not among those many who were "welcoming"
the possibility of bringing Soviets under the Bolshevik in-
fluence, but I must state that, in fact, it was only the 27th of
August that made the 27th of October possible. And that
is really the great crime, the unredeemable sin against our
native country of those naive dreamers, skilful politicians
and bold adventurers who undertook to save Russia by
means of a " White General.'' * In his proclamation " to
the Russian people/' General Kornilov, in spite of all evi-
dence to the contrary, states that the Provisional Govern-
ment acts under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority of
the Soviets,' etc. Whether Kornilov himself laboured under
a delusion, or lied deliberately, is of no importance, but
there was nothing, nothing whatever, of the kind at the
time in the Soviets clearly leaning to the Right. But Kor-
nilov himself proved a remarkable prophet. Almost imme-
diately following his declaration, the Soviets were every-
where actually seized by the Bolsheviks.

On the 27th of August, the lighted match actually fell into
a powder-store. On September ist the Bolsheviks' resolu-
tion, containing the program of the coup d'etat of the 25th
of October, was introduced into the Central Executive Com-
mittee of the Soviet. Here are some of its most prominent
points. " All wavering policy ^s to the organization of the

1 General on a white horse.

100 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

authority must be decisively set aside; the policy of com-
promise must be struck at the root. . . . The extraor-
dinary powers and irresponsibility of the Provisional Gov-
ernment can no longer be tolerated. The only remedy lies
in the creation of an authority composed of representatives
of the revolutionary proletariat and peasants, whose policy
would be based upon the following principles: immediate
abolition of all private land property, that of the landowners
to be abolished without compensation, etc. ; labour control of
all production and distribution upon a scale embracing the
entire State; nationalization of the most important branches
of industry . . . ruthless taxation of large investments
and property and confiscation of war-profits ; annullation of
all secret treaties and the immediate proposal of a demo-
cratic peace to all nations. The following immediate meas-
ures must be decreed : revocation of all repressions directed
against the labour classes (read * Bolsheviks ') and their
organizations; abolition of the death-penalty at the front
and restoration of complete liberty of propaganda and of all
democratic army organizations ..." etc.

At this same meeting of the Central Executive Commit-
tee, even Dan protested already against the " irresponsi-
bility" of the Provisional Government, and declared that
" the authorities have no right to take any repressive meas-
ures (against workmen) without a previous discussion with
our Commission for the struggle against the counter-revolu-
tion/' The same meeting of the Central Executive Commit-
tee of the Soviet adopted a resolution of protest against the
suppression of two Bolshevik papers which were carrying on
an injurious campaign against the officers.

The Red Guard was created, and developed so rapidly
that its statute was worked out in Moscow by the 5th of
September. On the 6th of September the Menshevik and

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 101

Social-Revolutionary presidium of the Petrograd Soviet
gave up its powers, and a few days later, in place of Gotz,
Skobelev and Tseretelli, appeared Bronstein (Trotsky),
Rosenfeldt (Kamenev) and Co. ...

A regular mania for arbitrary arrests was exhibited
everywhere : self-appointed " Committees for the suppression
of the counter-revolution " sprang up in all quarters, openly
refusing to obey my orders to stop their activity after the
suppression of the Kornilov revolt The so-called " Inter-
regional Conference ** at Petrograd on the 6th of September
declared that, " having discussed Kerensky's order, we de-
cide not to dissolve the revolutionary organizations for the
suppression of the counter-revolution and to inform the
Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of the above
decision/* The Central Executive Committee agreed to the
Inter-regional Conference's point of view.

On September yth the Moscow Soviet for the first time
rejected a Menshevik resolution expressing confidence in and
promising to support the Provisional Government on condi-
tion of the exclusion from its membership of Cadets (Con-
stitutional Democratic Party), and adopted the Bolshevik
resolution, which on the ist of September was not passed in
Petrograd.

Abominable massacres of officers occurred again in the
army and navy on the 30th of August, and I was obliged to
send the following telegram to the fleet : " I demand that all
atrocious acts of violence shall cease immediately. Crews
committing these crimes, under pretext of saving the country
and the Revolution, when in reality ruining the fleet's mili-
tary efficiency in the face of the enemy, have forgotten their
duty, their moral sense, and are traitors to their country.
These counter-revolutionary acts of murderers and brutes
will forever brand all the Baltic crews with shame. Am

102 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

expecting immediate report that order is fully restored/'
The position of the officers became indeed desperate. Army
organizations, under pressure of the soldiery maddened by
agitators, arbitrarily assumed new powers; much of what
had been re-established with such enormous difficulty had to
be thrown overboard for the sake of saving, at least, some
remnants.

Handled by clever demagogues scenting booty, the ab-
surd adventure of a group of persons becomes a " counter-
revolutionary Government plot against the labouring
masses." The worse than imprudent behaviour of a few
prominent members of the Cadet Party in having been in
touch with Kornilov's movement, offered the opportunity
for proclaiming the most influential Liberal Party a criminal
and counter-revolutionary organization, and that oppor-
tunity was seized by the very men who, in July, were indig-
nant at the attempt of the Right to lay the blame for the
rising of the 3rd~5th of July upon the entire Bolshevik
Party. A death-blow was being consciously dealt to the
idea of an all-national authority at a moment when nothing
but anarchy could replace it.

At the same time, maddened by their failure, the avowed
and secret Kornilov faction started a shameless slandering
campaign against me, creating the legend of a " great provo-
cation," which, cleverly managed by the writers of the
Pravda (the leading Bolshevik organ), became the fairy-
tale of my complicity, of my being a Kornilovite. It was
the beginning of a chaos. September and October witnessed
the torturing agony of the Revolution, which was destined
to become the agony of Russia. . . . We are quickly apt
to forget what happened but yesterday. I say to those who
have genuinely forgotten : curse not democracy alone for the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 103

Motherland's ruin ; remember that the 2 $th of October could
not have been without the 2?th of August.]

13

Chairman. Was the intended proclamation of martial
law in Petrograd called for by strategical considerations,
without any connection with the Bolshevik movement and
with the question of the organization of a strong authority?

Kerensky. Had I sufficient time at my disposal, I would,
according to my habit in dealing with big legal investiga-
tions into political cases, have reconstructed the whole story
properly. There certainly existed a certain group of per-
sons at the Stavka (Headquarters) who always en-
deavoured, whatever events took place in the country, to
make use of them according to their own definite tendency.
For instance, immediately after the break through at Riga,
I began to receive demands for the establishment of martial
law, for the transference of all the troops of the Petrograd
district to the command of the Generalissimo.

KrokhmaL Demands from whom?

Kerensky. From the Stavka, from Kornilov. My task
then was rather hard, because again part of the Provisional
Government were ready to accept ANYTHING coming from
the Stavka. As for myself, taking into consideration the
political situation on the one hand, and on the other con-
sidering that the front was drawing near to Petrograd and
that all the region close to Petrograd might gradually be-
come the army's rear line; that before Protopopov intro-
duced the separate command for Petrograd (which took
place on the loth of February, 1917, i.e., only a few days
before the Revolution), the Petrograd district was under

104 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

orders of the Generalissimo; that therefore this state of
things had been changed only seven months ago and that I
had no reason for adhering to such a separation of the
Petrograd district considering all that, I decided to pursue
but one aim to safeguard the independence of the Gov-
ernment I explained this to the Provisional Government
by pointing out that, owing to the critical political situation,
it was impossible for the Government to be entirely depend-
ent upon the Stavka for military command. I proposed the
following : that at any rate Petrograd and its nearest neigh-
bourhood should be detached and constitute a separate dis-
trict military subordinated to the Government. I firmly
insisted upon this. Thus the Provisional Government would
give over to the Stavka all that was needed for strategical
purposes, while Petrograd, as the political centre and the
residence of the Provisional Government, must remain
extra-territorial, i.e. militarily independent of the Stavka.
This plan cost me a week's struggle, but at last I succeeded
in bringing the members of the Provisional Government to
unanimity and in receiving General Kornilov's formal
assent It became known later that Kornilov thought there
would only be a delay of from four to five days, the condi-
tion " While the Provisional Government remains in Petro-
grad " having been interpreted by him as meaning that the
Provisional Government would leave Petrograd almost on
the day immediately following the declaration of the new
military order; although there was, of course, not the slight-
est intention of doing so, as practically no measures have yet
been undertaken to prepare a possible evacuation. Later,
General Krimov told me, before committing suicide, that he
came to Petrograd in the capacity of an Army Commander
with the order to proclaim a state of siege and divide Petro-
grad into military sections. So that we should have been

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 105

bagged at any moment. Therefore, in view of the Stavka's
state of mind and of possible complications arising from the
sending of troops to the front (which was not proceeding
quite smoothly) , in view also of possible excesses during the
transfer of the Government Offices to Moscow, we intended
to keep a certain number of armed troops at the special
disposal of the Provisional Government, but in no way
subordinated to the Generalissimo (i.e. neither to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Northern front nor to the Generalis-
simo).

Chairman. Therefore, martial law was not to be estab-
lished in consequence of Petrograd's being formed into a
separate unit?

Kerensky. No. Martial law was to be established, but
on a special principle, under direct control not of the Gen-
eralissimo but of the Provisional Government

Shablovsky. Was there any intention of dismantling
Kronstadt, and what were the reasons for doing so ? Were
they strategical reasons?

Kerensky. That was not mentioned in connection with
the establishing of martial law in Petrograd. That is an
old business as old as last summer.

Liber. The official document was signed on August
8th, therefore there was some connection.

Kerensky. No, that is an old story. There are very
good guns at Kronstadt which we needed for other posi-
tions, but the Kronstadt garrison would not give them up.
I think that this was due not merely to revolutionary zeal,
but to deliberate German propaganda, because Kronstadt
is full of German agents. From the very beginning of the
Revolution, especially during the summer, the Stavka had
given repeated orders for the guns to be delivered to the
command of the Northern front for some new positions, but

106 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

these orders always met with a decided opposition from the
Kronstadt garrison, on the alleged plea of the Stavka's
treacherous intention of disarming Kronstadt.

Krokhmal. For political reasons ?

Kerensky. Not only for political, but for treasonable
purposes. The result of the Kronstadt people's behaviour
is that the before-mentioned positions are insufficiently forti-
fied even now, and they cannot be fortified in the near fu-
ture. It was decided to dismantle the Kronstadt fortress
in June, or July at latest, and to transform Kronstadt into
a base for supplies, stores, etc.

Shablovsky. Was not the fortress considered of no
value for military purposes, and was not the coast considered
to be of more importance?

Kerensky. Yes, this is why all that was suggested
the removal of the guns and the dismantling of the fortress.
All this was intended for purely military and strategical
reasons,

Liber. And the removal of the Kronstadt garrison?

Kerensky. This was but the natural consequence of the
dismantling of the Kronstadt fortress. Had the fortress
been needed and had it possessed any importance as a point
of defence, then, whatever the spirit of its garrison, the Gov-
ernment would never have ordered its disarmament and
abolition for political reasons to suppose so is absurd ; but
had the heavy artillery been removed there would be sense
in such a dismantling. In general, Kronstadt has no mili-
tary or strategical importance whatever.

[The Kronstadt question had apparently been raised
owing to the following statement by General Kornilov.
Referring to the two tasks to be accomplished by General
Krimov upon arriving \yith his troops at Petrograd, Gen-
eral Kornilov writes that, "after accomplishing his first

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 107

task, General Krimov would have to send a brigade with
artillery to Oranienbaum and, once there, order the Kron-
stadt garrison to dismantle the fortress and cross over to
the continent. The consent of the Prime Minister for the
dismantling of the fortress had been obtained on the 8th of
August/' It was not I who u gave consent " for the dis-
armament of the fortress, but I as the Minister of Marine
had raised that question and obtained the consent of the
Provisional Government, and I never consented to the
method of disposing of the fortress proposed by General
Kornilov; besides which, he could allot no tasks to & de-
tachment sent to be at the disposal of the Provisional Gov-
ernment. ... I must say that the fall of Riga had slightly
sobered the Kronstadt garrison, and, when Kornilov was
entrusting Krimov with his " task," they were already " sur-
rendering " the guns. By a terrible irony of fate, in Febru-
ary last, the Kronstadt garrison's suspicion of treason in the
Stavka's order for the removal of heavy artillery was based
upon the Stavka's order being signed by the German name
of Captain Altvater, who is now, apparently, playing an im-
portant part with Messrs. " The People's Commissaries ''
and has been delegated by them as an t expert ** to Brest.
The legend of treason at the Stavka was so deeply rooted
in Kronstadt, that every attempt to remove the artillery
drove the crowd to absolute fury, intensified by clever
agitators.

I must point out, however strange it may seem, judging
by the terrible results of the six months' activity of the
revolutionary masses, that they were ready to credit the
most absurd stories and rumours of treason, and searched
for it with exceptional ardour. For instance, in the Baltic
provinces, the sailors in their ardent search for traitors
among the local German Barons surpassed all examples

108 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

of the kind recorded from the practice of the agents of the
old regime.]

Liber. Had the fortification works in Finland been
reduced with Kornilov's knowledge and had this been de-
cided upon at the Moscow Conference?

Kerensky. No, it had been decided upon much earlier.

Liber. But with Kornilov's knowledge? Was he ac-
quainted with it ?

Kerensky. No. It had been decided before Kornilov's
appointment to the post of Generalissimo. It can be veri-
fied by the agenda of the Provisional Government's meet-
ings. It was decided to limit measures for the fortification
of Finland because they proved to be utterly useless and ab-
surd. They were no good. Why do you attach any sig-
nificance to the matter?

Liber. Because, in his statement, Kornilov declares that
the cessation of work in Finland was a deliberate act of the
Government which has now resulted in disastrous conse-
quences.

Kerensky. Nonsense !

[" A deliberate act " the member of the Commission of
Inquiry has greatly softened General Kornilov's meaning.
" The limitation of fortification work in Finland " is con-
sidered by General Kornilov as a proof of the Provisional
Government's acting in full accord with the plans of the
German General Staff. The story of the " note " transmit-
ted at the meeting of the 3rd of August was, so to speak, a
preparation for attack. The Finland story is a bombard-
ment from a 48-inch gun. I am not revolted, nor indignant :
a year of revolution has too deeply revealed the secret na-
ture of men. I only want to tell all past, present and
future slanderers that he who wishes to calumniate success-
fully must know w.ell of what he is speaking.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 109

So far as I can remember, the limitation of work in Fin-
land took place in early spring, and in any case the ques-
tion arose in A. T. Gutchkov's time. The fact is that,
besides important military defensive constructions, a great
amount of work went on in Finland under cover of needs
of defence, and this work, very advantageous for those
who directed it, was unnecessary for the country's defence,
ruinous for the exchequer, and extremely harmful politi-
cally, since rapine, plunder and violence towards the popula-
tion acted more potently than any pro-German propaganda.
Dozens of square kilometres of timber were cut down around
Helsingfors and other places. Priceless forests were de-
stroyed aimlessly and needlessly, and national wealth ruth-
lessly plundered. It was the Government's duty to arrest
this carnival of mischief and put a stop to the activity
of such marauders of the rear. Needless to say, all the
really defensive works never ceased in Finland for a mo-
ment.

Speaking generally, it is possible to point to a whole
series of enterprises and works run under the old regime as
defence-work, often for no other reason than to escape the
necessity of asking the State Duma for a vote of credit.
This limitation of work in Finland formed but a small part
of the milliards saved from "military expenses " by the
Provisional Government in an urgent way, mainly owing to
the insistence of all four Ministers of Finance (Terest-
chenko, Shingarev, Nekrassov and Bernadsky), without dis-
tinction of party. Yet, what do demagogues from Right or
Left care for dull reality, when so many simpletons are
always ready to believe any kind of nonsense ?]

Chairman. In view of the coming establishment of
martial law, was any opposition to this measure expected
from the Soviet, and did the Government enter into negotia-

110 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

tions or confer with the Central Executive Committee con-
cerning the prevention of a possible conflict?

Kerensky. No, there were no negotiations. Probably,
Liber also knows that I had no negotiations concerning the
establishment of martial law, nor did any one else negotiate
in my name. We had plenty of Soviet representatives:
Avksentiev, Tchernov, Skobelev. There was no opposition
from any quarter. The Provisional Government only
wished to guarantee the capital and country from surprises
and experiments.

Shdblovsky. Then the 3rd Corps, which was marching
here, was to represent a military force placed at the dis-
posal, not of the Generalissimo, but of the Provisional Gov-
ernment in case of emergency?

Kerensky. Yes.

Shablovsky. Was there any intention of using these
troops for the suppression of possible disorders, or was
not the question discussed by the Provisional Govern-
ment?

Kerensky. It had never been definitely laid down for
what purpose these troops might be needed. Generally, in
case of any emergency. Because the Government needed
support. It was not even known against which side they
would have to be used. I did not even think there would
arise a necessity for using them. In any case, they were not
to have any relation whatever either with the Commander
of the front or with the Generalissimo.

Shablovsky. Were not these troops intended to form a
nucleus for the formation of a new army on the coast in
connection with the break-through at the Riga front?

Kerensky. Hardly that. There existed an old dispute
about the formation of an army for the coast. That is a
special military question. It had been raised in Gutchkov's

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 111

time, between the Stavka on one side and Gutchkov and
Kornilov on the other. There were many plans as to the
organization of the Petrograd troops in case they found
themselves obliged to defend not only the " Revolution/*
but the approaches to Petrograd. It is an old question.

14

Krokhmal Did the intention of summoning the 3rd
Corps originate only after Riga fell ?

Kerensky. Yes.

Krokhmal. Was not there some kind of talk between
you and Savinkov to the effect that this corps was meant for
a possible suppression of a Bolshevik revolt ; and is anything
known as to how Savinkov put it in his conversation with
Kornilov about the summoning of this corps?

Kerensky. I do not know the wording of Savinkov's
conversation with Kornilov, because I learn from the papers
that much has been said at the Stavka which has never been
mentioned here; for instance, I read that discussions took
place there concerning possible changes in the Provisional
Government; absolutely fantastic names were proposed,
while we here had no idea of what was going on. But here,
the question of calling up troops against the Bolsheviks had
never been so concretely formulated by the Provisional Gov-
ernment. No such great importance was attached here to
the Bolsheviks as was at the Stavka; they were a mere
incident. At that time, there were generally no particular
discussions. For instance, when we thought at one time of
moving to Moscow, it was intended to call up a railway
battalion to raise the efficiency of the Nicholas railway (from
Petrograd to Moscow) . All these episodes are of no conse-
quence. I recollect that only after Savinkov's return from

112 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

the Stavka, presumably on the 25th of August, I received
the first information that a corps was on the march, and
that it was actually the 3rd Corps. I mention all this be-
cause at the beginning of the episode I was questioned by
many persons who were more intimate with me, whether I
could remember how it all originated why the 3rd Corps
had been sent; and we could not recollect how it all hap-
pened, why and what everything had been so little re-
corded here.

[In his statement of the I3th of September, Savinkov
gives the following explanation of the causes which led to
the summons of the 3rd Cavalry Corps : " By order of the
Prime Minister I asked the Generalissimo to dispatch a cav-
alry corps for the purpose of establishing, in reality, martial
law at Petrograd. The establishment of martial law at
Petrograd originated from the necessity of subordinating
the Petrograd military district to the Generalissimo, in con-
sequence of recent events at the front. The draft of the
declaration of martial law at Petrograd was approved, to
the best of my belief, by the Provisional Government, of
which Tchernov was also a member. It goes without saying
that this cavalry corps, being at the disposal of the Pro-
visional Government, was obliged to defend it from all an-
tagonistic attempts independently of their origin, just as
the joint detachment defended the Government against the
Bolsheviks at the beginning of July" (Folia Naroda,
September I2th). This formula is perfectly correct It
is highly probably that Savinkov, when asking Kornilov in
my name to send troops to the Provisional Government,
founded this demand upon a possible danger from the Left.
. . . What else could he tell Kornilov? ... As to
Savinkov himself being perfectly alive to the danger from
the Right, this is plain from his following statement : " I

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 113

was satisfied (on August 24th) by Kornilov's statement of
his readiness fully to support A. F. Kerensky. However,
the general state of mind at the Stavka appeared to me as
being highly strained, and I was not at all surprised when,
on my return journey in the train, the Commissary of the
8th Army spoke to me of possible attempts at a conspiracy
of the Stavka Staff, and offered to put at once the entire
8th Army (of which he was sure) at the disposal of the
Provisional Government; an offer which I gratefully ac-
cepted, promising to send him a telegram in case of neces-
sity. I did send that telegram on the 27th of August,
having previously reported my conversation to A. F. Ker-
ensky/' On his return from the Stavka on the 25th of
August, Savinkov told me that, during the first day of his
stay, Kornilov's attitude had been quite "irreconcilable,"
but by the end of the second day he, Savinkov, succeeded in
making him change his mind. I must say that Savinkov
himself always suspected the Stavka Staff of plotting, but
exempted Kornilov himself.]

Kerensky. Concerning the 3rd Corps, I recollect Savin-
kov telling me, after his return from the Stavka, that he
had succeeded in dissuading Kornilov from sending here the
" Savage Division " and appointing Krimov. I do not know
whether you are aware that I had, just at that time, signed
the order appointing Krimov to the command of the nth
Army. This was done for greater reassurance.

KrokhmaL For whose reassurance?

Kerensky. For mine. Once General Krimov was in
command of the nth Army, there was nothing more to be
said. But, it seems, he remained all the while at the Stavka,
working out the disposition of the troops " in case of a
Bolshevik revolt," and then suddenly made his appearance
here. I was extremely surprised to hear of his arrival.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

I asked him : " Who are you? " " I am the Commander of
the Special Army." " Which ?" "The one appointed to
Petrograd."

Krokhmal And yet there had been no order appointing
him to the command of this very army ?

Kerensky. No. My assistant, General lakubovitch,
was present at our interview. I asked him : " Do you know
anything about it? " " No, I know nothing; neither does
the Ministry of War."

Chairman. We have a lacuna concerning General
Krimov, as we had not examined him; therefore, the Com-
mission begs you to state whether you have had any ex-
planations with him.

Kerensky. I have a vivid recollection of the whole
scene, and I can describe it to you.

Chairman. What information had you as to the move-
ments of his corps before he put in an appearance ?

Kerensky. You see, we dispatched an officer, who had
formerly served with him, to meet him at Luga and explain
the situation. We did this after our telegrams ordering
him to stay his march remained unacknowledged. This
mission succeeded. General Krimov arrived here accom-
panied by this officer (General Samarin). When General
Krimov was announced, I went to meet him, invited him to
my study, and then we had a talk. As far as I can remem-
ber, General lakubovitch, Assistant Minister of War, was
also present. General Krimov began by saying that they
had no special aims in marching here; that they had been
sent at the disposal of the Provisional Government; that
they had received orders to aid the Provisional Government;
that no one ever dreamed of acting against the Government;
that, as soon as the misunderstanding had been cleared, he
had given orders to halt. Then he added that he was in

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 115

possession of a written order to that effect. At first he
would not produce the order, and I had no reason to doubt
that he had been deceived by it. He apparently hesitated
to deliver it, but did so at last. The order was absolutely
clear and precise.

Chairman. You were good enough to give it me.

Kerensky. You know it. ... It is very cleverly writ-
ten. I read the order. I knew Krimov and always greatly
respected him, as a man of decidedly very moderate views,
but highly honest and decent. I rose and slowly approached
him. He also rose. He saw that I was greatly impressed
by the order. He approached this table; I came up quite
close to him and said, in a low voice : " Yes, General, I see.
You are undoubtedly a very clever man. Thank you."
Krimov saw that the part he played was perfectly clear to
me.

(To the Chairman) I sent for you at once and passed it
to you.

Chairman. You gave me the order.

Kerensky. After this, General Krimov told me that he
had been at the Stavka, where they had drafted the disposi-
tion and the statute for proclaiming a state of siege at
Petrograd ; he added that, according to this plan, Petrograd
was to be divided into military sections. I am sure he
found the situation unbearable, because he, Krimov, had
swerved from the truth ; first of all, he did not openly con-
fess his own part in the affair, and secondly, clause 4 of the
order begins with the words : " From communications of the
Stavka and information received by me, I learn that riots are
taking place in Petrograd . . /* etc. I asked him what were
his grounds for making this declaration in his own name
about riots. He was driven to refer to some " officer,"
travelling he did not know whence or whither. In short,

116 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

he could not explain it Then we parted, i.e. I dismissed
him, refusing to shake hands with him.

[It appears that in about an hour or two after Krimov left
my study he committed suicide. It should not be thought
that I ceased to respect him when I refused to shake hands
with him. Not at all. The whole of Krimov's behaviour
during his interview with me, his calm resolve after
momentary hesitation to hand over to me immediately
the convicting document (the order to his corps), his noble
silence as regards General Kornilov's telegrams of August
27th-29th, his manly confession of his belief in a dictator-
ship, all give him an undeniable right to the highest esteem
of his political enemies. All these facts clearly illustrate the
honest, courageous, vigorous nature of the man. But I, as
the most official person in the most official surroundings, as
Premier and War Minister I could not and had no right
to treat this general guilty of a crime against the State in
any other way.

By the way, General Krimov was one of those higher
officers of the Russian army who, in the winter preceding
the Revolution of February 27th, together with a part of
the " propertied classes," planned, and were preparing, the
deposition of Nicholas II.

The story of the 3rd Corps' march on Petrograd, led by
General Krimov, throws important light on the question
whether General Kornilov's rebellion was a ** misunder-
standing " caused by my " provocation," as it is termed in
Kornilov's address to the " Russian People," or whether it
was a premeditated crime. I shall record a few facts which
will solve this question, without as yet drawing any con-
clusions therefrom.

On August 2 ist Savinkov, the Deputy War Minister, ar-
rived at Headquarters, and reported to the Generalissimo

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 117

the Premier's suggestion to place a detachment of troops
at the disposal of the Provisional Government, under the
strict condition that Krimov should not be at the head of
the detachment, and that the native Caucasian division
should not be sent with it.

On August 24th Savinkov left Headquarters, having se-
cured (according to his statement) General Kornilov's con-
sent " to send a cavalry corps, not to appoint General Krimov
as its commander, and to replace the native division by a
regular cavalry division."

But, first, General Krimov, just appointed Commander
of the nth Army by the Provisional Government in the
usual way, i.e. on the recommendation of the Generalissimo,
turns out to be at Headquarters as " selected " to command
the Petrograd army, and precisely at that time is completing
the study of the plans not only " of the defence '* of Petro-
grad against the Germans, but also of Its occupation. Sec-
ondly, not only does the cavalry corps remain under General
Krimov, but, as far as I remember, precisely on August
24th, by special orders from the Generalissimo, Krimov .was
also placed in command of the native division. Thirdly,
not only does the native division remain unreplaced by
regular cavalry, but it heads the advance on Petrograd.
Fourthly and finally, the detachment, far from being sent
to be at the disposal of the Provisional Government, is ad-
vancing for the accomplishment of " two tasks " expressly
entrusted to General Krimov by General Kornilov.

On August 25th Savinkov returned to Petrograd and in-
formed me of General Kornilov's " consent " to accept my
conditions; and at the same time troops were already ap-
proaching Petrograd, but they were not those troops which
would have had the right to do so. On August 26th Kor-
nilov signed an order for the formation of the Petrograd

118 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

army, an order which under the pretence of its being
premature was not transmitted to the troops, nor was the
Government informed of it. Why was it just on August
26th? There certainly must be some reason for the fact
that on the very day of his departure to join his troops Gen-
eral Krimov was entrusted with the following task : ** On
hearing from me (General Kornilov) or from local sources
of the commencement of a Bolshevik rising, advance on
Petrograd immediately, occupy the city, disarm those di-
visions of the Petrograd garrison which join the rising, dis-
arm the population, and disperse the Soviets" All this
happened before the evening of August 26th, i.e, before my
conversation with V. N. Lvov and with General Kornilov
on the direct wire, when the " great provocation " is alleged
to have taken place. On August 27th at 2 140 A. M. General
Kornilov, as yet ignorant of his dismissal, sent a telegram
to the Deputy War Minister beginning with the following
words: "The concentration of the corps in the environs of
Petrograd will be completed by the evening of August 27."
... He thus made the Government believe that it was
the detachment which was to be placed at the disposal of the
Government without Krimov or the native division. At the
same time I and Savinkov were eagerly ** awaited at Head-
quarters " on August 28th, certainly not later. It was not
in vain that V. N. Lvov implored me not to go there. And
what would have been the position of the Provisional Gov-
ernment if it had, following on the same telegram, pro-
claimed martial law in Petrograd on August 2Qth and had
then to face Krimov's troops, who had a task of their own
to perform? Would not the Government itself be then de-
clared to be acting under the influence of the " Bolshevik
majority of the Soviets," as it soon happened (August
27th) ? This being so, did a change occur in the conduct of

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 119

Headquarters after the evening of August 26th, after my
conversation with Kornilov over the direct wire? No
change whatsoever.

" That General Krimov did not carry out the task en-
trusted to him," Kornilov explained by the fact that " com-
munications with him were severed, and he could not receive
my (Kornilov's) instructions. Xo special measures to main-
tain my connection with him were taken, because the corps
was advancing on Petrograd at the demand of the Pro-
visional Government, and I could not foresee that the Gov-
ernment itself would order connections to be severed
between the corps and Headquarters." In other words,
General Kornilov assumed that, in face of the demands put
forward through V* N. Lvov, and after our " conversation "'
on the direct wire, I would still feel happily confident that
there was no connection between Headquarters' " offers "
and the advance of the 3rd Corps.

On August 29th General Kornilov gave orders to General
Krimov to continue the movement on Petrograd, and " in
case of communications being severed again, to act accord-
ing to the circumstances and to my original instructions."

But this was not the first order since August 27th. On
the morning of August sgth General Krimov already issued
his own order No. 128, which he afterwards handed over to
me personally. These are its most characteristic points :

" i. I received the following telegrams from the Prime
Minister and the Generalissimo :

(Here he quotes the text of my announcement of the dis-
missal of General Kornilov and the reasons thereof, as well
as the text of General Kornilov's declaration of his open
move against the Provisional Government. )

'* 3. . - Having received M. Kerensky's telegram, I
sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front for

120 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

orders. General K sky stated in reply . . . that in

these hard times all Commanders-in-Chief recognized Gen-
eral Kornilov to be the sole Generalissimo, whose every
order was valid. Moreover, the Cossacks (it should be re-
membered that the 3rd Army Corps was a Cossack one)
long ago decided that General Kornilov could not be re-
moved, which I hereby proclaim for general guidance.

" 4. Tonight I heard from Generalissimo's Headquarters
and from Petrograd that riots have broken out in that
city. Famine is increased by the insane actions of the peo-
ple, who, panic-stricken at the sight of their own troops
marching on Petrograd, destroyed the railway and thus
stopped the supply of food to the metropolis. And who
were those troops they were so afraid of? They were
those who had sworn on oath to be loyal to the new regime,
those who at the Moscow State Conference had declared
their belief in the republican order as the best suited for
Russia/' etc.

This order scarcely requires explanation. I think every
one will now understand why General Krimov did not hand
over to me his order at once. And does not this order re-
mind one of Kaledin's conduct at the Moscow State Confer-
ence and the noisy campaign in favour of Kornilov's
"irremovability," which I have already mentioned above,
as well as many other things?

To what extent General Krimov's march on Petrograd
was anticipated and how serious were the hopes centred in it
can be seen from the fact that Headquarters could not to the
very end reconcile themselves with what had actually hap-
pened. On September ist General Lukomsky spoke over
the Hughes tape machine to General Alexeiev, who was then
at Vitebsk, already on his way to Mohilev :

" For me to receive a definite reply from General Kor-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 121

nilov, it is highly desirable that you should explain what is
happening to Krimov."

Even Kornilov himself admits that only at the moment
" when I learned from a conversation over the direct wire
of General Krimov's death did I take measures to settle my
conflict with the Prime Minister Kerensky in a bloodless
and painless way as far as the country and the army were
concerned."

These are the facts. There is one which I wish to em-
phasize. As Prime Minister I suggested that a detachment
of troops should be sent and placed at the disposal of the
Provisional Government on certain terms. This suggestion
was not carried out by the Generalissimo, so that the march
of Krimov's detachment cannot be explained as being the
result of an " agreement " with the Government

And then arises the pertinent question, why these troops
were marching on Petrograd even before the evening of
August 26th.]

15

KrokhmaL Was the question of bringing up additional
troops considered by the Provisional Government, or at a
private conference of some of its members?

Kerensky. I think the matter was settled by conversa-
tions. Usually, at meetings of the Provisional Government
questions are put to me by individual ministers, e.g., about
the general situation, or whether the Provisional Govern-
ment has at its disposal sufficient forces on which it can rely,
or what are the relations between, and the state of, this and
that body of troops, etc.

KrokhmaL Not at official meetings?

Kerensky, We hold various kinds of meetings busi-
ness, political and private. I always try to report to the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM .

Provisional Government about the general political situa-
tion, so as to keep it always well informed. At that time
the question arose of the necessity of securing a sufficient
force at the command of the Government to maintain order
under such difficult circumstances. I remember that in
addition we also had to deal with the grave question of the
influx of refugees from the Baltic provinces. I remember,
M. Shablovsky, your report on this question in connection
with the state of affairs on the Baltic railway lines, which I
then submitted to the Provisional Government. An active
propaganda was being carried on among the troops on the
lines of retreat towards Petrograd. On the whole there
was much tension in the atmosphere. Add to this the in-
evitable conflict between myself and Headquarters which
sooner or later was sure to arise, and I believe you will
admit there was sufficient cause for alarm concerning the
position of Petrograd.

Krokhmal Do you remember when the question of
bringing up troops was considered by the Provisional Gov-
ernment, and which of its members were present ?

Kerensky. No, I don't. I even think I can state with
certainty that we did not discuss at all which corps to bring
up, the 3rd, sth, or I2th. It was merely asked, " Are you
sufficiently secure?" and the Minister of War (or the
Minister of the Interior) answered, " The necessary steps
are taken/' or " everything will be arranged."

Krokhmal Do you remember whether the question of
the necessity of bringing up troops in connection with the
then possible or expected Bolshevik rising was put before the
Provisional Government?

Kerensky. No, I don't

Krokhmal Did not Savinkov speak to you about it?

Kerensky. Possibly. The subject was discussed.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 128

Krokhmal. But it was not definitely referred to when
it was decided to bring up troops?

Kerensky. It would be wrong to assume that our at-
tention was mainly directed that way, that we were expect-
ing a Bolshevik coup. Our attention my personal atten-
tion was directed elsewhere. You remember, just at that
time some of the Grand Dukes were arrested, and various
searches were made. After the Moscow State Conference
it became quite clear to me that the next blow would come
from the Right, not from the Left.

Chairman. Did Savinkov go to Headquarters with the
knowledge and according to the instructions of the Govern-
ment, or on his own initiative?

Kerensky. Both. You see, he arranged a conference
of all Commissaries at Headquarters for August 24th
(which I either did not know or had forgotten), to discuss
various proposals of reforms ; at the same time it was nec-
essary to arrive at a decision on many urgent questions,
e.g. about the Officers' Union, about sending troops, etc.
And as the question of proclaiming martial law, with the
exclusion of the Petrograd area, was also to be considered,
I asked Baranovsky to go with Savinkov in order that the
military business should receive better attention. [I re-
member that in this very room I met Savinkov, two of my
colleagues flakubovitch and Tumanov) and Baranovsky.
We were busy in defining the area which was to be excluded
from the jurisdiction of the Generalissimo after the Petro-
grad district had been transferred to that of Headquarters.
Then it was decided that Baranovsky should also go to
Headquarters.]

Chairman Was it reported to you and did you know
that Savinkov was taking Mironov with him, and what was
the object of it?

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Kerensky. No, I don't know about Mironov. I re-
member that the day after their departure I wanted Mi-
ronov to arrange that the movements of a certain person
should be watched. I sent for Mironov. I was told that
he had gone to Headquarters with Savinkov.

[At that time X, D. Mironov was the Head of the
Counter-intelligence Department at the General Staff of the
Petrograd Military District. His arrival at Headquarters
with Savinkov caused considerable alarm and enormous ir-
ritation.

" I know," said Kornilov to Savinkov excitedly, " Ker-
ensky wants to arrest a valuable officer. . . . He sent Mi-
ronov, this Professor of Sanskirt, with you. I know that
Mironov is engaged in political espionage. He has come
here to watch us. * . ."

" Mironov has come with my permission/' retorted Savin-
kov. " Kerensky did not even know that he was going with
me. . . /*

" All the same, I warn you, If Mironov dares to arrest
any one here, 1*11 have him shot by my Tekintzy (Asiatic
soldiers)."

" He cannot arrest any one without my orders," remarked
Savinkov.

This is a picturesque fragment from Savinkov's conver-
sation with Kornilov on August 24th. The alarm caused at
Headquarters by Mironov's arrival will be perhaps better
understood in the light of the fact that it was Savinkov's
intention to take serious measures against the Main Com-
mittee of the Officers' League and the Headquarters' Polit-
ical Department in connection with information received
concerning the plot]

Chairman. What report did Savinkov give of his visit
to Headquarters?

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 125

Kerensky. Not a very detailed one. He told me be-
sides that on the first day (August 23rd) Kornilov adopted
an extremely excited and irreconcilable attitude towards
me. Only after long negotiations did Savinkov succeed in
alleviating this animosity, and at his departure Kornilov
himself, or a representative of his I don't remember who
called on Savinkov in order to ask him to tell me that
Kornilov desired to co-operate with me and was devoted
to me.

At the same time Baranovsky, who also returned, told
me, as I have already mentioned, that the whole atmosphere
at Headquarters was unbearable, that "it is even impos-
sible to mention your name there," that "practically no
work is being done/' because at all desks one heard noth-
ing but political discussions.

[I must here mention that one of the most unexpected
aspects of Kornilov's policy was that from the moment of
his appointment as Generalissimo all questions, military,
strategic, or concerning the front, completely ceased to
interest Headquarters. What used to be the chief subject of
my discussions with Alexeiev and Brussilov now fell into
the background. I remember that on several occasions I
expressed surprise at such a hypertrophy of politics where
such questions should not have existed at all]

Chairman. Did Savinkov tell you about his proposal
not to proclaim martial law in Petrograd until the 3rd
Corps approached the city?

Kerensky. Yes, he did. But I pointed out that / did
not attach any importance to the advance of the corps,
that I considered the delay quite superfluous, that the
measure was necessary in view of altered circumstances,
and that martial law could be proclaimed without waiting
for new troops- So you see, I disagreed with Savinkov*

126 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

The Government did not discuss this particular question.

Chairman. Did he report only to you personally?

Kerensky. As far as I remember, no report was made
to the Government on the subject, apart from a statement
of the general results of his journey to Headquarters.

Chairman. Was it not then intended to send Terest-
chenko on a mission to Headquarters, and for what reason ?

Kercnsky. To which mission do you refer?

Chairman. To the one immediately following on Savin-
kov's return. What was the reason of it?

Kercnsky. He visited Headquarters in July, and brought
back the news that Filonenko was intriguing against Lukom-
sky.

Liber. And what about his visit before Lvov?

Kercnsky. Oh, yes. He went to Headquarters on his
own business, and possibly might have wished to discuss the
general situation personally. I believe at that time Makla-
kov had to go there, whose ambassadorial appointment to
Paris was then under consideration.

Chairman. So there was no connection between Terest-
chenko's visit and Savinkov's mission?

Kerensky. That, I think, is very unimportant. It did
not occupy my attention at the time. [But now I can say
definitely that it had nothing to do with Savinkov's Mis-
sion,]

Raupakh. May I ask whether Baranovsky had any ob-
ject of his own in accompanying Savinkov to Headquarters?
Kerensky. He went as Chief of the Military Cabinet,
mainly to investigate the question (of the exclusion of
Petrograd) from a military "point of view, and was only
present at the meeting at which this question was discussed.
Raupakh. Does that mean that he was instructed to
insist on the exclusion of Petrograd?

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 187

Kerensky* The military authorities were always against
the exclusion of Petrograd, as were also lakubovitch and
Prince Tunianov at the meeting in my room mentioned
above. But for considerations of my own, I desired to
make the military aspect of the question clear to Kornilov,
and as all here were more or less unanimous, Baranovsky
was sent to Headquarters to defend my point of view.

16

Shablovsky. When you first discussed with Lvov the
question of reorganizing and strengthening the Government,
who initiated the discussion, and what were the concrete
suggestions made by Lvov?

Kerensky. I had no such discussion with him.

Shablovsky. What were the concrete suggestions he
made?

Kerensky. Among the infinite number of people who
come to me with all sorts of serious propositions and
"schemes," useful advice and idle talk (everybody being
convinced that the real cause of all the disasters is that I
did not give him a hearing), came Lvov. He did not talk
much about his " schemes " or the changes in the Provisional
Government, but tried to persuade me that my " song was
sung," that I had no support anywhere, because I was now
" hated by the Right," and that I had " lost my influence "
with the democracy owing to my resolute repressive meas-
ures against and persecutions of the Bolsheviks, that I and
my Provisional Government had " lost our footing," that
support must be found, that he could help, that Cabinet
changes were necessary, and that elements even more mod-
erate than the Cadets ought to be included. As this hap-
pened soon after the Moscow Conference, I considered it

128 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

natural for a man to come and express such opinions. I
answered in general terms that I was a convinced ad-
herent of Coalition Government, etc. I do not now re-
member the details of the conversation, but the gist of it
was that V. Lvov tried to show that I " had no support/*
whereas he had something or somebody behind his back.
He kept on repeating : " We can do this. We can do
that." I asked him who " we " were, what he could do,
in whose name he was speaking. To these questions he
replied : ** I have no right to tell you. I am only author-
ized to ask you whether you are willing to enter into dis-
cussion/' I could see from what he said that he came on
behalf of a distinct group. There was no doubt about it.
More than once he hinted that he had just come from
somewhere, and that he must return the same day, but
" before leaving I must have your answer." He emphasized
the following : " I am instructed to ask you whether you
are willing or not to include new elements in the Provisional
Government, and to discuss the question with you/' I
replied : " Before I give you an answer, I must know with
whom I am dealing, who are those you represent, and what
they want" " They are public men/' " There are various
kinds of public men," said L At last I said: "Well,
supposing I have no support, what can you offer, what are
the actual forces you rely upon ? I can imagine of whom
your group consists, and who those public men are/' He
then hinted that I was mistaken, that " they " were backed
by a considerable force which nobody could afford to
ignore.

Such was my conversation with Lvov. Of course I gave
him no instructions, no powers. I believe he had admitted
that in speaking as he did at Headquarters on my behalf
he " exceeded " his warrant Of course he did, because I

THE PKELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 129

told him nothing of the sort. I plainly told him : " Before
I can give you any answer, you must tell me whom I am
dealing with."

Shablovsky. And he said he was not entitled to tell you?

Kerensky. Yes, that was what puzzled me most. In
the tangled mass of information I had about the intended
lines of action of various groups, this secrecy attracted my
attention. I have known Lvov for a long time: I saw
that he did not merely drop in to have a chat He said
he wished me well, that my personality interested him, and
he did not desire my ruin, etc.

Shablovsky. As he did not say from whom he came,
because he was not authorized to do so, did you not suggest
that he should obtain such authority?

Kerensky. I did not say " authority." I said, " Before
I express my opinion, I must know whom I am dealing
with and in whose name you are speaking."

Shablovsky. How did he end the conversation?

Kerensky. He did not. He asked: " Will you nego-
tiate if I tell you?" I replied: " Tell me more definitely
what you want to learn from me and why." He said
" Good-bye " and departed. That was the end of it Head-
quarters were not even mentioned.

Shablovsky. Did you expect him to come again after
this conversation with clearer and more definite proposals,
or did you consider the matter finished?

Kerensky. I thought the matter would end at that
Generally speaking, I did not attach any importance to it,
but some of the details, and more particularly Lvov's man-
ner, attracted my attention. I suspected that V. Lvov was
referring to that Rodzianko group, the group of ** men who
have been," which then had its Headquarters in Moscow.
It must not be forgotten that it was a time of all sorts

180 THE PBELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

of talk and idle scheming. Even in June-July people
sometimes came to me with various suggestions as to the
proper organization of the Government. Direct offers of
dictatorship were even made to me. Such offers made
it easier for me to keep an eye on' those round Kornilov,
because they were the same men who had previously tried
to gain my ear.

Shablovsky. Did Lvov suggest inclusion in the Gov-
ernment of only those elements of the Right whose support
could be relied upon, or did he suggest strengthening the
Government by gaining the support of wider masses? Or
did he suggest any real force, aiming at strengthening the
Government?

Kerensky. When he first came we talked about the
inclusion of new elements to widen the range of influence
of the Provisional Government, and when I asked : " Who
can raise the authority of the Government; what is the use
of appointing two or three more Ministers? " he answered
with a smile, " Oh well, you may be mistaken ; there are
forces behind us" " What forces? " " You don't know,
but there are." This was what particularly impressed me.
Lvov seemed to know something; he was not talking for
himself.

Shablovsky. Did you speak to your colleagues Zarudny
or Nekrassov or to somebody else about Lvov's suggestions
to the effect that here was an attractive offer, and did you
instruct any one to find out who was behind his back and
who was responsible for the offer?

Kerensky. I don't remember. . . . No, indeed, I gave
no such instructions.

Shablovsky. Did you mention the matter at all?

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 131

17

Kerensky. I could not tell you. I believe I merely
mentioned casually to one of my colleagues that Lvov had
been talking with me, but I cannot speak with certainty
for the moment, because I did not attach much importance
to his visit. I must say that on his second visit on August
26th he completely changed his manner. He tried hard
to arrange an interview with me. I remember; I had neither
time nor desire to see him, particularly as he was incensed
when he left the Provisional Government. I believe he
then said to Terestchenko, " Kerensky c'est mon ennemi
mortel" The second time he came, I met him with the
following words: "You have come again to talk about
the inclusion of new elements in the Provisional Govern-
ment" (I am not certain about the actual words, but
such was the meaning, ) He answered : " No, I have come
to discuss a totally different subject; the situation has com-
pletely changed." This time he made no mention what-
soever of the necessity to include new elements in the Pro-
visional Government or of extending its range of support.
He told me bluntly that he had come to warn me that my
position was extremely precarious, that I was doomed;
in the very near future there would be a Bolshevik rising,
when the Government would receive no support; that no
one would guarantee my life, etc. When he saw that
all this made no impression upon me and that I took it in
a jocular way: "It can't be helped, such is fate," and
so on, he abruptly broke off the conversation. Then, ap-
parently much excited, he added : ** I must make you a
formal offer." "From whom?" "From Kornilov."
When I listened to all this nonsense, it seemed to me that
either he was insane or something very serious had hap-

182 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

pened Those who were about me can testify how much
I was upset When Lvov left my study, V. V. Vfrubov
was shown in. I showed him the document just drawn
up, and said: " This is what we have come to, such is the
state of affairs."

[I must apologize for inevitable repetitions, but I deem it
necessary to reproduce the events of the evening of August
26th as precisely as I can. As a matter of fact, I was cross-
examined on certain particular episodes of the affair of
which the nature was sufficiently familiar to the Commission
of Inquiry, but which may not be grasped by the reader.
The evening of August 26th was of exceptional impor-
tance. Thanks to the coming of Lvov, it was possible
quoting Xekrassov's vivid expression " to explode the al-
ready prepared mine, two days before the time fixed for
it" (August ^8th), and it was just because of the events
of that evening that General Kornilov talked of "great
provocation/ 7 and all his followers conducted against me
and a certain part of the Provisional Government a most
obdurate campaign.

So about six o'clock on August 26th V. N. Lvov came
to me in my official study, and after a long conversation
about my " doom " and about his anxiety to " save " me
and so forth, said in so many words that

General Kornilov declared to me (Kerensky) through
him (Lvov) that no assistance whatever would be given
to the Provisional Government in its struggle with the
Bolsheviks, and that in particular Kornilov would not an-
swer for my life anywhere but at Headquarters; that the
continuance of the Provisional Government in power could
no longer be permitted; that General Kornilov invited me
to urge the Provisional Government to transfer its powers
that very day to the Generalissimo, and, pending the for-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 133

mation by him of its new Cabinet, to hand over the direction
of current affairs to the Assistant Ministers and to proclaim
martial law throughout Russia. As to myself and Savin-
kov, we were urged to go away that night to Headquarters,
where Ministerial portfolios awaited us for Savinkov the
position of War Minister, for me that of Minister of Jus-
tice.

To this V* N. Lvov added that this last condition
that is to say, our going to Headquarters and the rest
was put to me privately, and was not to be disclosed at
the session of the Provisional Government

This communication was an absolute surprise to me, and
especially the fact that it came from the lips of V. N.
Lvov, because his name had never before been mentioned
in any of the reports or statements concerning the plot
which I had in my possession.

At first I burst out laughing. " Don't joke, V. N./' I
said.

" There is no time to joke; the situation is very serious/*
Lvov answered; and with extreme excitement and evident
sincerity, he began to urge me to save my life. For that
there was " only one way, to yield to Kornilov's demands."
He was beside himself.

I walked hastily up and down my large room, trying
to understand, to feel, what was the real meaning of all
this Lvov's coming, and the rest of it. I remembered
what he had said at his first visit about " real force/' and
compared it with the feeling that existed against me at
Headquarters, and with all the reports about the ripening
conspiracy which was without a doubt connected with
Headquarters; and as soon as I had got over my first sur-
prise, or rather shock, I decided to test Lvov once more,
to verify his statement and then to act And to act in-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

stantly and resolutely My mind was at work. I did not
hesitate for an instant in my acting. I rather felt than
understood all the extraordinary seriousness of the situa-
tion, if ... if only Lvov's words were even remotely in
accord with reality !

Calming myself a little, I deliberately pretended that I
had no longer any doubt or hesitation, and that personally
I had decided to agree.

I began to explain to Lvov that I could not convey such
a communication to the Provisional Government without
proofs. He reassured me, saying that every word he had
uttered was true* At last I asked him to put into writing
all Korailov's points. The readiness, the assurance, the
quickness with which Lvov agreed and wrote down Karni-
lov's proposals gave me full confidence that Lvov was not
only fully informed, but that he had no doubt as to the
totalization of the plan.

Here is the text of the note Lvov wrote:

General Komilov proposes

(i) That martial law shall be proclaimed in Petrograd.

^2) That all military and civil authority shall be placed
in the hands of the Generalissimo.

(3) That all Ministers, not excluding the Premier, shall
resign, and that the temporary executive power shall be
transferred to the Assistant Ministers till the formation
of a Cabinet by the Generalissimo.

V. Lvov.
PEIKOGRAD, August 26, 1917.

As soon as he began to write, my last doubt disappeared.
I had only one desire, one overmastering impulse : to check
the madness at the outset, not giving it time to blaze up,

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 185

and preventing the possible breaking-out of its partisans
in Petrograd itself. All that had previously occurred
the activity of various organizations, the commotion around
the Conference in Moscow, the campaign in the Press, re-
ports concerning conspiracies, the behaviour of individual
politicians, the series of ultimatums sent to me by Staff
Headquarters, Aladin's visit to Prince G. E. Lvov, Korni-
lov's recent telegram supporting the railwaymen in their
impossible demands, the insistence that the Petrograd army
should be handed over to Staff Headquarters all, all
instantly shone clear in a very brilliant light and merged
into one clear picture. The double game was manifest.

Certainly I could not then prove every point, but I saw
everything with extraordinary clarity.

In those instants while Lvov was writing, my brain
worked intensely. It was necessary to prove at once the
formal connection between Lvov and Kornilov so clearly
that the Provisional Government would be able to take
resolute measures that very evening. It was essential to
make Lvov commit himself, by making him repeat in the
presence of a third person all his conversation with me.
I felt I must act thus, and in no other way. . . . Mean-
time, Lvov finished writing, and giving me the document,
said, " That is very good ; now everything will end peace-
fully. People there think it very important that the powers
of the Provisional Government should be transferred legally.
Well, and as for you," he concluded, " will you go to Staff
Headquarters?"

I do not know why, but this question stabbed me, put
me on my guard, and almost involuntarily I replied, " Cer-
tainly not. Do you really think that I can be Minister of
Justice under Kornilov? "

Here something strange happened,

136 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Lvov sprang up; his face brightened as he exclaimed:
" You are right ! You are right ! Don't go there. A trap
is set for you; he will arrest you. Go away some-
where far away; but get out of Petrograd you must They
hate you.*' Lvov said this excitedly.

We then " decided " that Kornilov should learn by tele-
graph of my resignation, and that I should not go to Staff
Headquarters.

" And what will happen, V. N.," I said, " if you are mis-
taken, or if they have played a practical joke on you?
What position will you be in then? You know, what you
have written is very serious/'

Lvov began energetically to prove that it was not a mis-
take, that it could not be a joke, that it was indeed a very
serious matter, and that "General Kornilov would never
take back his words."

At that moment the idea came into my head that I would
get direct confirmation from Kornilov himself on the direct
telegraphic line. Lvov jumped at the suggestion, and we
arranged that we should meet at eight o'clock at the house of
the War Minister to speak together to Kornilov on the
direct telegraph.

Lvov had come to me a few minutes after five o'clock,
and he left, as far as I remember, after seven. Nearly
an hour was left before we were to meet at the War Min-
ister's house. As he went out, at the door of my room
Lvov met Virubov, who was coming to me. After I had
acquainted him with what had happened, and asked him to
stay with me, I sent my aide-de-camp to arrange for a
direct line, and to summon to me at my Palace at nine
o'clock in the evening the Chief Assistant of the Military
Staff, Balavinsky, and the Assistant to the Commander
of the Military District, Captain Kosmin.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 137

At eight o'clock in the evening I went with Virubov
to the telegraph. Everything was ready. Kornilov was
waiting at the other end of the line. Lvov was not yet
there. We tried to ring him up at his house, but there
was no reply. Kornilov waited at the telegraph for twenty
to twenty-five minutes. I decided to speak alone, as the
character of the conversation made it indifferent whether
only one or both of us were there; the subject had been
agreed upon beforehand. I must confess that apparently
both Virubov and I were still hoping that General Kornilov
would ask in utter bewilderment : " What is there for me
to corroborate? Which Lvov?" But the hope was not
realized. Here is the full conversation as recorded by the
Hughes tape machine.

THE CONVERSATION BY THE HUGHES TAPE MACHINE OF
THE PRIME MINISTER (KERENSKY) WITH THE COM:-
MANDER-IN-CHIEF ( GENERAL KORNILOV) . Italics and
figures are partly mine.

(1) " Good day, General. V. N. Lvov and Kerensky at
the apparatus. We beg you to confirm the statement that
Kerensky is to act according to the communication made
to him by V. A/7*

" Good day, Alexander Feodorovitch ; good day, V. N.
Confirming again the description I gave V. N. of the present
situation of the country and the army as it appears to me,
I declare again that the events of the past days and of
those that I can see coming imperatively demand a definite
decision in the shortest possible time."

(2) " I, V. N., ask you whether it is necessary to act on
that definite decision which you asked me to communicate
privately to Kerensky, as he is hesitating to give his full
confidence without your personal confirmation."

138 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

*' Yes, I confirm that I asked you to convey to Alexander
Feodorovitch my urgent demand that he should come to
Mohilev/'

(3) "I, Alexander Feodorovitch, understand your an-
swer as confirmation of the words conveyed to me by V. N.
To do that today and start from here is impossible. I
hope to start tomorrow. Is it necessary for Savinkov to

go?"

" I beg urgently that Boris Victorovitch shall come with
you. Everything I said to V. N. refers in equal degree
to Savinkov. I beg you earnestly not to put off your de-
parture later than tomorrow. Believe me, only my recog-
nition of the responsibility of the moment urges me to per-
sist in my request"

(4) "Shall we come only in case of an outbreak, of
which there are rumours, or in any case? "

" In any case/'

" Good day. Soon we shall see each other, 5 *

"Good day/'

The above is a classical specimen of a " code '* conversa-
tion in which the one who answers understands from half
a word the one who questions, because the subject of the
conversation is known to them both. For instance, take
the first and second answers, " Confirming again," etc.,
where everything is puzzling to the outsider and clear only
to the initiated, who knows the real point of the dialogue.
There is not a single leading question, not a single question
whence one could gather what is already known by the
questioner about the subject of his interrogation. Never-
theless the answers were precisely what were expected.
They were in exact accordance with V. Lvov's communi-
cation to me, especially the second and third.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 139

This conversation yielded more than could have been
expected ; it not only confirmed V. Lvov's authority to speak
directly on behalf of Kornilov, but also verified the ac-
curacy which Lvov had passed on to me Korniloi/s
words. . . .

It was now necessary to strengthen this evidence by the
repetition in the presence of a third person of my " private '*
conversation with Lvov.

We went back to the Winter Palace. On our way a
scene occurred which is mentioned later in the evidence.
On my return to my study, the conversation with Lvov
was repeated. S. A. Balavinsky, at that time present in
my room, gave the following account of it next day, August
27th, to the examining magistrate, among other evidence.

" I was in M, Kerensky 's cabinet and wanted to leave
in view of his approaching interview with Lvov, but Ker-
ensky asked me to remain, and I stayed in the room all
through the conversation. Kerensky had brought with
him two documents. At the very beginning Kerensky
read to Lvov the tape from the telegraph to Staff Head-
quarters containing the Kerensky-Kornilov conversation,
the same tape that you now produce before me*' (they
showed the witness the tape produced by Kerensky at the
examination), "and Lvov confirmed the accuracy of the
conversation recorded on the tape.

" Then A. R Kerensky read aloud to Lvov those notes
in Lvov's own handwriting which you show me now, and
he confirmed the accuracy of those notes, certifying that
every proposal in those notes had been made by Kornilov
himself. Further, V. N. Lvov said that the general opinion
of the people and of everybody at Staff Headquarters
was so strongly against Kerensky and the Provisional Gov-
ernment, that General Kornilov could not answer for A. F.

140 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Kerensky 's personal safety in any place in. Russia, and
that was why it was necessary that A. F. Kerensky and
Savinkov should go to Staff Headquarters, and Lvov
privately gave Kerensky friendly advice to accept and carry
out General Kornilov's conditions. Advising Kerensky to
fulfil Kornilov's demands, V. X. Lvov said that General
Kornilov offered in the Cabinet he was forming the port-
folio of Minister of Justice to Kerensky, while Savinkov
was to have the Ministry of War and, as it seemed to me,
the Ministry of Marine.

" In his conversation with Lvov, Kerensky several times
returned to the same question: according to the accurate
information he had received, there would not be a Bolshe-
vik outbreak on August 2jth; what then were the reason
and motive that made General Kornilov say it was impera-
tive for Kerensky and Savinkov to go to Staff Headquar-
ters ? But to this question Lvov made no answer. In his
conversation Lvov mentioned that he had not slept for
four nights, and that he felt very tired, and he asked Ker-
ensky to come to a decision quickly.

u I did not know previously with whom Kerensky, who
had just returned, was going to talk, and while witnessing
the conversation between Kerensky and Lvov, I was not
seen by the latter/' *

After this conversation, which took place about ten o'clock
in the evening, V. Lvov was put under arrest. , . . The
reckoning began.

x This was one of the most important testimonies in the Kornilov
affair, and although almost the first, it was not printed in a single one
of the hosts of newspapers which filled their columns with "truth"
about this matter.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 141

18

Now comes the question: had I not the right, after
all that had happened on August 26th between five
and ten o'clock in the evening, to declare to the popula-
tion :

** On August 26th General Kornilov sent V. Lvov, mem-
ber of the Duma, with a demand for the handing over
of the whole civil and military power of the Provisional
Government, so that he might at his own discretion form
a new Government to rule the country. That Lvov, mem-
ber of the Duma, possessed full authority to make this
proposition was afterwards confirmed by General Korni-
lov in his conversation with me on the direct line/'

Or was the "telegram of the Prime Minister in the
whole of the first part a lief as Kornilov dared to declare
to the Russian people? Or, lastly, was the whole thing
a "mutual misunderstanding," to quote the timorous ex-
pression of Kornilov's cautious partisans?

Kornilov himself does not deny that he sent V. Lvov,
member of the Duma, to tell me something, and conversing
on August 27th about five o'clock on the direct line with
Savinkov, Kornilov, among other things, said : " Yester-
day evening, when I was talking with the Premier on the
telegraph, I confirmed to him what I had asked Lvov to
communicate to him, and I was quite satisfied that the
Premier, convinced of the serious condition of the coun-
try and willing to work in full agreement with me, had
decided to leave for Staff Headquarters today, to come
to some definite decision here."

It is true that, giving later his evidence before the Com-
mission of Inquiry, General Kornilov stated that he " had

142 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

only confirmed his request to Kerensky to come to Staff
Headquarters." But it is enough to glance at the text of
the communication on the tape to see that, before confirm-
ing the necessity of my going to Mohilev, General Korni-
lov (point i) had already answered in the categorical affir-
mative the general question whether I was to act on Lvov's
statement.

Besides that, the whole character of the second question
and General Kornilov's answer to it, in relation to his fur-
ther words " everything Lvov said applies in equal degree to
B. V, Savinkov," undoubtedly showed that Kornilov under-
stood quite well why " A. F. is hesitating to give his full
confidence/* understood what was meant by, not only to
" start," but ff to do that " today was impossible, etc.

In one word, all the text on the tape left no doubt what-
ever that General Kornilov did not dare to tell the Com-
mission of Inquiry the truth, and if General Kornilov only
confirmed his invitation to me to come to Staff Headquar-
ters, why was It that *' after this conversation," Prince
Trubetzkoy tells us, "a sigh of relief came from Korni-
lov's breast, and on my question: 'Then the Provisional
Government will meet you in everything? ' he said :
'Yes.'" 1 Why?

So it was not a "lie" when I declared that General
Kornilov had sent Lvov to me with something.

Also it was not a " lie " when I declared that this some-
thing was the " demand " for my transference of the* full
power of the Provisional Government to General Kornilov,
and that Lvov came to me on this mission. " Events de-
mand quite definite decision in the shortest possible time/'
said Kornilov on the direct line. Moreover, next day,
in conversation with Savinkov on the same subject, Kor-

1 The italics everywhere are mine.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

nilov said: " After your departure 1 1 received two alarm-
ing communications about the state of affairs at the front
and at the rear " (and I may add that Krimov was then
already moving on Petrograd), " I told Lvov it was my
profound conviction that the only solution was to be found
in the establishment of a Dictatorship and the proclamation
of martial law throughout the country. I asked V. Lvov
to tell Kerensky and you that I considered it absolutely
imperative that you and Kerensky should take a share
in the Government I asked him to convey my insistent
appeal that you should come to Staff Headquarters to
take some definite decision, and I added to that, that in
view of the accurate information in my possession con-
cerning a Bolshevik rising in Petrograd, I considered the
position extremely serious, and in particular I believed that
your and Kerensky's presence in Petrograd was very dan-
gerous for both of you, and for that reason I offered you
to come to Headquarters, guaranteeing by my word of
honour your absolute safety" Is it not more than obvious
that Lvov's rendering entirely coincides with the actual
thoughts of General Kornilov? Whilst the "apprehen-
sion " of Lvov for my life so strangely coincides with the
promises of " safety " of the General. Why, however,
should the Commander-in-Chief have to pledge his " word
of honour" that the Prime Minister, the Supreme Chief
of the State, will remain alive if he comes to the Com-
mander-in-Chief's Headquarters at his own invitation?

That which had taken place at Headquarters after the
conversation carried on by means of the Hughes tape ma-
chine and "the sigh of relief" confirms once more that
Lvov was not indulging in any fancy of his imagination

1 Between Savinkov's departure from the G.H.Q. and Lvov's visit
to Komilov five or six hours passed.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

when he made his demands to me, to be immediately ful-
filled ("within the shortest possible time/' according to
General Kornilov's Hughes' communication).

" The Commander-in-Chief " (so Prince Trubetzkoy con-
tinues his narration), "assuming that he had come to a
complete understanding in principle with the Prime Min-
ister, gave orders confirming orders previously given by him
for the dispatch to Petrograd of the necessary troops. At
the same time he sent telegrams to certain prominent po-
litical men inviting them to come to his Headquarters to
discuss the situation that had arisen, with a view to induce
them, together with some members of the Provisional Gov-
ernment (Kerensky and Savinkov), to form a new Cab-
inet, which, in General Kornilov's opinion, was to have
carried out a strictly democratic program, consolidating
the people's liberty and having for its main feature the
solution of the agrarian question." I have to add that
already, about a fortnight previous to August 26th, a cer-
tain professor arrived from Moscow at Headquarters for
" conversations " upon the agrarian question, and by
August ^6th a full agrarian law or manifesto was already
drafted.

It appears therefore that at the time of the Moscow Con-
ference General Kornilov was already taking an interest
not only in discussions of financial and international ques-
tions and had conversations not only with railway men.

The picture therefore is perfectly clear. On August zSth
there would have been assembled in Headquarters, with
the Commander-in-Chief, <c the elders of the nation " and
the Prime Minister, with the War Minister, who have
"agreed" to hand over the power to General Kornilov,
whilst at Petrograd there would have been the troops of
Krimov, the "beheaded" Provisional Government, the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 145

"Bolshevik majority" of the Soviets exercising pressure
on that Government, and . . .

The Provisional Government would thus " loyally " have
ceased to exist.

General Alexeiev, perfectly well informed of the inten-
tions of the conspirators, asserts in the same confidential
letter to Miliukov that Kornilov's movement " was directed
solely against the persons who one after the other joined
the Ministry and quickly left it," that is to say, against the
Provisional Government of that time, and acknowledges
that it was precisely for that purpose that the $rd Cavalry
Corps was moving on Petrograd.

To what extent by the eve of August 26th everything had
been prepared and arranged at Headquarters is borne out
by the following characteristic conversation of Kornilov
with the same Prince Trubetzkoy : " To my question why
Kornilov insists on the participation of Kerensky and Savin-
kov in the Cabinet (consequently there were some who did
not insist!) I received the reply: 'The new Government
will be compelled by the force of circumstances to take
some very stringent measures, and I desire that these meas-
ures should not be more stringent than are required. More-
over, democracy should see and know that it is not being
deprived of its favourite leaders and most precious con-
quests.' " This statement of 'motives does not err on the
side of bashfulness, and is quite sufficiently frank.

I think that no one who knows and has thought over
the Kornilov affair can deny that the intentions of the
Kornilov group towards the Provisional Government as
such were perfectly definite; that the Provisional Govern-
ment was to yield to the will of the Dictator; that no kind
of "misunderstanding" as regards the Provisional Gov-
ernment as a whole existed at Headquarters; that on

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

August 28th the fatal question would have been settled as
to the purpose for which Headquarters troops were being
moved on Petrograd; that Lvov indeed caused, whether
wishing it or not, the mine that had been prepared for the
Provisional Government to explode two days before the
appointed time.

19

The participators in the rebellion themselves did not deny,
and do not deny, their intentions towards the Provisional
Government ; they did not deny it even when they declared
the words of the Prime Minister to be " an absolute lie."
It is necessary to read very carefully the first lines of
the appeal or manifesto of the Commander-in-Chief to the
" people of Russia " in order to understand their true mean-
ing and to apprecfr e the ;,kill oi the author of the appeal
Zavoiko. Here are these lines: "Telegram No. 4163
of the Prime Minister is absolute lie in the whole of its
first part; it was not I who sent the member of the Duma,
V. Lvov, to the Provisional Government, but Lvov came
to me as an envoy of the Prime Minister, as Aladin, an-
other member of the Duma, can witness. And so a great
act of provocation was committed, which placed at stake
the fate of the country." How can the direct meaning of
these lines be understood on comparing them with my tele-
gram No. 4163? There the Prime Minister states (i)
" Lvov came to me on behalf of General Kornilov. (2)
He called upon the Provisional Government to hand over
the power to Kornilov. (3) Kornilov confirmed that he
had given Lvov the necessary authorization." " All that
is an absolute lie/' replies the Kornilov manifesto, whence
the simple-minded reader will conclude (i) that Lvov did
not come at all to Kerensky; (2) that he did not communi-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 147

cate any demands to the Provisional Government; (3) that
accordingly Kornilov was not in a position to confirm that
Lvov was acting with due authority. More than that, the
simple-minded reader will infer that not only did nothing
of the kind take place, but that it was all the other way
about : Lvov \vas Kerensky' s envoy who came to Kornilov.
That undoubtedly is the direct meaning of that part of
Kornilov's appeal or statement which was communicated
in the night of August 27th-28th on all railway lines to
" all persons in authority " and to the " railway commit-
tees/* These are words which clearly reveal the distinct
intention, that, to put it vulgarly, all those should be " taken
in " by surprise in whose chest, in the words of the same
statement, "a Russian heart is beating, and who believe
in God and in the temples." The people had to be taken
in and to respond before they would have had time to un-
derstand and to learn the truth.

But this bold demogogic text adapted for circulation in
the masses has a different, real meaning, which can be
understood only by a very thoughtful or well informed
reader r Yes, I did make demands on the Provisional Gov-
ernment, I don't deny it, but I made those demands with
the knowledge of the Prime Minister. It was he who first
sent Lvov to me for negotiations; it was Kerensky who
was " provoking " me. That is the real meaning.

It was then that the carnival of lies was started. Kerensky
was insincere and betrayed Kornilov that is the calumny
of the Right. Kerensky is a " Kornilovite," a counter-
revolutionary, he meant to betray democracy; that was the
shameful lie, one regrets to say, not of the Bolshevik dema-
gogues alone. " Kerensky's participation is beyond every
doubt "; thus General Alexeiev, as if summing up the vari-
ous legends, Even if that had been so, nevertheless that

148 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

in which I participated would remain a crime; there would
only have been one criminal more. But what evidence is
there of my participation? There is the circumstantial
evidence the calling out of the 3rd Cavalry Corps (which
already has been referred to) in connection with certain
actions and statements of Savinkov, the behaviour at Head-
quarters of Filonenko < to him I will refer later), and finally
the mission of Lvov.

It seems to me that the above sufficiently demonstrates
the absurdity of this last proof of the clumsy invention of
the conspirators. In their hurry they overlooked even
this simplest consideration. Supposing, indeed, that
through Savinkov and Filonenko I was in agreement with
Kornilov, why should I at the last moment fc introduce into
the business " an outsider who, moreover, since he ceased
to be a member of the Provisional Government, was no
friend of mine?

How, then, stood matters in reality, and how did it come
about that on the evening of August 26th V. N. Lvov
was in my room ? This is how it happened : V. N. Lvov,
having come to take part at the Moscow Conference, met
at the National Hotel (the Moscow headquarters of Zavoiko
and Aladin) an old friend, a certain Dobrynski, a member
of the Executive Committee of the Union of Knights of
St. George, a fellow-officer of Krimov, and at that time a
frequent visitor at Headquarters. Dobrynski introduced
Lvov to Aladin, and they both to some extent initiated
Lvov into their plans. At that time (immediately after
the Moscow Conference), feverish preparations went on,
and a man was urgently required for a special task : to con-
trive to see me otherwise than through the usual channels
of our communications with Headquarters (through Savin-
kov or Baranovsky). Aladin knew by his own experience

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 149

that men of his kind have no chance of being admitted to
me personally. An attempt of the same Aladin to obtain
an interview with me through an intermediary fell through :
Prince G. E. Lvov, to whom Aladin applied a short time
before V. N. Lvov's arrival, asking the Prince to obtain
my consent to see him (Aladin) on a matter of exceptional
importance, refused Aladin's request. When leaving Prince
Lvov, Aladin nevertheless took the precaution to mention
that for so many (I do not remember how many) days
he would wait for a decision at the National Hotel, and in
the course of his conversation with Prince Lvov, Aladin em-
phasized the fact that he came from Headquarters. Aladin
did not, however, receive any message, and thereupon
V. N. Lvov was sent, who as a member of the Duma and
former member of the Provisional Government had natu-
rally a right to be received by me.

The following particulars are relevant and very inter-
esting. Between August i6th and 2ist Aladin had been
to Prince Lvov. On August 1 7th Dobrynski returned from
Mohilev with the news that " Headquarters have decided to
insist on reforms " and told it to Y. N. Lvov. On August
2 ist, Dobrynski, as Aladin put it, " introduces " Lvov
to Aladin, and Lvov there and then informs Aladin that
he will go to Petrogra^i to Kerensky and as his '* personal
friend " will insist on 'the necessity of forming a Ministry
that will enjoy general confidence. On August 2ist Lvov
leaves Moscow to see me; on August 23rd he returns to
Moscow. At the same National Hotel, in Dobrynski's pres-
ence, Lvov informs Aladin that Kerensky has agreed to
enter into negotiations with Headquarters. It is true that
Lvov's statement before his departure for Petrograd to see
me (as the same Aladin had put it) hardly agrees with
what he said about Headquarters after he saw me. But

150 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

that does not make any difference to Mr. Aladin. On
the same day, August 23rd, Lvov>> and Dobrynski both
hurry back to Headquarters with a letter from Aladin to
Zavoiko.

On August 24th Aladin goes to Headquarters. On the
evening o that day General Kornilov receives Lvov. They
speak at first without anybody else being present, but after-
wards, in the presence o " the orderly officer, Zavoiko, I
(General Kornilov) confirmed to Lvov the essential points
of my statements/' After his interne w with Kornilov,
Lvov spends most of the night with Zavoiko, Aladin, Radio-
nov (if I remember rightly, the author of " Our Crime")
and Company.

On August 26th Lvov hurries to Petrograd, and almost
straight from the train goes to my waiting-room. A tele-
gram from Headquarters follows, addressed " Winter Pal-
ace, Kerensky for Lvov. On your return, find and bring
Rodzianko. DOBRYXSKI/' Alas ! that wire arrived when
Lvov was already undef arrest.

Thus since August 2ist (the day when he was "intro-
duced " to Aladin) Lvov did not spare himself and had no
rest It was not without reason that in speaking to me
he complained that he had not slept for four nights. Was
he not peculiar, my "envoy"? He made journeys not
going from me, but coming to me once from Moscow,
sent by Aladin and Dobrynski, another time from Mohilev,
where he was spending his time in the company of Kornilov,
Zavoiko, and again with Dobrynski and Aladin.

After that, who could testify better than Aladin to all those
" who believe in God and the temples '* that Lvov was
" my envoy " and that everything else is *' complete lie " ?

I have taken the trouble to give the details of Lvov's
movements during the relevant days, together with some

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 151

explanatory extracts by the persons themselves concerned,
so that the clumsy efforts of the conspirators to prevent the
truth coming out should be perfectly clear to every reader.
What was Lvov's position in that crowd, and to what
extent he was initiated into their plans, I have not yet suc-
ceeded in ascertaining. It seems, however, fairly certain
that he was not one of the chief conspirators, but was
one of the men whom the principals used for such services
as they were supposed to be fit for.

The statement of the outside observer, Prince Trubetz-
koy, well illustrates my surmise. " When I heard that V.
Lvov had visited Kornilov, I asked one of the aides-de-
camp : * Is Kornilov aware that Lvov is not a very bright
intellect? * The aide-de-camp smiled and said, * Everybody
knows that, but General Kornilov said that anyhow he is
capable of delivering a message given to him, and more-
over, until quite recently he was a member of Kerensky's
Cabinet. 5 " et He is capable of delivering a message given
to him " that is the worth of Lvov as weighed at Head-
quarters. He was treated accordingly. First he was sent
to me with demands, and when the game failed, an offer
" from me to Kornilov " was put into his (Lvov's) mouth
"that Kornilov should accept the dictatorship which
should be proclaimed by the present Provisional Govern-
ment" (General Kornilov's words to Savinkov on August
27th, communicated by the Hughes apparatus). Here we
see once more a complete agreement of Lvov's version with
what General Kornilov actually did say: on the 26th of
August in the evening Lvov was insisting to me on the
importance of the " lawful " transfer of power. And what
is of especial importance, these words of Kornilov through
the Hughes apparatus completely bear out the fundamental
point 2 of Lvov's written ultimatum.

152 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

V. Lvov himself, after a series of his muddled semi-
truthful or not entirely mendacious statements, although
he affirmed in his last deposition (which was entirely di-
rected against myself) that I gave him a commission, ad-
mitted, however, that it was not to make any offers or pro-
posals on my behalf, but to find out the desires of others
the desires of certain political groups, including that of
Headquarters.

It must be said that later, \vhen giving evidence before
the Commission of Inquiry, General Kornilov, who knew
by that time that a third person heard my apparently private
conversation with Lvov, has transformed Lvov from a
" proposer " into an " inquirer" and takes the initiative
as to the dictatorship upon himself.

4 * V. Lvov told me on behalf of Kerensky that if in my
opinion Kerensky *s continuation in office deprives the Gov-
ernment of the necessary strength and firmness, Kerensky
is prepared to leave the Provisional Government. If Ker-
ensky can count on support he is willing to remain. To
that, I, having stated briefly the general position of affairs
in the country and in the army, declared that the only way
of helping the grave state of affairs, as I am profoundly
convinced, is a dictatorship and the immediate proclamation
of martial law throughout Russia/' (Compare point i of
Kornilov's reply through the Hughes apparatus on August
26th). " I stated that personally I am not after power and
am prepared to obey immediately the man who will be
made dictator. Lvov stated that such a decision is not im-
possible; that, in view of the difficult general situation of
the country, the Provisional Government, as at present con-
stituted, will of itself come to the decision of the necessity
for the appointment of a dictator, and it is quite possible

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 153

that I will be chosen to accept that appointment" What a
change, thank God !

The story of my sending an envoy to Headquarters with
a most humble request, ** come and lord over us/' is simply
a desperate attempt of men who have lost their heads after
having been caught red-handed, and now try to hide behind
other people's backs and to obliterate all their own traces
and who are not very particular as to their methods.
Unfortunately, this was not by any means the only attempt
of the kind. On the same day when the proclamation was
sent out containing the absolute lie about the " great provo-
cation," General Lukomsky sent me a telegram (No. 6406)
in which he wrote, inter alia, that General Kbrnilov had
taken his " final decision " after the " arrival of Savinkov
and Lvov, who made General Kornilov a proposal on your
behalf to the same effect . . . and in accordance with your
proposal, has given final orders which it is now too late
to countermand/* Having read the telegram, Savinkov
immediately handed me a statement in writing. That
statement was immediately handed by me to the Pro-
visional Government, from whom it was sent to the
Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry, for which reason
I can only quote it from memory. " Having become
acquainted with the reference to myself contained in the
telegram of General Lukomsky, No. 6406, dated August
2/th, I state that it is a libel. No political statements what-
soever were made or could have been made by me on your
behalf to General Kornilov. (Signed) SAVINKOV, August
27, 1917." Savinkov was indignant over that libel, and
expressed his anger by the direct wire to General Kornilov,
repeating that the words of General Lukomsky concerning
him, Savinkov, were a libel. To which immediately the
only possible reply was made that Lukomsky's telegram

154 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

referred only to what Savinkov had said in the presence
of General Lukomsky, General Romanovsky and Colonel
Baranovsky on sending troops at the disposal of the Pro-
visional Government and the proclamation of martial law.

This time the attempt failed at once. It is to be re-
gretted that the conversation with Lvov took place either
without the presence of anybody else or in the presence of
such a " witness " as Zavoiko. It is accordingly extraor-
dinarily difficult to establish the truth here. Nor was it
by accident or chance that General Lukomsky mentioned
Lvov and Savinkov together. They both saw me on August
22nd at Petrograd. Both left the capital the same evening
Lvov for Moscow and Savinkov for Mohilev; they were
both at Mohilev on August 24th Savinkov was leaving
and Lvov had just arrived. It may be asked why should
I have chosen for a ** conspiracy " the roundabout way via
Moscow-Lvov and ignored the more direct and convenient
means of communication Savinkov, who, moreover, could
have much more easily and without being observed by any
outsiders or third parties have had a strictly private
tete-a-tete conversation with Kornilov.]

20

Chairman. On August 26th, when Lvov appeared here,
did he first report himself through somebody, or did he
suddenly appear? Further, did any information reach you
that day as to Lvov spreading some extraordinary rumours
over the city?

Kerensky. To my regret I learnt of this only later,
after Lvov had already left me. Before Lvov came I
had with me the Supreme Commissary of Turkestan with
a most important report. As soon as he left me, Lvov

THE PKELTJDE TO BOLSHEVISM 155

came in. ... Who told me? ... One of my men told
me that Lvov was seen in a fairly excited state- . . . Oh,
yes, another man, who had spoken to Lvov just prior to
my seeing him, afterwards told me that, not only in the
street but even here at the Winter Palace, Lvov was speak-
ing in very strong terms. I do not recollect who it was who
told me.

Chairman. Then, Lvov's report. How did he intro-
duce it? What motive did he disclose? Did he connect
it with any previous visit to you, or did he speak as if it
were an entirely new, different matter?

Kerensky. That's it. He was quite a different man.
All the past had been wiped out, as it were.

Chairman. So this occasion was entirely unconnected
with what preceded it ...

Kerensky. Yes. I have already stated that I met him
with the words, *' Here you are again with your affair/*
and he replied, " No, circumstances have changed," or some-
thing to that effect. This time there was only one topic
of conversation. I must hand over my office and quit.
There was no mention of any " introduction of new blood "
into the Provisional Government or of any " extension " of
its basis. ... I remain firmly convinced, and I expressed
this conviction at the time, that this was perhaps the only
evening when Lvov was sincere, and being aware of what
was to come, was genuinely desirous of saving me from
something. Whether his conscience raised its voice, or
whether he became frightened, makes no difference. I
was particularly confirmed in that conviction by our conver-
sation in the motor-car (on the way from the direct wire
station to the Winter Palace), when, in V. V. Virubov's
presence, I purposely told V. N. Lvov that " I have changed
my mind and will go to Headquarters." I said that to test

156 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

him. Thereupon he became greatly excited, and with his
hand on his heart implored me : " May God prevent you
from doing that For God's sake don't go to Headquar-
ters; you'd be lost there."

[When on August 3Oth, being under arrest, Lvov learnt
of the complete failure of the Kornilov attempt, he sent me
a note : " I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart.
I am glad that I saved you out of Kornilov's hands. Yours,
V. Lvov, joth of August." I handed that note too to
the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry and am writ-
ing from memory, but I am quite certain of its general
tenor.]

Chairman. Did he tell you any details, why and how
or did he merely put an ultimatum before you?

Kerensky. An ultimatum. He said, t I am instructed
by General Kornilov,"

Chairman. Did he tell you in detail, did he have some
information?

Kerensky. No, he only stated the points. He obviously
knew them very well indeed, for he stated them correctly
both verbally and in writing: the proclamation of martial
law, the handing over of the power and the resignation,
and point 4 (for myself and Savinkov only) : immediate
departure for Headquarters. That is why I wished to fix
point 4, which did not appear on paper, by the Hughes tape
machine. From my point of view, the almost decisive
words of our conversation by the Hughes tape machine were
in my question: " Is Savinkov wanted? " Lvov told me
that Kornilov insisted equally on the immediate arrival both
of myself and of Savinkov. That is why I put the ques-
tion whether the suggestion as to the immediate journey
to Headquarters concerned myself only or both myself and
Savinkov. A categoric confirmation "Savinkov also"

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 157

and then the statement that only the "sense of respon-
sibility " compelled him " so insistently to demand/' made
it perfectly clear to me that Lvov was au courant of the
whole affair.

Chairman. Did Virubov see that note?

Kerensky. I handed it to him and said : " Read/'

Chairman. What impression did it make on Virubov?

Kerensky. He said, "What is to be done?" I told
him what steps I was taking. Later in the evening Lvov
was arrested.

Chairman. So Lvov was not there at the time?

Kerensky. Lvov went out, Virubov came in. I had
asked Virubov to be in good time for eight o'clock p. M.
at the direct wire in the house of the War Minister. After-
wards Balavinsky and Kosmin, the Deputy Commander
of the Petrograd Military District, were asked to attend.
In a word, I made all the preparation necessary duly to
establish " the fact"

Raupakh. So Lvov set out those points not as an
opinion of Kornilov, not as an advice, but as a demand,
an ultimatum?

Kerensky. There was no question of any opinions; it
was a demand, an ultimatum. A further point of the com-
munication over the Hughes tape to which I attached the
greatest importance was the reply to my question whether
our arrival was desirable only in case the Bolsheviks moved.
When I was speaking to Lvov I was trying to find out
whether the journey was thought desirable only in case of
danger from the Bolsheviks or in any case. I wished to
find out whether they really apprehended the Bolsheviks,
or if that was merely a pretext. I put the question to Lvov
several times: "Is all that required if the Bolsheviks
really will act, or am I to go in any case, Bolsheviks or no

158 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Bolsheviks ? " The reply was, " Just the same." I put the
same question to Kornilov. I do not remember how it was
on the tape.

Raupakh. " Is it necessary for me to come . . ."

Kerensky. " Only in the event of the Bolshevik action
or in any event?" Reply: "In any event." Thus the
two men Kornilov and Lvov, hundreds of miles away from
one another and not being aware what the other was saying,
gave the same replies to the same questions. And then a
third time, when I and Lvov were returning from the direct
wire, I put the same question in Balavinsky's presence.

Chairman. To Lvov?

Kerensky. Yes. Whether I was to leave in any event
or only in case the Bolsheviks acted. I myself knew for
certain that on August 27th there would not be any move
by the Bolsheviks.

Chairman. So that you decided to have Lvov arrested
after your conversation with Kornilov and in connection
with that imminent journey?

Kerensky. No, it was in connection with my growing
conviction that this man was a party to something or knew
something, and that he was speaking the truth. He several
times, especially during the first conversation with me, used
the plural " we/'

Chairman. To whom then, and in what order of se-
quence, did you tell of that episode with Lvov and of your
conversation with Kornilov?

Krokhmal. I wish to ask how that document was ob-
tained.

Kerensky. Oh, it was obtained perfectly simply. I have
already referred to it at the first interrogation. Lvov had
stated it all verbally and demanded of me categorical com-
pliance. I finally told him: "You understand yourself,

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 159

Vladimir Nikolayevitch, that if I go before the Provisional
Government and make that sort of statement, still no one
will believe me, but will think I am mad, or they will first
send to find out and verify whether Kornilov did make such
a proposal to me, and I shall find myself in the position of
a fooL What right have I to place such proposals before
the Provisional Government? I know you and trust you,
but I cannot speak without evidence." ** No, I will guaran-
tee it" " If you will guarantee it, please write it down."
"With pleasure, because, as you know, I never say any-
thing that is not true." So he wrote it down.

Raupakh. Was this before the conversation over the
tape?

Kerensky. It was. I showed these points to Virubov,
and thereupon I left, to communicate with Kornilov over
the direct wire.

Raitpakh. Lvov was not with you?

Kerensky. He was late, but he carne. As we were
going down the staircase he was coming up. It was because
of that that I afterwards read to him the whole conver-
sation on the tape, so that he should confirm it

Raitpakh. Was the conversation carried on in your own
name, or in Lvov's name?

Kerensky. He told me that perhaps he would be a little
late, but as Kornilov had already been some twenty minutes
at the telegraphic apparatus, I did not wish to wait any
longer and put the questions as coming from us both.

Raupakh. Why did you consider it necessary to speak
in the names of both? What cause was there for this?
Was it more convenient to carry on the conversation with
Kornilov that way?

Kerensky. Because Lvov came to me on behalf of Kor-
nilov. He said that he was acting under the instructions

160 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

of Kornilov. So it was arranged that we should carry
on the conversation jointly. As we were going down and
Lvov came up, he asked me, " Well, Alexander Feodoro-
vitch, have I proved a true friend? I have not deceived
you/' I said, " You have not."

Raupakh. That was after the conversation (with Kor-
nilov) ?

Kerensky. Yes. And after that we came together here*

Raupakh. Here, in Balavinsky's presence . . .

Kercnsky. Here, in Balavinsky's presence, Lvov re-
peated all the essential points of our conversation during
the day. And above all I attached importance not so much
to particular words of Lvov, as to the fact that I should
be able to have some one else to witness the excited state of
Lvov and to confirm that he considered all that business
exceptionally important.

Kojokolov. And did Lvov know that Balavinsky was
there?

Kerensky. He did not.

[Only now when I can pass in review the whole of the
campaign which is carried on against me by both the extreme
wings who are making capital out of the Kornilov affair,
only now do I appreciate the great importance of the fact
that on the 26th, in the whirl of events, I was able to see
the necessity of making some sort of safeguard for myself.
I can imagine what would have happened if my conversation
with Lvov, which he thought was quite " private/' had not
been heard by a living though involuntary witness, a well-
known public man.]

CHAPTER III
21

Chairman. To whom and in what order of sequence did
you communicate Lvov's proposal and the conversation with
Kornilov over the tape ; and after you had read the tape and
the note, were any objections made by any of your col-
leagues?

Kerensky* It was like this. We returned from the ap-
paratus. The second conversation with Lvov took place.
Then I ordered his arrest. By that time we were joined,
as far as I remember, by Xekrassov, Virubov, Balavinsky;
I am not sure whether Terestchenko was there or not.
There were a fair number of seats occupied at the table,
but I am not quite sure who was there. Savinkov came
later.

Chairman. No one of those gentlemen, having taken
cognizance of the tape, had any objections to make to you
on the subject?

Kerensky. I recollect that Savinkov suggested an imme-
diate conversation with Kornilov over the direct wire.

[I also remember very well that I refused that request of
Savinkov. I refused it because Savinkov was of opinion
that it was the duty of the Provisional Government to use
every means for a peaceful settlement of the "conflict/'
which should remain unknown. I myself was of opinion
that it was not a ** conflict " between two equal parties, but a
crime ; it ought emphatically to be settled by peaceful means;
not, however, by negotiations with the guilty General, but
by the will of the Provisional Government, to which the

161

162 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Commander-in-Chief, who had failed in his trust, should
submit immediately. From the moment when my con-
versation with Kornilov satisfied me as to his plan, nobody
and nothing could make me abandon this point of view.

The idea that Lvov " made a mess of it " and that the
whole thing was a "misunderstanding" became popular
only the next day August 27th. Savinkov himself was
saying to Filonenko over the direct wire on the morning of
the 27th : " I regret to say that you are not well informed :
General Kornilov confirmed the statements of his envoy in
speaking to A. F. by the Hughes apparatus. The decision
has now been taken." And in the evening of the 26th
Savinkov suggested sending a telegram to the front to send
a certain unit which he knew as being " reliable " to march
on Headquarters. The information that arrived from
Headquarters in the night of August 26th~27th could only
increase our anxiety. About one o'clock in the morning
Filonenko made the following fairly obscure communica-
tion over the Hughes apparatus in his " code" language:
that the heights (Kornilov) were changing hands; that gal-
lant generals were going to attack ; that a dance was to take
place between the Herculean Pillars (Kerensky and Kor-
nilov) ; that some great men were expected to meet at Head-
quarters, and so on ; the one definite conclusion that could be
made from those communications was that something
extraordinary was going on at Headquarters. What was
going on can be now put thus : Pending the result of Lvov's
mission, Kornilov was discussing in his study the final de-
cision as to the form of the dictatorship. Two main
schemes were examined; in one Kornilov was to be sole
dictator, with the Council of Ministers subordinate to him;
in the other a " Council of National Defence " was to be
created, with Kornilov at the head, whilst the Council of

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 163

Ministers were to take their instructions from that " Coun-
cil of National Defence." The second scheme was ap-
proved, and the One Man Dictatorship was rejected. By
whom? By Messrs. Zavoiko, Aladin, and Filonenko. The
honour of bringing about the rejection of the One Man
Dictatorship was claimed by Filonenko !

Having settled, with those highly qualified advisers, the
form of the Government, Kornilov in the same company
makes a list of his Cabinet, discusses details of the pro-
gram, etc. Finally, having received the communication of
my ** consent " to surrender the Provisional Government
without a struggle, Kornilov with a sigh of relief hastily
sends telegrams to some favourites Miliukov, Rodzianko,
Maklakov, and so on to come immediately to Headquar-
ters in view of the perilous state of affairs. That was the
kind of " misunderstanding " that was going on at Head-
quarters.

Nevertheless, next day, August 27th, after Savinkov's
conversation with Kornilov about 6 p. M., the version is
being spread in Petrograd that Lvov simply " made a mess
of it," that a "misunderstanding" arose. That version
finds many energetic supporters. The same Savinkov, in-
sisting on Filonenko's leaving Headquarters, was telling him
in the morning : " Believe me that I am better informed than
you are, and that you have been unaware of many things,
just as I was when I was last time at Headquarters.'* But
after his conversation with Kornilov, Savinkov proceeds
about 8 P. M. to the Winter Palace and insists on the neces-
sity " of attempting to clear up the misunderstanding and
of entering into negotiations with General Kornilov." This
in spite of the fact that, in the course of that conversation,
Kornilov not only stated that he refused to give up the
command, but acknowledged that he had sent Lvov to make

164 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

a statement as to the dictatorship. He only explained that
that statement was a reply to my proposal. What, then,
was the misunderstanding that made negotiations desirable?
The Cummander-in-Chief of all the active armies in the field,
who informs the Government of an immediate proclama-
tion of his dictatorship, cannot be left at the head of the
armies by any Government for one minute, whilst a general
who, in these circumstances, refuses to hand over his com-
mand is clearly committing the weightiest of crimes against
the State. The only " misunderstanding," if Kornilov were
to be believed, that in the circumstances could have happened,
would be either that I really made such a proposal to him
and afterwards repudiated it or that some one had caused
General Kornilov to form a mistaken idea of my proposal
To those now who literally accepted Kornilov's words and
accordingly considered me an accomplice, I say that any
negotiations should have been conducted not with myself,
but with the Provisional Government, who should have been
asked to order my arrest.

Those who supposed that a bona fide error was made by
General Kornilov could have held to that supposition until
the moment when it was made clear to Kornilov that Lvov
did not have and could not have any instructions from me
for General Kornilov.

In any case, if until August 27th it was possible to be-
lieve that General Kornilov was making a bona fide mistake,
it was impossible to deny that his action was criminal
Consequently any negotiations of the Provisional Govern-
ment with a man acting criminally were out of the question.
It could be submitted that there was reason to treat him
mildly on the ground that his error was a mitigating cir-
cumstance. This was the sole reason for which I could see
my way to listen at all to Savinkov and others in favour of

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 165

negotiating on August 27th, for I took it that they were
assuming a bona fide error of Kornilov. I suggested that
they should themselves " negotiate " with General Kornilov,
that is to say, I asked them to use all their influence with
him to induce him to submit to the Provisional Government
before it was too late, before his action had led to serious
consequences for himself personally and above all for the
State. But it was impossible for me to allow any pourparlers
between Kornilov and the Provisional Government I could
not allow even any delay in the taking of the necessary
measures against General Kornilov. In my opinion, imme-
diate and resolute action alone could prevent further de-
velopment and save Russia from further bloodshed.

Obviously, those who genuinely believed the assumption
that the whole trouble was caused by Lvov misleading Kor-
nilov could be in favour of pourparlers only up to the morn-
ing of August 28th, that is to say, up to the day when Kor-
nilov's proclamation was published concerning the "great
provocation " and " Lvov's mission/* From that moment
any possibility of doubt had ceased : the malicious intention
was evident. It should have been obvious for them that any
possibility of pourparlers had disappeared. When Savin-
kov, towards the morning of August 28th, learnt not only
that Kornilov had refused to hand over his command, but
that he had detained Filonenko and sent the ** Savage Di-
vision f> m the van of the cavalry corps and had appointed
Krimov commander of the corps that is to say, that Kor-
nilov had broken his promise even Savinkov understood
that " in the circumstances " it was no longer possible to
enter into pourparlers with General Kornilov. Next day
(August 29th), Savinkov, as Military Governor of Petro-
grad, issued an appeal to the inhabitants of the capital which
began as follows : * c In the perilous hour when the enemy

166 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

has broken through our front and when Riga has fallen,
General Kornilov has attempted to discredit the Provisional
Government and the Revolution and has joined the ranks of
their enemies/"]

Kcrensky. In the night, when I read to the Provisional
Government both documents (the tape of the conversation
with Kornilov and Lvov's " points ") one after the other, no
objections were raised at all, as far as I can remember.

Chairman. So that thereupon the meeting was called for
the night of August 26th-27th, when - . .

Kerensky. The meeting of the Provisional Government
had already previously been appointed to take place that
night At the meeting I reported all the circumstances very
fully Lvov's visit and all subsequent events. Then I
made a proposal. . . . My proposal amounted to order-
ing General Kornilov to hand over his command, and noth-
ing more.

22

Chairman. Was it not suggested by you to the other
Ministers or by the Ministers to you that, in view of the
circumstances, in view of the revolt which was evident, you
should be given special powers unlimited powers to fight
the counter-revolution?

Kerensky. Yes. I do not remember the exact wording.
I do not think that I put it quite that way, but I pointed
out that it was necessary that I should have a certain free-
dom of action. I was of opinion that this was indispensable.

Chairman. Therefore the Provisional Government was
dealing already on the night of August 26th-27th with the
question of the rebellion of which we are speaking now?

Kerensky. I do not remember whether the word " re-
bellion " had been mentioned. We spoke generally of the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 167

extremely serious situation, of the obvious act of insubor-
dination by Kornilov, of the attempt to overthrow the Pro-
visional Government

I forgot to say why " they " wished me to go to Head-
quarters. Lvov said several times that they thought it of
the utmost importance that a lawful transfer of power
should take place, that there should be no seizure of
power, but that there should be a formal decision by
the Provisional Government to transfer it. "They"
seemed to lay particular emphasis on that. Lvov at least
three times resumed that point, and insisted that they con-
sidered it of the utmost importance that the Provisional
Government should decide the transfer of power, so that
everything should be done in a perfectly legal form.

Raupakh. Tell us, please, was not the surrender of
their portfolios by the Ministers at that night sitting occa-
sioned by an endeavour to leave you wider powers for com-
bating the rebellion?

Kerensky. Yes. The position was so complicated!
The mutual relations within the Provisional Government had
already been rather difficult, while now, under the newly
created circumstances, the necessary steps could hardly be
taken rapidly. The Government lacked cohesion and
solidarity. The " polarity " between Kokoshkin and Tcher-
nov was found to be particularly embarrassing. They were
elements that could hardly act jointly, or even stay together,
at such a moment.

[The powers obtained by me from the Provisional Gov-
ernment on the eve of August 27th for the suppression of
General Kornilov's rebellion were thus formulated in my
Message to the population, issued on the same date, August
27th: "The Provisional Government has found it neces-
sary, for saving the country and the Republican order, to

168 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

empower me to take prompt and resolute measures for nip-
ping in the bud any attempts to encroach upon the supreme
authority in the State and upon the rights conquered by the
Revolution for its citizens. I am taking all the measures
required for the preservation of order and liberty in the
country." This text confirms that on the night preceding
August 2/th I did not receive " entire plenitude of author-
ity," but only defined powers for the solution of a definite
problem, viz. the quickest and least painful '* liquidation '*
of the Kornilov move. If then, after the almost
instantaneous quelling of the rebellion, there came a
" quinquevirate " period (the so-called Directorate), such a
form of government accorded least with my own desires,
whereas such a concentration of power as took place on
August 27th seems to me to have been a clear necessity.
While entering upon a struggle with a conspiracy directed
by the will of a single person, the State must oppose that
will by a power capable of prompt and decisive acts. No
collegiate body can act as such a power, least of all one that
is composed of a coalition.

The blow struck by Kornilov was aimed at the very junc-
tion of the coalition forces that governed the country, the
Provisional Government, and could not but strengthen the
centrifugal forces within the same. The Provisional Gov-
ernment was living through a crisis like the one it had
experienced between the 3rd and the 5th of July; the only
difference was in the parts played by the political wings (the
Right and the Left) parts which were now the reverse of
what they had been before. The struggle with Kornilov
had to be carried on in the name and with the participation
of the whole people, and the Government had to act only
as the people's common authority, without inclining to-
wards the Right wing for an agreement with the rebels, or

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 169

towards the Left wing for combating whole groups and
classes of the population under the pretence of suppressing
the counter-revolution. As far as we can judge ourselves,
the Provisional Government has fulfilled this task of a con-
centration of authority. At any rate, it did not shed a single
drop of blood; and it did not permit a single superfluous
victim to be made, nor has it deviated a single step from its
sworn promise to govern in the name of the general in-
terests of the whole State.

That is precisely my reply to the rhetorical question put to
me on September 5th at the Democratic Conference by J. G.
Tseretelli : " When, at the moment of Kornilov's rush, in
order to have a free hand against Kornilov, who was march-
ing upon revolutionary Petrograd with a dictatorship, the
head of the Government felt it necessary (but only on that
particular occasion) to confront Kornilov with the revolu-
tionary power of a single person, was he right or was he
wrong?" To which Tseretelli himself immediately an-
swers that, in his opinion, "he was wrong." He thinks
that, "as a matter of fact, only the union of the entire
democracy at that moment, the indissoluble union of the
Government and of all its representatives with the democ-
racy, could and actually did save the Revolution."

If they did save it, what was wrong then? Why then
did Tseretelli not only say of me that " at this time of his
administration he committed blunders," but also think fit to
declare: "Let democracy blame itself if at that height its
representative's head shall turn!' ( Cheers. ) In what way
was the turning of my head made manifest? Was it in my
declining to throw myself, between the 27th and the 3oth
of August, into the arms of the elements and to proclaim,
with the support of the Soviets, a campaign against the
whole of the Russia that exists outside the Soviets, thus

170 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

affirming my fulness of power by the horrors of civil war?
Or was it in that, while remaining the representative of the
whole democracy, of the whole of Russia that" was free and
devoted to freedom, I did not, in the night preceding Aug-
ust 28th, appear before the Central Executive Committee
of the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies in or-
der to " unite myself indissolubly " only \vith one portion
of the democracy, though a very influential one? Was it
not clear to every one that, if my head had really turned, I
could have restored tyranny in Russia two months earlier
(than it actually came), at this very Central Executive Com-
mittee on the night preceding August 28th, under the cover
of the watchword : " All the power to the Soviets " ? Or
was, perhaps, the turning of my head shown in the fact that,
on the very next day after the bloodless conclusion of the
Kornilov rebellion, I insisted in reinstating the work of the
Provisional Government as a whole, and was only prevented
from carrying my wish into effect by impediments from out-
side, which compelled me to behold for three weeks, with
set teeth, how the State was being ruined and the Revolu-
tion was perishing, merely because the victory of the whole
of Russia, that had been of one mind, was entirely and ex-
clusively attributed to the Council of Workmen's and Sol-
diers* Deputies, who (the imaginary victors!) were pre-
paring all the time to dictate their terms to Russia and to
the Government ! No, the wine of victory did not go to my
head; although, if you like, my head was really turning,
but only from my consciousness that, in spite of all tempta-
tions, I remained sober to the last, though once more
solitary. I had been solitary at the very outset of the re-
bellion, when, because of the conduct of Miliukov and the
newspaper Retch the Left started to hunt down the whole
party of the Constitutional Democrats, and the " Izvestia "

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 171

of the Central Executive Committee demanded the elimina-
tion of the representatives of that party from the Govern-
ment Then I was the only one who said what J. G. Tsere-
telli vainly urged later at the Democratic Conference : ** One
must not approach political currents with a Penal Code
criterion/* and, " When they tell you that you must deter-
mine the degree of participation of individual persons or
organizations, and that that participation obliges you to
sweep away from political work an entire political party
containing heterogeneous elements, then the problem has
not, politically speaking, been stated properly."]

Raupakh. From the moment, then, when the portfolios
were handed over to you, you considered that the plenitude
of power belonged to you ?

Kcrensky. No, I did not consider it so, and that is why
I declined to accept the resignations. The problem merely
consisted in creating such conditions as would render it pos-
sible to act promptly and resolutely, and to effect, in case of
need, a re-grouping within the Provisional Government.
This led to the relations with some of the Cadets among the
Ministers becoming somewhat strained, as a certain differ-
ence in our and their respective attitudes towards events
manifested itself. The majority of the Ministers continued
to exercise their functions, and actually contributed in every
way towards ending the rebellion. Only a very small group
of Ministers, not more than two, raised the question of resig-
nation quite formally, and abstained decidedly from every
contact with the Provisional Government. They laid stress
on their being no longer Ministers. I impressed upon them
there and then that this meant that they had resigned them-
selves, since I had not accepted the resignation of the mem-
bers of the Provisional Government.

[Tchernov then also retired immediately from the Pro-

172 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

visional Government, but was energetic in repressing the
rebellion; he made a tour of all the positions round Petro-
grad, and issued his appeal by the Rural Minister which
became famous for a time. At present, when in Russia,
or rather in Muscovy, the "knights of denunciation and
execution " are raging as of old, I consider it a duty to em-
phasize the fact that the behaviour of those two Cadet
Ministers was by no means typical. The other Constitu-
tional Democratic Ministers remained with the majority
of the Provisional Government Still less could conclusions
be drawn from the conduct of those two members of the
Government as to the mood of the whole Cadet Party at the
time. One ought to look at the facts, and remember what
had happened from the 3rd to the 5th of July. Then it was
the same thing, only vice versa. The attempted rebellion,
then, too, originated with elements hostile to the coalition,
only then they were the Left elements. Then too, it was
necessary to take prompt and resolute measures, while there
were also hesitations, but on the opposite wing of the Pro-
visional Government. Those hesitations lasted until the
peals of thunder from before Kalustch and Tarnopol
reached Petrograd- Now, as then, nobody approved the
"way of acting ": on both occasions there was complete
solidarity on that question between the two wings of the Pro-
visional Government On both occasions the question was
only as to the manner of combating the rebels, whether
resolutely, or by seeking a way to reconciliation. Just as
on the 3rd-5th of July, to people who were utter strangers
to Social-Maximalist mentality, mere hesitation on the ques-
tion as to the necessity of resolute measures seemed to be a
crime, so after the 26th-3Oth August all those were classed
among " traitors to the Revolution " who offended in the
same way, i.e. by too closely approximating to the sentiment

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 173

of the Kornilovites, or by too intimate an understanding of
the motives of their activity. Both these parties in turn
failed to " see the wood for the trees " ; through their per-
sonal sentiment they overlooked the State and that terrible
danger which lurked equally in Bolshevism and Kornilovism.
On both occasions the position of the members of the Pro-
visional Government who understood too well the motives
of the criminal moves was all the more difficult because,
within their own parties, now the Left, now the Right,
Maximalism already found an active echo. Let us remem-
ber Kamkov or Martov, in the days of the 3rd-5th July,
and Miliukov or Struve, in the days of the Kornilov
movement

Lack of sharpness to its edges constituted both the strength
and the weakness of the Coalitional Government ; it consti-
tuted strength so long as State-consciousness prevailed over
class and group interests, but became a weakness when that
consciousness was extinguished.

To return to the Cadet Ministers who were in the Pro-
visional Government before, during, and after Kornilovism,
I feel bound to testify to the intentional maliciousness of
accusing such clean men as Kartashev, Oldenburg, Kishkin
and others of any intrigues and conspiracies against democ-
racy. If these Radicals by conviction represented the Rus-
sian bourgeoisie as members of the Cadet Party, it was that
wise portion of the same which, according to the words of
Tseretelli himself, " had understood that at this moment the
Kornilov adventure did not mean the affirmation of the
principles put forward by Kornilov, but the complete de-
struction of the country" The Cadet Party also perceived
the error of some of its members : after August 27th-29th,
Miliukov soon left for a " rest " in the Crimea, while I, as
Prime Minister, up to the very opening of the Provisional

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Council of the Republic, in my negotiations with the Cadet
Party, had to deal chiefly with that very sagacious, far-see-
ing, and real statesman, V. D. Nabokov,]

Raupakh. I am putting this question as to your powers
because the dismissal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief
would only be possible by an order of the Government.

Kerensky. This was done before the resignation of the
Ministers.

Raupakh. There was then a ukase, a decision of the
Government as to the discharge of Kornilov?

Kerensky. That was resolved immediately.

Chairman. And does it exist in writing?

Kerensky. I don't know whether it exists in writing, as
the sitting was a rather stormy one.

Raupakh. The dismissal, then, was not your personal
act, but a decision of the Government ?

Kerensky. Certainly. Only I can't say whether the
decision was put into writing there and then. At the sit-
tings are present the Chief Clerk of the Provisional Govern-
ment and the Bureau officials, who afterwards enter all the
resolutions in the journal. I only remember that my motion
was to the effect that it was necessary immediately to request
Kornilov to resign his post Such was my declaration.

Raupakh. Do you recollect how the telegram was
drafted? In your own name, or in that of the Provisional
Government?

Kerensky. The telegram was composed in a hurry.

Raupakh. Was it not entered in the journal of papers
going out?

Kerensky, It was drafted in a very great hurry. One
must remember the circumstances of that night.
Raupakh. But it must be in existence. It was trans-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 175

mitted by the direct line. It must be here ; we couldn't find
it there.

Kcrcnsky. Where do you mean by " there "?

Raupakh. At Headquarters. It was not to be found
there.

Kerensky. What do you mean by "It was not to be
found "?

Shablovsky. It proved to have been lost. It was taken
by Kornilov; it was brought to the Staff; it was used as evi-
dence, but it was not to be found there. We did not get it
in the original.

Raupakh. The dismissal of Kornilov was not, then, a
personal act of your own, but a decision of the Govern-
ment? This is very important.

Kerensky. It was moved and adopted by the Provisional
Government before the resignations had been handed to
me. There is no doubt whatever about that. I made a
detailed report, together with the conclusion arising there-
from.

[The Commission of Inquiry went so minutely into the
question of the moment of General Kornilov's dismissal and
the circumstances in which the telegram about it was dis-
patched to him because, in the course of the inquiry, formal
defects of the telegram mentioned at that point of my inter-
rogatory were advanced as one of the serious motives of
Kornilov's refusal to lay down the command. The defects
were the following: (i) the absence of a serial number;
(2) the mere signature "Kerensky" without the addition
of my status; (3) the absence of any reference to the de-
cision of the Provisional Government. But if General
Kornilov had really entertained any serious doubt as to the
authenticity of that telegram, or as to my authority to send

176 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

it, he could and should first of all have Immediately ad-
dressed an inquiry for verification ; and secondly, his scepti-
cism would have been somehow reflected in conversation with
Savinkov on the Hughes tape machine on August 27th; but,
of course, he made no such indications of uncertainty.
Among motives for refusing to surrender his office set out
on the Hughes tape machine is no mention of the formal
defects of this telegram. Only in one of Kornilov's deposi-
tions known to me he says, by the way : " On the morning
of August 27th, I received a telegram signed * Kerensky/
but without any number, instructing me to hand over my
post to Lukomsky." That is all !

Filonenko, if credence may be given to his deposition in
this case, establishes that it was he who raised the doubt in
General Kornilov's mind as to the authenticity of the tele-
gram, and that it was he who ascertained the genuineness of
the same on August 27th, in his conversation with Savinkov.
In other words, it follows from Filonenko's version that the
clearing-up of any doubt as to the genuineness of the telegram
did not in the least influence Kornilov's further conduct.
Nor did General Lukomsky doubt for a moment the genuine-
ness of my telegram, since without any inquiries he sent
me a telegram in reply with a reasoned refusal to undertake
the command instead of General Kornilov.

I explained intentionally this insignificant episode of the
telegram with greater detail in order to show with what care
and attention the Commission of Inquiry was verifying
every indication in favour of General Kornilov, and was
eager to ascertain the slightest fact that might provide a
motive justifying General Kornilov's conduct. How very
different was the activity of the Commission of Inquiry,
formed by me personally, from any attempt " to hide in snap
judgments in Court and in graves the truth, the aims of the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 177

movement, and the participation of members of the Govern-
ment in the affair " ! But it is exactly such a purpose that
General Alexeiev attributes to the " invisible participators
(in the Kornilov revolt) who came as the masters of destiny
and the managers of the inquiry/'

Does not the whole tenor of the minutes of my examina-
tion prove the real independence of the Commission of
Inquiry, which enabled it to investigate so closely, and some-
times even captiously, the acts of the " master of destiny "?
Alexeiev's insinuation only proves one thing: that the so-
ciety educated by the justice of a Stsheglovitov only deserves
a tribunal a la Stutchka! l ]

23

Shdblovsky. What happened, in chronological order,
after you sent off the first telegram ; what objections arose
in view of the communication to the population of the Prime
Minister of August 27th which was then being worked out?

Kerensky. I think there arose a question as to the de-
sirability of delaying this telegram, and, I think, it was
delayed. But which telegram are you speaking of?

Shablovsky. Of the communication in your name of
August 27th. (One of the members of the Commission
hands to Kerensky the telegram in question.)

[I remember that the dispatch by wireless of this tele-
gram which I addressed to the population was delayed, but
not on account of the motives insisted upon by those persons
who proposed its delay. These persons were anxious to
put off altogether the publication of the " conflict " between
the Provisional Government and General Kornilov, in order
not to lose the possibility of finding a " compromise " and

1 Minister of Justice under the Bolsheviks.

178 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

to settle the misunderstanding by peaceful means, on the
basis of " mutual concessions-" As I explained before, I
could not agree to that, and my agreement was the less pos-
sible as towards the evening of the s/th, especially during
the night, most of the conciliators insisted on a compromise,
no longer on the supposition of Kornilov's bona fide mis-
take (which by that time was already disproved by the
facts), but on the ground of " sober calculation of the real
forces/ 3 By that time General Kornilov was already a
fighting party, which had mobilized its forces.

Among the public at large there is a conviction that Gen-
eral Kornilov's active move against the Provisional Govern-
ment began after he became acquainted with my appeal to
the population of August 28th, circulated by wire, and after
the telegraphic prohibition to the railways from carrying out
any orders of the " late " Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
that is to say of Kornilov. This conviction is quite
erroneous. It is an error which is strongly supported by
the Kornilovites. Indeed, Kornilov himself, when he says
that it was only on August 28th that " he resolved to move
openly and to force the Provisional Government by pres-
sure/' is trying to represent his move as a consequence of
" my having been declared by the Provisional Government
on August 28th to be a traitor to the country."

As a matter of fact, my appeal did not play, any part in
Kornilov's resolve to make his move. This is clear
even from the remark written down by General Korni-
lov on the very date of August 28th with regard to
the copy of my telegram addressed to General Klembovsky,
which had been reported to Kornilov, General Kornilov
wrote on the copy of that telegram as follows : " I request
General Klembovsky to let me know immediately his de-
cision, since on the ground of his yesterday's telegram [that

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 179

is to say of August 27th] I have already taken a definite
decision, the rescinding of which would be the cause of great
convulsions in the army and in the country." On the same
day (August 2/th) Krimov's echelons began to force their
way by violence, so that it proved necessary to remove the
rails in order to keep them back. On August 27th, General
Kornilov's communications with the fronts were concluded,
and an order was sent to the Commanders of the rear dis-
tricts to obey Kornilov henceforward. At least I know one
such telegram that had been sent to the Commander of the
Moscow Military District General Denikin had already
sent on that day to the Provisional Government his
laconic but clear telegram No. 145, which began with the
words : " I am a soldier and cannot play at Mde-and-seek"
and as well had undertaken on the spot a number of un-
equivocal measures. In short, on August 27th the mobiliza-
tion of troops for operations on a wide front was proceeding
most intensely at Headquarters. So tHat on the night of
August 27th, while the conciliators were besieging me in the
Winter Palace, at Headquarters the irretrievable decision
had already been taken ** to compel the Provisional Govern-
ment to remove from its midst those Ministers who, accord-
ing to my [Kornilov's] information, are traitors to the
country, and, secondly, to reorganize itself in such a way as
to secure for the country a strong and firm authority. In
order to exercise pressure on the Provisional Government, I
resolved to utilize General Krimov's 3rd Cavalry Corps, or-
dering it to continue its concentration towards Petrograd."
This forms a most valuable confession by General Kornilov.
He thinks, however, that his soldier's word of honour
will be believed by everybody and that nobody will ever
doubt that it was only after his being insulted by the Govern-
ment that Kornilov suddenly resolved to make an open

180

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

move; whereas, in fact, the draft of his famous Declara-
tion to the People of Russia was already prepared on August
27th, while my Appeal has perhaps only accelerated its publi-
cation with a suitable alteration at the beginning of its
text 1

1 The following is the text of these two documents, to which I have
to refer so often.

PROCLAMATION BY THE
SUPREME COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF

A MESSAGE TO THE
POPULATION

I hereby announce:

On August 26th General Korni-
lov sent to me the member of the
State Duma V. N. Lvov with a
demand for the surrender by the
Provisional Government of the
whole plenitude of Civil and
Military authority, with a view to
his forming, at his personal dis-
cretion, a NEW GOVERNMENT for
administering the country. The
authenticity of Deputy Lvov's au-
thorization to make such a pro-
posal to me was subsequently
confirmed by General Kornilov in
his conversation with me by direct
wire. Perceiving in the presenta-
tion of such demands, addressed
to the Provisional Government in
my person, a desire of some cir-
cles of Russian society to take
advantage of the grave condition
of the State for the purpose of
establishing in the country a state
of authority in contradiction to
the conquests of the Revolution,
the Provisional Government has
found it indispensable:

To authorize me, for the salva-
tion of OUR country, of liberty,

The Premier's telegram No.
4163 is in its first portion a lie
throughout : it was not I who sent
Deputy Vladimir Lvov to the Pro-
visional Government, but he came
to me as the Premier's envoy.
Deputy Alexis Aladin is a witness
to this.

A great provocation has thus
taken place, which jeopardizes the
fate of the FATHERLAND.

PEOPLE OF RUSSIA!

Our great country is dying.
The hour of its end is near. Be-
ing compelled to come forward in
the open, I, General Kornilov, de-
clare that, under the pressure of
the Bolshevik majority of the
Soviets, the Provisional Govern-
ment is acting in complete accord
with the plans of the German
General Staff, at the time when
enemy troops are landing on the
Riga coast; it is killing the army
and shaking the foundations of
the country.

A grave sense of the inevitable
ruin of the country commands me
at this threatening moment to call

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

181

My telegram which the conciliators wanted to stop, far
from " provoking " anything, even rendered essential as-
sistance to Headquarters by providing them with an oppor-
tunity for still further covering up their traces. The

and of Republican order, to take
prompt and resolute measures for
the purpose of uprooting any at-
tempt to encroach upon the Su-
preme Authority in the State and
upon the rights which the citizens
have conquered by the Revolution.

I am taking all necessary meas-
ures to protect the liberty and
order of the country, and the
population will be informed in
due course with regard to such
measures.

At the same time I order here-
with:

I. General Kormlov to surren-
der the post of Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief to General Klem-
bovsky, the Commander-in-Chief
over the armies of the Northern
front which bar the way to Petro-
grad ; and General Klembovsky to
enter temporarily upon the post
of Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
while remaining at Pskov.

II. To declare the city and dis-
trict of Petrograd tinder Martial
Law, extending to it the regula-
tions for the localities declared
under Martial Law.

(See Code of Law, vol. iL, on
Provincial Public Institutions,
Art. 23, with its supplement of
1892 and its continuation of 1912.)

I call upon all the citizens to
preserve complete tranquillity and
to maintain order, which is so in-

upon all Russian people to save
the dying country.

All you in whose breast a Rus-
sian heart is beating; all you who
believe in God and in the temples,
pray to the Lord to manifest the
greatest miracle of saving our
native land. I, General Kornilov,
the son of a Cossack peasant, de-
clare to all and sundry that I want
nothing for my own person, ex-
cept the preservation of a Great
Russia, and I swear to carry over
the people, by means of a victory
over the enemy, to the Constitu-
ent Assembly at which it will
decide its own fate and choose
the order of its new State life.

I cannot bring it upon myself
to hand over Russia to its heredi-
tary enemy, the German race, and
to turn the Russian people into
slaves of the Germans, but prefer
to die on the field of honour and
battle, so as not to see the shame
and infamy of the Russian Land.

Russian people, the life of your
country is in your hands!

GENERAL KOENILOV.

The 2?th day of August 7917.

182 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

definite decision, the rescinding of which "would be the
cause of comulsion in the army and in the country/ 3 was
taken first, while the refusal to surrender the command fol-
lowed only afterwards. This was the real sequence of
events.

Only prompt and resolute measures could save the coun-
try, and did save it then, from great and sanguinary convul-
sions. I was all the more unable to admit any delay as,
since the evening of August 26th, it had become clear to me
that we had to deal with events which were unfolding them-
selves according to a previously thought-out plan, and that,
while calculating upon taking the Provisional Government
by surprise, the conspirators had also provided for the possi-
bility of another turn of events. It was also necessary to
take into account the possibility of surprise on the part of
those elements who had been got ready in various localities,
including Petrograd, with the intention of forming fighting
bodies from them; about these we had information. It
may be added that by the trains going from Mohilev towards
Petrograd, which were stopped on the way on the 27th and
the 28th of August, there travelled groups of persons who
were intended to distinguish themselves at Petrograd by
their active support of Headquarters.]

dispensable for the salvation of
the country. I call upon all the
ranks of the army and navy to
carry on with calmness and self-
abnegation their duty of defend-
ing the country against the ex-
ternal enemy.

A. F. KERENSKY,
Prime-Minister, Minister of

War and of Marine.
The 2?th day of August 1017.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 183

24

Chairman. Were no objections raised against sending
off that telegram of August 27th?

Kerensky. Objections were made. It was urged that
the affair would perhaps end in a compromise- That
was said by those who held the point of view which was
most clearly expressed afterwards by Miliukov, who called
upon me to offer his mediation, declaring that I ought to
understand that the real strength lay on the side of Kornilov.

Until it became finally dear that my predictions were
correct, and that Kornilov found himself in a complete
" vacuum/* there remained up to the last moment a large
number of adherents to a policy of compromise, or, to speak
more correctly, of surrendering the positions to Kornilov.

[Miliukov's visit to my study took place during the day
of August 28th.

In this connection General Alexeiev says in his deposition
as follows: "As it seemed very likely that in this affair
General Kornilov was acting in agreement with several
members of the Provisional Government, and that only
during the last days of August the 26th to the 28th
this agreement was infringed or some misunderstanding had
occurred in the interval, Miliukov and myself called once
more on the Premier on August 28th at 3 p. M., to make an
attempt to induce him to send to Mohilev several members
of the Government together 'with Miliukov to clear up mat-
ters so as to reach an agreement; or, at least, to continue
negotiations by the Hughes apparatus. But in this we met
with a resolute refusal" I ought to mention that while he
was in my study, General Alexeiev kept silent the whole
time, except for a few words on the position at the front in
the absence of command which had occurred, so that I was

184 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

rather in the dark as to the reason for his presence at my
interview with Miliukov. At any rate, it never occurred to
me then, on August 28th at 3 P. M., that there was sitting
before me not only partisans, but such partisans as had
come to me from a certain meeting, as I learnt afterwards.
I need hardly say that the motives for the necessity of con-
tinuing negotiations, which are set out in the above deposi-
tion of General Alexeiev, were not even hinted at by
Miliukov in our conversation; for, if he had done so, he
would not have had the opportunity of carrying on his con-
versation with me to the end.

Miliukov reasoned on the ground of the interests of the
State, of the patriotic motives of the move of General
Kornilov, who was only mistaken in his methods, and, lastly,
as an ultima ratio, he brought forward the reason which
seemed to him the most conclusive and effective, namely,
that the real strength lay on the side of Kornilov. 1

*On what real forces they were counting at Headquarters and on
what they founded their assurance of the wide support and success of
" the open move' against the Provisional Government," may be seen
from the following " diplomatic " telegram, No. 262, from Prince Tru-
betzkoy, authorized by General Kornilov, which was sent on the worn-
ing of August 28th to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I describe this
telegram as authorized by General Kornilov because, before dispatching
it to Petrograd, Prince Trubetzkoy had shown it to General Kornilov,
who, "after acquainting himself with the text of the same, said, ' Send
it on/ " Here is the text of this telegram, which has become known to
me only now:

" On a sober estimate of the position, one has to admit that the whole
personnel in command, the overwhelming majority of the officers, and
the best part of the army at the front will follow Kornilov. In the
rear there will stand on his side the whole of Cossackdom, the majority
of the military schools, as well as the best elements of the troops. To
their physical power must be added the superiority of a military or-
ganization over the weakness of the Government organs, the moral
sympathy of all non-Socialist elements of the population, the ever-
growing discontent with the existing order among the lowest classes,

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 185

As far as I remember, I replied that I would rather die
than subordinate Right to the argument of Force. I added
that I was astonished at the suggestion made to me, the
Premier, to continue negotiations after General Kornilov
had dared tc; declare the members of the Provisional Gov-
ernment to b# agents of the German General Staff. Yes, I
was very angry. I felt extremely indignant at Miliukov's
complete indifference to this, to say the least, quite inadmis-
sible sally of Kornilov, though among the members of the
Provisional Government there were some of Miliukov's
closest political friends. Even Prince Trubetzkoy, who ex-
perienced the strong pressure of the atmosphere at Head-
quarters, relates that when on August 28th he became
acquainted with the contents of the Proclamation to the

and, among the majority of the popular and urban masses, who have
"become blunted in regard to everything, the indifference which obeys
the stroke of tk<t whip. An enormous number of those who were So-
cialists in March will doubtless pass over immediately to their side.
On the other hand, the latest events at the front and in the rear, espe-
cially at Kazan, have demonstrated with unmistakable clearness the
picture of the complete bankruptcy of the present order of things and
the inevitability of a catastrophe unless a crisis takes place at once.

tt This consideration seems to be decisive for General Kornilov, who
is aware that only by resoluteness is it possible to stop Russia at the edge
of the abyss into which it will otherwise roll It is neither here nor
there to say that Kornilov is preparing the triumph of the Kaiser, when
there will soon remain nothing for the German troops to overcome
except our wide expanses. It depends on the men now in power
whether they will meet the inevitable crisis half-way, thus rendering
it painless and preserving the real guarantees of popular freedom, or
if they will take upon themselves, by their opposition, the responsibility
for innumerable new calamities. I am convinced that only the imme-
diate arrival here of the Premier, of the Deputy Minister of War, and
of yourself, in order to establish jointly with the Supreme Commander-
in-Chief the foundations of a strong authority, can avert the threaten-
ing danger of civil war/*

Does not this telegram once more confirm that my urgent measures
against General Kornilov's move had a sufficient foundation?

186 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Russian People (Kornilov's Order No. i), he was "so
astonished at it that he doubted its genuineness/' and it be-
came clear to him that "adventurers had passed off on
General Kornilov a document which he signed without
proper consideration/' The text of that document made it
clear to Trubetzkoy that reconciliation was impossible.

I also remember that in the course of that conversation I
pointed out to Miliukov that my attitude towards the move
of Kornilov could not be any different from my attitude to-
wards the Bolsheviks in July ; that from the point of view of
the authority of the State the position was in both cases
exactly the same, and that the Government was faced by a
similar attempt to snatch power by violence, etc. I remem-
ber how Miliukov argued, from the difference in the motives
of the crime (which difference as to motives, I did not deny
myself, nor do I deny it now), the necessity for a different
attitude on the part of the Government towards the crime
itself. I thus had before me an inversion of Martov in July.
Indeed the leading articles in the Retch (the leading
organ of the CD.) at this time corresponded to the leading
articles in the Novaya Jizn (the organ of Internationalist
Mensheviks) during the period of the Bolshevik revolt

I have already mentioned that prominent individual Lib-
erals were giving by their conduct in the Kornilov days
fruitful material to Bolshevik and semi-Bolshevik dema-
gogues. In the ranks of the democracy there began a final
assault upon the sole State idea which had been saving the
State from political death upon the idea of a single uni-
versally national authority. Some started the attack openly
and others in a cowardly way, hiding themselves behind the
watchword of " a coalition without the Cadets/' though they
knew full well that this watchword practically signified the
negation of a coalition, since all that was progressive, but

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 187

not democratic, including the industrial aristocracy of Mos-
cow, bad then united round the Constitutional Democratic
Party.

After Kornilov's move the Government remained solitary
in its endeavour again to unite " the representatives of all
those elements which placed the eternal and general interests
of the country above the temporary and private interests of
single parties or classes/' The Government declared this
aspiration to be its immediate task in its Message to the
population of September ist, in which it declared Russia to
be a Republic. The " eternal and universal " was forgotten
by all parties and classes in the name of the " temporary
and private " ; both among the democracy and the bourgeoisie
the irreconcilable but active minority was rapidly capturing
influence and power. If, however, one can understand Bol-
sheviks who, by letting loose all the dark animal instincts of
the masses of the people, wished to capture and to utilize for
their own purposes the really gigantic force of these masses,
one must stand quite puzzled at the " Realist " policy of the
irreconcilable wing of the bourgeois intellectuals, who made
it their aim to free the State from the pressure of the whole
" revolutionary democracy/' without possessing at that time
any real force at their disposal. Truly, God deprives of
their reason those whom He wishes to chastise. But, while
punishing themselves, these ** sober " elements of the country
have greatly helped the Anarchist-Bolsheviks to precipitate
Russia into the abyss.]

Kerensky. Apart from the attempts at compromise,
there went on at this time a wholesale exodus from this
place, known to be doomed to ruin. Indeed, on a certain
night I walked about here, in the Winter Palace, almost
alone, not because I did not wish to act together with any-
body else, but simply because such an atmosphere had been

188 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

created all round that it was considered to be more prudent
to keep away from such marshy ground.

[I must admit that in appearance Miliukov had selected a
very convenient moment for proving to me that the real
strength was on the side of Kornilov. The day of the 28th
of August was precisely the time of the greatest hesitations
and of the greatest doubts as to the strength of Kornilov's
opponents, as well as of the greatest nervousness in the
midst of the democracy itself. The lingering self-suggestion
of a " counter-revolution " had induced a good many to ex-
aggerate the strength of the adherents of the " Republican
reaction " in the country. Bewildered by the noisy con-
fusion of the " Kornilovist revolution/ 5 a good many people
were as crudely mistaken as Miliukov himself. I shall never
forget the painful long hours of that Monday, and especially
of that Monday night. What pressure was I subjected to
all that time, resisting while seeing the growing perplexity all
round me ! This Petrograd atmosphere of utter mental de-
pression was rendering still more unbearable one's conscious-
ness that the absence of a Chief at the front, the excesses
within the country, and the dislocation of transport might
cause at any moment irretrievable consequences to the as yet
hardly recuperated mechanism of the State. During those
painfully lingering days I was weighed down by a truly
superhuman responsibility! I remember with a feeling of
satisfaction that I did not then bend down under its weight.
I also remember with gratitude those persons who supported
me then simply as human beings. It was only on the next
day, August 2gth, that a mighty reaction against the mad
attempt of the conspirators manifested itself throughout the
whole of the country. I have already said, and I must point
out once more, that the credit for the victory over Kor-
nilov could not under any circumstances be especially

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 189

ascribed to the Soviets. The Kornilov movement was
bloodlessly crushed at the very first moment only thanks to
the enthusiasm and the unity of the whole country, 'which had
rallied to the national democratic authority. This unity
embraced immeasurably wider strata of the population than
the Soviets circles at that time. The new municipal and
Zemstvo local government bodies then played an enormous
part in the popular movement. Hundreds and hundreds of
telegrams from all corners of Russia were speaking out
clearly that at this time the " unification of all the living
forces of the country" was not yet an empty sound. It
should not be forgotten that precisely at this time there was
going on a healthy process of decrease in the political im-
portance of the Soviets in the State. That process was
interrupted by Kornilovism, which turned the Soviets into
Bolshevik citadels. Nor should it be forgotten that the
Government had taken all its decisions and issued its orders
before any outsider was aware of the very fact of Kornilov's
move. The legend of the Government's having taken its
measures against Kornilov only under pressure from the
Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Work-
men's and Soldiers' Deputies is absolutely contrary to the
facts. In looking through the newspapers of that period I
came across, in the issue of the Isvestia of the Central Exec-
utive Committee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Sol-
diers' Deputies of August 27th, a characteristic little article
entitled " A Night of Alarm," which shows strikingly how
far even the most informed inhabitants of Petrograd were
from the reality on the morning of August 27th. That
paragraph relates the uninterrupted and alarming sittings of
the Ministers and the Premier's-consultations with the mili-
tary authorities, explaining it all by the expectation of street
demonstrations on the six months' celebration of the out-

190 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

break of the Revolution, The newspaper in question con-
cludes its description of the night of alarm with a
communication that, "on inquiries being made, the Bol-
sheviks .and other organizations have made categorical
statements that they had neither prepared nor were con-
templating any movements. Similar declarations were made
by all the democratic organizations." Indeed, the day of
August 27th passed off at Petrograd most quietly, without
there being seen any hint of the Bolshevik rebellion which
V. Lvov had prophesied with such assurance. The author
of that little article had not even the slightest idea as to how
near he was to the truth when he reported " some conjectures
as to the possibility of such movements being provoked by
the organizations of the Right" The 28th of August was
the hardest day, owing to its uncertainty, while on the eve-
ning of the 2pth it has already become possible to issue the
following Government communique: "The rebellious at-
tempt of General Kornilov and of the handful of ad-
venturers who had gathered round him remains quite
isolated from the active army and navy. Only small de-
tachments which had been moved by General Kornilov
towards Petrograd still remain in error, but the further
movement of these echelons has been stopped and communi-
cations between them interrupted. From everywhere in the
provinces reports arrive affirming the complete loyalty of the
troops and of the population to the Provisional Government,
while all the public organizations send 'in declarations of
their resolve to support the Government." On August
3Oth the Winter Palace was again full of people and anima-
tion, the calculators of the balance of forces having forgotten
their hesitations. General Alexeiev left in the evening for
Headquarters, but already on September ist the Provisional
Government had to write: "The insurrection of General

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 191

Kornilov is suppressed, but the trouble carried by him into
the ranks of the army and into the country is great. There
is once more a great danger threatening the fate of the
country and its liberty. The Provisional Government con-
siders it to be its main task to restore the order of the State
and the fighting capacity of the army.'* In its issue of
September 3rd the Izvestia of the Central Executive Com-
mittee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies, in an article headed " Do not Destroy the Army/'
had to put the terrible question : " Was it the unruly acts
and the assassinations which are disgracing the name of the
Russian soldier that have saved Russia from Kornilov's
conspiracy? No; Russia was saved by something quite
different/' If a certain newspaper in a neutral State has
recently put to the German Government the tragic inquiry
as to whether it was going to erect in the Siegesallee at Ber-
lin a monument to the conqueror of Russia Lenin, I
maintain very seriously that the Bolsheviks ought to erect
on one of the squares of the former Russia an obelisk to
Kornilov, with the inscription " In hoc signo vinces."]

Chairman. Had you had no conversation, with regard
to the position that had been created, with Terestchenko,
Dutov, Karaulov, and Savinkov?

Kerensky. These conversations had nothing to do with
my telegram of August 27th. As far as I remember, Dutov
and the Cossacks came on the night of that day.

Chairman. That is so.

Kerensky. They came with an intimation that they
should like to go to Headquarters with a view to mediation,
in order to try and arrange the relations with Kornilov. I
repeated that I would grant the permission required. But
when on the next day, August 28th, there followed on the
part of Kornilov not only an open act of disobedience, but

198 THE PKELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

also a declaration to the effect that we, the Provisional Gov-
ernment, were German agents, I refused permission for the
Cossacks to start for Headquarters, saying that after the
conditions now created any mediations or journeyings for
arranging the affair had become impossible, since the mat-
ter had now passed into quite a different stage. The Cos-
sacks were greatly excited and made a grievance of my
having first promised to let them start and then withdrawing
the permission. My answer was all the time to the effect
that the position had changed in the interval in a radical
manner.

[Altogether, in August the conduct of the Soviet of the
Cossack armies was rather provoking, while in those days
its members, and especially its President, only managed with
difficulty to abstain from giving utterance to their real opin-
ions and intentions. I had to speak to them very sharply,
all the more so as I could oppose to their political declara-
tions the temper of Cossackdom at the front, which, since
the resolution passed by the Council of the Cossack armies
as to the irremovability of Kornilov, had been protesting
to me against the policy of the Council. When later, on
the spth and 3Oth of August, one deputation after another
kept on arriving from the units of the third Cossack Corps,
I had for the first time occasion to convince myself of the
extraordinary exaggeration of the idea as to any special
unity between the high and the low ranks in Cossackdom.
I was able to convince myself of it once more through my
personal experience at Gatchina. When a delegation from
the Council of the Cossack armies arrived there and began,
among other things, to work against me as the " betrayer "
of Kornilov, they met with no success among the rank and
file of the corps, where, on the contrary, there was found
favourable soil for the Bolshevik propagandists who were

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

also agitating against me, but who concentrated their atten-
tion on quite different matters. In the end, after their
having decided to " deliver me " to Dibenko, they nearly
resolved to arrest their o\vn officers as well. I was not,
therefore, astonished in the least when news reached me of
the sad issue of the fighting on the Don against Moscow
Bolshevism.]

Raupakh. What about the proposal of lakubovitch,
Tumanov, Savinkov, and Lebedev to enter upon a com-
promise ?

Kerensky. I do not remember any conversation with
lakubovitch and Tumanov, As for Savinkov, there had
been a conversation with him about giving him an oppor-
tunity of talking the matter over with Headquarters by the
direct line, already on the evening of the 26th of August.

Raupakh. But after that, did he not say that it was
still possible?

Kerensky. He was given the opportunity of speaking
by direct line, and he did so throughout the whole day. But
when Lukomsky's telegram, which you probably remember,
arrived and Savinkov read it, he handed me a declaration to
the effect that the reference made to him was a calumny, and
that he never did, nor could, carry on negotiations in my
name. He made a similar declaration to Kornilov by the
direct line.

Raupakh. Did not that conversation serve as a reason
for Savinkov to point out that there was some possi-
bility . . .?

Kerensky. That was during the night

Raupakh. After the conversation by the direct line,

Kerensky. Possibly. I don't remember.

Raupakh. I am anxious to dear the matter up with re-
gard to all the persons who have been mentioned.

194 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Kerensky. There were all sorts of persons ; they should
be divided Into groups. As for the visit of the Cossacks,
they were simply anxious to reach Headquarters in time.
I have no doubt whatever that they were among those per-
sons who, like Miliukov, for instance, were convinced that
a victory would fall to the side of Kornilov, and not to that
of the Revolution.

Raupakh. To the side of the " real forces v ?

Kerensky, As I said before, all these persons must not
be thrown into one heap. As for lakubovitch and Tuma-
nov, I do not remember having had any conversation with
them. They spoke perhaps with me too, but such conversa-
tion must have been so insignificant that I remember nothing
about it. I know only one thing: when I asked how it was
that I did not see either Tumanov or laubovitch, I was told
by somebody by Savinkov, if I remember rightly that
the whole thing had had such an effect on Tumanov that
he was in a most depressed condition. I think that lakubo-
vitch came later, and, if I am not mistaken, I requested him
to invite several people to assist in organizing the defence.
I remember, however, with certainty Savinkov's offer to
speak by direct wire on August 27th, and then Miliukov's
call on the 29th. Subsequently, at the meeting of the Pro-
visional Government, when we discussed the question, I
think, already on the eve of the solution of the crisis, part
of the Government expressed itself for the necessity of a
solution by compromise, in view of the "correlation of
forces " and of the necessity to avoid commotions. Some
argued that it would inevitably strengthen the Bolshevik
current There were various conversations, but they were
in another connection in connection with estimating the
correlation of forces. / stood on the definite position that

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 195

there were no two parties, but only the Provisional Govern-
ment and a general who had transgressed his duties.

There was a group of persons and a portion of public
opinion who considered that there were two parties with
equal rights to fight for power; to carry on with one an-
other, so to say, peace negotiations, and to appeal for media-
tion* I was of opinion that such a course would inflict a
decisive blow to the idea of revolutionary authority and to
the unity it had maintained since the outset of the Revolu-
tion. I therefore could not accept the view of two camps
negotiating through mediators, considering that I should
break my oath by taking such a course.

Raupakh. Was there no offer of negotiations in view of
the possibility of misunderstandings?

Kerensky. Savinkov made an offer on the evening of
the 26th.

Raupakh. After the conversation by tape. What about
Terestchenko and Lebedev?

Kerensky. I don't remember such a thing with regard
to Lebedev, rather tlie opposite. . . . Lebedev was very
suspicious of Filonenko's part in this affair, and Filonenko's
exit was due, properly speaking, to Lebedev's communica-
tion of a certain conversation which had taken place at the
Staff on the night of Filonenko's arrival from Head-
quarters. As for Terestchenko, he was at one time
really in favour of an agreement. Indeed, he even said at
one of the meetings of the Provisional Government that the
business ought to be settled in such a way that both Keren-
sky and Kornilov should be set aside, thus satisfying both
parties by a mutual sacrifice.

Shablovsky. Who drafted the appeal to the Regional
Commissaries of the provinces: did it bear your signature?

196 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Krokhmal. Excuse me, who drafted the communication
of August 27th ?

Kerensky. I don't remember.

Shdblovsky. And the one to the provincial commis-
saries ?

Kerensky. I am unable to state that either.

Shdblovsky. We are interested in the part of Nekrassov ;
was it not drafted by him ?

Kerensky. What do you mean by the " part of Nekras-
sov *' ? He had no particular part whatever.

Shdblovsky. We ask it on account of a newspaper para-
graph which states that the Provisional Government was
prepared to refrain from sending out the telegram announc-
ing the conspiracy, but that Nekrassov made haste and dis-
patched it against the opinion of the Government, thus
placing the latter before an accomplished fact.

Kerensky. I don't remember. I do remember that the
telegram which was to have been sent by wireless was kept
back merely because we thought that we ought not to over-
excite public opinion and sentiment.

[Nekrassov's part! That is one of the malicious in-
ventions in the Kornilov affair. One finds in the deposition
of nearly every witness favourable to Kornilov some refer-
ence to the part of Nekrassov to the part of the evil
genius of the Premier, " who easily yields to outside influ-
ences." Here, Nekrassov is circulating, without the Gov-
ernments knowledge, a telegram which " renders any fur-
ther negotiations impossible " ; there, he orders on his own
initiative the rails on the road to Kornilov's detachments to
be removed ; then again, he comes forward in the capacity of
an irresponsible adviser, and so on. I read myself in one of
the pro-Kornilov newspapers how Nekrassov "has de-
stroyed the possibility of an agreement between Kerensky

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 197

and Kornilov." Paragraphs in this style were appearing
continually- Of course, all that was pure invention, and
Nekrassov himself was quite right when he proved that all
the leading instructions emanated from me, and that nothing
of importance had been undertaken without me. Still, there
is no smoke without a fire : Nekrassov has really done very
much towards putting an end to Kornilov's move as
promptly as possible. This was his crime for which the
Kornilovists could not forgive him ! They were taking re-
venge on Nekrassov because, as Deputy Prime Minister
that is to say, as my nearest assistant in the supreme ad-
ministration he carried out, in those alarming days of
general uncertainty, the duties of his office most con-
scientiously and with rare energy. They took revenge upon
him for having assisted me. I leave alone the considera-
tion that, even as a simple citizen, Nekrassov would have
been fully entitled to contribute towards the prompt sup-
pression of the rebellion, even apart from any of his par-
ticular duties. The Kornilovists would perhaps somewhat
have softened their attitude towards him if they had been
aware that there was an hour when I did not see even
Nekrassov near me !

But why the part of Nekrassov, who had accelerated the
suppression of the insurrection, should have interested so
much the Commission of Inquiry is not quite clear to me. I
am reluctant to admit that any energetic activity in the sup-
pression of the revolt should have interested some members
of the Commission of Inquiry more than the revolt itself.

The unscrupulous baiting started in various Kornilovist
publications against all those who had brought about Kor-
nilov's collapse may be seen even from the way in which the
Novoye Vremya of October loth, reported my examina-
tion by the Commission of Inquiry, of which the original

198 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

minutes are now placed before the reader's eyes. I shall
quote a few characteristic extracts from the Novoye
Vremya version. After an introductory remark to the ef-
fect that " A. F. Kerensky frequently took part himself in
the examination of witnesses " (which is a downright lie),
that paper begins to report my deposition thus :

" He first gave some brief explanations, setting out in a
compressed form the whole course of his negotiations with
General Kornilov. These explanations called forth, how-
ever, a number of supplementary questions. One of the
members of the Commission of Inquiry evinced an interest
in the question as to whether the Prime Minister had charged
V. N. Lvov to carry on negotiations with Headquarters.
A, F. Kerensky replied in the affirmative (? !). The
Premier likewise confirmed ( ? !) that Lvov was not present
at the conversation by the Hughes apparatus on August
26th, and declared that in view of the alarming moment
and of the importance of the question to the State, he had
taken recourse to such a trick (?). A series of questions
were then put to Kerensky as to the reason for the retire-
ment of several Ministers and as to the pressure (?) exer-
cised in that matter on the Premier by his former Deputy,
Nekrassov. Altogether, the Extraordinary Commission of
Inquiry concentrated its attention greatly on the part of
Nekrassov. The Premier was asked about the author of A.
F. Kerensky's well-known " Appeal " to the people with re-
gard to the move of General Kornilov, who was described
there as a rogue (?), a betrayer (?), and a traitor
(?). A. F. Kerensky stated that the author of that tele-
gram was N. V. Nekrassov (? !). One member of the
Commission of Inquiry questioned in detail (?) on Nekras-r
sov's interference with purely military questions and on the
pressure exercised by him in deciding questions on the re-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 199

calling of members of the High Command of the army."

Such a mixture of perversions of the truth and down-
right lies was offered to the reader as a report of my exami-
nation. For the thorough appreciation of the editorial work
of the Novoye Vremya and similar papers, one has to keep
in mind that, possessing the advantage of a very good source,
the Kornilovist papers had at their disposal all the original
minutes and documents of the Commission of Inquiry
almost on the very day of their production. Unfortunately
I only learnt too late who had provided that source.]

Chairman. What about Krimov and the third corps de-
tachment? Were any orders given to stop it, to damage the
road, etc. ? Was it called forth by some document, or only
by an apprehension that had but little foundation? Did
Krimov commit any act of open disobedience to Staff orders?

Kerensky. As I said before, Krimov participated in the
revolt, which he joined, together with a small number of
officers, with quite definite intentions. I remember one little
incident : when Krimov shot himself, an officer, whose name
I don't quite remember I think it was Bagratuni re-
marked: " Now all traces have disappeared." Krimov did
not carry out the order to stop the movement and continued
to go f orward.

Shablovsky. If such orders were given, they were, then,
called forth by some documents?

Kerensky. Yes, by communications as to the location of
the units in question. The chief part was pla3*ed in this
case by the railwaymen, who reported even the slightest
movements,

25

Shablovsky. What did Filonenko actually report on his
arrival from Headquarters?

200 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Kerensky. Filonenko's arrival at Petrograd was not
quite intelligible to me. I don't know the actual reason for
his arrival. He reported nothing to me until I summoned
him myself to the Palace. I had seen him at night at the
District Staff. As soon as Filonenko made his appearance
there, Savinkov intimated to me that he would like to have
him as his nearest assistant in the defence of Petrograd. I
objected, but ultimately agreed to this, as I considered the
chief director of operations could select whomsoever he
chose as his assistant, on his own responsibility. But the
next day it transpired that Filonenko had been carrying on a
most unsuitable conversation with General Kornilov. I
then summoned him here, and he confessed the nature of the
conversation, which he related* But Savinkov began to put
forward a whole series of attenuating comments. I ought
to say that Savinkov is a very trustful man, and when he
once has faith in anybody, he does not notice any defects in
him for a long time. This is what Filonenko related to me :
Kornilov had asked him whether it would not be opportune
for him to proclaim himself dictator. Filonenko replied
that he was against a personal dictatorship, and refused to
support Kornilov. The latter then suggested to him a
" collective" dictatorship, to be composed of Kornilov, Ker-
ensky, Filonenko, and Savinkov, to which Filonenko re-
plied that he was ready to join such a combination.

I considered that this conversation was inadmissible in
itself, apart from the fact that any one might conjecture
that Filonenko had some reasons for speaking in that way,
since he was the representative of the Central Government
with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I therefore found
that it was impossible to retain him in service any longer.
At first I even wanted to arrest Filonenko, but afterwards
I withdrew that order in view of the position which Savin-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 201

kov had taken up on that question. I decided that this
could be done later on just as well, and confined myself
for the present to ordering him to vacate his post imme-
diately.

[Filonenko arrived at Petrograd from Headquarters on
the night of August 28th. Early in the morning of the
^9th there called on me V. T. Lebedev (the former Deputy
Minister of Marine, whom I had appointed on August 28th
to be Assistant to the Governor-General of Petrograd).
He appeared quite alarmed, and told me that, together with
Colonel Bagratuni (the Chief of Staff of Petrograd Mili-
tary District), he had heard Filonenko using quite an in-
admissible phrase in his conversation with Savinkov. I or-
dered Filonenko to be arrested. Shortly afterwards Savin-
kov called on me, requesting me either to arrest him together
with Filonenko or to examine Filonenko's accusers in the
presence of both of us. I thereupon ordered Lebedev, Bag-
ratuni, and Filonenko to be summoned to my study, where
all of them appeared about n A. M. The sequel I shall
quote from the very exact report made by V. T. Lebedev
in No. 145 of the Folia Naroda:

" A. F. Kerensky addressed us thus : * I call you to-
gether, gentlemen, fdr the following reason : V. T. Lebe-
dev told me that in his report to B. V. Savinkov, M. M.
Filonenko had made use of the following phrase : " But
I kept on defending our scheme: Kornilov and Kerensky
as the two pillars of the dictatorship." Do you confirm
it, Colonel Bagratuni? 5

" * Yes, I confirm it/ replied Colonel Bagratuni.

" ' And you, M. M. Filonenko? '

" ' Yes, I made that remark.*

" M. Filonenko then related that, after the arrival of
V. N. Lvov, he had discussed together with Kornilov a

202 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

plan of a dictatorship in the form of a * Council of Defence/
composed of the following persons : General Kornilov, A.
F. Kerensky, Savinkov, and himself. He had been dis-
cussing that plan in order to counteract the contingency of
the sole dictatorship of Kornilov, which would otherwise
become inevitable. The Premier was quite astounded at
this confession.

" * How could you, the Supreme Commissary of the Pro-
visional Government, carry on such a conversation with
Kornilov! Who authorized you to do so? General Kor-
nilov might now indeed say that he had been led indirectly
into error.'

" Filonenko endeavoured to prove that he had put for-
ward this plan as a counterpoise to the schemes of the con-
spirators; that there was no time to be lost, and lastly, that'
this conversation had been carried on in the spirit of private
relations and personal friendship.

" * For General Kornilov you were the Supreme Commis-
sary, and this conversation of yours was a conversation
between the Supreme Commissary and the Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief. You appeared to General Kornilov as
representative of the Provisional Government, which, how-
ever, had never authorized you to make any such declara-
tions/

" When Savinkov and Filonenko pointed out that an
essentially similar plan of a Council of Defence had been
brought forward by the Provisional Government, A. F.
Kerensky replied :

" * Never, never ! A question was raised and passed as
to the formation of a " Council of Defence " [rather a
War Cabinet than a Council of Defence] from the midst
of the Provisional Government itself, for concentrating
in its hands the defence of the whole country, after the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 208

example of England. But it never occurred to any one that
General Kornilov, a subordinate of the Provisional Gov-
ernment, could ever enter such a Council, You, however,
who are a Commissary of the Provisional Government, dis-
cussed with General Kornilov, without the Government's
knowledge, plans for a Directorate into which there should
enter three persons who are not members of the Provisional
Government yourself, B. V. Savinkov, and General Kor-
nilov and one person who does form part of the Gov-
ernment, namely myself, who knew nothing about it! '

" As a result of the conversation, A. R Kerensky said
that he looked upon M. M. Filonenko's action as tactless,
to say the least, and that he considered it impossible for the
latter to continue any political work.

** I, for my own part, declared that I considered M. M.
Filonenko's behaviour at Headquarters had been criminal,

" Filonenko consented to submit to A. F. Kerensky's de-
cision and to retire from any participation in the political
life of the country, whereat Savinkov came out with a pro-
test, defending the correctness of Filonenko's conduct and
explaining away Filonenko's confession in such a manner
that A, F. Kerensky corrected him several times by say-
ing:

" All three of us myself, V. T. Lebedev, and Colonel
Bagratuni have heard what M. M. Filonenko has said.
He said something different/

"As Savinkov went on insisting on the correctness of
Filonenko's actions and expressing solidarity with him, the
Premier offered to refer the whole business to the Pro-
visional Government, which, however, Filonenko declined,
declaring that he preferred to submit to A. F. Kerensky's
decision/'

Towards the evening of that day Filonenko was officially

204 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

dismissed. As I pointed out before, Filonenko's behaviour
at Headquarters is being used as one of the three proofs
of my collusion with Kornilov. General Alexeiev said,
indeed, straight out that the question of Kornilov's move
had been discussed with Kerensky through Savinkov and
Filonenko. I have already spoken of Savinkov, to whom
I shall still have to revert ; but as far as Filonenko is con-
cerned, I think that the scene in my study is sufficiently
convincing proof that no discussion whatever had taken
place with me through Filonenko, and I shall not touch upon
that question again.

This confession of Filonenko, however, is most impor-
tant in itself, since it coincides with a corresponding depo-
sition of General Kornilov and with his Hughesogram of
August 27th. By adding to it the evidence of Trubetzkoy,
Lukomsky, and several others, one gets an exact picture of
the alterations that the scheme of dictatorship had under-
gone at Headquarters, as well as on whose initiative the
whole question had arisen altogether. Kornilov's conversa-
tion with Filonenko about a dictatorship took place in the
evening of the 26th. The declaration concerning a dictator-
ship, however, was made by Kornilov to V* N. Lvov on
the 24th. On that day a fictitious consent was given to
Savinkov not to send Krimov with the " Savage Division "
to Petrograd, and on the same day this division was placed
by special order under General Krimov and started for
Petrograd. According to the admission of General Korni-
lov himself in his conversation with Lvov, he had declared
the necessity of introducing a dictatorship on his own ini-
tiative. Lvov's arrival at and departure from Headquarters
became known to Filonenko afterwards from Zavoiko and
Aladin, who called on him on a visit. From the telegraphic
negotiations of August 27th by the Hughes apparatus and

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 205

the corresponding depositions of Kornilov and Filonenko,
it can be ascertained that up to the very evening of August
26th the introduction of Kornilov's sole dictatorship was
contemplated. The depositions contain no data for either
affirming or denying Filonenko's participation in any con-
sultations on the question of a dictatorship previous to the
evening of the 26th. Nor are there any indications as to
Filonenko having suddenly changed his point of view on
this question when he supported a collective dictatorship
on August 26th. Filonenko cannot therefore be recognized
as the initiator of the introduction of an individual dictator-
ship, no matter what his part at Headquarters may have
been. I think that one may assert in complete conformity
with the facts that the very question of a dictatorship had
arisen independently of Filonenko, and that the position
of that question at Headquarters was not known to him
in its full extent. Unfortunately, General Kornilov's con-
sultation with Krimov and the other military participators
in the conspiracy does not seem to have been cleared up at
all by the Inquiry. I am convinced, however, that the
practical part of the venture was precisely discussed with
such clever men as Krimov, and that among them there
could perhaps have been found the real initiator of the whole
affair. On the strength of the materials known to me, the
most active adherent at Headquarters, if not the initiator,
of the idea of individual dictatorship must be recognised
to be Kornilov himself.

All the circumstances of the final consultation about a
dictatorship held on August 26th seemed to point to the
probability of Filonenko having said perhaps the truth, when
he affirmed in my study that only after being confronted
by the fact of the inevitable declaration of Kornilov's sole
dictatorship he had put forward the counter-proposal of a

206 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

collective dictatorship as the lesser evil. At any rate, the
Inquiry has firmly established that this scheme had only
arisen on the 26th of August at the consultation between
Kornilov, Zavoiko, Aladin, and Filonenko; and of all the
data of the Kornilov affair, Filonenko's version is the only
one I could find which provides an explanation of this
sudden alteration of the plan of action. But even Filo-
nenko's story does not reveal those motives which had com-
pelled General Kornilov to agree to such an alteration in
the form of a dictatorship. It is not clear whether Filo-
nenko had really convinced Kornilov that his scheme was
more to the purpose, or whether, standing in need for some
reason or another of Filonenko's consent on that evening,
General Kornilov only pretended for a time to have been
convinced by Filonenko. I would rather suppose the latter,
because it is hardly possible to assume that General Korni-
lov did not perceive the whole absurdity of such a dictatorial
quartet, composed of Kornilov, Kerensky, Savinkov, and
Filonenko! I am simply of opinion that on that evening
Kornilov did not take any particular interest in the forms
of a dictatorship, since he understood, or at least felt, that
on the day following the coup d'etat the final decision would
belong to him who would remain in power.

As for the degree of the participation of Filonenko him-
self in the conspiracy, I am rather inclined to think that
he, as well as Lukomsky, for instance, was dragged into the
affair at the last moment, being placed before the fact and
bound by his boastful loquacity. It is not impossible, how-
ever, that a careful judicial inquiry would have revealed
that Filonenko had been more deeply concerned in the con-
spiracy. At any rate, it is very difficult to clear up Filo-
nenko's part at Headquarters, because on the one hand his
conduct was very slippery, while on the other hand the

THE PKELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 207

attitude of Headquarters towards him was rather change-
able. Now he was persona grata with Kornilov ; now they
could hardly put up with him; now he was ordered to be
arrested, and now he was given a special train to start for
Petrograd. According to the witnesses, he was now attack-
ing me, now insisting that no Government was possible
without me ; now he demanded the removal of Lukomsky,
and now he would discuss together with him and Kornilov
the composition of the future Cabinet in which he claimed
the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and would only
at worst "agree" to act as Minister of the Interior.
Lukomsky writes, as far as I remember, that in all his re-
lations with Kornilov, Filonenko manifested complete agree-
ment with all his schemes and used to say that he was
going hand in hand with him, while at the same time ** they
did not trust" Filonenko at Headquarters.

Even about the arrest of Filonenko two versions are in
existence. According to one, he himself asked to be ar-
rested, since " as a representative of the Provisional Gov-
ernment he ought to be on its side, whereas he sympathized
with his whole heart with Kornilov." According to the
other version, " on noticing a complete change in Filonenko
and taking account of the circumstances, General Kornilov
announced that he detained him at Headquarters." What
was happening? On the morning of the 2/th, on receipt
of my telegram dismissing Kornilov, there gathered in his
study Lukomsky, Zavoiko, Aladin, and Filonenko. They
discussed the position that had been created, when Filo-
nenko stated in the course of the conversation that he had
to start for Petrograd, whither he had been summoned.
After the conclusion of the conversation, Kornilov and
Lukomsky left the study and went away together. Imme-
diately afterwards Zavoiko came out of the study into fee

208 THE PEELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

hall telling those present that " Filonenko had just asked
to be arrested." On the other hand, Lukomsky, on meet-
ing Trubetzkoy, told him that ** Filonenko had been put on
parole not to leave the place." Filonenko himself posi-
tively asserts that it was not he who asked to be arrested,
but that he was detained by Kornilov, and that this happened
during that morning conversation in Kornilov's study. Lu-
komsky's confirmation of the words of Filonenko renders
the latter's story more credible.

Now, what made Zavoiko represent Filonenko in the
character of the wife of the non-commissioned officer in
Gogol's " Revisor," who, according to the excuse of the
local Governor, had inflicted a flogging upon herself?
Why does Filonenko's role appear so slippery and change-
able at Headquarters ? Why, after sending on August 2/th
from Headquarters a telegram to Petrograd upon the neces-
sity of retaining Kornilov in the post of Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief and of arriving at an agreement with him,
did Filonenko, when he succeeded in getting to Petrograd,
issue there a fighting proclamation against Kornilov? For
want of sufficient evidence I am unable to give a definite
reply. At any rate, Filonenko's behaviour at Headquarters,
as Commissary of the Provisional Government with the
Supreme Commander-in-Chief, urgently needed a judicial
investigation, and I feel no compunction for having wished
to arrest him,]

Shablovsky. Was the advancement in Filonenko's serv-
ice career occasioned by his personal qualities as well, or
was he merely a protege of Savinkov?

Kerensky. Before meeting him during the retreat and
the operations on the South-western front, Savinkov knew
him very little. I remember, at least, that before being

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 209

appointed to the army Filonenko referred me to Savinkov,
whereas Savinkov afterwards told me that he knew very
little of him. Filonenko was one of those young military
men who had done much for the organization of the army
Commissariats and for dispatching to the front Commis-
saries who undertook to act there not only by persuasion,
but also by personal participation in the battles. These
were the " Commissaries of personal example/* He per-
sonally displayed great courage in the 8th Army during
the offensive and the retirements. There at the front Savin-
kov and Filonenko evidently became intimate. Later on,
when Kornilov's appointment became inevitable, in view of
his " peculiarities " I wanted to appoint Savinkov as Su-
preme Commissary with him. I did not go any further
than that. Savinkov, however, pointed out that it would
be more correct to have Filonenko as Commissary, since
the latter had got accustomed to the ways of Kornilov,
with whom he had been working. I saw Filonenko once
or twice at Petrograd in the spring, and also when I spent
a daj; in the sector of the 8th Army, but hardly ever had
a talk with him. I also saw him at Headquarters and in
the train, after the conference of the i6th of July. Then
it was that a commissary had for the first time to be ap-
pointed with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief , for the pur-
pose, among other things, of being always sure as to the
correctness of the political course at Headquarters, in view
of the peculiarities in the character of General Kornilov.
I had wished that Savinkov, who had originally been in-
tended to act as Supreme Commissary, should control and
direct this political and public work. When Savinkov was
appointed Deputy Minister of War, the question as to the
personality of the Commissary with the Supreme Com-

210 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

mander-in-Chief became a matter of indifference to me,
since the direction of the political work at Headquarters
remained in the hands of Savinkov.

26

Shablovsky. We were impressed in Savinkov's depo-
sition by his support of Filonenko. He even identified
himself with him. When you wished to set Filonenko aside,
Savinkov almost coupled it with his own retirement.

Kerensky. Yes, I told Savinkov : " I trust you com-
pletely; I think that you might commit errors, but I do
not doubt in the least your devotion to the Revolution,
whereas Filonenko I do not know at all." In this case, too,
Savinkov's special feature of standing up to the very end
for men " devoted " to him manifested itself. Every time
he put the question about Filonenko as if it concerned his
own person. When I suggested to Filonenko to cease im-
mediately the execution of his service duties, Savinkov
brought up the question of his own retirement, so that I
had to postpone for a while Filonenko's official retirement
[as I did not want to lose Savinkov]. I considered it,
however, impossible to retain Filonenko in office, and Savin-
kov retired almost immediately* He declared to me cate-
gorically that he did not wish to serve with me any longer,
as he did not approve of the new appointments of Verk-
hovsky and Verderevsky, and absolutely insisted on re-
signing.

[With regard to Filonenko's confession, there might arise
the puzzling question as to why, when Filonenko spoke of
" our scheme/' that is to say, not only of his own scheme
but also that of Savinkov, I wanted to arrest Filonenko
alone and told only him to resign? I must answer straight

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 211

out: because I was perfectly sure that Savinkov had no
part whatever in the conspiracy, and I interpreted these
words of Filonenko as a mere attempt to justify before
Savinkov his participation in an inadmissible and criminal
conversation. At the same time, I only saw in Savinkov's
persistent and hopeless attempt in my study to put in the
mouth of Filonenko such words as the latter had never
uttered, a passionate desire to save Filonenko.

That Savinkov was by no means initiated into that
conversation at Headquarters may be gathered, first, from
the fact that even on the 23rd and the 24th of August he
was carrying on at Headquarters a struggle with the Main
Committee of the Officers* League and with the political
section of Headquarters (at the head of which was a mem-
ber of the same Main Committee of the Officers' League,
Captain S.) that is to say, with the two organizations,
numerous members of which were active participators in
the events; secondly, from the fact that General Kornilov
personally deceived Savinkov on the question of Krimov
and of the Native Caucasian Division (as far as I remem-
ber, even the very presence of Krimov at Headquarters
remained unknown to Savinkov) ; thirdly, from the fact
that even at the most critical moment, after Lukomsky's
telegram on Lvov's and Savinkov's proposals, at the latter's
direct declaration that the reference made to him was a
calumny, Kornilov was not only unable to make any re-
joinder, but was compelled silently to admit it; fourthly,
from the circumstance that Savinkov had never been in
close intercourse with Zavoiko and Aladin, and could not
endure the former at all, looking upon him with great
suspicion and avoiding him, while on the one occasion he had
even obtained his temporary relegation; fifthly, from the
fact that Savinkov was himself suspecting and trying to dis-

212 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

cover the conspiracy at Headquarters, though making a
reservation about Kornilov himself, whom he considered to
be a patriot and " a stranger to politics " ; and sixthly, from
the fact that from the 27th to the 3Oth of August Savinkov
did not hesitate for a single moment on whose side he
ought to stand.

In order to illustrate the character of the mutual relations
of Kornilov and Savinkov and of my own part in their
relationship, I shall quote a few extracts from Savinkov's
conversations with Kornilov, as written down by Savinkov
himself :

"Lavr Georgievitch," Savinkov said to Kornilov on
August 23rd, " I should like to speak with you in private."
(At these words, Lukomsky and Filonenko got up and left
the room.) "The matter is this: the telegrams lately re-
ceived by the Ministry and signed by various persons be-
longing to the Headquarters Staff, I must tell you frankly,
inspire me with alarm. These telegrams frequently treat
of questions of a political character, and that in an inadmis-
sible tone. I have stated to you already that I am convinced
that you will loyally support the Provisional Government,
and will not go against it. But I cannot say the same about
your Staff/'

Kornilov. "I must tell you that I do not trust any
longer Kerensky and the Provisional Government The
latter has not the strength to stand on the ground of firm
authority which alone can save the country. As for Ker-
ensky, he is not only weak and vacillating, but even insincere.
He insulted me undeservedly [at the Moscow Conference].
Moreover, he carried on conversations behind my back with
Tcheremissov, and wanted to appoint him Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief." [Nothing of the kind ever happened.
A. K.]

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 213

Sawnkov. " It seems to me that in questions of State
there is no room for personal grievances. As for Ker-
ensky, I can't share your opinion about him. I know
Kerensky/'

Kornilov. "The composition of the Government ought
to be altered/'

Savinkov. " As far as I know, Kerensky is of the same
opinion/ 1

Kornilov. " It is necessary that Kerensky should not
meddle with affairs/'

Savinkov. " This is impossible at present, even if it were
necessary."

Kornilov. " It is necessary that Alexeiev, Plekhanov
and Argunov should be in the Government."

Sai'inkav. " It is necessary rather that the Soviet So-
cialists should be replaced by non-Soviet Socialists. Is that
what you mean ? "

Kornilov. " Yes ; the Soviets have proved their imprac-
ticability and their inability to defend the country."

Savinkov. " All that is a matter for the future. You
are dissatisfied with the Government; talk it over with
Kerensky. At any rate, you must admit that without Ker-
ensky at its head no Government is conceivable."

Kornilov. " I shall not enter the Government You are
right, of course, that without Kerensky at its head no Gov-
ernment is conceivable. But Kerensky is vacillating; he
hesitates ; he promises and does not fulfil his promises/'

Savinkov. " This is not correct. Allow me to inform
you that during the six days that elapsed since the Moscow
Conference, at which Kerensky declared that he was adopt-
ing methods of firm authority, the Ministry of War did
much, namely . . /'

This conversation took place on the 23rd of August.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Here are some extracts from a conversation on the follow-
ing day:

Kornilov. "Very well, I shall not appoint Krimov/'

Savinkov. " Alexander Feodorovitch [Kerensky] would
like you to appoint General D/'

Kornilov. "Alexander Feodorovitch has the right of
objecting to an appointment, but he cannot instruct me
whom to appoint."

Savinkov. "Alexander Feodorovitch does not instruct
you, he only requests/'

Kornilov." I shall appoint D. Chief of the Staff."

Savinkov. "And what about the Native Division ?"

Kornilov. " I shall replace it by the regular cavalry/'

Savinkov. " Many thanks. Alexander Feodorovitch
also charged me to request you to detach for Hs disposal
Colonel Pronin [Assistant President of the Main Commit-
tee of the Officers' League]/*

Kornilov. "Pronin! What for? I understand. It is
a concealed arrest! I shall not let Pronin go. Give me
proofs, and I will arrest Pronin myself/'

Savinkov. " Very well. I shall report it in that way
to Alexander Feodorovitch/'

Kornilov. " Certainly/'

(Follows the conversation about Mironov, which I have
already quoted)

Savinkov. " Will you allow me, Lavr Georgievitch, to
come back to yesterday's conversation? What is your atti-
tude towards the Provisional Government?"

Kornilov. ' Tell Alexander Feodorovitch that I shall
support him in every way, for the welfare of the Father-
land requires it"
Savinkov. "Lavr Georgievitch! I am happy to hear

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 215

these words. I never doubted you. I shall tell Alexander
Feodorovitch what you have just said."

After this conversation, Savinkov, reassured and confi-
dent with regard to Kornilov, leaves at 3 p. M. for Petro-
grad. But a few hours after his departure there takes place
the reception of V. N. Lvov, to whom is made the famous
declaration for communication to me. . - . Such was the
sincerity and truthfulness of Kornilov, even in his relations
with Savinkov! Trying to explain somehow to Savinkov
the duplicity of his conduct, Kornilov, when conversing
with him by direct line on the 27th of August, says:
"After your departure I received alarming news on the
position of affairs at the front and at the rear." And this
within the three or four hours which had elapsed between
Kornilov's taking leave of Savinkov at the station and Lvov's
call at his study! Let us suppose it was so. But when
General Kornilov enumerates the new alarming news
(which, by the by, contained nothing that was new), he
does not mention any particular news he had received dur-
ing those hours from Petrograd. Why then did he not
at least warn Savinkov personally, at the station, that on
the strength of " exact information " from Petrograd he
considered the position to be " extremely threatening M and
the presence of myself and of Savinkov at Petrograd to be
" very dangerous *' for both of us?

Why then, after his most friendly last interview with
Savinkov, did Kornilov think it necessary, not only to com-
municate such alarming news through a man who called
by chance, but even to " guarantee " through him the com-
plete "safety" of our stay at Headquarters? The wisest
man will fail to solve this enigmatical conduct of Kornilov,
so long as he assumes that he has to deal with a sincere and

216 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

truthful soldier who is a "stranger to politics/' But to
any one who seeks the truth impartially, this day of August
24th throws a deeper light on the events than a whole
bundle of documents. He would perceive how, while he
was conversing <k sincerely " with Savinkov, matters were
not being talked about but being done with Krimov,
Zavoiko, and other initiated persons.

Savinkov is guilty indeed, but not of any conspiracy with
Kornilov, nor, as Alexeiev imagines, of my having been
previously "informed'' through him of Kornilov's move;
his guilt was that while being utterly unconscious of the
character and the real intentions of Kornilov, he unwittingly
assisted him in his struggle for power by putting forward
Kornilov as a political force with rights equal to those of
the Government. He is also guilty of having, while at
Headquarters, exceeded the powers granted to him, and of
having, besides acting in the capacity of my nearest assist-
ant, also undertaken special political tasks on his own
account He is guilty in that, being insufficiently informed
with regard to the general condition of the State, and
being unable after a long exile abroad to find his way as
yet in the complicated political relations and the real dis-
positions of the masses, he self-confidently began to carry
on a personal policy, without taking into account the experi-
ence and the plans even of those who, by advancing him
to an exceptionally responsible post, had taken upon them-
selves formal responsibility for his entire activity as a states-
man.

But, whatever my personal estimate of such conduct on
the part of Savinkov, I must decidedly protest against the
declaration made with reference to him at the fourth Con-
ference of the Social Revolutionary Party by V. M. Tcher-
nov on November 28th of last year, to the effect that in

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 217

the Kornilov affair " a more than equivocal, one may say
a treacherous, part had fallen to the share of a man who
had been once a member of the Social Revolutionary Party.' 1
The Kornilov case affords no data whatever for such a
declaration. To hurl a similar, more than careless, accusa-
tion was especially unpardonable at a time when Russia, in
November last, was living through an orgy of bloodthirsty
instincts I

Just because I knew that Savinkov was not concerned
in the conspiracy, it never occurred to me to dismiss Savin-
kov along with Filonenko. Savinkov himself, however,
continued with particular insistence to take Filonenko's
part, and after the morning of the 29th of August I saw
that he was only looking out for a pretext for retiring.
Such a pretext was found by him in my " lack of correct-
ness towards him" (which I shall not touch upon here,
as it is a purely personal question), and in the appoint-
ment of Verkhovsky and Verderevsky as Ministers of War
and of Marine respectively.

Against the latter reason for his resignation on principle
I could not raise any objection, whereas now I must admit
that Savinkov's negative attitude towards those appoint-
ments has been justified by the facts, since the results that
were expected from appointing in my place " real " military
men have in no way been obtained. It ought to be recog-
nized, however, that between Verkhovsky and Verderevsky
there existed an essential difference. The clever and most
diplomatic Verderevsky perfectly understood the position
created by Kornilovism, and wanted to save whatever could
still be saved. He considered it to be his chief task to pro-
tect the still uninjured naval officers from any further
lynchings and final extermination. This explains his exces-
sive opportunism in his relations with the sailors' organiza-

818 THE PBELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

tions. But while "kicking off" somehow the inrush of
the rank and file, Verderevsky devoted himself entirely
to the task of working out and preparing a number of
important measures intended to attempt during the winter
the restoration of the fighting capacity of the navy. Gen-
eral Verkhovsky, on the other hand, was not only quite
unable to master the situation, but could not even grasp
it. He was caught up by the political gamblers of the
Left, and he rapidly floated without sail and rudder straight
towards catastrophe. There may be imputed to me with
much reason the guilt of having appointed Verkhovsky to
the post of Minister of War, and I accept that reproach.
This was the most unlucky of all the appointments : Verk-
hovsky introduced into his activity a vague element of
comedy. Nevertheless, not by way of justifying myself,
but merely as a matter of fact, I ought to say that, previous
to his being appointed Minister of War, Verkhovsky had
appeared a somewhat different personality. I shall not
speak of his activity at Sebastopol and before, but even on
August 27th, in a telegram to Kornilov, he expressed his
solidarity with the substance of Kornilov J s measures,
only protesting against Kornilov's method of acting:
"One may and ought to have changed the policy, but
not to undermine the last strength of the people at a
time when the front was broken through." On arriving
at Petrograd after his appointment, Verkhovsky was intro-
ducing himself to everybody as a " Kornilovist." Besides,
owing to some vagueness in the conduct at the time of the
Kornilov movement of other desirable candidates, I literally
had no one to choose from, while both from the Right
and from the Left there was a sudden desire to see a mili-
tary man at the post of Minister of War.]

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 219

27

Shablovsky* Did the Government possess any data
when committing Kornilov, Lukomsky, Kisliakov, Denikin,
and Markov for trial : something that we have not got, any
information that we have overlooked ? We have just made
an inquiry at Petrograd, interrogating individual persons,
but the Government has perhaps something we are not aware
of?

Kerensky. As far as I know, all who had manifested
their activity after the formal removal of Kornilov from
office were committed for trial. General Kisliakov con-
tinued to give orders. Lukomsky well, I think his posi-
tion is clear, while the story of Denikin and Markov is
known to you.

Shablovsky. Were there no special reports?

Kerensky. On the contrary, the telegram and the be-
haviour of Lukomsky were a surprise to me. I did not
think that Lukomsky would go that way. Even now, I
consider it probable that Lukomsky was one of the last
to join. After all, the pith of the affair lies no doubt in
Zavoiko, Aladin and Co.

Raupakh. The question just put by the Chairman is
of interest to us, because the wording of the prosecution
is that they are committed for trial for rebellion. What
are the actual data that testified to their participation in
a rebellion?

Kerensky. You are now passing to the question of a
definition of the crime they had perpetrated. We con-
sidered that Kornilov's open disobedience to the head of
the Supreme Authority and his refusal to hand over his
office, together with the appeals and orders to the troops
that he had issued, constituted a "rebellion," while its

220 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

participators and adherents appear to be "abetting the
rebellion." A crime is always defined by the acts of its
chief perpetrator. I do not know by what other method
it might be defined.

Raupakh. By the degree of Kisliakov's, Lukomsky 's,
Denikin's, and Markov's participation?

Kerensky. Really, any one would think that when the
Provisional Government proceeds to measures of prosecu-
tion, it appears to be itself a rebellious organization ! But
this depends on the point of view. As for myself, I have
no doubt whatever that a general, who allows himself to
call the Provisional Government "agents of the German
Staff/' and declares himself to constitute a Government,
is a rebel! I do not know wherein the irregularity of the
definition consists.

Raupakh. I do not object to the definition; but were
there any data against Denikin, Lukomsky, Kisliakov, Mar-
kov, and others ?

Kerensky. They continued to co-operate with the in-
surgent general; these facts are quite sufficient. When
General Lukomsky is ordered to take over the post of
Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which he is bound in law
to do, and to arrest Kornilov in case of resistance, he de-
clares that he cannot do it because he is on the side of
Kornilov. What else is required?

Chairman. Now about Novossiltsev [the President of
the Main Committee of the Officers' League]. Who car-
ried out his arrest ; was there no report concerning Novos-
siltsev's acts when he was arrested ?

Kerensky. Novossiltsev was arrested on the local ini-
tiative.

Chairman. He was the President of the Main Commit-
tee; so was he not present at Headquarters?

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 221

Kerensky. He had just left at the time.

Chairman. It looks as if there had also been an order
from here for his arrest

Kerensky. I think that if there had been such an order
it would have been of an administrative character. The
Government, the Premier and the Minister of the Interior
have the right to arrest any one, if we consider it to be
necessary.

Chairman. I only meant to ask for information; per-
haps, sir, you possess some?

Kerensky. Exact information? No. Personally I am
convinced (under the conditions of our detective system it
will perhaps be impossible to prove it) that a portion of
the Officers* League, and especially of its Main Committee,
was very closely connected with all the attempts, including
this one. I have already said that in the preparations that
were made here, at Petrograd, a portion of the Officers'
League had taken part. I will not mention what may be
called the, so to say, "legal" telegrams, which were all
signed by Novossiltsev. How did he behave during this
affair? If he had not left, I think . . . Suppose, for in-
stance, that de Semiterre were now to make his appearance
(after hiding himself when they wanted to arrest him,
which confirmed the suspicions to some extent) ; suppose he
were to put in an appearance now, he would be reinstated
in his office in the nicest way, for he is an officer of the
General Staff and ought to be supported, whereas we, the
Government, are, of course, incapable of displaying any-
thing but open partiality and arbitrariness! He could re-
main in the service !

[According to trustworthy information, de Semiterre was
one of the chief agents of the conspiracy at Petrograd.
There *' passed " through his hands those persons who

222 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

were sent from Headquarters and from the fronts to the
capital " for purposes of co-operation. 1 ' He kept one of
the secret rendezvous where the conspirators " reported/'
and so on. The moment before the competent authorities
arrived at his flat to search it and arrest him, he started
for Finland. Unfortunately, the technical side of the con-
spiracy for preparing the movement has remained, so far
as I know, utterly neglected in the labours of the Com-
mission of Inquiry, That is why the personalities of
Zavoiko, Aladin, and similar persons have become excess-
ively prominent in this case. It is only the episode with
Krimov that lifts a little the curtain from the technical
side of the case. This blank may be explained, not only
by the great cohesion of that milieu which directed the
military and technical side of the conspiracy, but also by
the fact that, under the influence of the " counter-attacks "
("provocations," ''misunderstandings/' etc.), made at the
time, and of the clever campaign of defence carried out
in the Press, in conformity to the German rule that "an
offensive is the best defensive/' the attention of the Com-
mission of Inquiry was, in spite of themselves, chiefly con-
centrated on those sides of the affair in which public opinion
had taken a particular interest at the time. In the mean-
time, the possibility of penetrating by the still fresh traces
into the very laboratory of the conspiracy vanished. In
referring to Semiterre, as a reply to the question about
Novossiltsev, I meant to lay stress on my having had no
doubt as to Novossiltsev's participation in Kornilov's move-
ment, and to point out at the same time to the Commission
of Inquiry what solid grounds we considered absolutely
indispensable before proceeding to take measures of pre-
caution by administrative order.
Generally speaking, it may be noticed from the text of

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

within the army of the distrust by the rank and file of the
whole body of officers.]

28

Chairman. To come back to newspaper paragraphs:
we have had no deposition by Alexeiev, whereas the news-
papers mentioned an order given to Colonel Korotkov to
take Mohilev. Was such an order given ?

Kerensky. Yes, it was like this : my plan, which happily
was accomplished, consisted in settling the Kornilov episode
as far as possible in a peaceful manner without any excesses.
We summoned General Alexeiev, who undertook this most
difficult mission. But precisely at that time we were be-
sieged by a number of

Chairman. Of demands?

Kerensky. Not only demands, but also items of in-
formation, which later proved to have been partly fanciful,
such as Mohilev being surrounded by fortifications ; artillery
and machine guns being placed in position on the slopes of
" Governor's Mount " and in the Governor's garden. More-
over, unauthorized detachments of troops began to arise
everywhere, tending towards Mohilev in order to suppress
Kornilov. Ultimately the Moscow Military District

CJzairman. With regard to the movement of that
echelon

Kerensky. The commander of the Moscow Military
District, even after General Alexeiev had left for Head-
quarters, insisted most categorically that he should be al-
lowed to move immediately a mixed detachment of infan-
try, artillery, and cavalry in the direction of Mohilev, and
when Korotkov's detachment appeared at Orsha on its own
initiative, I sent a telegram to Colonel Korotkov to the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 225

effect that he should prepare and organize an offensive, but
should only act in agreement with Alexeiev. In this way
everything was brought into a certain shape.

Chairman. So that all this movement of separate units,
and particularly of the one organized by the Moscow Mili-
tary District, was duly obeying the Provisional Govern-
ment?

Kerensky. We had to act cautiously in certain respects.
Personally, I did not particularly believe all these items of
information, but at any rate it was necessary to take all
these rumours into account. Supposing we had not taken
any measures, and afterwards these rumours had turned
out to be true, I would then have definitely proved to be
" a traitor and a counter-revolutionary." The only thing
that turned out to be true was that a state of siege had been
proclaimed at Mohilev and that a rather serious state of
terror had prevailed there. Kornilov declared outright that
whoever was against him would be shot. Strictly speaking,
this saves all the participators of the rebellion, since every
one of them is now able to claim that he had been acting
under the terror created at Mohilev.

[The peaceful settling of Kornilov's rebellion at Head-
quarters is one of those recollections which affords me the
greatest moral satisfaction. Just as at the very outset of
the Revolution, it became now necessary to protect at any
cost the life of individuals from savage lynchings, and
this I did. After some hesitation I insisted on General
Alexeiev's acceptance of the post of Chief of Staff of the
Supreme Commander. In spite of all the irritation against
Alexeiev in large democratic circles, notwithstanding his
obstinate personal refusals for forty-eight hours, until the
real correlation of forces had revealed itself, I kept on
insisting on his accepting that office, as soon ,as I realized

226 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

that only Alexeiev, owing to his connections at Headquarters
and to his enormous influence among the higher military
circles, could carry out successfully the task of transferring
the command painlessly into new hands from those of Kor-
nilov. If I remember rightly, Alexeiev was summoned
early in the morning of August 27th. That night he was
already at Petrograd, and until the morning of August 3<Dth
he would not give any decisive reply to the offer made to
him to take up the office of Chief of Staff. Meanwhile,
time was passing; the question as to the Supreme Com-
mand remained obscure at Headquarters ; in the very heart
of the army there still remained Kornilov, continuing to
issue technical orders. All this led to great nervousness
among the masses, who had not yet recovered their senses
from the panic that had seized them. On this ground,
the disposition to start " by themselves " to " do away " with
Kornilov was growing more rapidly from hour to hour,
since the authorities either could not "clear him away"
from Headquarters or were " in collusion " with him !
The position was becoming truly critical since, not to
mention any considerations of humanity and honour, it
was impossible to permit the slightest interruption, and
still less the shattering, of the work of Headquarters. The
procrastination on one side and the nervous insistence on
the other were becoming quite unbearable! I then had
to take recourse to orders in the nature of an ultimatum
towards those who were dilatory, at the same time restrain-
ing the nervous volunteers who were anxious to rush off
to " suppress " Kornilov. I shall quote the Hughesogram
sent on September ist by the Chief of my Military Cab-
inet, Baranovsky, to Headquarters, which accurately de-
scribes the state of things at that time.
"A. F. Kerensky fixed for General Alexeiev the term of

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 227

two hours, which expired at 7.10 p. M., but there is no
answer yet. The Commander-in-Chief [i.e. Kerensky] de-
mands that General Kornilov and his accomplices should
be arrested immediately, since any further delay would
threaten innumerable calamities. The democracy is excited
without measure, and keeps on threatening to break out
with an explosion, the consequences of which it is not
easy to foresee. Such an explosion in the shape of a move
on the part of the Soviets and the Bolsheviks is expected,
not only here at Petrograd, but also at Moscow and in
other cities; at Omsk, the Commander of the troops has
been arrested and the authority has passed to the Soviets.
The circumstances are such that it is impossible to delay
any longer; the alternative is either tardiness and the ruin
of the whole work for saving the country, or immediate
and resolute acts and the arrest of the persons pointed out
to you. Then a struggle will still be possible. There is
no other alternative, A. F. Kerensky expects that states-
manlike wisdom will prompt General Alexeiev's decision,
and that he will arrive at it immediately: to arrest Korni-
lov and his accomplices. I am waiting at the apparatus
for a quite definite and the only possible answer, to the
effect that the persons who have participated in the revolt
will be arrested. You ought to understand those political
movements which arise from accusing the Government of
inaction and connivance. It is impossible to talk any longer.
It is necessary to make up one's mind and to act."

A little later there came the answer from General Alexeiev
himself: "About 10 P. M, General Kornilov and the
others were arrested."

At the same time General Verkhovsky, already Minister
of War, requested me, and almost insisted on obtaining per-
mission, to send a whole military expedition to Headquar-

228 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ters, and forwarded the following telegram to Alexeiev:

"I am starting today for Headquarters with a large
armed detachment for the purpose of making an end to that
mockery of common sense which is still taking place. Kor-
nilov and the others (whose names follow) must be im-
mediately arrested; this is the purpose of my journey,
which I consider to be quite indispensable."

The excessive nervousness and aggressive tone of Verk-
hovsky may perhaps be partly explained by the conversa-
tions which he had held on August 24th at Headquarters,
as well as by the telegram No. 6457 which he had received
on August 27th from General Kornilov to the following
effect : " At the present threatening moment, for the sake
of avoiding civil war and not to give rise to bloodshed
in the streets of Moscow, I instruct you to subordinate
yourself to me and to carry out my orders henceforth."

To Verkhovsky's repeated inquires, as well as to those
of Colonel Korotkov, I kept on enjoining upon them " to
make ready/ 1 but not to start without my permission.
Only with the greatest effort and by using all my influence
and persistence, I managed to avert possible complications
at Headquarters. Of course, in General Alexeiev's dep-
ositions all this striving of volunteers towards Headquar-
ters is transformed into some " ill will " which wanted at
any price "to push troops against Mohilev." It is not
difficult to guess where General Alexeiev is looking for the
source of that ill will I Well, no matter. Anyhow, Gen-
eral Alexeiev carried out the task of settling the matter
at Headquarters with which he had been entrusted. A
prolonged co-operation was impossible for both of us.
Alexeiev tendered his resignation, which I accepted without
raising objections.

Meanwhile, I cannot help remembering that while I was

THE PKELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Generalissimo General Kornilov was constantly guarded,
throughout his detention at the Bykhov prison, not only by
soldiers, but also by his personal escort of Tekinians, the
very same with whom, and with their machine guns, he had
come to me at the Winter Palace. Such a double guard
was instituted by the Chairman of the Commission of In-
quiry, not only to prevent Kornilov from escaping, but also
to protect him from being lynched by the soldiers. I well
remember how fiercely I was attacked for it by the Press
of the Left, and how the future conniver at the savage
lynching of N. N. Dukhonin, General Bonch-Bruyevich,
appeared before me at the head of a deputation from the
local Soviet with the demand "to remove the Tekinians
from Bykhov," as the revolutionary garrison did not trust
them, and to strengthen the guard over Kornilov. I felt
indignant at such behaviour on the part of a general of
the Russian Army who had been in the past one of the
most faithful servants of Tsardom, and wanted to remove
him from Headquarters, while I also recollect how the
honest Dukhonin interceded for him. Such is fate!]

29

Chairman. I have no general questions to ask. Per-
haps my colleagues have some questions?

Kolokolov. I have questions.

Kerensky. I wish to accompany my deposition by a
general conclusion. I think it will prove very difficult and
perhaps impossible for the Commission of Inquiry to estab-
lish the actual trend of the events, and the very persons
who took part in organizing the Kornilov movement. This
is indeed partly the fault of the administration and of our
Government, that, owing to the absence of a detective de-

230 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

partment, we are unable to furnish you with such materials,
which the old regime could have supplied you with. We
are unable to produce them. But personally, I have no
doubt whatever that behind Kornilov there was at work a
quite definite group of persons, not only united together
for the preparation of the planned conspiracy, but also in
possession of large financial means and in a position to draw
amounts from the banks. For me there is no doubt what-
ever about this.

[General Alexeiev's famous letter to Miliukov of Sep-
tember 1 2th, which was published on December 12, 1917,
in No. 249 of the Isvestia of the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies, has transformed this subjective conviction of
mine, which was not binding upon anybody, into a visible
matter of fact which nobody will be able to deny. The
main purpose of General Alexeiev's letter claimed to be that
of drawing the attention of the " honest Press " to the
terrible position of the " apparent participators in the con-
spiracy " who had been arrested in connection with the
Kornilov case and whom the "invisible participators in
the conspiracy," the " masters of the destinies " and the
*' wirepullers of the inquiry," wanted to commit for trial
before the most primitive of all tribunals, a revolutionary
court-martial, with its inevitable death sentence. The pur-
pose of such wicked actions on the part of the "masters
of the destinies " the General explains very simply: " The
crime of Kornilov was no secret to the members of the
Government. This question had been discussed with Savin-
kov and Filonenko and through them with Kerensky. Only
a primitive revolutionary court-martial could hush up the
participation of these persons in the preliminary negotia-
tions and agreements. Savinkov has already had to confess

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 231

it in the Press. . . . Kerensky's participation is indisput-
able/'

First of all, General Alexeiev ought to have started, not
merely by asserting, but by proving that very "through
them with Kerensky," since up to that moment nobody in
the world, apart from General Alexeiev, had known any-
thing about that " through/' Secondly, neither before nor
after September I2th has Savinkov ever "confessed him-
self " in the Press as guilty of the conspiracy, but only
referred to those actual negotiations and agreements which
Kornilov did not keep, and which had nothing to do with
Kornilov's move. On what other ground does General
Alexeiev base his assertion of my " indisputable " partici-
pation ? On the movement of the 3rd Cavalry Corps headed
by Krimov; on Kornilov's telegram No. 6394 sent to
Savinkov on the night of August 27th at 2 130 A. M., con-
cerning the establishment of martial law at Petrograd; and,
lastly, on Lukomsky's telegram No. 6406, referring to an
offer made to General Kornilov " in my name " by Savin-
kov and Lvov. That is all. To anybody who has made
himself acquainted with this deposition of mine and with
my explanations to the same, it must be clear, I think,
that it is quite impossible to prove by that evidence my par-
ticipation in the conspiracy, unless one is to place an inten-
tionally false interpretation on the facts. General Alexeiev
could neither ignore the story of the Krimov corps nor the
real meaning of Lukomsky's telegram, nor lastly the true
reasons for summoning the troops for the disposal of the-
Provisional Government, since all the documents required
for ascertaining the truth were accessible to him in his
capacity of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-
Chief . In any case, early in September, when he was draft-
ing his confidential denunciation, he had the opportunity of

332 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

receiving every explanation he might have required both
from the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry and from
myself in person.

According to him, "the invisible participators want to
destroy the apparent ones/' whom those who knew every-
thing are bound to save. Who are they? Alexeiev writes
thus :

** The Kornilov affair was not the act of a handful of
adventurers; it was supported by the sympathy and assist-
ance of large circles - among our intellectuals. . . . You,
Pavel Nikolaevitch (i.e. Miliukov), are aware to some ex-
tent that certain circles of our public not only knew about
everything, and not only sympathized with the idea, but
helped Kornilov as far as they could. ... I have another
request; I do not know the address of Messrs. V., P., and
others. The families of the imprisoned officers are be-
ginning to starve. ... It is my instant request that they
should come to their assistance. Surely, they are not going
to leave to their fate and to starvation the families of those
to whom they were united by the community of ideas and
preparations. I beg you most instantly to take that work
upon yourself and to let me know the result. In that
matter we officers are more than interested/'

The whole tenor of Alexeiev's letter would still not have
constituted any serious indication of anybody's participation
in the Kornilov conspiracy, especially when one takes into
consideration General Alexeiev's extreme licence in dealing
with facts. This " request/' however, to render assistance
and to start an immediate campaign in favour of the accused
in the columns of the "honest Press" was accompanied
by an addition which is fatal for those whom he had in
view : " In that case [i.e. if Alexeiev's request is not imme-
diately complied with. A. K.], General Kornilov will be

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 233

compelled to unfold extensively before the court all the
preparations, all the negotiations with persons and bodies,
as well as their participation, in order to show the Russian
people with whom he was acting, what were the real aims
he was pursuing, and how at the critical moment, abandoned
by all, he appeared with a small number of officers before a
hurried tribunal . . . This is the substance of my appeal
to you."

When one is not in possession of any weighty proofs,
even blackmailers do not accompany appeals for assistance
by such unequivocal threats of exposure ! I shall not touch
upon the moral side of such a method of appealing, espe-
cially as General Alexeiev was evidently better acquainted
with the milieu he was addressing than myself. At any
rate, in the Retch of December 13, 1917, the writer of
the leading article is of opinion that Alexeiev's letter con-
tains nothing of a compromising nature, and that " it re-
flects the extraordinary purity and nobility of its author."
Indeed, there are various conceptions of nobility and purity !
The writer of that leading article makes haste, of course,
to identify himself with " Alexeiev's perfectly correct view
on Kerensky's double position " in the Kornilov affair. I
shall not follow, in their methods of political warfare,
either Alexeiev or the organ of Miliukov ; I repeat once more
that the letter of Alexeiev, which is so fatal for the partic-
ipators and organizers of the Kornilov move, should under
no circumstances be taken advantage of as an instrument
for combating whole parties and groups of the population.]

30

L$er. Only one question, Alexander Feodorovitch.
When the Government was about to establish martial law

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

at Petrograd, did it not consider that it might meet with
opposition, or at any rate with a sharply negative attitude
on the part of the Soviets, and if so, did it not intend to
take some measures of precaution?

Kerensky. I may say that if within the Government
the Bolsheviks were spoken about, there were no conversa-
tions whatever about the Soviets, which at that time were
far from being Bolshevik, or about the Central Executive
Committee.

Liber I must say definitely that according to Savin-
kov's evidence this consideration has played a great part.
He states positively that one might have expected opposition
precisely on the part of the Soviet, and if such a supposition
could be entertained, then the presence of a corps would
come useful in such an emergency as well. It is of im-
portance to us to establish whether the Government has
been discussing such a contingency or not

[In order to make clear the kind of opposition on the
part of the Soviets to which Savinkov had referred, I quote
the corresponding extract from the minutes composed by
Generals Kornilov, Lukomsky, and Romanovsky, " About
the stay of the Deputy Minister of War at Mohilev during
the 23rd and the 24th of August/' These minutes were
drafted subsequently to August 27th, and consequently un-
der conditions most favourable for setting out the words of
Savinkov as near as possible to the intentions of Headquar-
ters. According to these minutes, Savinkov said to Kor-
nilov: "You know, of course, that approximately on the
28th or 29th of August a Bolshevik move is expected at
Petrograd. The publication of your demands carried out
through the Provisional Government would of course serve
as an impulse for the Bolsheviks to make their move, if for
some reason or another they might otherwise have had to

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 235

postpone it. Though we have enough troops at our dis-
posal, we cannot altogether count upon them, all the more so
S we do do not know yet what will be the attitude of the
Soviet of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputies towards
the new law. The Soviet might also prove to be against
the Government, and in such case we could not count upon
our troops. If, besides the Bolsheviks, the members of the
Soviet of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies should also
come out, we would have to act against them as well."

Even from the above expose of Savinkov's wordp, it is
clear that he was only speaking of the Soviets conjecturally,
with regard to their attitude to the future law, which at that
time had not been discussed by the Provisional Govern-
ment. But seeing that within the Provisional Government
there were representatives of the Central Executive Com-
mittee of the Workmen's and Soldiers* Deputies, it is evi-
dent that even this hypothetical contingency was an impos-
sibility, since either the Military Bill would have been
adopted in a shape acceptable to the whole of the Coalition,
and consequently to the Soviets as well, or the Coalition
, Government would have ceased to exist before the adoption
of the Bill.

When Savinkov came to know about these minutes which
had been drawn up post factum and in his absence, he made
the following note on the text of the same : " I never used
such words as 'the demands of General Kornilov'; nor
did it ever occur to me that the Soviets of the Workmen's
and Soldiers' Deputies would be certain to act against the
Provisional Government should disorders arise, I per-
sisted in the argument that the 3rd Cavalry Corps I was
asking for from the Cbmmander-in-Chief, at the request of
the Premier, should be placed at the disposal of the Pro-
visional Government to defend the Government against any

236 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

hostilities, no matter from what quarter. If at the moment
of a Bolshevik rising the Soviets of the Workmen's and Sol-
diers' Deputies should happen to be Bolshevik, then the 3rd
Cavalry Corps would be used against those Soviets as
well."]

Kcrensky. You will perceive by the composition of the
Government that there could not have been any conversa-
tion about the Central Executive Committee of the Soldiers'
and Workmen's Deputies, nor about the Soviet as such.
Nor had it ever been intended to establish martial law in
such forms as might be odious to public opinion at large.
Lastly, if any conversations concerning the Bolsheviks did
occur (as you know, there were rumours in circulation as to
the possibility of a repetition of the events of the 3rd~5th
of July), it was assumed that the Bolsheviks would stand
on one side, while the whole country would stand on the
other side (against them).

Kolokolov. Allow me to put a question. You have
stated, sir, that there is no evidence of a nature to establish
with complete exactitude the existence of a conspiracy; still,
have you any grounds, the verification of which might be
necessary for the Commission of Inquiry?

Kerensky. I can only tell you to ask M. T. Terest-
chenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whether he recol-
lects a Conversation he repeated to me, in which Zavoiko had
been speaking of the means " they >1 had at their disposal for
overthrowing the Government

[During my wanderings after the 25th of October, I met
a person who told me that he had certain knowledge of
similar conversations held by Zavoiko at the beginning of
last year.]

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 237

I must say, however, that at present it is very difficult
generally to give information. From the very moment of
the Revolution, people have quite ceased to distinguish in
our persons the Government from private individuals : any
information we possess in our capacity as members of the
Government very rapidly becomes the property of the man
in the street, and is turned into a means of settling personal
accounts, or into demands for proofs on the part of the
persons interested, and so on. With regard to a conspir-
acy's being organized by a group of military men, of officers,
we had very exact information, and we were watching its
participators as far as we could do so. The Kornilov events
have shown that we did know something. A portion of
the Council of the Union of the Cossack Armies possessed,
moreover, a great deal of " information " as well. I have
no doubt whatever about that, too; but there again the
thing cannot yet be proved formally, and so on. For many
considerations, however, it is not desirable to carry on an
investigation in that direction (among the military) at pres-
ent ; and this for the simple reason that its results would be
a poor compensation for its inevitable consequences, to judge
by the present temper of the masses. We do not wish, and I
am personally averse from it, to provide new occasions for
strife between various groups of the population, since a
group, as such, is not responsible for the acts of individual
persons.

Kolokolov. What were your grounds for arresting
Lvov?

Kerensky. It was quite clear to me from the whole con-
versation that he knew much more than he was saying. I
took it that he was warning me at the last moment of the
danger to my person, either because he had simply got
frightened or, perhaps, because his conscience had spoken.

238 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

After all, he had experienced nothing but good treatment
from me. But the mood in which he retired from the Pro-
visional Government pointed to the possibility of his having
gone against me from the outset. Then again, how about
Aladin? I am not sure whether you are aware of Aladm's
visit to Prince G, E. Lvov at Moscow. Just before V. N,
Lvov called on me, Virubov informed me, on behalf of
Prince G. E. Lvov, that Aladin had called on the Prince,
to whom he said quite seriously: "Let Kerensky bear in
mind that henceforward there must be no changes within
the Government without the consent of Headquarters.'*
This had made an impression on the Prince. Now, with
regard to agrarian reform. I was aware that they were
engaged in preparing an agrarian manifesto or law; I for-
get the name of that Professor from Moscow.

Chairman. Y v.

Kerensky. All this goes to confirm that preparations
were going on.

Ukraintsev. Coming to your statement that on the ques-
tion of the conspiracy you had a " whole reel "of informa-
tion from two sources, one of which was trustworthy, while
the other was not reliable, could you not let us have it?
This would enable us to find out the conspiracy.

Kerensky. No. I may repeat that one set of informa-
tion came from the agents and the other from the counter-
espionage. There was also a third source, and subse-
quently a fourth one. I handed over that officer to the In-
telligence Department. What was his name, though? Oh,

yes, V in. He had also come to warn me that I was

threatened by an imminent

Ukraintsev. Was it not the same officer who used to
move in Cossack circles and who denounced Zavoiko ?

Kerensky. Yes. About Zavoiko unfavourable news

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 239

reached us long before. He is altogether a man with a
rather queer past. His stay and the part he played at
Headquarters were strange and unintelligible. Still, that
was the man who exercised the greatest inftueiice upon Gen-
eral Kornilov. At the South-western front, Savinkov had
once succeeded in removing him from there, as Zavoiko's
influence was already injurious at the time. But he after-
wards returned, and was, moreover, joined by Aladin.

[On his relations to Zavoiko, General Kornilov's evidence
was to the following effect :

" I made the acquaintance of V. S. Zavoiko in April last
at Petrograd. According to the information in my pos-
session, he was a few years ago the Marshal of Nobility of
the Haysin district, in the Government of Podolia. He had
been working at the naphtha mines round Baku, and, as he
told me, was engaged in exploring the mineral resources of
Turkestan and Western Siberia* In the month of May he
arrived at Tchernovitsy and, after having joined as a volun-
teer the Daguestan cavalry regiment, he remained at the
Staff of the army in the capacity of my personal orderly.
He wields the pen with perfection. I therefore entrusted
him with the drafting of those orders and documents that
required a particularly vigorous and artistic style."

I have had to refer more than once to the proclamation
"To the Russian People," which is a splendid specimen, not
only of the artistic style, but also of the cunning hands of
Zavoiko. It may be seen from all the circumstances of the
case that the position of Zavoiko, in the circles near to
Kornilov, had nothing to do with his modest function of
orderly. His past as a financier evidently stood Zavoiko in
good stead in the way of promoting the flow of those means
to Headquarters about which information could be imparted
by V. and P., who are mentioned in General Alexeiev's let-

240 THE PEELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ter, as well as by the editors of several newspapers asd
leaflets which were baiting me so strenuously throughout the
summer and glorifying General Kornilov. Zavoiko is one
of the shadiest and most repulsive figures among the con-
spirators, and it is difficult to understand wherein lay the
secret of his influence upon Kornilov.]

3*

Ukraintsev. You stated, among other things, that an
offer of a dictatorship was made to you, and that you after-
wards met the same persons among those by whom Kor-
nilov was surrounded. Who were those persons ?

Kerensky. Conversations of that kind emanated from
the same Cossack circles. Then, some public men

Ukraintsev. This means that you are able to point out
the circles, but no single person ?

Kerensky. I should not care to point them out.

KrokhmaL But this did not bear the shape of a formal
offer; it was, so to say, in the nature of advice?

Kerensky. They would introduce it in this way: "If
you were to agree, we should . . /' and so on. But it al-
ways fell on fruitless soil. Let us leave them alone!

Ukraintsev. In that case, it may be that the very
offers did not bear the character of a concrete proposi-
tion?

Kerensky. No; when this " public opinion " became dis-
appointed with me as a possible organizer and chief worker
for a change in the system of Government in the direction
of a " strong authority/' they then started to look out for
another " man/' I consider that the longing for finding a
man was very strong. Even on August 26th, V. Lvov
thus expressed himself when conversing with somebody:

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM S41

" He would not agree to be a dictator, so we shall give him
one! "

Liber. Has it been reported to you that on the question
you are referring to, and which was then being discussed,
Kerensky, Savinkov, and Kornilov were named as candi-
dates?

Kerensky. Yes. Generally speaking, they were feeling
the ground. After my refusal, some of them thought that
the best I could do was " to get away," " not to interfere/'
and " not to shuffle the cards." Though they themselves
were predicting that my retirement would be followed by
a period of Bolshevik violence, they were nevertheless of
opinion that this would afford them an opportunity of tri-
umphing in the end. Kornilov was simply the unsuccess-
ful executor of other people's plans, for in order to create
a real dictatorship in Russia, one had to possess not only the
" heart of a lion," but also some intellectual qualities which
are neither given to all nor frequently to be met with.

[General Kornilov's personal qualities rendered his whole
attempt to establish in Russia a personal dictatorship too
naive and thoughtless for it to be able to count upon even a
momentary success. But even any other adventure, con-
ceived more seriously and carried out more intelligently,
would inevitably have come to the same end, after a more or
less prolonged period of struggle; or it would itself have
finally broken up the State and opened the gates to the Ger-
mans, as was actually done two months after Kornilov
by the anarchist Bolsheviks, who were politically more ex-
perienced and clever. The tragedy of the position of Rus-
sia at the end of the summer of 1917 lay precisely in its
not having yet attained such political maturity as would
have afforded to its leading political circles the possibility
of realizing to the very end and of carrying through the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

only system of organizing the State authority which alone
could still have stopped the threatening process of the col-
lapse of the State, which had commenced together with the
world-war, viz. the system of coalitions between all the
political parties that were holding to the idea of a State, in
order to create a common national Government. The con-
dition of the economic organism and of the technical appar-
atus of the State had made it impossible to govern the
country during war by the strength of any minority what-
soever, which is always and inevitably reduced to applying
political terror as the sole means of keeping the majority
in subjection. The stern reality which showed impera-
tively to all the conscious and responsible elements of the
country the only way for saving the State, by subordinating
all the interests and claims of the different classes and strata
of the population to the needs of the State, united all those
elements willy-nilly round the Provisional Government.
Any minority that made up its mind to combat the Govern-
ment would necessarily be found in the end to be in alliance
either with the home-grown reaction or with its variety
from across the frontier. We have seen what equivocal
elements, in both the political and the social sense, were
surrounding Kornilov. More recently we have seen some-
thing still worse : we have seen how the only " Communists "
in the world have saved Prussian Junkerdom, to whom they
have enslaved, both politically and economically, the Rus-
sian toiling masses !

Unfortunately, the leading political circles, which could
not help recognizing that the coalition was indispensable, did
not support it actively and fairly. They were only rather
afraid to take upon themselves the political responsibility
for the formal collapse of that system, while in their own
mind they were waiting for a * saviour/' whom some ex-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 248

pected from the Right and others from the Left. In their
" joyless love " of the Coalition they were dreaming of a
" painless parting/' * They were waiting all the time for
the moment when I should u leave " at last, while they them-
selves would not let me go, as they were afraid of the re-
sponsibility. But while retaining me, they wanted somebody
to come and overthrow me, in the hope of taking advantage
of somebody else's crime for their own political interests.
From October 24th to November ist I observed that trem-
bling expectation among my " friends "of the Left, just
as I had noticed the same trembling expectancy in the Kbr-
nilov days among some of the " adherents of the Coalition "
on the Right Those who accuse me of not having
" left " in time, and of having somehow stood in
somebody's way, ought to remember once for all that
I never sought power, nor did I hold on to it. I
only interfered with usurpers and adventurers. Politically
responsible circles, far from meeting with an impediment
on my part, had they wished to form a Government without
me, received repeated proposals from me to do so. Even a
month before the Bolshevik rising, at a secret session of the
Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets
of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, jointly with the
Presidium of the Democratic Conference and the representa-
tives of all the Socialist parties, including the Bolsheviks, I
raised the question as to the attitude of those present to-
wards the Government, and declared that on my part I would
do everything that was possible for the painless and rapid
transition of the State to a new system of Government, if
those attending the meeting would take upon themselves the
responsibility for dissolving the coalition with the propertied

1 " Their love was joyless; their parting will be painless." (From
Russian poetry.)

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

classes and point out a person willing to accept the task of
forming a newly composed Provisional Government, as I
personally could not carry out the task conscientiously. But
the meeting did not prove sufficiently resolute and bold to
undertake the responsibility for all the consequences of cre-
ating a " homogeneous Government." At the last Confer-
ence of the Social Revolutionary Party, one member of its
Central Committee put the matter thus :

" When one considers the helpless condition in which the
democracy found itself (after the Democratic Conference),
it will be perceived that it had not the strength for organiz-
ing the Government in any other way then by handing it
over to Kerensky. The conclusion to be drawn from it
comes to this : a sacrifice had to be made to the belief of the
masses that it was possible to do everything, whereas really
it is impossible to do everything. Still, that sacrifice was
needed. We accordingly sacrificed Kerensky, who put up
with being the victim, well knowing what was in store for
him."

This was not, however, a sacrifice, but the conscious exe-
cution of one's duty to the very end. I saw that nobody
was willing honestly to support that form of Government by
which alone it would be possible to preserve the State from
falling to pieces. But I could not, to save my own skin,
meet the elemental force half-way and bring the explosion
nearer, even by a single day, through my retirement. More-
over, in my heart there was still a glimmer of hope that the
democracy would prove able to overcome all that is dark and
brutish in itself!]

33

Ukraintsev. In describing the conversation with V.
Lvov, you mentioned that he made a proposal in the form

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 2*5

of an ultimatum; but have you not noticed that in his writ-
ten report he had replaced the phrase " General Kornilov
demands " by " General Kornilov proposes"?

Kerensky. If I had noticed it, I should have said to
him : " Write it down just as you said it.' 5 But I merely
folded the paper and put it in my pocket.

[Strictly speaking, there is no difference whatever be-
tween *' Kornilov demands '' or " proposes " this or that.
A proposal may be in the nature of an ultimatum, as a pro-
posal is frequently merely a more delicate form of a demand
or an order. I myself used often to write : " I propose to
So-and-So to do this. 13 ]

Ukraintsev. You only paid attention to the points?

Kerensky. Yes, just to the points, and then I put it in
my pocket. The very circumstances of the conversation
were so convincing to me. Indeed, I never dreamt at the
time that public opinion would ever see fit to make me out
a sort of accomplice of the Kornilov conspiracy or of a
rather unintelligible and equivocal personage. Had I been
able to foresee anything of the kind, I should perhaps have
arranged everything quite differently on that particular eve-
ning. But, at any rate, I consider that I did all that was
essential by nipping the attempt in the bud with extraordi-
nary rapidity.

Ukraintsev. Were you in possession of aijy information
to the effect that General Kornilov had precisely charged the
3rd Corps with an attack against the Provisional Govern-
ment, or was such an attack only discerned in the move-
ment upon Petrograd?

Kerensky. No, I discerned it in the position that was
occupied by Krimov, and also in the fact that, contrary
to the decision arrived at, the " Savage Division " was on its
way to Petrograd. All their calculations were generally

246 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

based on the " Savage Division/' It seems to me that Lvov
has simply exploded the whole thing. He perhaps let the
cat out of the bag a day or two too early [or blabbed out
more and in a different tone than he ought to have done] .
Had Krimov's detachment managed to get here, it would
not have proved so easy to dispose of it, seeing that in such
a case there would have come into play those forces that
were waiting here for events to develop, that is to say, those
messengers who had gathered here, and those groups which
had been organized for the purpose of rendering aid at the
right moment from the rear.

Ukraintsev. Did you have the impression from Savin-
kov's report on army reforms that greater importance was
attributed to them from a general political point of view
than from the purely military one?

Kerensky. On August loth, I accepted Savinkov's
resignation because I considered his report to be an unwar-
ranted act on the part of a man whom I had myself put into
a responsible post I was set before an accomplished fact.

It is altogether evident that Savinkov wanted at all costs
to unite me and Kornilov in spite of ourselves. It seems to
me that Savinkov and Filonenko had been taken advantage
of in the whole affair. Savinkov never aspired at doing
away with the Provisional Government or with myself. He
never had such a plan. But he imagined himself to be the
cleverest of all, whereas in reality there were people found
who outwitted him. He was only an instrument that was
made to do its share in the work that was carried on round
Kornilov.

[In his deposition Savinkov confirmed my conjectures,
when he said : " Though I witnessed all these increasingly
strained relations, I did not give up the hope that, by work-
ing together, A. R Kerensky and General Kornilov would

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 247

manage to realize a firm revolutionary Government, and I
endeavoured with all my strength to bring about a rapproche-
ment between A. F. Kerensky and General Kornilov."]

Ukraintsev. One more question concerning the conver-
sation that took place on returning from Headquarters after
the Conference of July i6th. Did not Filonenko propose
the formation of a special War Cabinet within the Pro-
visional Government?

Kerensky. Not to my recollection. I had no conversa-
tions whatever with him. I remember the conversation
held here on August 29th. As I said before, Filonenko was
indeed endeavouring, with the help of Savinkov, to trans-
form the conversation held at Headquarters about a dic-
tatorship into one which might be represented as dealing
with a subject which had also been talked about within the
Provisional Government, viz. a War Cabinet. But the
one was as distant from the other as heaven from earth, and
they had nothing in common between them. One must be,
or pretend to be, an idiot to suggest seriously that either the
Provisional Government or myself could ever think of
Filonenko as a possible member of the Provisional Govern-
ment. It is not only an absurd, but a ridiculous supposi-
tion ! It was merely an awkward expedient for getting out
of a foolish position. I repeat once more that Filonenko
did have a conversation with Kornilov, but that it had noth-
ing to do with a " War Cabinet."

Chairman. Allow me to thank you, sir, for your
evidence.

[Whoever reads my evidence to the end will understand
what a will and what a degree of faith in the final triumph
of truth one had to possess in order silently to bear all the
furious baiting that was going on. To look on in silence

248 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

while the poison of doubt was penetrating ever deeper into
the very masses of the people, severing one by one my close
relations with them; to see how even the most conscious
circles of democracy were unable to grasp the reasons for
the Government's silence, which they mistook for a con-
firmation of " revelations " that had produced the impres-
sion of convincing "internal evidence/' (I quote from
resolutions of the Bureau of the Central Executive Com-
mittee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Depu-
ties of September I2th.)

Who has raised his voice in the defence of the men who
were being hunted down with impunity, merely because, in
the fulfilment of their duty to the State and to the public,
they kept silent, bound as they were by the secrecy of the
Inquiry, which was shamelessly broken by the others? It
is only now that I have obtained the possibility to put in my
word.

Too late, as it seems. The work has been done.

The words I tittered at the Moscow Conference have
turned out to be true : " If the people should prove short of
sense and conscience, then the Russian State will perish,
flooded by a wave of collapse, disintegration, and treachery."

And the people newly born to freedom, so great in the past,
but now deceived and degraded, is dancing and grimacing
in a repulsive fool's cap before its cruel master of Berlin.

But do not lose heart ! Do not curse the popular masses ;
do not desert them. Go to the people with words of stern
truth; rouse its slumbering conscience, and, sooner than you
think, its manliness will revive and rekindle the sacrificial
flame of its love of Motherland and Freedom !

KERENSKY AND KORNILOV
A REPLY

I MUST commence my observations on Mr. Wilcox's
articles " Kerensky and Kornilov " in the September and
October issues of the Fortnightly Review with a short intro-
duction which is called for by some of his concluding words.
On page 517 he says: ** True, the chain of evidence is not
yet complete. One of the chief witnesses has yet to be heard
Kerensky. So far he has withheld from publication his
version of the affair, but by doing so he has left uncontra-
dicted statements by his own colleagues and agents gravely
impugning his constancy, stability, and consistency not
to say more ! Perhaps he will now speak out and fill up the
only serious gap that still remains in the story of the Kor-
nilov affair." This only serious gap has long since been
filled; my version of the Kornilov affair was published in
Russia in June of this yean Immediately upon my arrival
in England I took steps to prepare an English translation of
my book on the Kornilov affair, and if this English version
has not yet seen the light it is only because serious obstacles
have crossed its path which could hardly have been expected
in free England, However, this English version is due to
appear in the near future, and this circumstance allows me
to make my remarks about Mr. Wilcox's articles quite short
and without detailed arguments.

I do not think there is any need for me to explain why I
was silent as long as I was in power, and before the Bol-

240

250 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

sheviks* coup de main destroyed the possibility of General
Kornilov being brought to trial. The Commander-in-Chief
of the Russian Armies commits a grave crime of State at the
climax of the war; he endeavours to compel the Government
by force of arms to " carry out his program," i.e., he openly
attempts an armed rising against the governmental authori-
ties of his country. After the failure of this attempt, the
Provisional Government appointed a Special Commission of
Inquiry to examine the circumstances of the affair and to
bring to trial the General who had overstepped his duty, as
well as his accomplices. Was it possible for me, the Prime
Minister of the Provisional Government and the principal
witness in the affair, to infringe the secrecy of the prelimi-
nary legal investigation and to announce before the trial my
own opinion and my evidence about the affair? Of course
not; silence before the trial is the elementary duty of all
witnesses, and it was thus that every witness in the Kornilov
affair behaved who was not interested in hiding the truth of
the matter. But besides this last section of witnesses there
were the accused and those who had participated too closely
with them, and finally the accomplices of General Kornilov
who remained at liberty outside the scope of the inquiry.
Some of this group of people who were implicated in the
Kornilov affair organized a Press campaign, systematically
working upon public opinion for their own purpose. With
this aim they at various times published parts of the ma-
terials from the inquiry, which were favourable to them,
largely declarations of the accused and of witnesses who had
grounds for fearing that they, too, would be accused ; occa-
sionally they even resorted to falsification. As far as I
remember rightly, the President of the Extraordinary Com-
mission of Inquiry into the Kornilov affair had twice to
warn public opinion about the necessity of refraining from

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 251

all judgment and declarations about the affair until the trial
However, the more than biased campaign in the Press con-
tinued. But the Government did not resort to reprisals upon
those organs of the Press which so rudely abused the young
freedom of speech in Russia. The Government considered
that a public and independent trial would be the best answer
to this campaign of calumny; and that this trial, better than
any repressions, would teach the need to use properly the
liberty of the Press. But the anarchy which has temporarily
enveloped Russia destroyed the possibility of a legal trial in
the Kornilov affair. Hence the biased and lying informa-
tion which had been published in the Press became for the
time being the sole source of information about the Kornilov
affair both in Russia and in all the rest of Europe.

I make these introductory remarks in order to show
whence these fictions arise which are being circulated in
all directions as the truth about the circumstances of Kor-
nilov's rebellion and in order to emphasize that, while I shall
set out the principal inaccuracies of Mr. Wilcox, I do not
wish to cast any doubts whatsoever upon the mistaken good
faith of their author.

It is to be confessed, however, that under the influence of
the biased materials at his disposal, Mr. Wilcox has been
drawn so strongly to the side of his hero Kornilov that
he has sometimes been ready even to some extent to " cor-
rect " the facts if these did not fit in his scheme of events
which is so well disposed towards General Kornilov ; but of
this I shall speak later.

Mr. Wilcox commences his article with the words : " Ker-
ensky's open conflict with Kornilov" (thus he strangely
terms General Kornilov's rising against the Provisional Gov-
ernment) " was the final turning point of the Russian Revo-
lution." With this I am wholly in agreement. I agree also

252 THE PKJELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

that " From that moment the triumph of Bolshevism and the
dissolution of Russia into primeval chaos became inevitable.
The Brest treaties, with all they have meant for the Allies,
followed as a matter of course, and, for that reason, prob-
ably no other single event has had so decisive an influence
on the course of the war as the Kerensky-Kornilov im-
broglio/' Mr. Wilcox continues : " It is, therefore, of con-
siderable importance that we should understand the true
meaning of this incident, and be able justly to apportion the
responsibility for the disastrous consequences that issued
from it"

Mr. Wilcox's whole article, indeed, is an attempt to find
this true meaning of the events in order to be able justly to
apportion the responsibility, and certainly the true meaning
of the events in Mr.- Wilcox's version inevitably leads to the
complete vindication of General Kornilov, and the whole re-
sponsibility for the disastrous consequences justly falls upon
his opponents, and chiefly upon me. It cannot be otherwise ;
by the use of data collected with a previously determined
purpose by people who are interested in hiding the truth, one
cannot find the truth.

But I am not writing now in order to establish the truth ;
my task is much more modest, I wish only to show by a
few examples the complete inaccuracy of the information
upon which Mr. Wilcox founds his " true meaning of this
incident." If I succeed in showing this, there will be ex-
posed the complete contradiction between the events as set
out by Mr. Wilcox and what actually took place; and if
this contradiction is established, any conclusions whatever
about the just apportioning of responsibility on the basis
of Mr. Wilcox's historical study will be clearly quite impos-
sible. Thus, in commenting on Mr. Wilcox's article, I am
setting myself a quite negative task.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 253

Turning to the facts, I must say that it is quite impossible
not only to deal with, but even to note all the divergencies
from facts of which the articles are full. For this it would
be necessary for me to write whole series of articles. I
shall, therefore, mention only the chief ones.

The first article in the September issue is of an intro-
ductory character. Indeed, it sets out facts which have
very little connection with the history of Kornilov's con-
spiracy. In it Mr. Wilcox writes of the circumstances of
Savinkov's acquaintance with General Kornilov, of their
activities on the South- Western front, of the reformative
work of Savinkov and Kornilov, and of the fate of their
memoranda. All these facts precede the rising only in point
of time, but they have no internal connection with it what-
ever. The reformist activities of Kornilov and Savinkov
and the conspirative work of Kornilov and Zavoiko, Krimov,
and the others, are two quite separate processes, only paral-
lel in time. To prove this, it is enough to say that not only
was Savinkov not an accomplice in the conspiracy, but, as
will be seen later, the conspirators actually deceived him at
the critical moment. However, the history of Savinkov's
acquaintance with Filonenko and Kornilov on the South-
western front, their mutual relations, the appointment of
Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief , his journey to Petrograd
with his memorandum to the Provisional Government, in
short, all what happened before the Moscow conference, has
a great psychological significance. In his exposition Mr.
Wilcox continually assures his reader that everything good
that was done in the Russian Army in the summer of last
year, and all the initiative for reforms, all the attempts to
improve the fighting capacity of the Russian troops and to
save the front from disaster were entirely the work of Sav-
inkov and Filonenko; and chiefly of Kornilov and his

254 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

party. On the other hand, all the events which serve as a
kind of prologue to the tragic history of September 8th-i2th
are made to create the conviction in the mind of the reader
that Kerensky and his friends were the whole time applying
the brake to the reformers* great undertakings, and that
Kerensky was wavering the whole time, so to speak, be-
tween good and evil, and only after the Moscow conference
did he wish to enter on the path of good, i.e., to come over
to the side of Kornilov' s party alas ! only in order once
more and for the last time to betray this party by his
weakness, at best and consequently the task of saving the
country also.

Unfortunately lack of space prevents me from analysing
the opening portion of Mr. Wilcox's work, and from show-
ing fact by fact that his exposition does not correspond with
reality. All his first article is artificial^ connected by Mr.
Wilcox with the events of September 8th-i2th by the fol-
lowing phrase :

"When Kerensky returned to Petrograd on August 3oth from
the Moscow Congress he had perceptibly inclined to the side of the
Kornilov party, for he asked Savinkov to continue in office as
Acting Minister of War and withdrew his demand for the resigna-
tion of the Headquarters Commissary, Filonenko. He also ac-
knowledged that in principle he was in agreement with Kornilov*s
recommendations, and instructed Savinkov to have the Bills em-
bodying them finally revised and prepared for submission to the
Cabinet/ 5

I will commence my examination of Mr. Wilcox's articles
with this. It is true that after the Moscow Conference I
altered my instructions about Savinkov's resignation and in-
structed him to complete his preparations for changes at the
Ministry of War, but this was not at all because I had " per-
ceptibly inclined " to the side of the Kornilov party, but from

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 255

quite different motives. On August 3ist, i.e., immediately
after the Moscow Conference, Savinkov made the follow-
ing announcement in the Press : " I may inform you that I
am remaining at the head of affairs in the War Office, . . .
and by Kerensky's instructions I can again work in com-
plete agreement with him to bring to life that program
which he indicated in some passages of his speech at the
Moscow Conference, and with which I and the Commander-
in-Chief , General Kornilov, are wholly in agreement. . . .
It would be a mistake to think that I had proposed to im-
pede the functions of the Army organizations, and the news
to that effect which appeared in the Press is absolutely in-
correct. . . . Neither I nor General Kornilov ever pro-
posed anything of the sort. Like A. F. Kerensky, we stood
for the preservation and strengthening of the Army organ-
izations." It is clear from this statement that Savinkov
was remaining at his post after the Moscow Conference
only because he had promised beforehand to work in full
agreement with me. And thus after the Moscow Confer-
ence not only did I not incline to the side of the Kornilov
party, but Savinkov's and Kornilov's paths also completely
separated. Savinkov returned to his work at the Ministry,
where he fully completed his preparations for the projects
of Army reforms which had been initiated in the War Office
on my instructions long before Savinkov took charge there
or Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief. Savinkov,
on the one hand, went to Headquarters on September 3rd
with these projects to the conference which had been ar-
ranged there of the representatives of the War Office with
the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, the Commissaries at
the Front, and the representatives of the elective Army or-
ganizations. The Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand,
and his party, i.tf v the group of conspirators, to which Savin-

256 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

kov had never belonged, were steadily engaged in preparing
their rebellion. And as it happened those further decisive
steps which, according to Mr. Wilcox, were taken by me two
days after my return from the Moscow Conference in the
same direction, i.e., in the direction of the Kornilov party,
were in fact in part directly aimed at liquidating the anti-
Governmental movement which had grown up, and were
partly called for by the necessity of guarding the Capital
and die Provisional Government from all surprises from the
Right and from the Left

I need not tell here how already at the beginning of the
year there had sprung up in certain circles of Russian society
a notion of strong authority, and how a whole tendency in
favour of a military dictatorship had gradually been or-
ganized and had spread, and how on this basis there were
gradually founded conspirative organizations which set
themselves the aim of establishing by force this regime in
Russia. I will only mention that at the time of the Moscow
Conference this conspirative movement had grown so ripe
that its organizers thought even of declaring a dictatorship
at the very moment of the Moscow Conference. Thanks to
the temper of the great majority of the Congress it was
found necessary to put this plan aside, and these people had
to concentrate all their energy for the preparation of a real
coup d'etat prepared according to all the rules of conspiracy.
The chief centre of this conspiracy was Headquarters. This
is why I instructed Savinkov when he left for the conference
about Army reforms to " liquidate," as Mr. Wilcox puts it,
the political department of the Commander-in-Chief s Staff
(page 502) and the Chief Committee of the Officers'
League ; the intention was not entirely to liquidate the last,
but only to remove it from Mohilev to another town. Mr.
Wilcox has set out Savinkov's first two instructions cor-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 257

rectly; but he has given them a meaning which does not
correspond with the facts.

But the other two instructions which Mr. Wilcox gives as
if they were from me he expresses quite inaccurately:

** Savinkov states that he was charged by the Minister Presi-
dent: . . . (3) to obtain Kornilov's consent to the formation of
a distinct military district out of Petrograd and its immediate
environs, so that a state of war might be declared in that area
separately."

In actual fact, after the taking of Riga, Kornilov himself
insisted to the Provisional Government upon the declara-
tion of martial law in Petrograd and upon the handing over
of all the troops of the Petrograd military district, including
the Petrograd garrison, to the exclusive orders of Head-
quarters. The Government realized the necessity of hand-
ing over to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief the troops
of the Petrograd military district, in view of the proximity
of the rear of the Army to the Capital after the taking of
Riga, but it could not agree to the demand to hand over to
the orders of the Commander-in-Chief the troops of Petro-
grad and its nearest environs, because the Provisional Gov-
ernment, like every Government, could not remain in its
residence, especially in such a disturbed time of war and
revolution, without any force to defend it which would be
entirely and exclusively at its command. The Head of the
War Office, together with the Head of my Military Cabinet,
was only meant to work out at Headquarters the technical
conditions for the temporary exclusion of Petrograd and its
surroundings from the composition of the Petrograd mili-
tary district, and

" (4) To request the dispatch to the capital of a cavalry corps to
help the Government to enforce its new policy there, and in par-

258 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ticular to suppress a Bolshevik rising, which, according to the re-
ports of the counter-espionage, was to take place almost immedi-
ately in conjunction with a German landing and an insurrection in
Finland."

Nothing of the sort The real motive for the summoning
of the cavalry corps was published in the Press by Savinkov :
" I asked the Commander-in-Chief for a cavalry corps at the
demand of the Prime Minister in order to establish martial
law in reality in Petrograd. This was called for by the
strategic necessity of subordinating the Petrograd military
district to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in view of
the last happenings at the front. The plan of declaring
martial law in Petrograd was approved by the Provisional
Government." It is obvious that this cavalry corps, as it
was to be at the disposal of the Provisional Government,
was meant to defend it from all the attempts to overthrow
it, from whichever side they might come, as, for example,
the combined force had protected the Provisional Govern-
ment at the beginning of July from the attempts of the
Bolsheviks.

Thus, of the four " decisive steps " towards the Kornilov
party, two were directed directly against his party, and the
two others were called for, as I have already said, by the
necessity to protect the Provisional Government from all
attacks both from the Left and from the Right. Mn
Wilcox would not pervert the meaning of my instructions
to Savinkov thus if he had not been dealing with the mate-
rials collected by the Kornilovists, or if, at least, he had been
able to deal with it critically. But yet, on page 503, our
author has a passage which might lead one to doubt his im-
partiality and the genuineness of his desire to discover the
true meaning of the events. Quoting the conversation in

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 259

regard to my four instructions which took place between
Kornilov and Savinkov in the presence of Generals Lukom-
sky, Baranovsky, and Romanovsky, Mr. Wilcox, entirely on
his own account, makes the following addition :

"Of the plan thus outlined only one feature was the result of
Savinkov's independent initiative: that was the request that the
cavalry corps should not be under Krimov. Also, on his own re-
sponsibility, Savinkov urged that the ' wild * or ' savage ' division,
which was composed of semi-civilized tribesmen, should not be in-
cluded in the forces sent to Petrograd."

Yet, without doubt, Mr. Wilcox had at his disposal the text
of Kornilov's private interview with Savinkov, passages
from which are mentioned by the author on pages 502-503,
from which it is plain that Savinkov was speaking about
General Krimov and the savage division not on his own
" independent initiative " and " on his own responsibility,"
but exclusively by my instructions. Even if Mr. Wilcox
had not had before his eyes the text of Kornilov's conversa-
tion with Savinkov, even so he need not have spoken of the
" independent initiative " of Savinkov, since he . will not find
any evidence of such initiative anywhere in the published
materials about the Kornilov affair. This passage is the
result of his own " independent creation/'

But why did Mr. Wilcox do this? What serious signifi-
cance has this suggestion in the explanation of the "true
meaning " of the events? I can answer plainly that it is of
vast importance, because this invention is an attempt to con-
ceal one of the principal proofs against General Kornilov.
We must note the phrase that follows this interesting
passage :

" He states that Kornilov promised to fulfil both these requests,
which, however, he failed to do."

260 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Trifles, indeed, to which it is not worth while to pay at-
tention ! Probably the reader of Mr. Wilcox's articles has
simply passed over this phrase "promised to fulfil" but
" failed to do " so. Nevertheless, this promise and non-ful-
filment have a huge significance in the whole history of the
dispatch of the cavalry corps to Petrograd, which in its turn
is one of the principal episodes of the affair, without proper
explanation of which it is quite impossible to understand
the significance of the events of September 8th-i2th.

My " agreement " with Kornilov is mainly shown by this
call for troops, as if for the purpose of using them in joint
activity with Kornilov at Petrograd. Again, my "be-
trayal " of Kornilov and his party is mainly shown by my
sudden stopping of the movement of the cavalry corps which
had been summoned to Petrograd by the Government itself
in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief .

It is true that the Government, desiring to protect itself
from all surprises, wished to have at its complete disposal a
fresh and well-disciplined military force. Having reason
to mistrust General Krimov and those in command of the
savage division, and, moreover, considering this division to
be insufficiently disciplined for service in a city, I asked
Savinkov to tell General Kornilov from me that in the force
sent for the disposal of the Provisional Government the
savage division should not be included, and that General
Krimov should not be appointed to the command of the
force. Knowing that these two restrictions were absolutely
necessary conditions for the dispatch of troops to Petrograd,
Savinkov twice spoke about it to General Kornilov. Re-
ceiving his promise strictly to fulfil both these instructions
of mine, Savinkov, " fully satisfied/' as Mr. Wilcox himself
says, returned to Petrograd and at once on the 7th of
September he informed me of the matter and also of General

THE PRELUDE JTO BOLSHEVISM 261

Kornilov's loyal attitude towards him. General Kornilov
not only promised not to send Krimov to Petrograd, but at
the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief General Krimov
was appointed by the Provisional Government as Com-
mander of the nth Army on the South- Western front. But
at the same time, however, that Kornilov was promising
Savinkov not to send Krimov to Petrograd, General Krimov
at Headquarters was working out a plan for the occupation
of Petrograd and for introducing there a state of siege.
Moreover, he was appointed Commander of the Petrograd
Army without the Provisional Government's being in-
formed, and he left for Petrograd with the cavalry corps,
at the head of which marched the savage division.

Krimov left for Petrograd not to put himself at the dis-
posal of the Government, but having with him special
instructions from General Kornilov. On September 7th-
9th, there approached Petrograd not troops which had been
summoned by the Government, but in the guise of these the
troops of General Kornilov's force whose aim was hostile to
the Government. When these troops were near enough to
Petrograd on the evening of September Qth, V. Lvov came
to me with General Kornilov's ultimatum. Now, I think,
the reader will understand why Mr. Wilcox or his inspirers
had to invent the tale of Savinkov's "independent initi-
ative." The whole story of General Kornilov's rising is
dark and difficult to understand unless the circumstances of
the dispatch of the cavalry corps to Petrograd are explained.
It must be said that General Kornilov himself did not con-
ceal his intentions to use force of arms against the Pro-
visional Government Thus, Mr. Wilcox himself says, on
page 514:

" In the Army Orders which he posted in Mohilev on September
loth and nth> but which he was prevented by the Government pro-

262 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

hibition from circulating further, and in the statement prepared by
him for the Judicial Commission, Kornilov gives a very full exposi-
tion of his motives for refusing to surrender the Chief Command
and attempting to compel the Government by force of arms to
carry out his program/'

On page 515 we find:

" Feeling that * further hesitation would be fatal/ Kornilov, hav-
ing assured himself of the support of most of the other command-
ing generals, decided to use the 3rd Cavalry Corps to compel the
Government ..."

But the conspirators and, like them, Mr. Wilcox are only un-
successful in their attempts to represent all this story in such
a way as to suggest that the decision to "use" the 3rd
Cavalry Corps came into the head of General Kornilov
"suddenly/' when he was convinced that Kerensky was
endeavouring to break his arrangement with him and that
the Government had again fallen under the influence of
the " Bolshevist majority in the Soviets."

According to the conspirators' version this sudden deci-
sion came to General Kornilov only on September loth
after he had received at Headquarters the text of my proc-
lamation to the population of September gth, where I
seemed to declare General Kornilov a " traitor/' General
Kornilov himself gives the same explanation in one of his
own depositions. But this explanation cannot withstand
criticism. On September 6th Krimov at Headquarters was
already working out his plan of approach upon Petrograd.
On September 7th Kornilov's troops in the guise of the
Government troops were already moving on Petrograd.
On September 8th~9th there took place and were concluded
General Kornilov's arrangements with the Generals at the
front, by whom he was convinced " of the support of the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 263

other commanding Generals. 5 ' On September gth General
Kornilov sent a proposal to the Commanders of the military
divisions at the rear to take orders only from him, and on
the same day, September pth, General Krimov's force began
its march upon Petrograd. Finally, already on the evening
of September 8th there took place at Headquarters the final
conference about the nature of the dictatorship (General
Kornilov, Aladin, Zavoiko and Filonenko took part), and
General Kornilov by telegraph invited certain prominent
politicians to come immediately to Headquarters to discuss
" State matters " of extraordinary importance, i.e., to estab-
lish a new Government attached to the dictatorship.

It is clear from this short chronology how energetically
everything was being prepared for the moment of General
Krimov's entry into Petrograd. The measures which I took
simultaneously (on the night of September loth) against
the further approach of Krimov's force led to the complete
failure of the adventure. " As soon as Kornilov realized
that Krimov's expedition had failed he did everything in
his power to prevent that civil war" (page 516), says Mr.
Wilcox, thus in fact recognizing the significance of Gen-
eral Krimov's force in the events of September 8th-i2th.
I am sorry to have harped so long on Mr. Wilcox's inven-
tion of Savinkov's " independent initiative " in the episode
of the dispatch of the Cavalry Corps, " at the disposal of
the Government/' Every one who has read the articles I
am discussing and is now acquainted with my remarks about
them will understand how important it is to determine the
genuine facts which were connected with General Krimov's
name, facts which, thanks to Mr. Wilcox's independent
inventions, remained unknown to the readers of his articles,
which were supposed to be an attempt to facilitate an un-

264 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

derstanding of " the true meaning of the incident/* These
facts destroy every possibility of connecting the summoning
of the troops with any sort of agreement I am supposed
to have made with General Kornilov's party, and at the
same time prove beyond doubt the reality of the quite definite
form of General Kornilov's and his party's activity.

But Mr. Wilcox writes mainly of the, so to speak, intimate
side of my relations with General Kornilov and his party
through V. Lvov (my f< friend ") whom I instructed " se-
cretly" to conduct the negotiations with Headquarters.

"Lvov is a man of eminently mediocre talents, and the role
into which he thrust himself here, on the grounds of his close
personal friendship with Kerensky, was merely that of a messen-
ger, but the effects of his intervention shook the political world
like an earthquake." (Page 504-)

In the first place, there was never any close personal friend-
ship, or even any friendship whatever, or close relations,
between V. Lvov and me. Indeed, not only was there no
friendship, but after the compulsory exit of V, Lvov from
the Provisional Government in July of last year, he was
extremely hostile towards me. He never hid this, and even
declared that: "Kerensky, c'est mon ennemi mortel"
And on September 8th, late in the evening, he said to one
of his friends, in a state of great excitement: <( Kerensky
did not want to be a dictator, so we shall give him one. 1 '
Secondly, V. Lvov never was my " messenger."

" It may be stated here that Kerensky, in his evidence before
the Special Commission, admitted that Lvov went to Headquar-
ters at his request" (Page 505.)

says Mr. Wilcox. Nothing of the kind was said. On
the contrary, when I gave my evidence before the Special

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 265

Commission I declared that even the word " Headquarters ff
was not mentioned during my first conversation with V.
Lvov on September 4th. And that I never sent him with
any instructions and that all this episode consisted mainly
in that V. Lvov, like many others at that time, discussed
the weakness of the Government and suggested to me that
our authority should be strengthened by the inclusion in the
Provisional Government of new elements who had actual
strength in the country. This conversation took place im-
mediately after the Moscow Conference, where the question
had been raised of a closer union between the democracy
and the privileged classes, and therefore this theme of con-
versation was quite natural on V. Lvov's part, all the more
so as precisely at the time there had taken place at Moscow
a political conference of the group of public men with whom
V. Lvov had been in close connection in the Duma. I would
enquire how Mr. Wilcox can affirm that I admitted on
examination that which I never said and which is not in
the stenographic report of my examination which is about
to be published in England? This time Mr. Wilcox is
not guilty of " independent initiative." He is only repro-
ducing a phrase from the forged resume of my examination
which the Kornilovists published in the Press instead of my
original deposition, which was in their hands. Besides this
unsuccessful reference to myself, Mr. Wilcox adds that
Aladin and Dobrinsky the accused m the Kornilov affair
declared that, according to V. Lvov's words: "Ker-
ensky empowered him to negotiate with Headquarters for
the formation of a new Government/' He said that " Ker-
ensky wished the negotiations to be secret, as he feared
that attempts might be made on his life from the side of
the parties supporting him if anything was divulged before

266 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

a definite result had been reached." But Lvov, in spite
of all his " invalid condition/' does not confirm this rub-
bish in any way in any of his depositions. 1

But Mr. Wilcox would probably not have referred to
Aladin and Dobrinsky at all if he had considered the matter
more seriously. He would have realized in that case that
these two gentlemen together with Zavoiko were precisely
the organizers of Lvov's journey to me, first on September
4th for reconnaissance, and later, on September 8th, to
present Kornilov's secret ultimatum. The point is that,
when the conspiracy was sufficiently ripe, when the troops
and Krimov's detachment might enter Petrograd any day,
the organizers of the whole adventure had to find a means
of penetrating to me besides the normal methods of com-
munication between Headquarters and me as Prime Min-
ister and War Minister. At first Aladin personally under-
took the attempt, but I categorically refused to receive him.
Then he tried with equal unsuccess to penetrate to me with
the help of the ex-Prime Minister, Count G. E. Lvov, who,
however, refused to help him in this. But Count G. E.

1 Mr. Wilcox, by the way, so blindly follows his favourite sources of
information that occasionally he falls into quite humorous situations.
Explaining by his invalid condition V. Lvov's "confused and frag-
mentary" declarations, Mr, Wilcox, without any attempt to be critical,
repeats Lvov's words how " his health had been broken and his memory
impaired by a month of solitary confinement in the Dowager Tsaritza's
room at the Winter Palace* where his sleep was continually disturbed
by Kerensky singing operatic roulades in the adjoining apartment"

Could not Mr. Wilcox guess that, even if I had wished to disturb
Lvov's valuable health with my arias, with the enormous amount of
work which occupied me for twenty hours a day and compelled me
the whole time to be with people, I could not have been able to spend
whole nights in the neighbouring room to Lvov's singing u operatic
roulades " there. I assure Mr. Wilcox that, if I had wished to break
Lvov's health in some such manner, I should have placed ten big drums
in Lvov's own room. Really, there should be some limits to human
credulity.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 267

Lvov thought it well to inform me of his uneasy surprise
that, when Aladin received his refusal and was leaving
him, he very significantly asked him to inform me, the
Prime Minister, that henceforward no changes in the com-
position of the Provisional Government ought to take place
without the consent of Headquarters. Aladin and Co. after
this unsuccess decided to make use of V. Lvov, rightly con-
sidering that he, as a Member of the Duma and an ex-
Member of the Provisional Government, could at any time
easily have an interview with me. Thus, on September
3rd, after a conference with Aladin and I>obrinsky in Mos-
cow, Lvov came to Petrograd, and at once, on September
4th, had an interview with me. On September 5th he was
again in Moscow, meeting Aladin and Dobrinsky again.
On the same day he left for Mohilev with Dobrinsky, and
with Aladin's letter to Zavoiko. On September 6th he
reached Headquarters, where he was in the company of the
same Dobrinsky and of Zavoiko, and in the evening he
was able to have an interview with General Kornilov. At
this interview, at the conclusion of which Zavoiko also
was present, he was given instructions by the Commander-
in-Chief. With the first train after this interview with
General Kornilov V. Lvov came to Petrograd, and on Sep-
tember 8th he came to me there almost straight from the
station with General Kornilov's "proposal." This haste
is quite intelligible when one remembers that at this time
General Krimov's detachment was already fairly near to
Petrograd.

But let us admit for a moment that I sent Lvov with
instructions to General Kornilov. With what instructions?
On this question it is impossible to receive any plain and
coherent answer from the people in Kornilov's party. Mr.
Wilcox refers, on page 505, to General Kornilov's state-

268 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ment in his deposition to the Commission of Enquiry, that
Lvov, coming in my name, had only made enquiries, but
that he (Kornilov) himself in reply to these enquiries had
spoken of the necessity of a dictatorship in some form or
another. Meanwhile, on September 9th again, Kornilov
himself told Savinkov on the direct wire that Lvov had
come to him with a proposal from the Prime Minister to
"accept the dictatorship and announce this fact through
the present Provisional Government."

V. Lvov declared in all his depositions that he had pro-
posed nothing in my name, but, in the deposition which
Mr. Wilcox mentions, V. Lvov actually announces that
Kornilov not only did not propose any ultimatum to him,
but that

*' Kornilov submitted to him * no kind of ultimatum/ and what
passed between them was a ' simple conversation/ in the course
of which various desires in the sense of strengthening the Gov-
ernment were discussed."

And yet on the same September 8th Lvov himself confirmed
before a witness that the proposals which he had set out in
writing came direct from General Kornilov. Whence does
this disagreement come between the two parties to the con-
versation? Why does General Kornilov report the same
conversation with Lvov in a quite different way ? Why did
he in the course of time deny his own declaration that I
myself had proposed to him through Lvov a coup d'etat
against myself?

The matter is easily explained. Neither those who sent
Lvov to me, nor'Lvov himself, knew until afterwards that
my conversation with Lvov on September 8th, which they
supposed had taken place between us two alone, had in
actual fact been overheard, unknown to Lvov, by a third

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 269

person. This person, the Assistant of the Director of the
Militia (Police) Department, gave the following evidence
to the juge ^instruction on September gth, the day after
the conversation of Lvov with me. " I happened to be
in Kerensky's room, and intended to leave in view of the
conversation he was about to have with Lvov. But Ker-
ensky asked me to stay and I remained in his room during
the whole period of the conversation. Kerensky brought
with him two documents: first, he read out aloud to Lvov
the tape of the telegraphic direct wire from Headquarters,
which contained Kerensky's conversation with General Kor-
nilov, the same which you are showing me now. And
Lvov confirmed the correctness of the conversation set out
on the tape. Then Kerensky read aloud to Lvov Lvov's
own note, which you are showing me now, and Lvov con-
firmed also the correctness of this document, declaring that
all that was proposed in this note came from General Kor-
nilov. . . . Further, Lvov said that the public and every
one at Headquarters were so roused against Kerensky and
the Provisional Government that General Kornilov could
not answer for Kerensky's personal safety in any place
in Russia, and therefore Kerensky's and Savinkov's jour-
ney to Headquarters was essential; and Lvov on his side
gave Kerensky ' good advice ' to accept and carry out Gen-
eral Kornilov's conditions- Advising Kerensky to fulfil
General Kornilov's demands, Lvov said that General Kor-
nilov offered posts in the new Cabinet of Ministers he was
forming to Kerensky as Minister of Justice and to
Savjnkov as Minister of War and, I think, of Marine."
On September 8th General Kornilov did not yet know
of this witness's account, but afterwards he did know of it,
and this explains the change. But here is the original text
of the document which Mr. Wilcox so disdainfully calls

270 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

"a few detached thoughts/ 1 It is printed on page 106
of the Russian text of my book " The Kornilov Affair " :

"General Kornilov proposes (i) to declare martial law in
Petrograd; (2) to give all the military and civil power into the
hands of the Commander-in-Chief ; (3) the resignation of all
Ministers, including the Premier himself, and the transfer tem-
porarily of control from the Ministers to their assistants until
the establishment of the Commander-in-Chief 's Cabinet. (Signed)
V. Lvov. Petrograd, August 26th (September 8th), 1917."

Thus, if Mr. Wilcox had made use of all the materials, and
not only of the evidence cunningly shuffled by the conspira-
tors, he himself could have shown that Lvov had not simply
" jotted down a few detached thoughts/' but set out in an
accurate form General Kornilov's proposal, that I did not
snatch the document and put it into my own pocket in order
not to give Lvov the opportunity to become acquainted
with what he himself had written, but, on the contrary,
that I read him his document and he confirmed its correct-
ness; that although Lvov was arrested, this was not imme-
diately after his setting out on paper General Kornilov's
proposal, but only after this had been confirmed on the
direct wire by General Kornilov himself.

I would advise the reader now to read again my conversa-
tion on September 8th with General Kornilov on the direct
wire (October issue, pp, 507-508), and to compare it with
these " detached thoughts " of Lvov and with the above
declaration made by our witness who was present with us
during our conversation. Then every one will see plainly
that I had good reason, after all these conversations, to
conclude that Lvov was acting as a plenipotentiary for Gen-
eral Kornilov, and that General Kornilov himself confirmed
to a sufficient degree what Lvov had said to me. " Yester-
day evening during my conversation with the Prime Min-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 271

ister on the direct wire I confirmed to him what I had said
through Lvov," said General Kornilov on September pth
to Savinkov on the direct wire.
Even Mr. Wilcox agrees that

" The Minister-President asked for, and received, a confirmation
of Lvov's message, but neither of the two speakers indicated what
the message was, except so far as the single point of the journey
to Headquarters was concerned."

Thus General Kornilov answers the questions, put in a
conspirative manner, as only a man would answer who
thoroughly knew what significance is contained in these
questions, which would be mysterious for outsiders. One
may ask why Mr. Wilcox did not think it necessary to give
his readers the text of V. Lvov's "detached thoughts/'
Why does he hide in his pocket the little key to my myste-
rious conversation with General Kornilov? By the way,
on page 508 Mr. Wilcox says that V. Lvov was not present
at the apparatus at the time of my conversation with Gen-
eral Kornilov, that he did not know to what abuse his name
was being put, and that afterwards he protested against
the freedom which the Prime Minister had taken with it.
From the evidence given above by the person who was
present at my second conversation with Lvov when I had
in my hands already the tape record of my conversation
with General Kornilov, it is clear that Lvov not only did
not protest against the abuse which I had made of his name,
but on the contrary confirmed the conversation, i.e., he
acknowledged that I had not in my conversation with Gen-
eral Kornilov transgressed those limits which had pre-
viously been arranged between me and Lvov. I had to
hold my conversation with General Kornilov on the direct
wire without Lvov only because the latter arrived nearly

272 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

an hour later than the time we had arranged, and it was
impossible to make General Kornilov wait any longer at
the apparatus.

" ' Before the Special Commission/ continues Mr. Wilcox, ' Ker-
ensky replied that in view of the gravity of the situation ha
felt entitled to make use of this ruse in order to induce Kornilov
to talk more freely than he might otherwise have done."

I never said anything of the kind to the Commission of
Enquiry; I said only what I have just repeated. In this
case Mr. Wilcox has been made a victim of the falsification
of my deposition of which I have already spoken. This
silence of Mr. Wilcox about Lvov's document has served
the same purpose as his act of direct creation in regard to
the " independent initiative " of Savinkov. Because of this
silence about Lvov's document the events of the evening of
September 8th, which saw the beginning of the formal
liquidation of the Kornilov adventure, remain for Mr. Wil-
cox's readers unintelligible and obscure. And Mr. Wilcox,
following his sources, is able to explain the whole liquidation
as a tragic misunderstanding brought about by the unex-
plainable interference of my "messenger," V. Lvov. All
attempts to liquidate this misunderstanding painlessly were
in vain, since the Prime Minister, under the influence of
this evil counsellor Nekrassov, and of the Petrograd Council
of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, after some wavering
refused to hold out the hand of reconciliation to General
Kornilov, and "by the evening of September loth the
breach between Kornilov and Kerensky was complete and
final"

Of course, in reality, this was not at all the case. Lvov's
arrival and the answers given to me by General Kornilov
on the direct wire on the evening of September 8th, in con-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 273

nection with the approach of the Cavalry Corps towards
Petrograd, made the situation absolutely clear to me. Tak-
ing into account all that had preceded and all the serious
information we had about the preparation of a conspiracy,
I had no doubt that only by the most decisive and speedy
measures was it possible to smother at the very outset the
conflagration which was beginning, and to save my country
from the upheaval towards which those short-sighted poli-
ticians and bold adventurers wished to drive it.

On the night of September pth the Provisional Govern-
ment gave me special plenipotentiary powers to liquidate the
revolt. I took immediately the most essential measures in
order to stop the further advance of General Krimov's
force upon Petrograd, and I proposed to the Government
to dismiss General Kornilov from his position and to call
him to Petrograd, etc. Mr. Wilcox declares, on page 510,
that I received on the night of September 9th " full powers/ 1
i.e., that I became in fact dictator, and consequently

" Kerensky must bear the entire responsibility for everything
that was done in the name of the Government during those days.
In particular his appointment as Commander-in-Chief must have
been his own work, and not, as it was officially announced to be,
a Cabinet decision."

The responsibility for all that the Government did in those
days lies upon me, and I am quite prepared to bear it. But
still, I did not ask for full powers for myself on September
9th, nor did I receive the same; but I was given powers
only " to take quick and decisive measures to cut off at the
roots all attempts upon the sovereign power of the coun-
try and upon the civil rights which have been won by the
Revolution," as was stated in my official proclamation to
the population. Therefore my taking over the duties of
Commander-in-Chief was not "my own work/' but was

274 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

the common decision of the members of the Provisional
Government, brought about by special circumstances of
which this is not the place nor the time to speak.

I think that I have sufficiently established the lack of
correspondence between Mr. Wilcox's exposition and the
real events which took place in Russia between September
4th and I4th. Therefore I shall only briefly touch upon
certain other contradictions, the significance of which is by
itself sufficiently plain.

" During the 9th of September, 1 ' says Mr. Wilcox, " Ker-
ensky took no absolutely irretrievable step," but on the
night of September loth, at the time when General Alexeiev,
whom Kerensky asked to resume the Chief Command, came
to know in Kerensky's quarters in the Winter Palace of the
documents about the Kornilov affair, Kerensky "appar-
ently " received the Executive Committee of the Petrograd
Soviet. " We do not know what passed between Kerensky
and the Committee/ 5 continues Mr. Wilcox, but he hints
very plainly that the hostile and uncompromising position
of the Petrograd Soviet after this conference acted disas-
trously on Kerensky's conduct and that the Soviet drove
him to the uncompromising step of publishing the proclama-
tion in which the word " treason " was for the first time
used and applied to the activities of Kornilov. Not only
does Mr. Wilcox not know what took place between me and
the Committee on the night of September loth, but nobody
in the world knows, because no conference between me and
the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet took place
either on the night of September loth or altogether during
the whole time when the Kornilov affair was being liqui-
dated. Not " apparently," but absolutely certainly in this
instance, Mr. Wilcox or his inspirers have consciously de~

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 275

sired to give their suggestions the appearance of actuality.

So far as the terrible proclamation is concerned with the
word " treason/ 1 inspired, forsooth, by the Soviet, " It has
been admitted by Kerensky," says Mr. Wilcox, " that this
proclamation was the work of Nekrassov, the Minister of
Finance, and was sent along the railway lines without the
Minister President's knowledge." According to Vladimir
Bourtzeff, he adds, the text of the proclamation came as a
complete surprise to me.

I never confessed anything of the kind, and here, once
more, Mr. Wilcox is making a quotation from my forged
deposition. The text of my proclamation to the people of
September 9th from first to last was revised by me jointly
with the Minister of Finance, Nekrassov, and, what is more,
there is no word "treason" or declaration of Kornilov
as a traitor in this proclamation. Here is the correspond-
ing place in this proclamation : " Considering that in the
presentation of these demands to the Provisional Govern-
ment in my person there was evidenced the desire of certain
circles of Russian society to take advantage of the serious
position of the country to establish in it a state of Govern-
ment which was contrary to the conquests of the Revolu-
tion, the Provisional Government has thought is necessary
. , ." and there follows a list of measures taken by the
Government and an appeal to the citizens to keep calm.
That is all.

Mr. Wilcox again returns to the question of the disastrous
influence of the Soviet upon me, and hints transparently
why I refused Milioukov and General Alexeiev's request
to allow them to interfere in my conflict with General
Kornilov and to endeavour to bring the opposed sides to a
compromise :

276 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

** Bogdanoff, one of the chief Soviet officials, boasted at a meet-
ing that the Political Department of the Petrograd Soviet, hearing
of the mediation of Alexeiev and Milioukov, k acted with all energy
and prevented any kind of agreement between Kornilov and the
Government/ "

Perhaps Bogdanoff boasted this, although I have never
either heard or read anything about this before. But the
Soviet could not have any influence upon my refusal to allow
Alexeiev and Milioukov to interfere, however much it
wanted to, for the simple reason that when I heard Miliou-
kov's and Alexeiev's request, I refused it on the spot de-
cisively and categorically. " At the same time the Soviets
usurped to themselves many of the functions of Govern-
ment/' states Mr. Wilcox. Yes, indeed, Kornilov's rising,
arousing in the masses a psychology of absolute distrust
for the authorities, resuscitated Bolshevism in the Soviets
and their tendency to usurp the functions of government,
but this happened rather later, and the Government fought
against it the whole time. The liquidation of General
Kornilov's rebellion was conducted by the Provisional Gov-
ernment so independently of all influences that it was pre-
cisely from the side of the Soviet circles that I was re-
proached for not desiring in those difficult days to lean upon
the Soviet and the Soviet organizations. One of the most
prominent democratic leaders and my personal friend ac-
tually reproached me publicly for this, saying that my " head
had been turned '' by power.
At the end of his study Mr. Wilcox says that Kornilov

" wanted to emancipate it [the power] from the illicit and para-
lysing influence of the Soviets. In the end this influence destroyed
Russia, and Kornilov's defiance of the Government was the last
faint hope of arresting the process of destruction."

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 277

This quite corresponds with the first words of Kornilov's
proclamation on September gth where he declares war on
the Government : " Forced to an open rising, I, General
Kornilov, declare that the Provisional Government, acting
tinder the influence of the Bolshevist majority in the
Soviets, . . ." This is an obvious falsehood, since before
the Kornilov rising there had not been a Bolshevist ma-
jority in a single Soviet, and, as it happened, in the time
preceding Kornilov's rising the political influence of the
Soviets was less than at any other time of the Revolution.
In the summer the organs of local government which had
been created on the basis of universal suffrage had begun to
function; the excitement of the first months of the Revo-
lution was wearing off, and the Soviets were losing their
exclusive significance in the life of the masses. This healthy
and normal evolution was acclaimed in the Press by the most
active members of the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviets themselves. The absurd attempt of General Kor-
nilov to force matters to a 'crisis destroyed all this intense
half-year's labour to construct a national machine, and it
again threw the masses on to the path of anarchy and ruin.
Within a week after the Kornilov rising the Soviets were
captured by the Bolsheviks. Then everywhere Bolshevist
majorities came into being, and there began under the
motto " All power to the Soviets " the fatal conflict of the
unbridled masses with statesmanship and order in Russia.

The Kornilov adventure was the prologue to the Bolshe-
vist's coup d'etat. Had there been no September gth, there
would have been no November 7th.

But Kornilov himself loved Russia deeply in his own way,
and it was not bad faith but lack of knowledge and political
experience which urged him upon the disastrous path

278 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

whither certain irresponsible groups of political and finan-
cial jobbers and political adventurers enticed him. Zavoiko,
Aladin, and the rest were only casual people, and with am-
biguous pasts ; behind their backs stood influential anonymi-
ties who at the decisive moment saved themselves, but aban-
doned Kornilov.

Permit me in conclusion to make a somewhat long quo-
tation from a letter of General Alexeiev written on Sep-
tember 1 2th, 1917, to the now new-fledged Gerrnanophil
Milioukov; it throws a bright light behind the screens of
the Kornilov rebellion:

*' * The Kornilov affair was not the affair of a group of adven-
turers, and you know to a certain degree that certain circles of
our society not only knew all about it, not only sympathized with
the idea, but helped Kornilov as far as they could. . . I have
one more question: I do not know the addresses of Vyshne-
gradski, Poutiloff, 1 and the others. The families of the im-
prisoned officers are beginning to starve, and I insist on their
coming to their aid. Surely they will not abandon to their fate
and to starvation the families of those to whom they were linked
by the common bond of an idea and preparation. ... In that
case [i.e., if this demand is not immediately satisfied] General
Kornilov/ General Alexeiev continues, * will be forced to declare
in detail before the court the whole plan of preparation, all the
conversations with persons and groups and their participation,
in order to show the Russian people with whom he was working
what real aim he was pursuing, and how, abandoned by all in
his moment of need, he had to appear before an improvised court
with only a small number of officers/ "

Comment is needless.

A. KEREttSKx,

1 Well-known Russian financiers who stood at the head of a certain
group of Banks. A. K.

A "WHO'S WHO" AND "WHERE'S WHERE"
OF PEOPLE AND PLACES OCCURRING IN
THE TEXT

ALADIN. Member (for the Gov-
ernment of Simbirsk) of the
first Duma. Belonged to the
Toil Party* Acquired popular-
ity and renown through his
speeches in the Duma. On the
eve of the dissolution of the
first Duma, Aladin went to Eng-
land as a member of the dele-
gation sent by the Duma for
the purpose of conveying its
message of sympathy to the
British Parliament, and when
the Duma was dissolved he re-
mained in that country. His
subsequent activity was of such
a character that it changed al-
together the attitude towards
Aladin of his political friends,
so that he soon lost his pres-
tige and even the esteem he
formerly enjoyed in the Russian
democratic and intellectual cir-
cles. During the latter years of
his sojourn in England he even
became the London correspond-
ent of the Novoie Vremia.
Aladin has been formally struck
out from the rolls of the Toil
Party. In the summer of 1917
Aladin returned to Russia.

ALEXEIEV. General, Professor at
the General Staff Academy.
One of the highest military au-
thorities in Europe, Played a
prominent part in the Russo-
Japanese War. During the first

period of the present war, under
the Grand Duke Nicholas as
Commander-in-Chief, General
Alexeiev directed the operations
of the North-western front and
distinguished himself by his or-
ganizing ability and by the skill
with which he managed to ex-
tricate his troops from awk-
ward and critical positions.
After the grave situation of
1915, when the Grand Duke
Nicholas was relieved of the
post of Generalissimo, General
Alexeiev took over the Supreme
Command in the capacity of
Chief of the Staff of the nom-
inal Commander-in-Chief the
late Tsar Nicholas. At the de-
cisive moment of the Revolu-
tion, Alexeiev lent his support
to the Duma and, together with
other generals, advised the Tsar
to abdicate according to the de-
mand of the Duma, The Pro-
visional Government appointed
Alexeiev Commander-in-Chief,
which office he held until the
end of May, 1917. Immediately
after Kornilov's rebellion, Alex-
eiev resumed for a short period
his military activity in the ca-
pacity of Chief of the Staff of
the Generalissimo, Kerensky;
however, he only remained in
this office for a fortnight, when
his place was taken by General
Dukhonin.

279

280

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ALTVATER. Rear - Admiral. In
1916 Altvater, then a captain,
served in the Naval Staff at the
Tsar's Headquarters. In 1917
was attached to the Commander
of the Army Group of the
Northern front. After the Bol-
shevik coup d'ttat, Altvater ac-
cepted service under the Bol-
shevik Government and partici-
pated, in an " expert" capacity,
in the Brest-Utovsk negotia-
tions. After that ignominious
action Altvater continued to
collaborate with Trotsky.

AVKSENTIEV. A leader of the
Social Revolutionary Party. In
1905 was a member of the Pet-
rograd Soviet of Workmen's
Delegates. Was arrested by the
Witte administration in No-
vember of that year, together
with other members of the
Soviet, and deported to Siberia,
whence he escaped and fled
abroad. Until the amnesty of
1917 Avksentiev lived abroad,
chiefly in France, taking an act-
ive part in the life of Social
Revolutionary centres and the
party Press. Not long before
the war, Avksentiev with his
friends founded a paper Pot-
chin ("The Beginning"), an
organ of Social Revolutionary
revisionism, in which he em-
phasized the necessity of bring-
ing Socialist principles into
agreement with the ideas of
State and nationality; he also
struggled against the interna-
tionalist extremism in his party.
During the war, Avksentiev, to-
gether with Plekhanov and other
Russian Socialist supporters of
national defence, started a

paper, Prim ("The Appeal"),
of a sharply pro-war and anti-
German character, which em-
phasized the liberating effect of
the war on Russia and the in-
evitable downfall of the autoc-
racy. On his return to Russia
in the spring of 1917, Aksen-
tiev became one of the foremost
representatives of that wing of
the Social Revolutionary Party
which supported national de-
fence and national interests.
The first Ail-Russian Congress
of Peasants elected Avksentiev
as Chairman of the Central
Committee of Peasants. In
July, Avksentiev became a mem-
ber of the Provisional Govern-
ment as representative of the
peasants' organizations. He
took the portfolio of Minister
of the Interior, in which office
he remained until the begin-
ning of September. The Coun-
cil of the Republic (a sort of
provisional Parliament con-
voked by the Government to sit
until the Constituent Assembly
met) elected Avksentiev its
Chairman. An ardent patriot
and supporter of the national
defence, Avksentiev was a bit-
ter enemy of Bolshevism; it is
no wonder that after their vic-
tory the Bolsheviks sought him
out everywhere and, when at
last they found him at Petro-
grad, imprisoned him in the
fortress of SS. Peter and Paul.
Avksentiev was elected to the
Constituent Assembly by sev-
eral constituencies.

BAGRATTON. Prince. A fighting
general. During the summer of
1917 and the Kornilov rebel-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

281

lion he was in command of the
Caucasian native division (" the
savage division")*

BAGRATUNI. General, Officer of
the General Staff; participated
in the present war. From the
early summer of 1917 until the
Bolshevik coup d'ltat he was
Chief of Staff of the Petrograd
Military District.

BAKU. A town in Transcau-
casia, on the coast of the Cas-
pian Sea; centre of exceedingly
rich oil wells.

BALAVTNSKY. A barrister. A
well-known Moscow public man.
Has taken part for many years
in the revolutionary movement
Belonged to the Social Revolu-
tionary Party, and has been
prosecuted by the police. Has
worked much during the war in
public organizations under the
Provisional Government. Has
been invited by the Ministry of
the Interior to act as one of
the Directors in charge of the
organization of the local ad-
ministrative and police services.

BALUIEV. General. Officer of
the General Staff. During the
summer of 1914 was in com-
mand of a special army on the
South-western (Galician) front.
Later he was appointed Com-
mander of the Western front, in
which office he remained until
the Bolshevik coup d'ttat.

BARANOVSKY. General. Officer
of the General Staff. A fighting
general. Fought in many bat-
tles in the Carpathians and East
Prussia. During 1916 Bara-

novsky was active in the Staff
of the General Headquarters of
the Commander-in-Chief. When
Kerensky became Minister of
War, Baranovsky was sum-
moned by him to Petrograd and
appointed chief of the Min-
ister's military cabinet. In
September, 1917, Baranovsky
exchanged this post for that of
Quartermaster-General of the
Northern front After the Bol-
shevik revolt he was arrested in
Pskov and imprisoned in the
fortress of SS. Peter and Paul,
where he remained for several
months.

BEREDITCHEV. An important Jew-
ish town ; after the retreat from
Galicia it was the residence of
the Headquarters of the South-
western front

BERNADSKY. Professor. Special-
ist on financial questions. Took
part in the liberation movement
of 1905. One of the founders
of the Radical Democratic
Party, which began to grow
after the Revolution and strove
to organize the consistently re-
publican and democratic, al-
though non-socialist, elements
of the Russian urban population.
In July, 1917, Bernadsky was ap-
pointed Deputy Minister to
Nekrassov, the Minister of
Finance; in September, after
the Kornilov rebellion, he be-
came a member of the Provis-
ional Government as the Min-
ister of Finance. After the
Bolshevik coup d'etat, Bernad-
sky was arrested and impris-
oned in the fortress of SS.
Peter and Paul.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

BIKHOV. A small town not far
from Mohilev, where the G. H.
Q. were situated. This town
was selected for the confine-
ment of General Kornilov and
his accomplices up to the time
of their trial. In the first days
after the Bolshevik coup d'etat,
Kornilov and his friends es-
caped from Bikhov to the Don.

BONTCH-BRUIEVITCH. General
Officer of the General Staff.
Was a close collaborator of
General Ruzsky. After the Clat-
ter's retirement he remained
Chief of the Staff of the Nor-
thern front until the beginning
of September. He is a brother
of the writer Bontch-Bruievitch
(a prominent Bolshevik and a
close collaborator of Lenin).
After the Bolshevik coup d'etat
the general, until recently a
zealous servant of the Tsardom,
managed to adapt himself to the
" Communist " Government.
General Bontch-Bruievitch, to-
gether with Trotsky, Krilenko,
and other Bolshevik military
authorities, has had a hand
in all ignominious acts of the
Bolsheviks.

BRUSSILOV. General. One of the
most brilliant fighting com-
manders of the Russian army;
famous for his remarkable of-
fensive in Galicia in the year
1916, which not only proved a
serious blow to the Austrian
army on the Russian front, but
also saved the Italian army
from the (up to then) success-
ful offensive of the Austro-Ger-
mans. Although far from be-
ing equal to Alexeiev in mili-

qualification for his high post,
Brussilov was endowed with
qualities inestimable in an army
leader: initiative, boldness, and
a talent for rousing the spirit
of his soldiers. After the de-
feats of 1915, Brussilov began
to sympathize with the libera-
tion movement, supported the
public organizations in their
work at the front, and, on the
eve of the Revolution, was in
touch with representatives of
the opposition groups of the
Duma. When the Revolution
broke out, Brussilov took openly
and unhesitatingly the side of
the people, thereby preserving
to a considerable extent the
South-western front ^ (Galicia)
from anarchy and disaggrega-
tion. In May, 1917. the Pro-
visional Government, on the ini-
tiative of A. F. Kerensky (who
then accepted the portfolio of
Minister of War), appointed
Brussilov Command er-in-Chief.
Under his direction the Russian
Revolutionary Army took the
offensive on the 1st of July,
1917. It met with a serious
check towards the end of that
month, and General Brussilov,
tired and overworked, was re-
lieved by the Provisional Gov-
ernment of the Supreme Com-
mand, which was entrusted, on
the initiative of A. F. Kerensky,
to General Kornilov. During
the bombardment of Moscow by
the Bolsheviks, Brussilov was
seriously wounded by a piece of
shrapnel penetrating into his
room, and one of his legs had
to be amputated.

BUBLIKOV. Important man of

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

stitute of Ways and Communi-
cations. Was member of the
fourth Duma. When the Revo-
lution broke out, Bublikov, on
an order of the Duma Commit-
tee, occupied with a detach-
ment the Ministry of Ways and
Communications and the Cen-
tral Railway Telegraph, there-
by accelerating the "winding-
up" of the old regime.

DAN (GURVITCH.) -A leader of
the Social Democratic Party
(Mensheviks) ; a publicist;
member of the medical profes-
sion. During the war was de-
ported to Eastern Siberia in the
" administrative manner " (i.e.
without a court trial). From
the first days of the Revolution
was one of the leaders of the
Petrograd Soviet. After Tchk-
heidze left for the Caucasus,
Dan acted as Chairman of the
Central Executive Committee
of the Soviets. Together with
the majority of his party (Men-
sheviks), Dan recognized the
necessity both of continuing the
war and of the Socialist parties
participating in a "bourgeois"
Government, although person-
ally he was far from being a
warm supporter of these prin-
ciples.

DJE SEMITTER. Colonel of the
General Staff. Participated in
the officers' plot. (Particulars
in the book.)

DIBENKO. Sailor of the Baltic
Fleet. Prominent agent of
Lenin and Trotsky at Helsing-
fors. After the Bolshevik coup
d'etat was appointed People's
Commissary of Marine. Among

the Bolshevik agents this igno-
rant demagogue has been con-
spicuous for his impudence and
cruelty. After the Brest-Litovsk
peace he quarrelled with Trot-
sky and started a demagogic
campaign against him in the
navy. He was accused by the
Bolshevik authorities of em-
bezzling public money.

DOLGO'RUKY. Prince. General ;
participated in the present war.
In August, 1917, was in com-
mand of the army corps sta-
tioned in Finland.

DUKHONIN. General One of
the most brilliant amongst the
younger officers of the General
Staff. Took a very active and
important part in the planning
and execution of Brussilov's
offensive in Galicia in 1916. In
the year 1917, Dukhonin, then
Chief of the Staff of the South-
western front, organized the
July offensive. Dukhonin was
endowed with an extraordinary
organizing ability. He was in-
timately acquainted with the
conditions of life of the
common soldiery and under-
stood their mentality, so that
he managed to get on very
well with his soldiers, while
fully safeguarding the authority
and the dignity of a Chief.
Shortly after Kerensky became
Commander-in-Chief, Dukhonin
was appointed his Chief of
Staff. He then proceeded, to-
gether with General Diedrichs
(now commanding the Tchekho-
Slovak troops in Russia), to
work out a scheme for the re-
organization of the Russian
army in order to have its fight-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ing capacity restored by the
spring of 1918. The Bolshevik
revolt put an end to this work
at its very beginning; as to
General Dukhonin himself, he
met a martyr's death at the
very moment of his departure
from his Headquarters after
they had been captured by the
Polsheviks. He was torn to
pieces by an infuriated mob of
Bolshevik sailors, in the pres-
ence of the Bolshevik " military
authorities " Krilenko at their
head w ho looked on without
interfering.

DUTOV. A Cossack. Chairman
of the Council of the All-Rus-
sian Union of Cossackdom.
Has carried on an aggressive
campaign against the Provis-
ional Government-Ataman of
the Orenburg Cossackdom.
Took part in the organizing of
a movement in the troops
against the Provisional Govern-
ment.

ERDELLI. General. An exemplary
Guards officer. During the
third year of the war com-
manded an army at the South-
western front. A typical rep-
resentative of the high military
bureaucracy, who managed to
adapt himself for some time to
the new state of things in the
army. After the Revolution
and before August, 1917, Erdelli
was considered as one of the
liberal generals and a friend of
the elected soldiers' organiza-
tions. However, after the ap-
pointment of General Denikin
to the post of Commander of
the South-western front, Er-

delH sharply changed his policy
and joined the military reaction.

GOBETCHIA. Member of the So-
cial Revolutionary Party; lived
for many years in France as
a political refugee. After the
March Revolution he returned
to Russia and went to the front,
in the capacity first of the
deputy of Savinkov, the com-
missary of the 7th Army, then
of the commissary of that
army.

GOTZ, A. Prominent member of
the Social Revolutionary Pa.ty
and member of the Central
Committee of that party. At
the time of the old regime was
a member of the terrorist or-
ganization of the Social Revolu-
tionary Party. Belongs to that
wing of the Social Revolu-
tionary Party which is clearly
in favour of national defence
(" Oborontzy ") . Supported the
idea of a Coalition Government.
Gotz returned to Russia after
the Revolution from Siberia,
where he was imprisoned with
hard labour.

GUTCHKOV, A. T. A representa-
tive of the wealthy Moscow
merchant circles of old stand-
ing. One of the foremost Mos-
cow Conservative public men.
During the Japanese War,
Gutchkov was the representa-
tive at the front of the Red
Cross. Fought in the South-
African War as a volunteer in
the Boer army. During the
liberation movement of 1905-6,
Gutchkov placed himself at the
head of the bourgeois ele-
ments which opposed that move-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

285

ment. At the municipal and
Zemstvo congresses he always
fought the influence of the
Cadet Party. Was a decided
adversary of any kind of self-
government of the small nation-
alities of Russia. He even was
opposed to an autonomy of
Poland, and approved of Stoli-
pin's hostile policy towards Fin-
land. Gutchkov founded the
" Party of the I7th of October "
(date of the famous Tsar's
Manifesto in 1905), usually
called the " Octobrist " Party.
Gutchkov approved of all the
reactionary measures of the
Government in 1905, and with
his and his party's authority
supported the dissolution of the
second Duma and the illegal re-
strictions of the electoral rights
of the people, enforced by
Stolipin on the 3rd of June,
1907. After this coup d'ttat,
Gutchkov, together with his
party, entered the third Duma,
where he was the leader of the
majority nearly for the whole
time of its existence, and at
one period was the Speaker of
that Duma. As a member of
the Duma, Gutchkov worked
much in the Army and Navy
Commission, and made many a
disclosure concerning the shady
aspects of the military bureau-
cracy. He also struggled
against generals of the type of
Sukhomlinov, and against irre-
sponsible and disastrous inter-
ference of the Grand Dukes in
military affairs. Gutchkov or-
ganized a group of military men
who rallied to him, and thereby
he gained from the Tsar the
name of "Young Turk." In
internal politics Gutchkov ener-

getically supported Stolipin, in
whom he saw a strong weapon
for the purpose of establishing
in Russia a very moderate,
strictly bourgeois constitutional
monarchy. The ever-growing
irresponsible influence of the
nobility and Court circles in the
Government, which was quickly
relapsing into frankly auto-
cratic ways, the servility of
Stolipin himself, drove the very
prudent and cunning Gutchkov
towards the end of the third
Duma into making speeches
in the opposition spirit with
steadily increasing- frequency.
Beaten at the elections for the
fourth Duma in the Moscow
constituency, Gutchkov became
a member of the State Council,
to which he was elected by the
Curia of Industry and Com-
merce. The regime of a Ras-
putin, a Sukhomlinov and a
Stunner reconciled Gutchkov to
the political tendencies against
which he was struggling a short
time before, if it did not bring
him nearer to them. During
the war, being at the head of
the War Industries Committee,
Gutchkov came in touch even
with certain Labour circles.
While travelling at the front,
Gutchkov strengthened his old
connections and established new
ones amongst the High Com-
mand circles, which connections
would have proved extremely
useful in the event of a well
planned and a prudent coup
d'ttat. The outburst of the
Revolution brought confusion
into this game, but at first did
not rebuff Gutchkov, who, not-
withstanding his open monarch-
ism, entered the first Provision-

286

THE PKELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

al Government, naturally as the
Minister for War. Such was
the elementary force of the
pressure of the soldier masses
at the beginning of the Revo-
lution, that it was the lot of
Gutchkov, a Conservative and
a partisan of strictest discipline,
to sanction measures which re-
sulted in destroying that disci-
pline. The trial proved too
much for him, and, foreseeing
what would be the results of
his own decrees, the prudent
and cunning Gutchkov aban-
doned his dangerous post in
good time.

GUTER. General. Was in com-
mand of an army on the South-
western front under Brussilov.
In the spring of 1917, when
Brussilov was appointed Com-
mander-in-Chief, Gutor, upon
the recommendation of the
latter, was entrusted with the
command of the South-western
(Galician) front, which he held
when the July offensive began.
After the German break through
at Tarnopol, Gutor was de-
prived of his command for
reasons explained later in the
book itself, and his place was
taken by General Kornilov.

IAKUBOVITCH. General. A young
officer of the General Staff.
Took part in the Japanese War,
particularly in the defence of
Port Arthur. At the most
critical moment of the Revolu-
tion, lakubovitch, together with
a few other officers of the Gen-
eral Staff, reported to the Revo-
lutionary Committee of the
Duma and put himself at its
disposal for the fight for free-
dom, lakubovitch was ap-

pointed member of the Military
Commission of the Duma, of
which the object was to direct
the local garrison and to settle
questions relative to military
matters, until such time as the
normal activity of the Ministry
of War and of the local mili-
tary institutions was completely
resumed. When Kerensky be-
came Minister of War, lakub-
ovitch was appointed Assistant
Minister of War, in which of-
fice he remained up to the time
of the Bolshevik counter-revo-
lution.

IVERSKAIA. The especially re-
vered ikon of Our Lady
of Iversk, which is kept in
Moscow in a special chapel near
one of the gates of the Krem-
lin. It was the customary pro-
ceeding of the Tsars, when
coming to Moscow, to visit that
chapel on their way to the Pal-
ace in order to pray before the
ikon.

KALEDIN. General. A Cossack.
Took an important part in this
war. After the old rights of
self-government, of which the
autocracy deprived the Cos-
sacks, were restored to them
by the Provisional Government,
Kaledin was elected the first
Ataman of the Don Cossacks,
i.e., head of the executive power
in the territories on the River
Don inhabited by Cossacks.
According to the old Cossack
law, every district is governed
by the "circle," a sort of elec-
ted body with both administra-
tive and legislative functions,
which nominates for a certain
period all the officials, with the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

287

Ataman at their head. On his
entering that office, General
Kaledin became a supporter of
a wide autonomy of the Cos-
sack territory and acquired a
great popularity amongst the
Cossacks. At the Moscow Con-
ference (summoned by the Pro-
visional Government in order
that the critical situation at the
front and in the country might
be discussed by representatives
of the nation), Kaledin de-
clared in the name of the whole
of Russian Cossackdom that
the latter favoured a Republi-
can form of government.
After the Bolshevik counter-
revolution, Kaledin placed him-
self at the head of the anti-
Bolshevik movement on the
Don. Kaledin did not under-
estimate the elementary force
of the anarchist wave which
carried off the whole of the
soldier masses and was even
spreading to the poorer ele-
ments of Cossackdom; he there-
fore acted in a ^very prudent
way, avoiding collision with the
Bolsheviks, which he considered
then premature. This gave rise
to conflicts between Kaledin
and the other leaders of the
movement. In February, 1918,
Kaledin committed suicide by
shooting himself.

KAMENEV (ROSENFELD). A
prominent Social Democrat of
the Bolshevik wing. Propagan-
dist and publicist. For many
years a close collaborator of
Lenin. During the war he car-
ried out a propaganda on Lenin-
ist lines in connection with the
war in Russian Labour circles
and led the Bolshevik group in

the fourth Duma. At the be-
ginning of 1915, Kamenev, to-
gether with the five Bolshevik
members of the Duma, was
arrested and tried for de-
featist propaganda and for par-
ticipation in the Social Demo-
cratic Party. When giving
evidence, Kamenev declared
that he did not in the least share
Lenin's program in connection
with the war. Together with
the Bolshevik deputies, he was
deported to Siberia. After the
amnesty of 1917 he returned to
Petrograd, and on Lenin's re-
turn to Russia, became his
zealous collaborator. He has
always acted in a very prudent
and equivocal way. After the
Bolshevik coup d'etat he was
for a short time one of the
People's Commissaries, i.e,
Lenin's Ministers, as well as
Chairman of the Central Execu-
tive Committee of the Soviet.
However, with his customary
prudence Kamenev soon chose
to accept a diplomatic mission
abroad. He was appointed
"Ambassador" to Vienna, but
on his way there fell into the
hands of Finnish White Guards
and was imprisoned. The first
delegation to Brest-Litovsk in-
cluded Kamenev, but he pre-
ferred to avoid participation in
the second.

KAMKOV (KATZ) . Social Revo-
lutionary. Prosecuted by the
Tsar's Government for his revo-
lutionary work, Kamkov at the
very beginning of his activity
fled abroad and spent there
many years as a political refu-
gee. Graduated at a German
University; then studied in

288

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Paris. During the war joined
the extreme internationalist
wing of the Social Revolution-
ary Party. For some time was
editing in Switzerland a small
paper for Russian prisoners in
Germany. On his return to
Russia after the amnesty,
Kamkov became one of the lead-
ers of the extreme internation-
alist " irreconcilables " of his
party. That wing of the Social
Revolutionary Party was in
practice very near to the Bol-
sheviks, striving as it was for
dictatorship of the proletariat
'and of the labouring peasants,
and for transforming the war
of nations into a social war of
classes. The theoretical differ-
ences between the Left wing
and the Centre of the Social
Revolutionary Party soon led to
an actual split. Even before
the Bolsheviks' coup d'etat the
Left Social Revolutionaries were
everywhere supporting the Bol-
sheviks; after the victory of
Lenin, they openly joined the
Bolshevik movement. Ex-
pelled from the Social Revolu-
tionary Party at the Party Con-
gress in November, 1917, Kam-
kov and his friends declared
that they formed a separate
" Left Social Revolutionary "
Party, and sent their representa-
tives to the Council of People's
Commissaries, i.e., Lenin's ad-
ministration. This co-operation
with the Bolsheviks ceased after
the Brest-Litovsk peace, since
the majority of the Left Social
Revolutionary leaders, includ-
ing Kamkov, did not see their
way to recognize that treaty
and to share with the Bolshe-
viks the shame of it Accord-

ing to latest information (as
yet unconfirmed), Kamkov has
fallen a victim to the Bolshevik
terror for the part he took in
the organizing of Count Mir-
bach's assassination in Moscow.

KARAULOV. A Cossack of the
Tersk region. Graduated at the
Petrograd University. Was a
member of the fourth Duma;
was prominent in local and
Cossack public affairs. When
the right of self-government
was restored to the Cossacks by
the Provisional Government,
Karaulov was elected Ataman
(Head) of the Tersk Cossack-
dom. After the Bolshevik coup
d'etat Karaulov was killed in
a skirmish with revolted Cau-
casian mountaineers.

KARTASHEV. Son of an Ural
peasant; an exceedingly gifted
religious-philosophical thinker.
A deeply sincere believer in
Orthodox Christianity, he
strove, under the old regime,
for a complete liberation of the
Church from the tutelage of
the State, because the latter was
killing the soul of the Church
and had made it a kind of
police institution. Professor at
the Theological Academy of
Petrograd, he was dismissed be-
cause of his religious democ-
ratism. Together with the
well-known writer Merejkovsky
and a few others, who strove
for the regeneration of the
Church, Kartashev founded in
Petrograd the " Society of Re-
ligious Philosophy," where he
has often spoken in defence of
the peasant before the Russian
Intelligentsia, and boldly de-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

289

nounced the servility of the
Synodal Church, pointing out
the necessity of destroying the
autocracy which was ruining
and debauching the Church and
depraving the masses of the
people. It was because he
thirsted after the regeneration
of the Church that this remark-
able religious thinker was
driven to join the active ene-
mies of the autocratic regime.
Being a supporter of the sepa-
ration of the Church from the
State for the sake of the com-
plete freedom of the former,
Kartashev entered the Pro-
visional Government after the
abolition of the office of the
High Procurator of the Holy
Synod, 1 and became the first
Minister of Cults, in July, 1917.
In August of that year Karta-
shev, in the name of the Pro-
visional Government, opened the
All-Russian Church Congress
in Moscow, the object of which
was to establish quite independ-
ently a new and free constitu-
tion for the Orthodox Church
of Russia. At the time of the
Bolshevik coup d'etat Karta-
shev was arrested and impris-
oned in the fortress of SS.
Peter and Paul.

KISHKIN. A member of the
medical profession. A promi-
nent member of the Liberal
opposition. Leader of the Mos-
cow Left Cadets. Took part in
the municipal work of Moscow.
During the war was one of the
founders of the All-Russian
Union of Zemstvos, and, in

1 Under the old r6gime a govern-
ment official with -wide powers to con-
trol the church.

spite of Government opposition,
rendered inestimable services
to the Russian army by organiz-
ing the sanitary department and
supplying the army with clothes
and better food. In his strug-
gle against the autocracy Kish-
kin always strove to unite all
the Liberal, Democratic, and
Socialist parties for the fight
against the common enemy.
During the first days of the
Revolution Kishkin's activity
in Moscow was very important,
in that he united all the revo-
lutionary forces for their com-
mon objects. The old regime
was overthrown in Moscow in
a perfectly painless and blood-
less way. Kishkin was then
appointed Commissary of the
Provisional Government in
Moscow. He remained in that
office till September, 1917, when
he was offered, and accepted,
the portfolio of Minister of
Public Assistance. Kishkin al-
ways enjoyed the full confidence
of wide circles of Russian so-
ciety because of his loyal char-
acter and consistent democratic
activity. During the Bolshe-
vik coup d'etat he was arrested
at a sitting of the Cabinet and
was imprisoned in the fortress
of SS. Peter and PauL

KISUAKOV. General. Military
engineer. Was assistant Min-
ister of Ways of Communica-
tion. Has been attached to the
General Headquarters and was
in charge of all matters con-
nected with transport for
military purposes. Was ar-
rested together with General
Kornilov.

290

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

KLEMBOVSKY. General. Was in
command of the Northern
front during the summer of
1917. After Kornilov's rebel-
lion Klembovsky was relieved
of his command, his place be-
ing taken by General Tchere-
missov.

KOKOSHKIN. Learned historian ;
an authority on public law and
a publicist. Prominent Mos-
cow politician; belonged to the
opposition. One of the found-
ers and leaders of the Consti-
tutional Democratic Party
(" Cadets " the most impor-
tant Liberal party in Russia),
Kokoshkin was elected to the
first Duma, and, when the lat-
ter was dissolved, he signed the
manifesto of Viborg (inviting
the nation to refuse to provide
recruits and to pay taxes, etc.) ,
for which action he was con-
demned to prison and disfran-
chised. Kokoshkir was a
permanent member of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Consti-
tutional Democratic Party. At
the very beginning of the Revo-
lution Kokoshkin, as an author-
ity on the constitutional law,
was invited by the Provisional
Government to preside over an
Extraordinary Legal Commis-
sion attached to that Govern-
ment Later he presided over
the Commission entrusted with
working out the Electoral Law
of the Constituent Assembly.
In July, 1917, Kokoshkin was in-
vited by Keren sky (upon recom-
mendation of the Constitutional
Democratic Party) to enter his
Coalition Cabinet, in which Ko-
koshkin received the port-
folio of State Controller, and

he remained in that office up to
the time of Kornilov*s rebel-
lion. He was elected to the
Constituent Assembly, and in
December, 1917, came to Petro-
grad from Moscow, the nth of
that month being the date (new
style) primarily fixed by the
Provisional Government for the
opening of the Constituent As-
sembly. There Kokoshkin was
arrested by the Bolsheviks
(while on a visit to the Countess
Panm) and imprisoned in the
fortress of SS. Peter and Paul.
With a weak constitution and
suffering from tuberculosis, his
health rapidly declined there,
and his friends succeeded in
having him transferred (to-
gether with Shingarev) to a
private nursing home. There,
on the very night of his ar-
rival and on the eve of the
Constituent Assembly, the suf-
fering Kokoshkin was atrocious-
ly murdered in his bed by the
infuriated Red Guards. Such
was the tragic end of this man,
whose knowledge, impartiality,
and energy were instrumental in
creating the most perfect and
just Electoral Law of the Rus-
sian Constituent Assembly.

KOLOKOLOV. A civil judge.
Member (appointed by the Gov-
ernment) of the Commission of
Inquiry for the Kornilov Af-
fair.

KONOVALOV. One qf the most
important Moscow manufac-
turers, a well-known Liberal
public worker of Moscow.
Was a member of the fourth
Duma, where he belonged to the
Progressive group ; and, during

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

291

the last years, took an active
part in the liberation move-
ment. As a politician Kono-
valov always strove to create
a single wide front in opposi-
tion to the Government, to unite
Liberal, Democratic, and So-
cialist Parties for a joint attack
on the autocracy. After the de-
feat of the Russian armies in
1915, Konovalov participated in
organizing a coup d'ttat which
was then being prepared. Kono-
valov was a member of the
first administration of the Pro-
visional Government, where he
was the Minister of Commerce
and Industry. In June, 1917,
Konovalov resigned that office,
but in September he resumed it
in the last administration of the
Provisional Government, where
he was also Vice-President of
the Council of Ministers. Dur-
ing the Bolshevik coup d'etat
Konovalov was arrested at the
sitting of the Cabinet and re-
mained imprisoned for a long
time in the fortress of SS.
Peter and Paul.

KORNILOV. General. A Cossack,
an officer of the General Staff,
and a fighting officer of excep-
tional bravery. When a young
officer, Kornilov made an ex-
tremely dangerous journey in
Afghanistan for intelligence
purposes. During the present
war he became famous for his
escape from an Austrian pris-
oners' camp. His further activ-
ity is described in this book.
According to reliable informa-
tion, Kornilov was killed during
his struggle against the Bolshe-
yiks.

KOROTKOV. Colonel. A fighting
officer. Member of the Execu-
tive Committee of the Armies*
Group on the Western front.
At the time of Kornilov's re-
bellion Korotkov with a de-
tachment of troops marched on
the Stavka (G.H.Q.).

KOVEL. This town was captured
by the Austro-Germans in 1915,
The attempts made in 1916 to
retake this important strategic
centre were badly organized and
therefore unsuccessful, and cost
the Russian army terrible sacri-
fices.

KOVN<X A first-class fortress, not
far from Vilna, Has been cap-
tured by the Germans, together
with the whole of Its artillery
and immense ammunition stores,
owing to criminal negligence of
the High Command. The Gov-
ernor of the fortress, who left
Kovno at the most critical mo-
ment, has been condemned and
imprisoned with hard labour.

KKCLENKO. Ensign. Participated
in the present war. An active
member of the Bolshevik
Party. In 1905 Krilenko, then
student of Petrograd Univers-
ity, became conspicuous in party
propaganda and was widely
known as a powerful speaker
(under the nickname of " Com-
rade Abraham"). Was tried
for participating in the Petro-
grad Social Democratic organ-
ization. Later Krilenko gradu-
ated at the University and was
in the Civil Service in the prov-
inces. After the Revolution of
1917, Kerensky was elected first
a member, then Chairman, of

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

the Executive Committee of the
nth Army on the Galician
front, where he carried on an
energetic propaganda in favour
of Bolshevism and against the
offensive. After the Bolshevik
rising in Petrograd in July, 1917,
Krilenko was arrested by the
military authorities, but was re-
leased later by the judicial au-
thorities, the evidence against
him being deemed insufficient.
He was appointed Commander-
in-Chief in the first days of the
Bolshevik counter-revolution,
and, with a detachment of sail-
ors and Red Guards seized the
General Headquarters, where
the Chief of the General Staff,
General Dukhonin, was atro-
ciously murdered at the railway
station, under the very eyes and
without the interference of
Krilenko. Even before the
Brest-Utovsk peace, Krilenko
completely destroyed the Rus-
sian army by his ignominious
and treacherous order authoriz-
ing each unit at the front to
conclude a separate armistice
with the enemy, which order
was fully exploited by the Ger-
man Staff. At the critical mo-
ment of the Brest negotiations,
Krilenko, without waiting for
definite information about their
result, ordered the demobiliza-
tion of the army, thereby leav-
ing Russia completely at the
mercy of the Central Powers
and making the German Staff
the unchallenged master of the
Bolshevik Government

KRIMQV. General A fighting of-
ficer. Full particulars in the
book.

KKOKH MAL Barrister. Promi-
nent member of the Social
Democratic Party; elected by
the Central Executive Commit-
tee of the Soviet of Soldiers'
and Workmen's Deputies to sit
on the Commission of Inquiry
for the Kornilov Affair.

KRONSTADT. A fortified city on
the Gulf of Finland. Built by
Peter the Great to protect the
approaches to Petrograd, Kron-
stadt has lost of late its strategic
importance. In the times of
Tsardom there were quartered
in Kronstadt the disciplinary
battalions of the Baltic Fleet,
whither the worst characters of
all the crews were sent for pun-
ishment and correction. There
were also a garrison, docks,
workshops, etc. In 1906 the
Kronsladt garrison responded to
the dissolution of the first Duma
by an unsuccessful rising. When
the Revolution broke out in
1917 most revolting acts of vio-
lence were committed in Kron-
stadt on the officers, mostly by
the punished sailors of the disci-
plinary units. The Commander
of Kronstadt was torn to pieces ;
many officers were murdered;
others were thrown into mili-
tary prisons and kept there in
conditions even more cruel than
those in which sailors had been
kept in the same prison before
the Revolution. Such was the
fury of the sailors* revenge for
the past, that neither the first
Minister of Marine in the Pro-
visional Government, A. T.
Gutchkov, nor the military judi-
cial authorities could do any-
thing to better the lot of their
officers. The situation was only

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

93

altered through the intervention
of the Cabinet, more especially
of Kerensky. The sailors al-
lowed a special commission
delegated by Kerensky to in-
vestigate the position of the of-
ficers and gradually to release
them and to bring them out of
Kronstadt. The unhealthy past
of Kronstadt, the concentration
there of vicious elements of the
navy, of political police-agents
and German spies in great
numbers all this made Kron-
stadt an especially easy prey for
the corrupting Bolshevik propa-
ganda.

KUZMINT. Captain in the Russian
army. Graduated as an engi-
neer. Took part in the Japan-
ese War. During the revolu-
tionary movement of 1905 Kuz-
min placed himself at the head
of the revolted garrison of
Krasnoiarsk (Siberia) and of
the revolutionary municipal au-
thorities. He was sentenced to
death (in his absence) by the
punitive expedition of General
Rennenkampf. He fled from
Russian territory and lived first
in Pans, then on Mount Athos
Later he voluntarily returned to
Russia, surrendered to the au-
thorities, and was sentenced by
court-martial to a long imprison-
ment with hard labour. On his
return to Petrograd after the
Revolution Kuzmin was ap-
pointed, in May, 1917, Deputy-
Commander of the troops of
the Petrograd Military District.
Owing to his revolutionary rec-
ord, Kuzmin enjoyed a great
moral authority among the sol-
diery and successfully fought

against Bolshevik tendencies in
the army.

LEBEDEV. A Social Revolutionary
under the old regime. Organ-
ized and participated in the rev-
olutionary movement amongst
the troops. Prosecuted because
of this activity, Lebedev was
compelled to take refuge abroad
and lived for a long time in
France. After the declaration
of war Lebedev fought in the
ranks of the French army, and
returned to Russia when an
amnesty was granted in Russia
to officers of the French army
who won military distinctions.
After Gutchkov's withdrawal
from the Ministry of Marine,
the new Minister of Marine
(Kerensky) appointed him
Chairman of the Commission for
the purpose of revising the
Statute of the Navy. In that
capacity he resisted with con-
siderable success the excessive
demands of the sailors, a task
which proved to be too much
for the previous Chairman of
that Commission, the Right Oc-
tobrist Savitch Later entrusted
with the administration of the
Ministry of Marine, Lebedev
carried on an energetic struggle
against the Bolshevik defeatist
propaganda amongst the sailors,
and was nearly always busy in
visiting for that purpose the
ships of the Baltic navy. An
enthusiastic patriot and a warm
supporter of the national de-
fence, Lebedev has been com-
pelled, since the Bolshevik revo-
lution, to remain in hiding, as
he is being sought for by un-
disciplined bands of Bolshevik
sailors.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

LEICHITSKY. A fighting general
of old traditions. After the
Revolution it became impossible
for him to serve in the army
tinder the new conditions.

LIBER. A prominent Social Dem-
ocrat (Menshevik). At the
time of the Provisional Govern-
ment Liber was one of the most
active members of the Presi-
dency of the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviet of
Soldiers' and Workmen's Depu-
ties. Member (elected by the
Central Executive Committee of
the Soviet of Soldiers' and
Workmen's Deputies) of the
Commission of Inquiry for the
Kornilov Affair.

LUGA. A provincial town half-
way between Pskov and Petro-
grad, on the Warsaw railway.

LUKOMSKY. General. An officer
of the General Staff; professor
at the War Academy. Has had
a brilliant military career and,
when still a comparatively
young man, was appointed
Deputy-Minister to the Minister
for War, General Polivanov.
When the place of the latter
was taken by General Sukhom-
linov, Lukomsky went into the
army as a divisional commander
and fought with his division in
a number of battles, having
especially distinguished himself
during most difficult operations
in the Carpathians. His double
experience as an administrator
and as a fighting general made
him particularly suitable for one
of the highest posts in the army;
and in May, 1917, Lukomsky

was appointed Chief of the Staff
of the Generalissimo Brussilov,
in which office he remained up
to his arrest in connection with
Kornilov's rebellion.

Lvov. Prince G. A. well-known
Zemstvo worker. Was a mem-
ber of the first Duma. A vet-
eran of the Liberal- Constitu-
tional movement of the Zemstvos.
Was a member of the famous
delegation of Zemstvos and
towns in 1905 which presented
Tsar Nicholas II with an ad-
dress pointing out the necessity
of establishing a constitutional
government. A remarkable or-
ganizer, Lvov created at the
beginning of the war the All-
Russian Union of Towns, and
rendered inestimable services to
the Russian army by creating an
exemplary system of sanitary
institutions and by supplying the
army with food, clothes, and
even with ammunition. All the
best elements of the Zemstvos
rallied around Lvov, and the
Union of which he was the
leader has played an exceedingly
important part in uniting during
the war the enemies of Tsardom
for the fight against the latter.
When the old regime was over-
thrown, Prince Lvov proved to
be the only one whose candi-
dature to the premiership was
unopposed, as both Liberal and
Democratic circles recognized
how greatly he had deserved of
the State, and held him person-
ally in great esteem. After the
Bolshevik rising in July, 1917,
Lvov left the Provisional Gov-
ernment, in which he held office
both as Prime Minister and
Minister of the Interior*

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

295

Lvov, V. N, A big landowner.
Was a member of the third and
fourth Dumas. Belonged to the
parties of the Right. In the
fourth Duma was a member of
the so-called Centre, a small
group consisting mainly of Con-
servative landowners and oc-
cupying a middle position be-
tween the Octobrists and the
Nationalists. When, during the
war, a new Conservative-Liberal
majority was formed in the
Duma, under the name of '* Pro-
gressive Coalition," the group
of the Centre formed its right
wing. Lvov represented that
group in the first Provisional
Government, where, having been
considered in the Duma a spe-
cialist on Church questions, he
was given the portfolio of the
High Procurator of the Holy
Synod of the Orthodox Church.
In July, 1917, Lvov left the Pro-
visional Government and the
office of High Procurator was
discontinued, as being contrary
to the principle of the autonomy
of the Orthodox Church and
hateful to the Church because
of its historical traditions.

MAKLAKOV. A Moscow barrister,
powerful political and courts
speaker, one of the foremost
Liberal politicians. In 1904,
when certain political crimes
were taken out of the jurisdic-
tion of the administrative au-
thorities to be tried by special
courts, and thus the so-called
"political cases" were resumed
in Russia, Maklakov with a few
of his colleagues organized the
Moscow Group of Counsel for
the defence of political crim-
inals. Maklakov was a member

of the Cadet Party, where he
occupied a position on the right
wing. Was a member of the
second, third, and fourth Dumas.
During the war Maklakov was
in sympathy with the coup d'etat
which was then being prepared
In the first days of the Revolu-
tion, before a Provisional Gov-
ernment was formed, the Duma
Executive Committee appointed
Maklakov Commissary of the
Ministry of Justice. In the
summer of 1917 Maklakov was
appointed Ambassador of the
Provisional Government to
France.

MARKOV. General. One of the
younger generals belonging to
the General Staff; a close col-
laborator and adviser of General
Denikin and a permanent Chief
of Staff of the latter. His atti-
tude towards the elected military
organizations contributed much
towards straining the relations
between these bodies and Gen-
eral Denikin. Markov helped to
prepare the Kornilov movement
at the South-western front

MARTOV (ZEDERBAUM) . One of
the oldest Social Democratic
leaders in Russia; publicist. For
many years collaborated in the
leading party organs ; under the
old regime lived mostly abroad
as a political refugee. After
the split of the Russian Social
Democratic Party into Bolshe-
viks (under Lenin) and Men-
sheviks, Martov assumed the
leadership of the latter. During
the war Martov neither shared
the anti-Marxian and extremist
attitude of Lenin towards the
war, nor did he join the sup-

296

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

porters of the national defence
(" Oborontzy ") ; he was the
most important representative
of the so-called "international-
ist" point of view, which may
be described as a sort of ma-
levolent neutrality towards the
war. On his return to Russia
after the Revolution, Martov,
together with a small group of
his friends, adopted in his ar-
ticles an attitude of hostility
towards the Provisional Gov-
ernment and the national demo-
cratic movement of the " oboron-
tzy." During that first period
of the Russian Revolution,
Martov, while keeping in prac-
tice aloof from Lenin's enter-
prises, lent to Bolshevism his
theoretical and moral support,
mostly by his contributions to
the Novoia Jisn, edited by the
famous Russian writer, Maxim
Gorky. After the Bolshevik
coup d'etat Martov became a
bitter opponent of Lenin, Trot-
sky and Co., whom he pro-
claimed the greatest and most
dangerous enemies of the pro-
letariat and of the whole of
democracy.

MILIUKOV. Learned historian ;
late lecturer at the Moscow
University; author of the well-
known works "The Russian
State under Peter the Great/ 5
"Essays on the Russian Cul-
ture/' and others. One of the
founders and the leader of the
Constitutional Democratic Party.
Member of the third and fourth
Dumas. Has taken a prominent
part m the liberation movement
which has been going on in
Russia for the last twenty
years. Actively participated in

the March Revolution (of 1917),
first as a member of the Execu-
tive Committee elected by the
Duma to direct the events, then
as the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the first Provisional
Government After having been
in office for nearly two months,
Miliukov, who supported an
aggressive policy in the ques-
tion of war aims, disagreed with
the views held by the majority
of the members of the Provi-
sional Government upon the
immediate object of the Russian
foreign policy, and at the begin-
ning of May, 1917, he resigned
office. Since then Miliukov has
been in opposition to the Gov-
ernment.

MIRONOV. Sanskrit scholar and a
Social-Revolutionary j ournalist.
Took part in the liberation
movement of 1905-6. Lived long
in Paris as a political refugee.
On his return to Russia col-
laborated in the Academy of
Sciences. In the spring of 1917,
after the Revolution, Mironov
placed himself at the disposal
of the Ministry of War for work
of counter-espionage. He was
the head of the counter-espion-
age department of the Staff of
the Petrograd Military District,
and specialized in the matter of
German influences in the Bol-
shevik Party.

MITAVA (=MITAXJ). The capital
of Courland. Captured by the
Germans at the beginning of the
war. In the winter of 1916 a
Russian offensive took place in
the direction of Mitava, which
was badly organized and un-
successful.

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

29?

MOHILEV. Administrative centre
of the Province (Government)
of Molulev. Was the residence
of the General Headquarters
from the summer of 1915 up to
the Bolshevik counter-revolu-
tion. It was the scene of the
murder of General Dukhonin.
At present Mohilev is in the
hands of the Germans.

MOJAISK. A provincial town, not
far from Moscow.

MUJRAVIEV, Captain. Naval offi-
cer. Participated in the present
war. Muraviev was a flag-
captain attached to the Minis-
ter of Marine, Keren sky.

NABOKOV, V. D 1 . Son of a Min-
ister of Justice under Alexander
the Second; a big landowner;
specialist on penal law. Was a
lecturer upon penal law in the
"Privileged School of Law"
until the time of the liberation
movement of 1905-6, in which
movement he participated as a
publicist and a prominent mem-
ber of the Constitutional-Demo-
cratic Party. Nabokov was a
member of the first Duma and
was sentenced to three months'
imprisonment and deprived of
political rights for having signed
the Viborg Manifesto (which
invited the nation to refuse
levies and moneys to the Gov-
ernment on account of the dis-
solution of the Duma). Pre-
viously Nabokov had been
deprived of his rank at Court
for having published articles
against the Government, more
especially one protesting against
the Jewish pogrom at Kishinev
(1903), After the Revolution

Nabokov was appointed Director
of Affairs to the Provisional
Government, member of a spe-
cial Legal Commission attached
to the Government, and to re-
port on Caucasian affairs.
Later he was appointed mem-
ber of the Senate.

NEKRASSOV. Graduate of Insti-
tute of Ways and Communica-
tions. Member of Tomsk (Si-
beria) in the third and fourth
Durnas, where he was promi-
nent as the leader of the Left
wing of the Cadets, in opposi-
tion to the Right wing under
the leadership of Aliliukov. His
political work began when he
was elected to the Duma, in
whose assembly Nekrassov soon
took his place amongst the fore-
most and most active members
of the opposition and worked
hard in trying to effect a coali-
tion of different groups of the
opposition (Liberals, Democrats,
and Socialists), which coalition
Nekrassov (together with his
political friends) considered
most essential as a preparatory
step towards the struggle for
wresting the power from the old
regime. When war was declared
Nekrassov temporarily aban-
doned politics and went to the
front as the Chairman of the
"Union of Towns." for the
purpose of organizing at the
front hospitals, supply-centres,
baths, etc.

After the terrible defeats of
1915, when the criminal activity
of the Court Camarilla (Raspu-
tin and others) became even
more apparent, Nekrassov re-
sumed his political life and took
an active part in the work of

298

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

the organizations which were
preparing the coup d'etat. The
spontaneous outburst of the
suffering masses in March, 1917,
put an end to the work, and,
instead of an organized coup
d'etat, resulted in a people's
revolution, which for a while
made of the Duma a national
revolutionary centre. The Gov-
ernment created by that centre
naturally included Nekrassov,
who became Minister of Ways
and Communications. During
the first four months of the
Revolution Nekrassov (with a
few others) also represented in
the Government the Cadet
Party. At the beginning of
July Nekrassov went to Kiev
as a member of the Government
delegation for the settlement of
the Ukrainian question. As his
views upon this matter proved
irreconcilable with those of
other Cadet members of the
Government, Nekrassov left
both his party and the Govern-
ment, but shortly afterwards re-
entered the Cabinet as a non-
party politician. He received
the portfolio of Minister of
Finance, and was also appointed
Vice-President of the Council of
Ministers. After the Kornilov
rebellion Nekrassov went to Fin-
land as Governor-General, where
he was still at the time of the
Bolshevik revolt.

NOVOSSILTSEV. A big landowner.
A Zemstvo worker and a poli-
tician. Cadet (Constitutional-
Democrat) of the Right. Was
a member of the fourth Duma,
but resigned his seat a consid-
erable time before the expiration
of his mandate. Upon the

declaration of the war Novos-
siltsev was called to the colours
as a reserve officer. First he
was at the front, then was
transferred to General Head-
quarters, where he took an im-
portant part in organizing the
All-Russian Officers' League.
Was Chairman of the Main
Committee of that League.
After the Kornilov rebellion was
arrested by the Government.

OLDENBURG. Member and Perma-
nent Secretary of the Academy
of Sciences of Petrograd; an
authority on Sanskrit and Budd-
hism. Member of the Central
Committee of the Constitutional-
Democratic Party (Cadets).
Although a brilliant scholar, he
has never kept himself within
the sphere of purely academic
interests; even from an early
age he took an active part in
the liberation movement and has
done all he could to promote the
education of the Russian people.
In July, 1917, Oldenburg was
invited to join the Provisional
Government as Minister of Ed-
ucation.

OMSK. Seat of administration of
the Steppes region of Western
Siberia.

ORANIENBAUM. A small town on
the coast of the Gulf of Finland,
opposite the Isle of Kotlin,
where Kronstadt is situated.
An imperial residence.

POLIVAN-OV. General. Very able
General Staff officer. Was for
some time (in the days of the
third Duma) Assistant Minis-
ter for War. Belonged to the

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

299

officers' circles which rallied to
Gutchkov; and, together with
the latter, carried on a struggle
against Sukhomlinov and his
camarilla. After the debacle of
the Russian armies in 1915 and
the fall of Sukhomlinov, Poli-
vanov was appointed Minister
for War; he tried to meet
Russian society half-way in its
efforts, resisted by the majority
of the Government, to come to
the aid of the army. Polivanov
also tried to organize collabora-
tion with the Duma. In short,
his policy was to a certain extent
a Progressive one. He did not
remain long Minister of War,
because of his differences on
many points with the ever-grow-
ing reaction of Government
circles. After the Revolution
Gutchkov, then Minister of War,
appointed Polivanov Chairman
of the Extraordinary Commis-
sion newly established by the
Ministry of War for the pur-
pose of revising the Military
Code with a view to bringing
it into agreement with the new
revolutionary conditions of life
in the army. This Commission,
which was known as " Polivan-
ov's Commission" and is well
remembered for its disastrous
results, was composed partly of
military officials appointed by
the Ministry, partly of elected
delegates of soldiers' organiza-
tions and representatives of the
Petrograd Workmen's and Sol-
diers' Soviet. Under the influ-
ence of the general atmosphere
in the first period of revolution-
ary excitement, the Commission
imprudently went much too far
in meeting the wishes and de-
mands of the soldiers and the

Soviet's representatives, who
wanted radically to modify the
whole army discipline and the
relations between the body of
officers and the rank and file.
When in May Kerensky became
Minister of War, he stopped the
work of this Commission and
started gradually to wind up the
awkward legacy of its reforma-
tory activities.

PRGNIN. Colonel Officer of the
General Staff. In 1917 served
on the Staff of the Commander-
in-Chief. Was Vice-Chairman
of the Main Committee of the
All-Russian Officers 1 League
(for particulars of which see
book).

PROTOPOPOV. The last Tsarist
Minister of the Interior; big
landowner of the Government
of Simbirsk and an important
manufacturer, supplying cloth to
the army. In 1916 was elected
Marshal of the Nobility of his
province. A retired officer. Was
a member of the third Duma
and Deputy-Speaker of the
fourth Duma. Protopopov be-
longed to the Octobrist Party
and displayed always rather
Progressive tendencies. He tried
to be on good terms with the
moderate and even the extreme
opposition groups of the Duma,
at the same time conserving
very friendly relations with the
bureaucratic circles. When the
Special Commission was formed
for the purpose of inquiring into
the criminal conduct of Sukhom-
linov, the Minister for War,
Protopopov became the repre-
sentative of the Duma on it,
both by election and by appoint-

300

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

ment of the Government. Dur-
ing the war Protopopov became
in lima te with the Rasputin
circles and came under the
patronage of Rasputin. In Sep-
tember, 1916, Protopopov was
appointed Minister of the In-
terior, being designated for that
post by the Rasputin circles and
insistently supported by the
Tsarina. Once Minister of the
Interior, at the very time \\hen
the whole of Russian society,
the Duma, and even his own
party were carrying on a bitter
fight against the crumbling
Tsardom, Protopopov soon for-
got his "Liberalism" and be-
came a docile tool in the hands
of the Court Camarilla. He
rapidly became one of the best
hated men in Russia. After the
assassination of Rasputin, Pro-
topopov tried to keep his posi-
tion by assuring the Tsarina
and her intimates that Rasputin
was in mystical communication
with him, and even that Raspu-
tin's spirit had incarnated in
him. When the Revolution
broke out, Protopopov, who
only with difficulty escaped
lynching, appeared before the
Duma and voluntarily surren-
dered to the revolutionary au-
thorities. Protopopov was re-
cently shot by the Bolsheviks.

PUGATCHEV MOVEMENT (Pugat-
chevst china). Towards the end
of the eighteenth century, during
the reign of Catherine the Great,
pn exceptionally powerful spon-
taneous rising of the peasant-
f crfs broke out in the Urals and
in the Volga provinces. Taking
revenge on their age-long op-
pressors the landlords the

peasant masses everywhere mas-
sacred their masters and burnt
dov/n the estates and plundered
the property of the nobles. At
the head of the mutineers was
an ignorant Cossack, Emelian
Pugatchev, who declared himself
to be the Emperor Peter 1IT
(the husband of Catherine the
Great, who was dethroned by
her and later strangled by one
of her lovers). Violent atj-
archical mass movements are
often called in Russia "pitgat-
chevstchina " after this leader of
the peasants' rising.

PURISHKEVITCH. A militant reac-
tionaA-y. In Plehve's time was
in the Civil Service in the
capacity of olHcial for vSpecial
missions. Publicist. In 1905 he
helped to organize the " Black
Hundreds." A violent anti-
Semite. Participated in the
"League of United Nobility"
and the "Unio*i of the Russian
People." Later created the rival
reactionary " League of Arch-
angel Michael," subsidixcd by
the Government. Punshkevitch
specialized in systematic attacks
on the Universities and on public
men prominent in popular edu-
cation. Was a member of the
second, third, and fourth Dumas,
where he became notorious for
his unbearable and scandalous
behaviour. For some time Pu-
rishkevitch enjoyed exceptional
patronage in the highest govern-
mental circles, when he and his
League and its provincial bran-
ches played the part of a volun-
tary police organi/ation, literally
terrorizing the people by their
espionage and denunciations. Pu-
rishkevilch carried on a violent

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

301

campaign against all non-Rus-
sian nationalities and cults
within the Empire In the
fourth Duma, up^n the declara-
tion of the war, Punshkevitch
stopped his destructive and anti-
public work and displayed con-
siderable energy in his activity
with the Red Cross. Under
pressure of the horrors of the
Rasputin rcgiiiie, Purishkevitch,
although a monarchist, began to
act as an opponent of the re-
gime, and finally participated in
the assassination of Gregory
Rasputin.

RAUPAKH. A colonel. Military
lawyer; member (appointed by
the Government) of the Com-
mission of Inquiry for the Kor-
nilov Affair.

RODZIANKO. A big landowner.
Has been many times elected
"Marshal of the Nobility" of
the provinces where his estates
were situated. During the lib-
eration movement of 1905 he
joined the reactionary forces of
bureaucracy and nobility. At
the time of the first Duma he
was elected by the nobility to
the State Council (the Upper
House). Was a member of the
"Union of the Nobles" which
demanded and obtained the dis-
solution of the first Duma and
directed the reactionary policy
of Stolipin. During the period
of reaction which set in after
the dissolution of the first
Duma, Rodzianko was the lead-
er of liis Government (province)
in the campaign of the reaction-
ary nobility against the Zemst-
vos and against all the acquisi-
tions gained through the libera-

tion movement of 1905. After
the reforms of the electoral law
of the Duma illegally enforced
by Stolipin, when a reactionary
majority was artifically created
by means of a cunal system of
elections, Rodzianko was sent to
the third Duma by the land-
owner curia of the Government
of Ekaterinoslav (Ukraina).
There he joined the Octobrist
Party led by Gutchkov. That
party formed, together with the
Nationalist group, the majority
in the third Duma. The Rus-
sian people remember well the
activity of that majority, tend-
ing to destroy all the cultural
and constitutional gains of 1905-
6; the persecutions of the non-
Russian nationalities of the Em-
pire (Finns, Poles, Jews, etc.),
and finally, its Land Act, con-
trary to the interests of the im-
mense majority of the Russian
peasantry. During the last
years of that Duma, Rodzianko
was elected Speaker. He was
re-elected to the fourth Duma,
of which he also was the Speak-
er during all the five years of
its existence; and, together with
the majority of that Duma,
Rodzianko performed a rapid
evolution towards the Left.
The regime of Rasputin drove
even the most devoted support-
ers of the Tsardoni into the op-
posite camp. The criminal
anti-patriotic activity of the
Court Camarilla during the war
not only allayed the fear of
revolution in the rntnd of peo-
ple like Rodzianko, but actually
convinced them that the Revo-
lution \\as possible, nay, inevi-
table. During the winter of
1916 Rodzianko had even some-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

thing to do with the preparatory
organizing of a coup d'etat.
And so the Revolution did not
take by surprise this former re-
actionary; after a short hesita-
tion Rodzianko, on the after-
noon of February 27th, 1917,
definitely joined the movement,
accepted the chairmanship of
the Executive Committee of the
Duma, and sent to the Tsar
Nicholas the famous telegram
in which he urged him to abdi-
cate. Rodzianko was also a
member of the delegation to the
Grand Duke Michael which pre-
sented the latter with a similar
demand. Having been left out
of the Cabinet of the Provision-
al Government, Rodzianko re-
mained, after the Revolution,
Speaker of the Duma. As the
importance and the authority of
the Duma were rapidly diminish-
ing, Rodzianko went even
more into the shade, and since
then did not take any positive
part in the events. After July,
1917, Rodzianko openly went
over to the opposition to the
Provisional Government and
again passed through a rapid
evolution this time from Left
to Right The political story of
Rodzianko is interesting because
he may be considered a typical
representative of his class,

ROMANOVSKY. General. Officer
of the General Staff. In 1917
was Quartermaster-General at
the Staff of the Commander-in-
Chief. Romanovsky was ar-
rested with General Kornilov.

RXJZSKY. General. Took a prom-
inent part in the war, at the
beginning of which he partici-

pated in the first offensive in
Gahcia; afterwards he was in
command of the Northern army.
For some time Ruzsky has been
very popular in wide circles of
Russian society.

SAMARIN. General. Officer of
the General Staff and a fight-
ing officer. Took part in the
present war. For a time was
Chief of Staff of General Kor-
nilov. Under Kerensky as Min-
ister of War, Sarnarin held the
office of Assistant-Chief of the
Military Cabinet of the Minis-
ter; later he was appointed to
command the troops of the Ir-
kutsk Military District in
Siberia.

SAJT . A river in Eastern Galicia.
There the German army under
General Mackensen effected the
famous break through of 1915,
when Russian troops, lacking
ammunition, almost entirely
without artillery (owing to the
criminal policy of the Minister
of War, Sukornlinov, and
others), were subjected to a
sweeping drum-fire and were
compelled to a hurried retreat
from Galicia. Shortly upon this
retreat, followed the fall of
Warsaw, the retaking by the
Austrians of the first-class fort-
ress of Peremyshi (Przcmysl),
taken by the Russians at the
cost of enormous sacrifices, and
so on.

" SAVAGE " DIVISION. The Cauca-
sian cavalry division formed by
the Tsar's brother, the Grand
Duke Michael, of representa-
tives of Moslem Caucasian
tribes which were exempt from

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

803

conscription. This division con-
sisted of exceedingly brave but
utterly uncivilized mountaineers,
and was commanded by officers
selected by the Grand Duke.
Among these officers there were
many Guards and young men
belonging to aristocratic fam-
ilies. The division was con-
sidered quite " free from infec-
tion " of revolutionary propa-
ganda, and therefore particularly
suitable for carrying out the
plan of the plotters. The di-
vision distinguished itself in
the war by the exceptional bold-
ness of its cavalry charges on
the enemy and by its rather easy
ways with the peaceful popula-
tion.

SAVINKOV. One of the foremost
revolutionaries; member of the
Social Revolutionary Party. A
partisan of terrorism, Savinkov
organized and co-operated in
the most important political
assassinations in Russia
(Plehve, Grand Duke Sergius,
and others). Spent many years
abroad as a political refugee,
and has written during that
period several novels from the
life of revolutionaries, which
enjoyed a great success. On his
return to Russia after the Revo-
lution, Savinkov went to the
Galician front as the Commis-
sary of the 7th Army, to which
post he was appointed by the
Minister of War, Kerensky,
upon a recommendation of the
Central Executive Committee of
the Soviet. There Savinkov
carried on an intense struggle
against the Bolshevik tenden-
cies, and at the peril of his life,
restored discipline in some of

the most debauched regiments.
By that activity Savinkov con-
siderably contributed to the suc-
cess of the offensive on the 1st
of July, 1917, at Brzezany.

When Kerensky became ac-
quainted on the spot with Savin-
kov's work, he appointed him
First Commissary of the Min-
ister of War attached to the
Commander of the Army group
of the South-western front,
thereby creating a new office
with very wide powers. Savin-
kov's activity since that appoint-
ment is described in the book
itself.

SAVITCH. Member of the third
and fourth Dumas. Octobrist.
One of the close collaborators
of Gutchkov. In the Duma he
was considered a specialist on
matters connected with the navy.
Was for some time Chairman of
the Army and Navy Commission
of the Duma. After the Revo-
lution the Minister of War and
Marine (Gutchkov) formed at
his Ministry a Commission simi-
lar to that of Polivanov (g.#.)
at the Ministry of War, and
appointed Savitch to act as its
Chairman.

SELIVANOV. General. A fighting
general. During the July of-
fensive was in command of an
army corps; then was in com-
mand of an army at the Galician
front.

SHABLOVSKY. Military - Naval
Prosecutor (Procureur) Gener-
al; Chairman of the Extraor-
dinary Commission of Inquiry
for the Kornilov Affair. Under
Tsardom, Shablovsky was a

804

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

prominent barrister who special-
ized in the defence (mostly in
the Baltic provinces) of per-
sons prosecuted by the Tsar's
Government on account of their
revolutionary and political activ-
ity.

SHINGAREV. Member of the
medical profession. Was promi-
nent in the Zemstvos both as
medical man and as Zemstvo-
Councillor. Publicist. After
having 1 graduated at the Uni-
versity, Shingarev gave up his
University career and settled in
the country in order to treat
peasants. Shingarev took part
for many years in the Zemstvo
and liberation movement. He
was a member of the second,
third and. fourth Dumas. Was
a member of the Cadet Party,
vice-chairman of its Duma
group and a member of the Cen-
tral Committee of the party.
In the third Duma he special-
ized in questions of finance. In
the fourth Duma he also worked
much in the Army and Navy
Commission, and later became
its chairman. He was a popu-
lar speaker in the Duma. After
the Revolution Shingarev be-
came Minister of Agriculture,
and then Minister of Finance.
He left the Government at the
beginning of July, together
with other representatives of his
party, because of their differ-
ences with the Government on
the Ukrainian question. Under
Shingarev as Minister of Agri-
culture were laid the foundations
of the radical agrarian reforms.
Having been elected to the Con-
stituent Assembly in November,
1917, Shingarev came to Petro-

grad in time for the date fixed
by the Provisional Government
for the convocation of the As-
sembly the 28th of Novem-
ber. On the eve of that day
Shingarev, together wilh Ko-
koshkin Ctf.?'.), was arrested by
the Bolsheviks and imprisoned
in the fortress of SS. Peter
and Paul. Transferred to a
private nursing home on the
day before the dissolution of the
Constituent Assembly, the suf-
fering Shingarev was atrocious-
ly murdered in bed by the Bol-
shevik guards.

SKOBELEV. Descendant of schis-
matic peasants (Molokani) who
were in past time deported to
the Caucasus. Son of an im-
portant Baku trader. Was edu-
cated at the Vienna Polytechni-
cal Institute. A social Demo-
crat (Menshevik), Skobelcv
when still a young man was
elected to the fourth Duma by
the Russian population of
Transcaucasia. Joining the So-
cial Democratic group in the
Duma, Skobelev by his frequent
speeches and questions on im-
portant, occasions came to the
foreground and acquired a wide
reputation. Skobelev did not
remain within the bounds of
party activity, and participated
in the general opposition and
revolutionary movement, not
beins afraid of co-operating
with the bourgeoisie. Skobelev
took a most intimate part in
the Revolution from the first
day, and when the Pctrograd
Soviet of Workmen and Sail-
ors' Delegates had been formed,
he was elected its Vice-Chair-
man. In the Soviet Skobelev

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

305

always energetically supported
the necesssity of national de-
fence and of a co-operation of
the Revolutionary democracy
with the Liberal bourgeoisie, if
the country and the Revolution
were to be saved. In the
month of May Skobelev became
a member of the first coalition-
al Provisional Government as
the head of the then created
Ministry of Labour, in which
office he remained up to the time
of Kornilov's rebellion.

SOLDAU. A town in East Prus-
sia, near which was routed the
Russian detachment under Gen-
eral bamsonov, whereupon Rus-
sian troops began a disorderly
retreat in the autumn of 1914.

STCHEGLOVITOV. A prominent re-
actionary politician of the last
years of Tsardom. A lawyer
and a well-known specialist on
penal law. Stcheglovitov up to
1906 always emphasized his
liberal ideas and independence
of the governmental influences.
When (in the late 'nineties and
first years of 1900) Stcheglovi-
tov was High Prosecutor (Qber-
Procuror) of the Criminal
Court of Error (Cassation) of
the Senate, he even gained the
nickname of the " Red Procur-
eur," because of his bold actions
in defence of the law courts and
courts statutes. During that
period Stcheglovitov was a con-
tributor (together with most of
the prominent jurists in oppo-
sition to the Government) to
the judicial review The Law,
which carried on an energetic
struggle against the autocracy.
After Stcheglovitov had been

appointed Minister of Justice, in
the time of the first Duma and
before the dissolution of the lat-
ter, he strove to keep friendly
relations with its Constitution-
al Democratic majority. The
dissolution of the Duma and
the decisive victory of the
Stolipin reaction at a stioke
transformed the "Red Pro-
cureur" into one of the black-
est heroes of the last ten years
of Tsardom. Stcheglovitov lit-
erally " burnt all that he used to
adore, and adored all that he
used to burn." Like all rene-
jgades, Stcheglovitov tried to
make people forget his old sins ;
thus, he knew no bounds in his
jeering mockeries at justice and
humanity. Being one of the few
clever ministers educated in
statesmanship among the many
ignorant high dignitaries of the
last period of the old regime,
Stcheglovitov became the source
of ideas and inspirations to the
Government reaction; and he
was clever at giving political
and civili2ed appearances to the
wildest enterprises of the Black
Hundreds He protected assas-
sins hired by reactionaries from
a judicial prosecution; shut his
eyes to the fact that torture
was being employed during in-
quiries into political crimes;
and under his rule the judicial
authorities manufactured false
documents for the purpose of
concocting evidence to convict
the enemies of the autocracy.
He hunted down the independ-
ent Press and all the non-Rus-
sian nationalities of the Empire,
more especially the Jews, Poles,
and Finns. The crowning
"judicial" achievement of this

306

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

renegade jurist was when he
used the barbarous mediaeval
judicial procedure, which he
had introduced, for the purpose
of manufacturing evidence
against Beiliss, the. Jew accused
of a ritual murder of a Chris-
tian boy. Stcheglovitov actu-
ally succeeded in destroying all
justice in the courts of Tsarist
Russia, and thereby contributed
perhaps more than anybody else
to the fall of Tsardom. In spite
of all those efforts, however,
this former Liberal always re-
mained somewhat suspect to the
pillars of the Court reaction;
and so Stcheglovitov's dream
of becoming Prime Minister
was never realized. In 1916,
he retired from the Ministry of
Justice and was appointed Presi-
dent of the Slate Council. He
was the first of the Tsar's digni-
taries to be apprehended (on the
first day of the Revolution, at
his house by a group of citi-
zens), and was brought to the
Duma and handed over to Ker-
ensky, who had him arrested in
the name of the Revolutionary
Authority. Recently Stche-
glovitov has been shot by the
Bolsheviks.

STKUVB. Professor, learned

economist, publicist and philo-
sopher. Collaborated with
Plekhanov and Lenin. Tn the
'nineties Struvc was one of the
foremost followers of and au-
thorities on Marxian doctrines
in Russia* lie wrote the first
manifesto laying down the pro-
gram of the Russian Social
Democratic Party, and actively
contributed to the first successes
of that party both among the

Intelligentsia and in Labour
circles Later, he lost faith in
the philosophical and political
ideas of Marxism and left the
Social - Democratic Party.
Struve then took a prominent
part in the idealist (neo-Kan-
tian) movement, \vhieh at that
time \vaj> rallying a considerable
part of the Russian Intelligent-
sia. At the same time in poli-
tics lu* joined the Lilieials, He-
fore tlif liberation irovement of
1 005, Struve went to Stuttgart,
where he edited a Russian news-
paper, O&volwjdcmc ('* Libera-
tion"), devoted to propaganda
against the Tsardom and in
favour of a parliamentary con-
stitution for Russia, In spite of
all measures taken by the
Tsarist police, that periodical
was brought into Russia in
groat numbers by the agents of
the *' Union of Liberation/' a
very large Liberal-Democratic
secret organisation which arose
in Russia towards the cud of
the last century for the purpose
of carrying on a .struggle against
the TsardonL This union ab-
sorbed and organized all the:
non-Socialist elements among
the Intelligentsia, the Xemstvo
and municipal workers, scientists
and writers* There 1 is hardly a
single prominent public man in
Russia who 1ms not been at
some time a member of this
secret society. The paper edited
by Struve abroad was its secret
organ* In i<p$, after the
famous Manifesto of the i?th
of October, when open imlitical
work became possible in Russia,
the "Union of Liberation " fell
to pieces, its main body form-
ing the Cadet Party, while its

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

307

Right wing joined the Octobrist
Party, and its democratic ele-
ments were dispersed among dif-
ferent Socialist parties. On his
return to Russia after the i7th
of October, Struve became a
prominent Constitutional Demo-
crat and a member of the Cen-
tral Committee of that party.
He waft a member for Petrograd
of the second Duma. In his
evolution from Social Democ-
racy to Liberalism, Struve
reached the Right wing of
the Constitutional Democratic
Party, passed through it, and
was working with the political
dements occupying a position
still further Right who may be
described as Liberal-Conserva-
tives, Being an ardent support-
er of the centralist idea, Struve
was rather hostile to the aspira-
tions of the non-Russian na-
tionalities. After the Revolution
of 1917, Miliukov, then Minister
of Foreign Affairs, placed
Struve at the head of the new-
ly formed Economic Depart-
ment of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, lie was also very
active in the High Council of
lu-onomics attached to the Pro-
visional Government, and later
was a member of the Provision-
al Council of the Republic
( Provisional Parliament). At
present Struve is a leader of
the monarchist movement in
Russia*

STXTTCHKA. A Lett barrister, a
violent Bolshevik. After the
Bolshevik coup d'etat Stutchka
took a very active part in the
destruction of the Russian ju-
dicial machinery. The absurd
and barbarian " courts" estab-

lished by the Bolsheviks have
received m Russia the contempt-
uous nickname of "Stutchka's
courts."

TARNOPOL. A town in Easlern
Galicia. It was near that town
that the Austro- German troops
succeeded on the ipth of July
1917, at the very moment of the
Bolshevik revolt in Petrograd,
in breaking through the Rus-
sian front, whereupon the Rus-
sian army was compelled to
evacuate Galicia. This retreat
was of such a character as to
remind one of many episodes of
the catastrophic retreat of the
Russian army at the time of the
old r?g\me in 1915.

TCHEREMISSOV.- General. Profes-
sor at the War Academy. One
of the ablest officers in the Rus-
sian army, who, however, did
not enjoy the general confidence
of the Staff circles, owing to
his somewhat hesitating policy.
At the critical moment of the
Bolshevik revolt. Tcherernis-
sov, then at Pskov (south-east
of Petrograd) , in the capacity
of the Commander of the Nor-
thern front, adopted a passive
attitude, and thereby contri-
buted, perhaps unwillingly, to
the success of the revolt.

TCHERNOV. One of the founders
of the Social Revolutionary
Party ; Chairman of its Central
Committee; publicist As a
political refugee has spent
many years abroad, in France,
and especially in Switzerland.
On his return to Russia after
the Revolution he became (in
May, 1917), member of the Pro-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

visional Government as Minister
of Agriculture, in which office
he remained until the Kornilov
rebellion, when he joined the
opposition, demanding the for-
mation of a homogeneous So-
cialist Government. Before the
Bolshevik coup d'etat Tchernov
carried on a personal campaign
against Kerensk3 r , trying to in-
duce his party to come to an
agreement with the Bolsheviks
and occupying a somewhat am-
biguous position towards the
question of the continuance of
the war.

TCHERNOVITSI ( CzERNOVICH ) .

The capital of the Austrian
Province of Bukovina.

TERESTCHENKO. Belongs to a
well-known Russian family of
very wealthy sugar-refiners. A
gentleman of independent
means Terestchenko from the
beginning of the war devoted
himself entirely lo work in pub-
lic organizations at the front;
he was one of the creators of
the Military Industrial Commit-
tees which, after the debacle of
1915, took the initiative in re-
equipping the Russian army
While working at the front and
in those public bodies, Terestch-
enko was driven to believe defi-
nitely in the necessity for a coup
d'ttat. His wide social connec-
tions, which included military
circles, made it possible for
Terestchenko to do considerable
work in that direction. When
the Provisional Government was
being formed, Prince Lvov,
Chairman of the All-Russian
Union of Zemstvos, who was
himself marked out for the post

of Prime Minister, proposed
(together with several other
persons) that Terestchenko
should be made Minister of
Finance Thus Terestchenko
became a member of the first
Revolutionary Government,

where he was the only one who
had never before been elected to
a Legislative Chamber. After
Mihukov left the Government,
Terestchenko accepted the port-
folio of Minister for Foreign
Affairs, in which office he re-
mained until the Bolshevik coup
d'etat. Having been arrested
by the Bolsheviks at the sitting
of the Cabinet, Terestchenko
was imprisoned m the fortress
of SS. Peter and Paul, where
he remained for several months.

TROTZKY ( BRONSTEIN ) .Well-
known Social Democrat; propa-
gandist and publicist. A re-
markable demagogic speaker.
During the Resolution of 1905
he was a member of the Pctro-
grad Soviet of Workmen's Dole-
gates, then formed for the first
time. Trotzky was among those
Labour leaders who contributed
much to the defeat of the first
Russian Revolution by their ex-
tremist watchwords and their
irreconcilability. Having been
arrested, together with the other
members of the Soviet, on an
order of the Government of
Count Witte, Trotzky was, with
the others, sentenced to be de-
ported to Siberia, whence he es-
caped and fled abroad. Until 1917
Troteky lived in different Euro-
pean centres and took an impor-
tant part in the Russian Social-
Democratic movement, where he
stood for a middle course be-

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

809

tween the Mensheviks and the
Bolsheviks. During the present
war Trotzky joined the militant
Socialist Pacifists, being espe-
cially hostile to England. The
Revolution of 1917 found him in
America, whence he returned in
April to Russia, via England
and Sweden. Profiting by the
full freedom reigning there,
Trotzky, who knew how to re-
main prudently in the back-
ground until the right moment,
carried on a tenacious and ut-
terly unscrupulous struggle for
power, together with Lenin.
The ill-fated Kornilov rebellion
exasperated the workmen and
soldiers and drove them, from
supporting a Social Revolution-
ary and Menshevik Government,
into the arms of the Bolsheviks
and Anarchists; thus the road
was opened for Trotzky to the
chair of the Petrograd Soviet
After this Trotzky began openly
to work for an armed rising and
the disorganization of the de-
fence of the country. It is most
characteristic of the man and
his kind that, while preparing a
dictatorship and the dissolution
of the Constituent Assembly,
the Bolshevik demagogues, with
Trotzky and Lenin at their
head, adopted as their war-cry
the immediate convocation of the
Assembly and the alleged resist-
ance to it of the Provisional
Government; similarly, the de-
struction of Russia's military
power was started in the name
o the " Revolutionary Organisa-
tion by Workmen and Soldiers
of the Defence of Petrograd,' 1
which the Provisional Govern-
ment began to evacuate in order
(the Bolsheviks pretended) to

surrender it to the Germans.
With the chairmanship of the
Petrograd Soviet begins a new
period of Trotzky's activity, not
yet concluded and intimately
connected with the terrible and
treacherous work of Lenin and
his collaborators.

TRUBETZKOY. Prince G. N. Diplo-
mat Supporter of an active
policy in the Balkans. Has been
Russian Minister to Serbia, then
was Director of the Near East
Department in the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs. One of the
close collaborators of Miliukov
at the time when the latter was
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Later, when that office was taken
over by M. I. Terestchenko,
Trubetzkoy became head of the
Diplomatic Department attached
to the General Staff, which of-
fice he relinquished after Kor-
nilov *s rebellion.

TSERETELLI. A Georgian (of
Georgia in the Caucasus). One
of the leaders of the Social-
Democratic Party (Menshe-
viks) His speeches in the sec-
ond Duma in 1907 gave him a
wide renown. That Duma was
dissolved by Stolipin after a
life of a few months, and on an
order of the Government the
whole of its Social-Democratic
faction was committed for trial
on a false charge of organizing
an armed mutiny of the troops.
Together with several of his
comrades, Tseretelh was con-
demned by the Imperial Court
to imprisonment in Siberia with
hard labour, and he was only
liberated and returned to Rus-
sia after the amnesty pro

310

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

claimed by the Provisional Gov-
ernment. On his arrival in
Petrograd in April 1917, Tsere-
telli became one of the beloved
leaders of the Russian democ-
racy and the guiding leader of
the Soviets A very decided
defender of the necessity of
continuing the war for the sake
of the national defence, and an
honest supporter of the idea of
a coahtional government based
upon the co-operation of the
Liberal, Democratic and Social-
ist Parties, Tseretelli, became
in May, 1917, a member of the
first Coahtional Cabinet as
Minister of Post and Telegraph,
and later as Minister of the In-
tenor. At the beginning of
August, Tseretelli relinquished
office, because it was highly
necessary for him to concen-
trate his efforts in directing the
policy of both the Petrograd and
the Central Soviets and in the
struggle against the Bolshevik
agitation.

TUMANOV. Prince. Officer of the
General Staff. In the very first
days of the Revolution Tumanov
reported at the Duma, together
with a few other officers of the
General Staff, and placed him-
self at the disposal of the people
for the struggle against the
autocracy. Was a member of
the Military Commission of the
Duma, which during the transi-
tion period of the revolutionary
days played the part of the Su-
preme Military Authority and
restored order in the Petrograd
garrison. Was Assistant Mini-
ster of War during Kerensky's
office at that Ministry. During
the Bolshevik counter-revolution

Tumanov was atrociously tor-
tured to death in the street, and
his body was thrown into the
Ekaterminsky Canal.

UKRAINTSEV. A colonel. Mili-
tary lawyer, member (appointed
by the Government) of the Com-
mission of Inquiry for the Kor-
mlov Affair.

VASSILKOVSKV. General. A Cos-
sack. Participated m the pres-
ent war After the July Bolshe-
vik rising was appointed Com-
mander of the troops of the
Petrograd Military District.

VELITCHKO. General. Professor
of military engineering; a well-
known specialist. In 1917, Ve-
litchko was at the head of all
engineering troops and organiza-
tions at the front.

VERDEREVSKY, Rear- Admiral. A
remarkable naval officer. Served
first in the Black Sea then in
the Baltic. After the Japa-
ese War, Verdcrevsky i.ook a
very active part in the work of
recreating and reorganizing the
Baltic Fleet. He was a mem-
ber of the Staff of Admiral
Essen. A few months before
the war, he retired from the
service on his own initiative.
After the declaration of war
Verderevsky returned to the
Baltic Fleet, where he was
placed in command first of a
cruiser, then of the first cruiser
squadron, and afterwards of the
submarine division comprising
the British submarines on Rus-
sian service. At the moment
when the Revolution broke out,
Verderevsky was at Revel,

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

311

where a considerable part of the
Baltic Fleet was concentrated;
he directed the events in the fleet
in those days, and has done
much to maintain order and
peaceful relations between of-
ficers and men. The Minister
of Marine, Gutchkov, appointed
him Chief of the Staff of the
Baltic Fleet; later, in May 1917,
he was appointed by the then
Minister of Marine, Kerensky,
Commander of the Baltic Fleet
Verderevsky held this post at
the time of the first Bolshevik
rising (July, 1917) . Under
pressure of the sailors, who were
in sympathy with the Bolshe-
viks, he refused to carry out
the orders of the Provisional
Government to send a destroy-
er squadron to the Neva to fight
the mutineers. The Provisional
Government then ordered Ver-
derevsky to come to Petrograd,
to be arrested and tried for high
treason.- A judicial inquiry
which took place immediately
established that Verderevsky's
real motive in his act of open
insubordination towards the*
Government was his wish to
save the officers of the Baltic
Fleet from being lynched by the
sailors, and to maintain to some
extent the fighting capacity of
the fleet. When all the circum-
stances of the affair were cleared
up, the inquiry against Verderev-
sky immediately ceased. After
the Kornilov rebellion Verderev-
sky was appointed Minister of
Marine.

VERKHOVSKY. General. A young
officer of the General Staff.
Before the revolution of 1905,
when a pupil of His Maj-

esty's Own Corps de Pages,
he was sent to the army as a
private, because of his sympa-
thy with the liberation move-
ment. He participated in the
Japanese War and was awarded
the soldier's Cross of St.
George. Took part in the pres-
ent war After the Revolution
Verkhovsky participated in the
organization of the Central
Executive Committee of the
Black Sea Fleet, an elected body
where the sailors worked in
harmony with the officers, and
for a long time conserved the
discipline* organization, and
fighting capacity of the Black
Sea Fleet. In May 1917, Verk-
hovsky was promoted colonel
and given a command on a fight-
ing sector of the front. During
the same month he was ap-
pointed Commander of the
Moscow Military District, where
he remained up to the Kornilov
rebellion, after which he was
appointed Minister for War.
Not long 1 before the Bolshevik
coup d'etat Verkhovsky, with-
out being authorized by the
Provisional Government, de-
clared in the Army and Navy
Commission of the Council of
the Republic that it was neces-
sary to conclude peace immedi-
ately, for which declaration he
was de facto relieved of his
ministerial duties and was or-
dered to depart immediately
from Petrograd " on leave."

VIRUBOV, V. V. An ex-officer.
Was active in the Zemstvos.
One of the close collaborators of
Prince Lvov in the organizing
of the All-Russian Union of
Zemstvos, A Moderate Liberal,

THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

but an active adversary of autoc-
racy and the dynasty. Took an
important part in the libera-
tion movement of the last years.
During the war Virubov stayed
nearly always at the front as a
representative of the All-Rus-
sian Union of Zetnstvos, He
has studied thoroughly the needs
and conditions of army life.
When Kerensky was Command-
er in Chief, Virubov was ap-
pointed Assistant of the Chief
of his Staff for civil matters.

ZARUDKV. Son of the famous
collaborator in judicial reforms
under Emperor Alexander II.
Himself a prominent jurist,
Zarudny retired from the bench
as a protest against its reaction-
ary policy and went over to
the bar, where he soon be-
came prominent. A remarkable
speaker, Zarudny in 190.1 was
continually travelling all over
Russia in order to defend in
civil and military courts hun-
dreds of political criminals, i.e,
active opponents of the autoc-
racy. By his energy he saved
many of them from the gallows
or imprisonment with hard la-
bour, and revealed the crimes
of Stcheglovitov's "justice/'
Immediately after the revolution
of 1917 Kerensky invited Zarud-
ny to the post of First Assistant
to the Minister of Justice.

Zarudny was entrusted with the
direction of the legislative work
at the Ministry* and prepared a
series of reforms in the spirit
of the noble traditions of the
judicial reformers of the 'six-
ties, among whom his father
had been prominent In the
summer of 1917, Zarudnv be-
came Minister of Justice, in
which office he remained until
September, 1917.

ZAVOIKA - A character- sketch of
Zavoiko \vill be found in til.,
text of the book.

ZENZINOV, V. Prominent revolu-
tionary journalist. Leading
member of the Central Commit-
tee of the Social Revolutionary
Party. Partisan of terrorism in
the time of the old regime. Be-
longs to that wing of the Socis?!
Revolutionary Party which is
clearly in favour of the nation
al defence ("Oborontsy ") ; sup
ported the idea of a coalitionai
government, i c. based upon the
co-operation of the labeial,
Democratic and Socialist Part-
ies. Zenzmov returned shortly
before the Revolution from
" Russkoic Usstic," his place of
exile iu Siberia, a little village
situated to the north of the
Polar Circle, on the coast of tin
Arctic Ocean, where he spent
five years.